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Far-reaching reforms are influencing every aspect of governance within the People’s 
Republic of China, including in its criminal justice system. Against this backdrop, this 
thesis critically considers current concerns regarding torture and other ill-treatment in 
China. It assesses to what extent persistent allegations of ill-treatment of detainees 
indicate endemic practices; examines the effectiveness of nascent torture prevention 
measures and identifies the factors that may enable resilience of abuse. Overall, it 
investigates whether torture prevention is effective within the PRC legal framework or 
whether it can become so on the current reform trajectory.  
To do so, the thesis sets out the scope of available legal protections against torture and ill-
treatment in China, and assesses these in light of international law requirements so as to 
identify protection gaps and broader obstacles to prevention. The analysis examines these 
through the lens of three different justice processes: the criminal, administrative and Party. 
These are representative of China’s wider criminal justice system and the different routes 
through which persons can be deprived of their liberty. 
The analysis finds that while the criminal justice system is becoming more regulated, even 
here protection gaps remain. In the administrative and Party justice processes, almost all 
key safeguards against torture are missing: these remain legally ‘grey’ spheres. All three 
justice processes thus fail to protect every category of detainee and torture and ill-
treatment continue. The thesis identifies the key factors contributing to the resilience of 
torture and ill-treatment in China and the required reforms. The analysis concludes that 
while China is taking significant steps towards preventing torture and ill-treatment, these 
have insecure foundations and suffer from fundamental deficiencies that can only be 
addressed by further legal, structural, institutional and political reform. This China case 
study can provide valuable lessons for other countries where ill-treatment has become 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
Modern China has been described as a country of paradoxes; it is the world’s largest purchaser of 
Louis Vuitton products and second only to the United States in number of Lamborghini 
‘supercars’ imported annually,1 yet it has had the word ‘luxury’ banned from its billboards and 
has an official government policy that targets excessive spending by its civil servants. 2 
“Reform/revolution” (gai ge) is underway in China, with the dual aims of strengthening economic 
progress and development while at the same time ensuring national stability and security.3 Indeed, 
China’s One-Party State, with its guiding philosophy of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 
has been undergoing ideological and structural change since the start of Xi Jinping’s rule in late 
2012.4 Far-reaching and deep-seated reforms are changing all parts of the governance model in 
China,5 including its legal system.6  
As the Chinese legal landscape begins to change, there is some early reform of its criminal and 
justice laws. Emphasis on strengthening the precept of the ‘rule according to the law’ (although 
not necessarily ‘rule of law’)7 has been established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership as a priority, as evident in the recent Party Plenums and Five-Year Plans.8 Reforms 
include the strengthening of protections available to detainees and prisoners, added into the 
revised Criminal Procedure Law in 2012, and other laws governing the criminal, administrative 
and Party justice spheres. 
                                                     
1  E. Osnos, The Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2014). 
2  Personal conduct of officials is regulated by the CCP Discipline Regulations, 中国共产党纪律处分条例, Central Committee of 
the CCP, 21 October 2015, Article 126: ‘Where luxurious lifestyles, hedonism, or the pursuit of vulgar interests causes a 
negative impact, a sanction of a warning or serious warning is given; where the circumstances are serious, a sanction of removal 
from internal Party positions is given’ [sic]; See also R. McGregor, ‘What if Xi Jinping succeeds in restructuring the economy 
and strengthening the CCP?’, in ‘China’s Core Executive, Leadership styles, structures and processes under Xi Jinping’, (ed. S. 
Heilmann and M. Stepan), Mercator Institute on China Studies (‘Merics’) Series on China, Vol. 1 June 2016; See also Osnos, 
The Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China, (2014); Author’s interview with Mr. Y (name 
anonymised by request), Chinese national and teacher, Strasbourg, April 2016. 
3  October 2015, 授权发布:中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第五次全体会议公报, Official Communiqué of the Fifth Plenum 
of the 18th Party Congress.  
4  President of the People's Republic from 14 March 2013 to the present; General Secretary of the CCP, 15 November 2012 to the 
present. 
5  See Thesis Chapter 2, Section 2.2 ‘Political and governance models in China’. 
6  See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 ‘The Chinese criminal justice system: an overview’. 
7  See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 and Chapters 2 and 4. 







On the other hand, there is significant tightening of State control, a gradual concentration of 
power afforded to the Central (top-level) CCP. The priority is social and economic development 
for all of China’s citizens, with a focus on strengthening the middle classes and narrowing the 
inequalities and gaps between the very rich and the poor. To achieve this, the Chinese authorities 
consider social stability and countering public disorder a pre-requisite.9 There is a tangible shift in 
power structures under Xi. The CCP has, since 2012, concentrated on increasing centralised 
power by reigning in the discretion afforded to local governments, procurators and judicial 
bodies.10 This has manifested itself in a raft of reforms, including to the justice sphere. China 
scholars argue that these are yet another avenue to strengthen centralised power by limiting the 
broad discretion afforded to local bodies.11 If anything, the ‘iron fist’ of the State is hardening.12  
Progressive reform and consolidation of power may appear paradoxical, yet China scholars argue 
that the reform of certain areas does not always equate to the conferring of greater human rights’ 
protections for all persons. Persons perceived by the authorities to have the potential to undermine 
national stability, jeopardise security or challenge the status quo, can be considered as obstacles 
to the State’s priority of achieving smooth and ‘harmonious’ economic progress.13 China scholars 
note that Xi’s rule builds on traditional factors of stability (improvement in material living 
standards, Leninist institutions of control, economic progress and development). 14 Yet, they also 
point to ‘powerful sources of fragility’15 that undermine the CCP’s claim to power (economic 
pressures, authoritarian political control and lack of alternative voices, powerful factional 
groupings, etc.). China is at a significant crossroad between providing more robust legal 
protection for those suspects of run-of-the-mill crimes (within the criminal-law justice process), 
and the gradual tightening of control over other groups of people perceived to have the potential 
                                                     
9  See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 ‘Political and governance models in China’. 
10  See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 ‘Political and governance models in China’. 
11  A. Saich, ‘Controlling political communication and civil society under Xi Jinping’, Merics China Series Vol. 1, June 2016; V. 
Shih, ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after the 19th Party 
Congress?’ in Merics China Series Vol. 1 June 2016; A.L. Ahlers and M. Stepan, ‘Leadership Structures and Processes Top-
level design and local-level paralysis: Local politics in times of political centralisation’, Merics China Series, Vol. 1, June 2016. 
12  See Thesis Chapter 2, Section 2.2 ‘Political and governance models in China’. 
13  See Thesis Chapter 3. 
14  S. Heilmann, B. Conrad, M. Huotari; ‘Scenarios for political development under Xi Jinping’s rule’, Merics China Series, Vol. 
1, June 2016; V. Shih, ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after 
the 19th Party Congress?’, Merics China Series, June 2016. 
15  Heilmann, Conrad, Huotari; ‘Scenarios for political development under Xi Jinping’s rule’, Merics China Series, June 2016; 
Shih, ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after the 19th Party 






to jeopardise national stability and security. 16  An extra layer of complexity is that of 
implementation of the law; while the letter of the law may be strengthening on paper, there are 
significant concerns as to whether this translates into actual implementation and practice.17 From 
an international human rights’ law (IHRL) perspective these raise various concerns and provide 
significant context for the examination of torture prevention undertaken in this research. 
*** 
With this backdrop in mind, this analysis focuses on the current state of torture and other ill-
treatment in China. The key concern remains that there is a persistence of allegations of torture 
and other ill-treatment – despite some judicial reform – and that this may be indicative of an 
embedded or endemic practice of torture and other ill-treatment. From an IHRL ‘torture 
prevention’ perspective, this provides considerable scope for analysis. Here is a country that, 
despite a raft of legal reform to prevent torture, is still showing signs indicative of resilient torture 
practices. When some reforms are initiated to regulate and decrease the risk of torture in one area, 
other loopholes appear to circumvent protection.18 Equally, it is possible that legal reforms are 
also being ignored in practice.19 Thus, the current situation in China provides significant scope for 
detailed examination of the degree of implementation and effectiveness of nascent prevention 
measures. Is the current governance model conducive to, or does it afford, the right foundation for 
torture prevention initiatives to operate properly, as per their design and intent? Put more simply, 
is torture prevention working within the current legal framework in China, and can it do so on the 
current reform trajectory? These are questions that directly link to the safety of China’s detainees. 
Overall, there is a need to assess how safe detainees are in some of China’s most common types 
of detention. 
                                                     
16  See Thesis Chapter 2, Section 2.2 ‘Political and governance models in China’. 
17  See Thesis Chapter 3; See also J. Rosenzweig, F. Sapio, J. Jue. T. Biao and E. Pils, ‘Comments on the 2012 revisions of the 
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law’, in M. McConville and E. Pils (Eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in 
China, (Cheltenham, UK and Massachusetts, USA: Edward Elgar, 2013); I. Belkin, ‘China’s tortuous path toward ending 
torture in criminal investigations’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013); E. Nesossi, S. Biddulph, 
F. Sapio, and S. Trevaskes, ‘Opportunities and Challenges for Legislative and Institutional Reform of Detention in China’, in 
Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (eds. E. Nesossi, S. Biddulph, F. Sapio, and S. 
Trevaskes)(London and New York: Routledge, 2016); S. Biddulph, ‘Rights in the new regime for treatment of drug 
dependency’, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013). 
18  See Thesis Chapter 3. 






Ultimately, one overarching question needs to be answered: given the current trajectory of reform, 
may the risk of torture be expected to change over the next 10 years that, more or less, define Xi’s 
CCP leadership term? This study examines and weighs evidence to support two possible 
hypotheses. A positive answer would find that gradual change is likely to affect the sphere of 
torture prevention in China and that reforms, while nascent, will provide robust and sustainable 
protections to detainees (i.e. yes, China can provide a framework under its current governance 
model to protect detainees from torture). The negative answer would find that despite reforms, the 
risk of torture remains high and the protections remain insufficient or ineffective and will likely 
remain so – resulting in an unsafe environment for detainees (i.e. no, China cannot and, in the 
balance of probabilities, will not be able fully to protect all detainees from torture). If this is the 
case, the research will identify what may need to change to ensure that prevention can work 
effectively, and the extent of the required change(s). 
To address this question and provide evidence to support one of the above positions, the 
following specific questions will be examined: 
(i) What is the current system in place to protect detainees from, and prevent, torture and 
other ill-treatment? What is the scope of the available protections? 
(ii) Where are the protection gaps? Is it a matter of ‘plugging the gaps’?  
(iii) Are acts of torture or other ill-treatment still occurring in places of detention, despite 
protections, and on what scale? Is the current preventive approach effective and 
sustainable? 
(iv) If considered endemic, why does it remain so? What are the obstacles preventing 
effective prevention?  
(v) What, if anything, needs to change to ensure prevention is as full and effective as 
possible in China? 
These questions will be examined through the lens of a cross-selection of different justice 






law enforcement officials; whether by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) (Police) or Party 
investigation units; as this sphere carries the greatest risk of torture both in China20 and more 
generally.21  
Equally, any analysis of the prevention of torture necessitates examination of the overall criminal 
justice system, from initial custody and investigation to sentencing procedures and due process. 
This is to assess compliance with due process guarantees and safeguards. These regulate and 
provide for the proper treatment of, and adequate conditions for, detainees at all stages of their 
deprivation of liberty. Together, these safeguards and guarantees are sometimes referred to as 
‘transparency’ safeguards;22 designed to ensure that detainees are not held in an opaque space, 
subject to an non-transparent, unregulated or opaque justice process, but instead have access to, 
and oversight from, others who are external to the place of detention23 to help reduce the risks of 
torture.24 
This thesis selects three justice processes that can result in a person’s deprivation of liberty by 
law-enforcement as a compulsory measure. They are used as a lens through which to analyse 
China’s torture prevention measures and progress. These comprise:  
a) the criminal law justice system; primarily the investigatory period of initial 
custody and then remand in police-run detention (the Kanshousuo (KSS)),25  
b) two types of administrative justice, the de jure punitive administrative justice 
system (investigation and sentences of administrative offences resulting in 
administrative detention (Punitive Administrative Detention or ‘PAD’)), and the 
de facto administrative drug enforcement system, resulting in the administrative 
sanction of Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation (CDR), and 
                                                     
20  See Thesis Chapter 1. 
21  See Thesis Chapter 1. 
22  Author’s discussion with Professor Sir Nigel Rodley, Supervisor of this research, on his views on groupings and categorisation 
of preventive safeguards, August and September 2016. 
23  See Thesis Chapter 1.  
24  See Thesis Chapter 1; See also, in particular, paragraphs (para.) 8, 11 to 13 of ‘the Provisional statement on the role of judicial 
review and due process in the prevention of torture in prisons’, adopted by the UN SPT at its sixteenth session, 20 to 24 
February 2012, CAT/OP/2, October 2012. 
25  The scope of this research does not include the prison system, as this is run separately from PSB responsibility in China (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3 ‘The Chinese criminal justice system: an overview’). However, those held on remand under criminal law 
in China can spend many months detained before and after the decision of procurators in a KSS, before coming before a judge 






c) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system of detention by CCP Investigation 
and Discipline Committees, for the purposes of investigation and discipline for 
Party infractions, including an investigatory process known as ‘shuanggui’.26  
These have been selected as representing a cross-section of China’s justice processes and 
detention types. These vary from the most common (pre-trial detention pursuant to the criminal 
justice process), to less common types of quasi-judicial processes that are administrative and lie 
outside of the criminal law sphere. All three processes involve detainees being held in police or 
Party custody or detention, pursuant to a decision taken by an administrative body, without the 
approval from a judge. All involve extended periods of time in police or Party custody and 
detention. Two types of detention, administrative and Party, remain administrative in nature 
throughout the investigation and sentencing process, and comprise an initial period of time in 
police and/or Party custody and then a potential administrative sanction of detention. 
  
                                                     






A. Why China? 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in some ways an unlikely focus for a study on the 
prevention of torture, not least because of the continuous flow of reports of torture and ill-
treatment in Chinese detention.27 The criminal justice system and its reforms have been covered 
extensively by scholarly literature. 28  Equally, cases of torture in China have been well 
documented and examined by China scholars. 29  China has started to develop some torture 
prevention measures, yet very few scholars document or publish analysis on this.30 There also 
remains little to no scholarship, from an international law perspective, on China’s first steps in 
torture prevention and on its fulfilment of its IHRL obligations in this regard. 
More generally, there is relatively little scholarship on torture prevention and on its impact and 
effectiveness globally.31 Similarly, there is scarce literature available on how governance models 
and legal systems in One-Party or autocratic states can affect the effectiveness of torture 
                                                     
27  See Chapter 3.  
28  See, inter alia, E. Nesossi, S. Biddulph, F. Sapio, S. Trevaskes. J. Rosenzweig, C. Lei, N. MacBean, ‘Legal Reforms and 
Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016); See S. Lubman, J. Cohen, J. Rosenzweig, E. Pils, M. McConville, F. 
Sapio, S. Biddulph, Chen Weidong, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, (2013); I. Belkin, ‘China’s 
tortuous path toward ending torture in criminal investigations’, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, (2013); 
S. Biddulph, Legal Reform and Administrative Detention Powers in China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); F. 
Sapio, Sovereign power and the law in China, (Brill, 2010); E. Nesossi, ‘China's Pre-trial Justice: Criminal Justice, Human 
Rights and Legal Reforms in Contemporary China’, in Law in East Asia Series, (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2012); Fu Hualing, 
‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice 
in China (2013); Chen Guangzhong, ‘Issues in the Reform of China’s Public Prosecution System against the Backdrop on New 
Revisions to the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, (2013); S, 
Lubman, ‘Bird in the Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao’, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and S. Lubman, 
‘Concluding Observations’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013); See also Thesis Chapter 2.  
29  See, inter alia, W. Wu and T. Vanden Beken, ‘Police torture in China and its causes: a review of the literature’,  Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology, Vol. 43(2010); Z. Guo, ‘Exclusion of illegally obtained confessions in China: an 
empirical perspective’, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, Vol. 21, no. 1-2, (Sage); C. Guangzhong, G. Zhiyuan, 
‘Some issues on the implementation of exclusionary rule of illegally-obtained evidence: An empirical perspective’, 
Jurisprudence Journal, 2014, 9: 1–16; J. Daum, ‘Tortuous progress: Early cases under China’s new procedures for excluding 
evidence in criminal cases’, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2011, 43(3): 699–712; He 
Jiahang and He Ran, ‘Wrongful conviction and tortured confessions: empirical studies in mainland China’, in Comparative 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, (2013); See also Thesis Chapters 2 and 3. 
30  A notable exception is the work of Renmin University Professors Chen Weidong and Cheng Lei; See Chen Wei Dong and T. 
Spronken, Three Approaches to Combatting Torture in China, (Intersentia 2012), as well as Thesis Chapters 2 to 4, for more 
details.  
31  See work by M. Evans in the field torture prevention, including M. Evans and R. Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); R. Morgan and M. Evans, Protecting Prisoners: the Standards of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture in Context, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); M. Evans and R. Morgan, ‘Getting to grips with 
Torture’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51 (2002); See also N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under 
International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009 (3rd ed.) and ‘Reflections on working for the prevention of Torture, 
Essex Human Rights Review, Vol. 6 (2009); R. Murray, E. Steinerte, M. Evans, and A. H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to 
the UN Convention Against Torture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011); R. Carver and L. Handley, Does Torture 
Prevention Work?, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016); C. Giffard and P. Tepin (eds.), The Torture Reporting 






prevention work in particular, as opposed to their impact on human rights’ compliance or torture 
prohibition more generally.32 This research touches upon all these areas, through the lens of China. 
There are various further reasons to examine China’s torture prevention obligations. First, China 
is not alone in having potential protection asymmetries in areas of its justice system. Second, 
China is a country undergoing a period of significant change and is reforming many of its core 
operating structures, as well as revising many of its laws, including within its criminal justice 
system. It is, therefore, a good time to examine China’s compliance with its torture prevention 
obligations and assess its evolution.33  
Equally, an analysis of China from a ‘prevention’ perspective could be pertinent to other states 
with similar governance structures and facing similar evolution challenges. Systemic obstacles 
that may be hindering effective torture prevention in China may also similarly be impeding 
progression in other countries, even if their contexts differ. Thus, there is scope for a renewed 
focus on China in the context of torture prevention more generally. Some aspects drawn from this 
analysis of torture prevention through the lens of China may prove useful for the overall scholarly 
discourse on the trajectory of development of torture prevention internationally. 
China has a range of different justice processes and detention types, some more comparable 
globally than others. Torture and ill-treatment occurring in initial police custody is not unique to 
China; that it may constitute a pattern or entrenched culture of police torture practice based on a 
‘confession-based culture’ would be less common, but also is not unique to China. To cite just 
one example, Russia, too, has been found by international treaty and monitoring bodies to have a 
pattern of systemic ill-treatment by the police embedded in its places of initial custody.34  
China’s punitive administrative legal system and detention process is more unusual. However, 
China is again not unique in its use of punitive administrative detention as a parallel legal system 
                                                     
32  See, for example, S. Karstedt, ‘Does democracy matter? Comparative perspectives on violence and democratic institutions’, in 
European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 12: 4; O.A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties make a difference’, in Yale Law 
Journal 111 (2002); D. Rejali, Torture and Democracy’, (Princeton University Press, 2007); J. Hollyer and B. Rosendorff, ‘Do 
Human Rights Agreements prolong the tenure of Autocratic Ratifiers?’ New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, 44 (2012); See also Thesis Chapter 4. 
33  See Thesis Chapter 2. 
34  HRC, Concluding Observations on Russia 2015, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, para. 14; CPT, Report to the Russian Government on the 






to the criminal justice system. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Uzbekistan all 
also provide examples of countries that use punitive administrative detention. IHRL bodies have 
highlighted the risk that this parallel justice process may serve to bypass stricter and more 
regulated procedural safeguards in their criminal law systems.35 Consequently, there has been a 
trend to reduce of the use of punitive administrative detention in police stations (and transfer 
detainees to prison) and to decrease the length of time persons can be held on administrative 
offence grounds by the police in some post-Soviet legacy countries (for example, Moldova, 
Russia and Lithuania). 36  Nevertheless, other countries (such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) 
appear to be extending their use of punitive administrative detention and its scope.37 Thus, the use 
of punitive administrative detention continues in some countries and this aspect of the China case 
study could provide some useful learnings on some common problems typically associated with 
this administrative justice process. 
Further, scholarly critique and the IHRL mechanisms’ (United Nations and regional treaty bodies, 
special procedures and international courts established to interpret areas of IHRL law) 
examination of administrative justice in China has, until recently, focused mainly on the Re-
education through Labour System (RETL), 38  as one of the more extreme forms of punitive 
administrative detention. Other forms of detention (such as administrative sanctions pursuant to 
administrative offences governed by the public order laws) and wider forms of administrative 
detention, such as Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation (CDR), have been subject to less extensive 
                                                     
35  See, for example, European Prison Rules (EPR), Rule 10.2; CPT Report on its visit to Moldova, CPT/Inf (2016), 16 para. 13; 
CPT Visit report on Armenia, CPT/Inf (2016) 31, para. 12; CPT visit report on Georgia, Georgia: Visit 2014 CPT/Inf (2015) 
42, paras. 24 and 115; Azerbaijan, Appendix I, para 13, in CPT/Inf (2017) 12; HRC on Israel’s use of punitive administrative 
detention: CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, para. 7 and CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 10; the WGAD, No. 43/2014 (Israel), Communication 
addressed to the Government on 16 September 2014, concerning Ahmad Ishraq Rimawi. 
36  CPT Report on its visit to Moldova, CPT/Inf (2016), 16 para 13; CPT Visit report on Armenia, CPT/Inf (2016) 31, para. 12; 
CPT visit report on Georgia, Georgia: Visit 2014, CPT/Inf (2015) 42, para 24 and 115. 
37  See, inter alia, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, Uzbekistan, which highlights increasing administrative arrests such 
as the cases of Umida Akhmedova, sentenced to administrative detention for protesting at an embassy and administratively 
arrested; detention and fines for Christians who conducted religious activities contrary to administrative offences, such as illegal 
religious teaching; see also US Department of State 2012 Report on Uzbekistan, highlighting that the authorities use 
administrative measures as alternatives to criminal sentences for non-violent offenders; See also M. Bayram, ‘Uzbekistan: 
Harshened Criminal and Administrative Code punishments’, Forum 18, 15 June 2016, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/57617da64.html [accessed 30 August 2016] highlighting the case of journalist Sergey Naumov, 
who was sentenced to 12 days’ administrative detention for “petty hooliganism” on 21 September 2013.  
38  See Biddulph, Legal Reform and Administrative Detention Powers in China, (2007) and ‘What to make of the abolition of re-
education through labour?’, in Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016); See also the CAT 






analysis.39 This is not helped by the fact that a considerable amount of primary legislation remains 
in Chinese only, and is thus generally less accessible to Western scholarship, (where this is the 
case and is relevant for this thesis, the author has translated the relevant regulations).  From a 
‘torture prevention’ standpoint, the relative lack of focus on certain areas of administrative justice 
is pertinent given the risks associated with the less-regulated systems in which they operate.40  
Many of the institutions and legal structures in China are Soviet-inspired and retain a post-Soviet 
legacy. As similar legacy structures can be seen in the former Soviet states, some of the lessons 
from an analysis of China may also be pertinent for some of these countries. One such area is the 
relationship between the rule of law and effective torture prevention. This research seeks 
critically to assess, through the lens of China, the extent to which prevention can operate 
effectively in states that are governed by a One-Party system or ones that have aspects of their 
legal systems and governance models that lie outside of a Rule of Law system. 
Further, China may not be alone in having its torture prevention efforts affected by its 
institutional set-up or governance model. Interviews with experienced monitoring experts, such as 
those at the UN Sub-Committee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) and scholars in this area,41 point to a growing sense of the need for a 
different and broader approach to the more traditional measures of torture prevention (i.e., 
ensuring safeguards are legally robust and operational in practice) for countries with embedded 
systemic torture and that repeatedly ignore or reject recommendations for change.42 This also 
links into wider questions about the impact of some elements of torture prevention, such as 
preventive monitoring and the wider discussions underway by all bodies involved – national, 
                                                     
39  See Thesis Chapter 3; See also Biddulph, ‘What to make of the abolition of re-education through labour?’, in Legal Reforms 
and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016) and M. Lewis, Statement of M. Lewis, ‘China’s pervasive use of 
torture’, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 2016, Congressional Committee testimony; 
For definitions, see ‘Categorisation of detention types’ (Thesis General Introduction) and Thesis Chapter 2, Section 2.3 ‘The 
Chinese criminal justice system: an overview’. 
40  See Thesis Chapters 3 and 4. 
41  Author’s interviews and correspondence with: S. Casale, former President of the CPT and SPT (September 2017); M. Amos, 
member of the SPT (June 2012 and September 2017); M. Kelly, Vice President of the CPT (August 2017); P. Muller, CPT 
Staff, (July 2017). 
42  See, for example, author’s interview and correspondence with M. Amos, SPT member, (June 2012 and September 2017); See 
also the CPT, which, for example, has held High level Talks with Azerbaijan (16 and 17 February 2017). The objective of the 
talks, was to discuss the state of co-operation between the CPT and the Azerbaijani authorities and, in particular, the 
implementation of the CPT’s long-standing recommendations concerning law enforcement agencies, prisons, psychiatric 
hospitals and social care homes (http://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-holds-high-level-






regional and international – on opportunities to improve prevention work.43 China has not been 
the subject of a detailed analysis from an IHRL ‘preventive’ standpoint and this research aims to 
address this and may offer wider lessons in this respect. 
Thus, while the primary focus is on China, this analysis raises broader questions and highlights 
wider implications that may apply to torture prevention work in other countries that may be 
facing structural impediments to their prevention efforts. 
B. Research structure and scope  
Part I of the thesis lays out the framework for the later analysis of the context of China. Chapter 1 
examines the nature of the obligation of torture prevention, its scope under international law, the 
universal and treaty obligations to prevent torture and other ill-treatment and the range of 
prevention measures required under IHRL. It also examines how the prevention measures 
interrelate, assesses questions of effectiveness and considers how far the legal prevention 
obligation should reach. Chapter 1 identifies and then groups together various core measures of 
prevention that later serve as elements to be assessed in each detention type in the later chapters. 
Part II assesses China in the context of the current state of its torture prevention measures. First, 
the research examines China’s legal system and recent developments in its torture prevention 
efforts (Chapter 2). To start with, the criminal justice system is examined, to provide a yardstick 
by which to compare the (less reformed and less common) administrative and CCP justice 
processes. Each of the three justice processes are assessed in turn, to understand the status and 
scope of prevention measures available in each type, and to identify differences in the protections 
available.  
Second, the current nature and scope of torture and ill-treatment in the three detention settings are 
examined, to assess the scale of torture in practice and the risk of torture in each type of detention 
                                                     
43  See Thesis Chapter 1; the Author also conducted interviews and correspondence with detention monitoring specialists and 
members of IHRL monitoring bodies such as Mark Kelly (CPT Vice-President)(August 2017), S. Casale (September 







setting (Chapter 3). Each area is then examined against some of the core elements needed for 
effective prevention identified in Chapter 1. The gaps between the guarantees established in 
Chinese law and the extent to which they are implemented are critically assessed in the context of 
torture prevention requirements (together the ‘protection gaps’). Overall, Chapter 3 seeks to 
identify both the deficiencies in the existing legal safeguards, as well as the areas where important 
safeguards are missing. The analysis seeks to establish whether the current preventive safeguards 
are robust, effective and sustainable. 
Third, the thesis examines other wider structural, institutional and political obstacles that might be 
impeding or hindering the full and effective prevention of torture in China (Chapter 4). This is 
required for critical assessment and understanding of why the existing safeguards in China may 
not be effective as they could or should be. 
The Concluding Chapter examines what may need to change for China to be able to fully protect 
all detained persons from torture and other ill-treatment. 
The analysis of the Chinese legislation is accurate up to June 2017, all new or draft legislation 
thereafter will not be included in the thesis or, if especially relevant, will be alluded to only.   
Scope of research, its limitations and target audience 
This research does not aim to develop an integrated global theory of prevention, rather it breaks 
down prevention into a core set of minimum prevention measures;44 it examines how these should 
be applied given China’s context45 and assesses the challenges inherent in their application in 
China’s political context.46 This is an explicit choice; there is significant scholarly discourse (c.f. 
M. Evans, R. Murray, A. Hallo de Wolf et al.) - as well as evolving torture prevention practitioner 
and IHRL bodies’ views - regarding the appropriateness of creating an exhaustive integrated 
theory of prevention.47  Generally, a (non-defined, and thus non-limited) plurality of prevention 
measures is recommended by scholarship and practitioners.48 The author follows this approach, 
                                                     
44  Thesis Chapter 1.2 and 1.3. 
45  Thesis Chapter 2 and 1.3. 
46  Thesis Chapters 2.2, 4 and Conclusions, Section C(ii). 
47  Thesis Chapter 1.2, in particular, Professor Sir Malcolm Evans and Professor Sir Nigel Rodley’s work as well as the SPT’s views. 






but does focus on a selected set of essential minimum “common core” of preventive measures. 
These are preventive measures that many scholars and practitioners49 have agreed upon (grouped 
together in Chapter 1).These are used here to provide an analytical framework through which to 
understand the state of torture prevention in China. The set of measures selected are considered to 
represent the key elements of prevention within torture prevention academic literature, and in 
prevention work practice.50 It remains, however, a non-exhaustive list, given the indefinite nature 
of prevention.51 
Measuring effectiveness of prevention measures is at an early stage within academic and 
practitioner spheres.52 There are few studies and the very nature of “preventive” work means that 
measurement is fundamentally challenging in that measuring success (i.e. the non-occurrence of 
torture is de facto difficult). Nonetheless, the research sets out what evidence does exist regarding 
effectiveness, often drawing on torture prevention bodies’ (i.e. “practitioner”) experience. 53 With 
the exception of Carver & Handley’s work,54 there is no commonly agreed analytical foundation 
available to assess effectiveness of prevention as a whole: practitioners tend to look at their own 
approaches and record change/improvement to recommendations made if and when it occurs55, 
while academics look to practitioners given the paucity of conclusive data.  
In China’s context, this is even more challenging. In China, the mere existence of prevention 
measures is difficult to establish, let alone assess compliance and effectiveness. The lack of ready 
                                                     
49  See Thesis Chapter 1.2 and notably Carver & Handley, Professor Sir Nigel Rodley, Professor Sir Malcolm Evans and the monitoring 
bodies such as the CAT, SPT, CPT. Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998); Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International 
Law (2009); Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011); Carver 
and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016), among others (see Thesis Chapter 1.2). 
50  See Thesis Chapter 1.2. 
51  See Thesis Chapter 1.2. 
52  See Thesis Chapters 1.2, and 1.3, notably the work of Evans and Carver and Handley, as well as the monitoring bodies’ work in 
assessing their own impact, for example, through follow-up visits from the CPT and successful implementation of past 
recommendations (see, for example, CPT Cyprus report references in Thesis Chapter 1) and the NPMs’ efforts in assessing their 
own impact (c.f. Chapter 1.3.4 and notably the UK NPM’s self-assessment tool) (for more details see Thesis Chapter 1).  
53  Thesis Chapter 1.2, 1.3 and Chapter 3. 
54  Referenced in Thesis Chapter 1.2 and 1.3. 
55  The CPT applies this approach on every country visit. The CPT takes, as a starting point, the recommendations made in its previous 
report (usually 2-4 years previously) on a given country and uses its current findings to assess and measure the rate of change to 
specific recommendations made previously on the same or similar places of deprivation of liberty in the respective country. This is 
not an uncommon approach and is followed by many other monitoring bodies and ‘prevention practitioners’, such as the NPMs, who 
more regularly visit the same places of detention and can see tangible change (or not) within in shorter time span. It also enables a 
snapshot of the macro picture of the rate of progress of a given country in light of the overall number of recommendations made, and 
can act as an indication of the level of action take by a state in the sphere of torture prevention (c.f. for example, HMIP/UK NPM 
who after each report and before each following visit assess how many recommendations have been fully, partially or no 
implemented (see HMIP’s ‘Expectations’, a set of standards and methodological guide that it uses, which is published on it website). 






access to places of detention; of independent oversight bodies; of external reporting avenues; as 
well as a censored media and civil society restricting the fourth estate’s ability to play a ‘watch-
dog’ role; the lack of impartiality and independence of the judiciary are but a few of the essential 
elements needed for prevention but that are being impeded from operating properly (Chapter 4).56 
This situation links to (but is not the only result of) China’s approach to its specific governance 
mode and One-Party State model (Chapter 2.2) and in particular the lack of autonomy or 
independence allowed for various oversight bodies within China’s One-Party system (Chapter 
4).57 The Concluding chapter examines how, when facing such limitations, a state, such as China, 
can ensure the proper operation of its prevention measures.  
In spite of these challenges, China has shown appetite to formally prohibit torture and ill-
treatment and to embark on establishing some prevention measures (Chapter 2). Given this 
context, and the above general and China-specific limitations facing the research, the research 
focuses in on the set of “common core” preventive measures. This is to provide a basic analytical 
framework through which to assess the rapidly evolving state of torture prevention in China, their 
compliance with IHRL norms and expectations, and the challenges in their application.  
Target audience  
There is considerable overlap between practitioner and academic views on torture prevention (the 
experts are often both).58 Thus, while the research uses a set of common core preventive measures, 
drawn from practitioner experience, the target audience of the thesis includes both scholars 
interested in the sphere of torture prevention globally and experts/practitioners in international 
and Chinese torture prevention work. 
 
 
                                                     
56  Thesis Chapter 4. 
57  Thesis Chapter 4 and Conclusions. 
58  See, for example, the composition of the UN SPT’s membership, where the current Chairman is both a scholar and a 
member/Chairman of the SPT; or the CPT, where again, its President is a Professor of international law, a practicing lawyer and a 
member/Chairman of this monitoring treaty body. At the CPT, out of its 47 members, 18 are academics. The same goes for many of 
the former UN SRTs: Juan Mendez and Manfred Nowak, two recent Special Rapporteurs, were also both active in academia at the 






Definitional limitations and discrepancies 
China does have its own views of what constitutes torture and ill-treatment (c.f. Chapter 2.4 (I)(i)), 
and in some notable aspects these are different from the international definition and scope of 
obligations in the UN CAT (c.f. Chapter 1(2)). Yet, as a signatory of the UN CAT it is bound by 
the international definition of these terms, and should be guided by the interpretative texts from 
IHRL mechanisms. As such, this analysis focuses on China’s compliance with international 
norms, based on international definitions.  
Differences in interpretation do, however, provide a useful starting point in understanding the 
Chinese perspective. Thus, the key definitional discrepancies are briefly examined to enable a 
fuller understanding of how torture and ill-treatment are framed and understood in China by the 
authorities, key bodies involved in investigating and prosecuting torture cases, such as the 
procurators and the judiciary, as well as national scholars (c.f. Chapter 2.4 (I)(i) and Chapters 
4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.4). This serves as a contextualisation for the evaluation of China’s prevention 
measures and their progress in China. It also highlights different perceptions of the sense of 
progress held between the Chinese and international actors: dialogue on prevention progress can 
be challenging when the starting point of what is and is not torture and ill-treatment is not the 
same. When national law doesn’t fully prohibit such abuse, this also has ramifications on how 
torture is defined by investigators and prosecutors, and can impact what they perceive as 
qualifying for prosecution and lays open loopholes in interpretation, which can facilitate abuse. 
The thesis briefly examines this to highlight where the key definitional discrepancies lie and what 
impact this may have on evaluating prevention progress (c.f. Chapters 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.4 and 
Conclusions, Section C(ii)). 
Protection gaps: regulatory deficiencies or implementation problems  
The issue of torture and ill-treatment in the criminal justice system has been acknowledged by the 
Chinese authorities, who have shown some appetite to reform to address this, notably through a 
number of legal initiatives initiated since 2012 (c.f. Chapter 2). These include significant 






rules, judicial interpretations and other guidelines (c.f. Chapter 2.3). However, a considerable 
number of allegations and cases of torture and ill-treatment in Chinese detention remain, and 
these are proving to be resilient despite reforms (c.f. Chapter 3). IHRL and civil society59 point to 
various reasons for this: first, regulatory deficiencies, where the existing protection provision is 
missing certain elements, omissions that allow torture and other ill-treatment to go undefined, 
ambiguously open to interpretation and fail to meet international law obligations (c.f. below and 
Chapter 2.4(I)(i)). Alternatively, there are aspects of the law where fundamental protections are 
entirely missing, creating entire protection gaps or vacuums. This is evident, for instance, in the 
virtually entirely missing raft of regulatory protections needed to adequately protect against and 
prevent torture of detainees in the spheres of PAD and CDR administrative detention and 
‘shuanggui’ (CCP detention for investigation and discipline purposes) (c.f. Chapters 3.2 and 3.3). 
Second, there are systemic deficiencies evident in China’s criminal justice system that enable 
certain bodies to stand above or outside of the protections in the law, for political or other reasons, 
and result in discretionary and misuse of numerous laws and regulations. This can be seen, for 
example, in the treatment of corrupt government officials within the ‘shuanggui’ justice system 
(c.f. Chapter 3.2), as well as in the pervasive co-ordination and influence that the central CCP and 
government yield over bodies such as the judiciary (cf. Chapter 4.3). Third, there are also 
implementation gaps that are evident, where difficulties in implementation that can either be due 
to genuine lack of understanding of the law, or deliberate unwillingness to enforce the law. An 
example of this can be seen in the practice of the systematic denial of access to lawyers and third 
party notification for certain ‘sensitive’ case categories of suspects (corrupt officials, those seen 
to severely disrupt public disorder, among others), when theoretically these rights exist, but can 
be delayed indefinitely – and are in practice – by the investigating bodies (c.f. Chapters 2.4 and 
3.1). Chapters 2.4 and 3 examine these protection gaps and the effect that these can have in 
practice on the current state of prevention of torture and ill-treatment.  
 
                                                     
59  See, for example, UN CAT 5th Periodic Report on China, December 2015, published February 2016; Amnesty International, ‘No 






C. Categorisation of terminology and detention types  
This section provides a brief general classification, and clarification, of the terminology used 
throughout the thesis. 
Torture and other ill-treatment 
This research addresses types of abuse that could amount to torture60 as well as other cruel, 
inhuman, degrading, treatment or punishment treatment or punishment61 (other ill-treatment), as 
defined in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), to which China is a ratified State Party. 
Nonetheless, its primary focus remains on the processes and safeguards needed to prevent torture 
and other ill-treatment from occurring at any stage of the deprivation of liberty process (from 
investigation to post sentence), rather than on the legal classification of the abuse itself. Thus, 
while there remain differences in definitions, for the purposes of this thesis, they will be grouped 
together under the umbrella term of “torture” or “torture and other ill-treatment”– unless specified 
otherwise. 
Administrative detention 
No single international definition exists for administrative detention and it is not the subject of a 
dedicated international-law treaty. It is, however, covered (albeit indirectly) by other international 
and regional treaties and soft law norms. It is widely understood as a type of detention that is not 
covered by the criminal law and is mentioned in treaty body reports and Concluding 
Observations, 62  jurisprudence, 63  opinions in Deliberations or General Comments, 64  soft law 
                                                     
60  UNCAT, Article 1: ‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’ 
61  Article 16, UNCAT. 
62  For example, see HRC Lithuania Concluding Observations, 2004, para. 13 and HRC Concluding Observations on Israel, 1998, 
para. 317. 
63  HRC, A. v. Australia, paras. 9.5 and 5.10, Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997). 






instruments,65 among other sources, under the umbrella generic term “administrative detention” 
or by its sub-categories or types. The way that the international bodies66 have approached the 
nature of administrative detention under IHRL has been generally to break it down by type (see 
below) and/or to treat it on an individual case-by-case basis. In addition, various descriptions of 
this specific type of detention have evolved in order to help explain its nature. A useful working 
definition of administrative detention, which will be used for this research, is one proposed by M. 
Louis Joinet67 in his report on the practice of administrative detention. Namely, a practice “is 
considered administrative detention if, de jure and/or de facto, it has been ordered by the 
executive and the power of the decision rests solely with the administrative or ministerial 
authority, even if a remedy a posteriori does exist in the courts against such a decision.”68  
For the purposes of this thesis, two key types of administrative detention are distinguished. 
a) De jure punitive administrative detention is a sanction based on grounds established 
in law or regulations for the commission of an administrative infraction, offence or 
misdemeanour (hereafter ‘punitive administrative detention’). 
b) De facto administrative detention (hereafter simply general ‘administrative 
detention’, unless otherwise specified) includes any form of deprivation of liberty – 
that is where a person is unable to leave without consent – where the detention 
decision rests solely with the administrative or ministerial authority.69 
This thesis acknowledges that the legitimacy of administrative detention per se can be questioned 
and that there is an important ongoing debate around whether regulations ‘normalise’ or 
implicitly endorse certain types of deprivation of liberty that should not be permitted in the first 
place.  The focus of this thesis is, however, on the current reality of torture and other ill-treatment 
                                                     
65  The UN Nelson Mandela Rules (revised Standard Minimum Rules on the treatment of prisoners), para. 4: 4. (1) Part I […] is 
applicable to all categories of prisoners, criminal or civil, untried or convicted, including prisoners subject to "security 
measures" or corrective measures ordered by the judge.”; paras. 94 & 95 for example, refer to “persons arrested or imprisoned 
without charge shall be accorded the same protection as that accorded under part I and part II, section C.” It covers those 
convicted and those detained but not convicted of criminal offences, which has been interpreted in HRC jurisprudence, for 
example, A v Australia, para 5.10, as including administrative detainees. 
66  In particular, the HRC and WGAD (see, for example, Deliberation No. 9 of the WGAD). 
67  The former member of the Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities, in his report on ‘the practice of administrative detention’, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1989/27. 
68  Louis Joinet, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1989/27, para. 17.  






in these detention spheres in China and the safeguards that need to be established to prevent 
torture.     
Punitive administrative detention (PAD) 
Some countries have a twin-track mode of running their public order system, especially (but not 
solely) those linked to legacy structures from the Soviet era – such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, China, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. These 
countries have an Administrative Code or Law that proscribes certain administrative infractions 
or offences. These are offences not regulated by criminal law, but instead are governed by 
administrative laws, such as ‘hooliganism’ or traffic offences. In many countries these are 
described as ‘misdemeanours’ or ‘administrative arrests’ or ‘administrative offences’.70 Not all 
countries that have an Administrative Offence Code have their legal systems based on legacy 
Soviet structures, for example Austria. Under Austria’s Administrative Criminal Code71 persons 
suspected of having committed an administrative offence may be held in police custody for up to 
24 hours.72 If subsequently found guilty by the competent authority, the persons concerned may 
be subjected to an administrative custodial sanction of up to six weeks,73 which is served in a 
police detention centre (‘Polizeianhaltezentrum’). 
De facto administrative detention 
There are multiple types of de facto administrative detention, each with differing grounds and 
purposes. The main general (non-exhaustive) categories include: 
 Initial detention in police custody (garde a vue) 
Arrest and initial deprivation of liberty in police custody by law enforcement staff (before 
bringing a suspect before a judge) falls under Joinet’s working definition of administrative 
                                                     
70  See, for example, Russia, where persons suspected of having committed an administrative offence may be held by a law 
enforcement agency for up to three hours; those facing trial in connection with certain administrative offences (e.g. minor 
hooliganism) may be detained for up to 48 hours (Section 27.5, Code of Administrative Offences). If found guilty, they may be 
sentenced to “administrative arrest” of up to 15 days (pursuant to Section 3.9, Code of Administrative Offences). Other 
countries with a soviet structure to their legal and administrative systems also have the administrative arrest justice track, 
including China (see Chapter 2), Georgia (Code of Administrative Offences), Moldova (Section 249 of the Code of 
Administrative Offences). 
71  Sections 12, paragraph 1, and 16, paragraph 2, of the Administrative Criminal Code. 
72  Section 4, paragraph 5, of the Constitutional Law on the Protection of Personal Liberty and Section 36, paragraph 1, of the 
Administrative Criminal Code.  






detention. International and regional human rights law regulate the duration of this detention 
and specify guarantees afforded to those detained.74  
 Compulsory drug rehabilitation (CDR) and detention on health grounds 
Many states worldwide also use domestic legislation providing for administrative detention to 
detain those suffering from a physical, developmental or mental disability75, those in need of 
involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation and treatment (civil involuntary patients)76 or for drug, 
alcohol or substance abuse.77 Civil involuntary hospitalisation and treatment can be effected 
pursuant to a state’s mental health laws or, in the context of forensic patients, according to a 
state’s criminal law. In some countries, involuntary hospitalisation is pursuant to 
administrative laws. In China for example, people contravening the Drug Control Law, can be 
subject to an administrative sanction of compulsory drug rehabilitation (for two years, 
extendable for another year) conferred upon them by the Police (PSB), pursuant to the 
Regulations on Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation.78  
  Chinese Communist Party (CCP) detention  
The current use, and regulation, of CCP investigation and discipline justice process 
(‘shuanggui’) appears unique in the world’s justice systems, largely because the People’s 
Republic of China is one of very few nations that still embraces communist ideology. 
Shuanggui is described and examined in Chapter 2, but for the purposes of definition, involves 
a period of detention in order to investigate violations of Party regulations and discipline, most 
notably in the area of official corruption. It is regulated by CCP regulatory norms, with 
                                                     
74  See Thesis Chapter 1. 
75  For example, HRC, 754/1997, A. v. New Zealand, para. 7.2 (mental health); HRC Concluding Observations on Moldova 2010, 
para. 13 (contagious disease). 
76  HRC, Fijalkowska v. Poland, para 8.4. 
77  See, inter alia, CPT reports on this, including its reports on Finland 2014, CPT/Inf (2015) 25, para. 93; Serbia 2015, CPT/Inf 
(2016) 21, para. 159; UN SRT Reports on China (2005)(2011) and the UNCAT Committee Concluding Observations on China 
(2008)(2015), on compulsory drug rehabilitation in China; See also a detailed analysis on this type of detention in China in F. 
Sapio, Sovereign Power and the Law in China, (2010) and S. Biddulph, Legal reform and Administrative detention Powers in 
China (2007) and ‘rights in the new regime for treatment of drug dependence’ (2013); See also Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis for 
an examination of CDR in China. 






deprivation of liberty decisions made by CCP officials. In short, it can be considered as a form 
of administrative detention.79 
International human rights’ law and associated bodies or mechanisms 
Where this thesis refers to international human rights’ law (“IHRL”), it refers to all sources of 
international law including hard law (such as international and regional treaties and conventions), 
international and national court jurisprudence and soft law (including universal and regional 
normative standards), as well as general principles of international law and customary 
international law. 
The work of the authoritative international bodies and mechanisms established to interpret treaty 
law (such as the UN Treaty bodies and the international and regional Courts or UN Special 
Procedures) is also examined. These include mechanisms such as the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture (UN SRT), the UN Committee against Torture (CAT Committee) and the Working Group 
of Arbitrary Detention (WGAD). In this respect, these mechanisms will be grouped together 
under the term ‘IHRL bodies’ or ‘IHRL mechanisms’, unless a specific body is individually 
relevant. 
While all IHRL mechanisms’ interpretations are important, two in particular, are often referred to 
in the thesis, namely, the CAT Committee and the UN SRT. The reasons for this are clear, their 
mandates touch most closely on the present focus of torture, they are directly applicable 
internationally and thus also to China, and China has ratified the relevant treaty (the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT)) or has accepted their applicability to China. 
  
                                                     






D. Glossary of selected abbreviations  
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations  
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
ACHPR African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
CAT Committee UN Committee against Torture, pursuant to the UNCAT 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CDR Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation 
CL Criminal Law (China) 
CPL Criminal Procedure Law (China) 
CoE Council of Europe 
CPT (European) Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECPT European Convention for the Prevention of Torture 
GBCC Great Britain-China Centre 
HMIP Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons (UK) 
HRAP Human Rights Action Plans of the PRC 
HRC UN Human Rights Committee, pursuant to the ICCPR 
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice  
ICPED International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
KSS Kanshousuo police-run pre-trial detention centre 
MPS Ministry of Public Security of the PRC 
OPCAT Optional Protocol to the (UN) Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
PAD Punitive administrative detention 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
PSAPL  Public Security Administrative Penalties Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 






SPT UN Sub-Committee on Prevention of Torture, pursuant to 
OPCAT 
UN United Nations 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UNCAT United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
UPR Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
UN SRT UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 











PART I:  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 








Chapter 1: Universal and treaty obligations to prevent torture 
and other ill-treatment 
1.1 Introduction 
The risk of torture and other ill-treatment exists whenever persons are deprived of their liberty. 
The act of deprivation of liberty creates an imbalance of power, weighted towards those detaining. 
It creates a reliance or dependence on those in charge. It also places a positive duty on them to 
ensure that those detained are safe and come to no harm from either staff, other detainees or from 
themselves.80 The risk of torture and other ill-treatment exists within any closed facility or broader 
place of deprivation of liberty (i.e., where a person is not free to leave at will).81  
Any person who has been deprived of his or her liberty could potentially be at risk, although 
some societal groups have been considered as particularly vulnerable. Various authoritative and 
specialist IHRL mechanisms (whose mandates specifically focus upon or cover torture, including 
the SPT, UN SRT, the HRC and, at the regional level, the ECtHR and the CPT) consider that 
vulnerable groups include, inter alia, racial, ethnic or religious minorities, women, children, 
migrants, and persons with disabilities.82  
Equally, the timeframe of the deprivation of liberty is also an indicator of the risk of torture. The 
CAT Committee, the SPT, the UN SRT, the HRC, the ECtHR and CPT,83 supported by many 
                                                     
80  See, inter alia, CPT Standards CPT/Inf 2002, 1 Rev 2016 and CPT Report on its visit the United Kingdom, March / April 2016, 
CPT/Inf (2017) 9. 
81  See analysis by IHRL bodies such as the SPT, ‘The approach of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture to the concept of 
prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’, CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 
2010; UNCAT Committee General Comment No. 2; HRC General Comment 35; for analysis of ECtHR case law on deprivation 
of liberty see P. Van Dijk and G. Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed.) 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1990); A. Mowbray, Cases, Materials and Commentary on the European Convention 
of Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2012)(3rd edition); D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, London: Butterworths 1995); M. Evans and R. Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998); N. Rodley, 
The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009); and R. Murray, E. Steinerte, M. Evans, and A. H. de Wolf, The 
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011).  
82  See, for example, the SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment under OPCAT’, CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010, para 5(j); HRC General Comment No. 
23, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 26 April 1994; UN SRT, Report on China, 2005; the CPT’s specific standards focused on the 
specific vulnerabilities and safeguards needed for detained juveniles, women and foreign nationals, CPT Standards CPT/Inf 
2002, 1 Rev 2016. 
83  SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under OPCAT’, CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010; ECtHR Grand Chamber, Salduz v. Turkey, Application no. 






legal scholars and specialists, 84 all consider that a period of particularly high risk is during initial 
custody of suspects by the police (i.e., the first 24 hours or so). This is premised on the risk of 
abuse in view of coercive extraction of confessions. This can be systemic or a matter of individual 
practice by police or law enforcement officials (i.e., the apocryphal “bad apple”)85. Nonetheless, 
other periods of detention can also carry heightened risks of torture or ill-treatment. For instance, 
in some countries, a failed asylum-seeker transferred to the airport to await deportation, whose 
deportation is aborted at last minute on legal grounds, can risk reprisals on the return journey to 
the immigration detention centre.86  
Similarly, when persons are deprived of their liberty and certain due process guarantees and 
safeguards are missing or are inadequate, the risk is of torture or ill-treatment also increases. 
Leading scholar Professor Sir Nigel Rodley considered that such safeguards could fall into two 
categories, procedural guarantees and “transparency measures”, both of which form part of the 
concept of the “opacity paradigm” (i.e., the principle of shedding light into otherwise opaque 
places of deprivation of liberty, where the risk of torture remains high). Better regulation of 
safeguards and transparency measures are both needed to reduce the risk of torture in otherwise 
opaque – and thus higher risk – places of detention.87 
Risk is a broad concept; and is challenging to assess in the context of torture. It can be difficult to 
measure and create definite legal obligations that effectively counter and prevent torture. Scholars, 
IHRL bodies and civil society specialists88 broadly agree that torture prevention requires a variety 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of fair trial and as a preventive safeguards against torture, especially pertinent in the first few hours of police custody). This 
right cannot unduly be restricted or delayed (Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom), (Applications nos. 50541/08, 
50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09), Grand Chamber judgment, 13 September 2016); CPT Standards CPT/Inf 2002,1 Rev 2016; 
HRC, Concluding Observations on Sudan, CCPR/C/SDN/CO/4, para. 18. 
84  Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998); Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009); Murray, 
Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011); Carver and Handley, 
Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016).  
85  See, for more analysis on the causes of torture, P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: how good people turn evil, (Rider Books, 
Random House 2007); and on the criminological perspective on the historical evolution of specific torture practices, M. 
Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison, (Penguin Books 1977), Part 1.  
86  See, for example, CPT Cyprus report 2013, and (not yet published) 2017 report on Cyprus, as well as the CPT Immigration 
Detention Factsheet, March 2017; another recent example can be seen in the UK, the Panorama documentary: ‘Britain’s 
Immigration Secrets’, on the Immigration Removal Centre Brook House, September 2017.  
87  Discussion on this topic with Professor Sir Nigel Rodley, PhD Supervisor, Supervision Session, August 2016. 
88  See, inter alia, CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2 on UNCAT Article 2; HRC General Comment No. 20 on ICCPR 
Article 7; SPT, ‘SPT Approach to the Concept of Prevention’, 4th Annual Report; SPT, ‘Provisional statement on the role of 
judicial review and due process in the prevention of torture in prisons’, adopted by the SPT at its sixteenth session, 20 to 24 
February 2012, CAT/OP/2; Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention of 






of different strategies or measures. These measures can include, inter alia, the establishment or 
strengthening of:  
- laws on torture prohibition and sanctions; 
- external and internal complaints avenues; 
- prosecution of allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and eradicating impunity; 
- investigation techniques;  
- conducting regular external and independent monitoring of all places of deprivation 
of liberty; 
- effective, accessible and confidential complaints mechanisms; 
- protective safeguards afforded to detainees in law; and 
- professional law enforcement training methods, among others.89  
The identification, content of, and need for these ‘preventive measures’ has been widely 
examined by a range the IHRL bodies and legal scholarship.90 Yet, there has been relatively little 
scholarship on the precise weight or relative effectiveness, and thus importance, of the preventive 
measures, although this is starting to change. 91  Some consider that procedural safeguards 
established in law and the regulation of correct detention practices are the most crucial measures 
to prevent torture. 92  Others consider that independent and unannounced system of regular 
monitoring are more effective.93 Overall, there is broad agreement is that prevention requires a 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Law (2009); Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011); 
Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016); Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), ‘Understanding 
the risk of torture’, http://www.apt.ch/en/understanding-the-risk-of-torture/ [accessed 14 June 2017].  
89  See, inter alia, the SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under OPCAT’ (2010); CAT Committee General Comment No. 2; HRC General Comment Nos. 20 
and 23; UN SRT, Report on China (2005); CPT Standards CPT/Inf 2002, 1 Rev 2016. 
90  See, inter alia, CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2 on UNCAT Article 2; HRC General Comment No. 20 on ICCPR 
Article 7; SPT, ‘SPT Approach to the Concept of Prevention’, 4th Annual Report; SPT, ‘Provisional statement on the role of 
judicial review and due process in the prevention of torture in prisons’, adopted by the SPT at its sixteenth session, 20 to 24 
February 2012, CAT/OP/2; Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998); Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International 
Law (2009); Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011); 
Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016). 
91  See, for example, Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016), Introduction and Conclusion.  
92  CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2 on UNCAT Article 2; see Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? 
(2016).  
93  Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011); See also 






multi-layered approach, requiring many different elements within a wide strategy to combat and 
eradicate torture. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the key preventive measures required to counter the risks of 
torture from materialising can be roughly grouped into five categories. These include:  
i. The international obligations and legal framework prohibiting and criminalising 
torture and other ill-treatment.  
ii. The legal framework regulating the protective safeguards and due process guarantees 
that should be afforded to those in detention, as well correct detention practice.  
iii. An effective and operational criminal justice system with proper investigation and 
adequate prosecutions of torture and other ill-treatment allegations; linked with this 
is the need for a strong independent judiciary and action taken to address any 
impunity.  
iv. Regular independent monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty (‘preventive 
monitoring’). 
v. The establishment of internal and external complaints mechanisms. 
IHRL bodies, legal scholars and experts have regularly identified all five elements as contributing 
to reducing and preventing incidences of torture and other ill-treatment. These can be seen to 
represent some of the key elements within the consensus preventive nexus within torture 
prevention academic literature and in prevention work practice.94 Nonetheless, as outlined in the 
Introduction, these are only a selection of some minimum “common core” preventive measures. 
These are set out to provide an analytical framework through which to understand a snapshot of 
the state of torture prevention in China. It is, however, a non-exhaustive list, given the indefinite 
nature of prevention.95 Some specific measures are not included explicitly in this grouping but 
can be seen as being part and parcel of the above-listed wider groupings. An example of one such 
                                                     
94  Thesis Chapter 1.2 (see, notably, Carver & Handley, Does Prevention Work? (2016) and the work of the CAT Committee,, SPT and 
CPT, outlined in Chapter 1.2. 






measure is the reparation for victims of torture, which is alluded to in Chapter 4.4.4 within the 
context of the effect on prevention of the lack of an impartial, robust and independent judiciary.96 
Nonetheless, wider actions may also be needed, in line with a broad prevention strategy, to 
prevent torture effectively, especially in certain countries where torture may have become an 
embedded or systemic problem. Chapter 497 examines certain broader socio-cultural factors that 
can contribute to an increased risk of torture or to torture practices becoming embedded and that 
need to be addressed to reduce the overall risk of torture. 
  
                                                     
96  See for example a comparative lack of reparations in China (see for example, REDRESS, ‘Reparation for Torture: A Survey of Law 
and Practices in Thirty Selected Countries’ (2003), and one of the causes is the impotence of the judiciary to comprehensively award 
or enforce compensation and other enforceable measures of reparation for torture victims (Thesis Chapter 4.4.4). 







1.2 Scope of obligations under IHRL  
There is a general legal obligation under international human rights law to prevent torture and ill-
treatment. The obligation to prevent severe abuse more generally has been the subject of detailed 
examination and critique by many scholars and experts, including Sir Nigel Rodley, 98  Sir 
Malcolm Evans, Rachel Murray, Elina Steinerte, and Antenor Hallo de Wolf, 99 among others.100 
They point out that the obligation to prevent abuse generally has long been established as a legal 
obligation under international law (as seen, for instance, in the ICJ case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro101). It has been adopted across a broad range of topics 
including the prevention of attacks on diplomatic agents, international organised crime, genocide 
and torture.102 These scholars argue that various international legal instruments that have focused 
on prevention have relied on the methodology of requiring states to criminalise acts in their 
national legislation and assert jurisdiction over “individuals who commit certain acts that are 
considered unacceptable to the international community.”103 These acts include genocide and 
torture. Many legal instruments, including the UNCAT and the Genocide Convention,104 were 
considered as requiring the prevention obligation to be fulfilled through ensuring adequate 
prosecution and conviction, thereby providing a form of deterrence once acts of torture or other 
ill-treatment had been committed.105  
                                                     
98  Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009). 
99  Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011), p.4. 
100  See, for example, Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016), chapter 1; Nowak and MacArthur, The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (2007); Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1998).  
101  ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007. 
102  OPCAT Research Team, ‘Prevention under International Law’, Bristol University, May 2009, p. 1 citing Article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, Article 1 and VIII of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Article 2(1) and 16 of the UNCAT. 
103  Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011), p.4; Nowak 
and MacArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (2007), p. 114, para. 52. 
104  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 
December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260 and entered into force on 12 January 1951. 






The general obligation to prevent has been widely acknowledged by IHRL mechanisms and 
scholars as extending to torture.106 The obligation to prevent torture and other ill-treatment is 
complementary to strengthening the prohibition of torture. In the context of treaty law, this 
primarily stems from the UNCAT Convention Articles 2(1) and 16(1). Article 2(1) specifies that 
“each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”107 It has gradually become accepted 
that the obligation to prevent torture extends to preventing other forms of ill-treatment. 108 
UNCAT Article 16(1) extends this prevention obligation “to prevent […] other acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in 
Article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity […].”109 The CAT 
Committee has explicitly addressed the extension of the prevention obligation to cover all forms 
of torture and other ill-treatment. 110 The rationale behind the CAT Committee’s broadening of 
the interpretation of prevention to other ill-treatment is that ‘experience demonstrates that the 
conditions that give rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures 
required to prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment’.111 Moreover, as noted by the 
SPT, “whilst the obligation to prevent torture and ill-treatment buttresses the prohibition of 
torture, it also remains an obligation in its own right and a failure to take appropriate preventive 
measures which were within its power could engage the international responsibility of the State, 
should torture occur in circumstances where the State would not otherwise have been 
responsible.”112 
The context, rationale and inspiration underpinning the obligation in UNCAT Article 2(1) for 
State Parties to undertake “effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to 
                                                     
106  See below references in this Chapter section, and in particular, the SPT, para I(1). 
107  UNCAT 2(1) [emphasis added]. 
108  CAT Committee, General Comment No 2; See analysis in Nowak and MacArthur, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: A Commentary (2007), p. 112. 
109  UNCAT 16(1) [emphasis added]. 
110  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008. 
111  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2. 
112  SPT, ‘The approach of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 






prevent acts of torture” (including discussions during the drafting process and inspiration drawn 
from other legal instruments) has already been examined extensively by the CAT Committee113, 
SPT,114 and scholars115, to fully understand the nature of prevention obligations. One area of focus 
is whether the Article 2(1) obligation to prevent torture extends in its entirety to other forms of ill-
treatment and any safeguards necessary to prevent this, or whether it only extends to specific 
measures contained in Article 10 (training), Article 11 (systematic review of interrogation rules 
and policies), Article 12 (prompt impartial investigation) and Article 13 (right to complain).116 
The CAT Committee in its General Comment No. 2 has stated that the obligation to prevent other 
forms of ill-treatment should be read as widely as possible. It points to the use of the term ‘in 
particular’ in UNCAT Article 16 as meaning that it should not be read exhaustively. It further 
refers to the obligation to prevent as extending, in its view, to Article 14 (outside of the original 
Articles specified in the treaty): ‘Article 16, identifying the means of prevention of ill-treatment, 
emphasizes ‘in particular’ the measures outlined in Articles 10-13, but does not limit effective 
prevention to these Articles’.117 Similarly, this is a view reflected by other IHRL bodies whose 
mandates also touch upon the subject of torture and other ill-treatment, such as the HRC.118  
According to various IHRL mechanisms and scholars, the obligation to prevent can also be read 
into other treaties and other sources of international law preventing torture. For instance, the 
ICCPR specifically prohibits torture and ill-treatment119 and articulates that detainees should be 
treated humanely and with respect.120 While the ICCPR does not expressly mention the duty to 
prevent torture, the HRC (the body mandated to interpret and assess compliance with the 
                                                     
113  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2. 
114  SPT, ‘The Approach to the Prevention of Torture’ (2010), para I(1). 
115  See, inter alia, A. Hallo de Wolf, OPCAT Bristol Research Team, ‘Prevention under International Law’, 20 May 2009, Bristol, 
Chapter 1; M. Nowak & E. MacArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2007); Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009); ‘Preventing Torture in the 21st 
Century: Monitoring in Europe Two Decades On, Monitoring Globally Two Years On’, Essex Human Rights Review Volume 6 
Number 1, December 2009, Special Issue 2009, S. Casale, ‘A System of Preventive Oversight’, N. Rodley, ‘Reflections on 
Working for the Prevention of Torture’, W. Tayler, ‘What is the Added Value of Prevention?’, A. Olivier and M. Narvaez, 
‘OPCAT Challenges and the Way Forwards: The ratification and implementation of the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture’, E. Steinerte and R. Murray, ‘Same but Different? National human rights commissions and 
ombudsman institutions as national preventive mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the UN Torture Convention’; M. 
Leidekker, ‘Evolution of the CPT's Standards Since 2001’; Y. Ginbar, 'Celebrating' a Decade of Legalised Torture in Israel’.  
116  See analysis in Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011). 
117  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2, para. 3. 
118  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2. 
119  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966, Article 7. 






ICCPR)121 has interpreted a requirement for state parties to do so, pursuant to ICCPR Article 2, 
which ‘requires that state parties adopt legislative, judicial, educative and other appropriate 
measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations’.122 Additionally, it points out that ‘in general, 
the purposes of this Covenant [ICCPR] would be defeated without an obligation integral to 
Article 2 to take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the Covenant’.123 Equally, the 
HRC’s General Comment No. 20, in relation to ICCPR Article 7 (prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment or punishment) shows the HRC’s perspective on the scope of prevention. The HRC 
observes that ‘it is not sufficient for the implementation of Article 7 to prohibit such treatment or 
punishment or to make it a crime. State Parties should inform the Committee of the legislative, 
administrative, judicial and other measures they take to prevent and punish acts of torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in any territory under their jurisdiction’. 
1.2.1 Broader interpretation of the scope of torture prevention requirements  
While there is general consensus among the IHRL bodies and scholars that the prevention of 
torture obligation is a legal obligation, its scope is a different matter. In all the international 
instruments’ treatment and analysis of prevention, the concept of prevention itself tends not to be 
described nor do the majority of these conventions include the actual content of the obligation to 
prevent.124 Given the indefinite nature of the preventive obligation, interpretations and parameters 
of the prevention obligation have evolved over time. 
‘Legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures’, included in UNCAT 2(1), are relatively 
broad and it is left open as to what precisely states must do to avoid being found in contravention 
of Article 2(1). This has been examined the CAT Committee (the body mandated to interpret and 
assess compliance with the UNCAT) in its General Comment on Article 2, to identify certain 
specific preventive measures and procedural safeguards required to effectively fulfil this 
obligation. Paragraph 4 of the General Comment comes close to suggesting what states should 
                                                     
121  ICCPR, Part IV. 
122  ICCPR 2(2); HRC General Comment 31, para. 7. 
123  HRC General Comment No. 31, para. 17. 
124  See more generally, Hallo de Wolf, ‘Prevention under international law’ (2009), p. 1; and Evans, ‘The Legal Concept of 






undertake to comply with this obligation, including stating that ‘state parties are obligated to 
eliminate any legal or other obstacles that impede the eradication of torture and ill-treatment; and 
to take positive effective measures to ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof are 
prevented’. 
The CAT Committee refers to the broad and progressively evolving nature of the measures 
needed to comply with the obligation to prevent torture and ill-treatment and states that ‘the 
Committee’s understanding of, and recommendations in respect of, effective measures are in a 
process of continual evolution, as, unfortunately, are the methods of torture and ill-treatment.’125 
The challenge with a relatively broad and evolving interpretation of scope and content of the legal 
obligation of prevention under UNCAT (2)(1) is that it remains hard (but not impossible)126 to 
measure.127 Equally, the CAT Committee considers that the interpretation of ‘effective measures’ 
for the purpose of Article 2 needs to remain broad to cover different contexts. It stresses that new 
prevention methods, when tried, tested and found to be effective against torture and ill-treatment, 
should be continually included in the prevention obligation to prevent. 128  It considers that 
UNCAT Article 2 provides ‘the authority to build upon the remaining Articles and to expand the 
scope of measures required to prevent torture’.129  
The SPT (the body mandated to interpret and assess compliance with the Optional Protocol to the 
UNCAT (OPCAT))130 supports this view on the broad concept of prevention.131 Moreover, it 
considers that the obligation to prevent torture is an obligation in its own right and ‘a failure to 
take appropriate preventive measures which were within its power could engage the international 
                                                     
125  CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2, para 4. 
126  See an examination of the impact and effectiveness of a range of different preventive measures conducted by Carver and 
Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016); see also an example of NPM self-assessment with the HMIP’s (one of the 21 
bodies that make up the UK NPM) ‘Self-assessment Tool’ for assessment against SPT NPM Guidelines, 2014-2015 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/06/HMIP-self-assessment-2014-15.pdf 
[access 12 June 2017]; see also H. Singh Bhui, ‘Can Inspection Produce Meaningful Change in Immigration Detention? Global 
Detention Project Working Paper No. 12, May 2016 (on the impact of HMIP preventive monitoring in immigration detention 
settings); see also OPCAT Group discussions in Copenhagen, 2009, on the measurability and impact of prevention, APT 
Presentation, May 2009. 
127  See OPCAT Group discussions held in Copenhagen, 2009, on the measurability and impact of prevention, APT Presentation, 
May 2009. 
128  Ibid, para. 14. 
129  Ibid, para. 14. 
130  Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, adopted 18 December 2002, 57th Session of the UN General 
Assembly, A/RES/57/199; entered into force on 22 June 2006 (see Section 1.3.4 for a description and analysis of preventive 
monitoring). 






responsibility of the State […]’.132  The HRC also underlines the need for wider prevention 
measures, such as awareness-raising and information dissemination to the population at large of 
the prohibition on torture and the need for adequate training of law enforcement officials and 
others involved in depriving persons of their liberty.133 
Various scholars134 assessing the scope of prevention obligations have observed that there appears 
to be a pull in two directions. On the one hand, there is impetus to create a concretely defined 
minimum core content of prevention to allow states to realistically achieve preventive safeguards 
and be measured in their compliance. On the other, there is an evolving context to define an 
increasing number of measures necessary to prevent torture and the challenges associated with 
ring-fencing their precise content. This has led to a concern that the scope and content of the legal 
obligations to prevent torture are relatively unclear and potentially difficult to implement as a 
matter of legal obligation.135 Legal scholars, Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and Hallo de Wolf, point 
out that “the real tension that underlies this – and other – explorations of the concept of 
prevention is that between a generic, but open-ended, ‘obligation to prevent’ on the one hand, and 
the existence of discrete obligations which have a preventive impact upon the other.” 136 
Nevertheless, an increasing body of IHRL mechanisms’ jurisprudence and interpretation, as well 
as scholarly analysis, indicate an emerging view that the obligation should encompass as many as 
possible elements in a given context that can contribute to reducing the risks of torture and should 
progressively and continually evolve.137  
Generally, scholars and IHRL mechanisms broadly agree that torture prevention goes far beyond 
merely respecting the prohibition of torture; as the SPT has highlighted, “torture prevention is not 
about fulfilling international commitments concerning the prohibition of torture. This is the result 
                                                     
132  SPT, Ibid, para. 1. 
133  HRC, General Comment No. 20, in relation to ICCPR Article 7. 
134  Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011), p. 60. 
135  Ibid, p. 60; See also discussions between the OPCAT Contact Groups of NGOs and the SPT representatives in Copenhagen, 
2009, on the measurability and impact of prevention, APT Presentation, May 2009. 
136  Murray, Steinerte, Evans, and H. de Wolf, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (2011), p. 71. 
137  CAT Committee General Comment No. 2, para. 3; SPT, ‘SPT approach to the Concept of Prevention’, para. 2, 4th Annual 
Report; ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 429 (on the general obligation to 
prevent); SPT, ‘SPT Approach to the Concept of Prevention’, 4th Annual Report; Carver and Handley, Does Torture 
Prevention Work? (2016); Nowak and MacArthur, The UNCAT: A Commentary (2007); Association for the Prevention of 







of torture prevention. Torture prevention embraces – or should embrace – as many as possible of 
those things which in a given situation can contribute to lessening the likelihood of risks of 
torture and ill-treatment occurring […] prevention casts a wide net embracing more easily matters 
such as education and training which have a clear preventive nexus but may appear more 
tangential when viewed from the perspective of ‘protection’.”138  
Scholars Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth MacArthur, in their commentary on the UNCAT,139 and 
jurisprudence from the IHRL mechanisms 140  support the view that UNCAT Article 2(1) 
formulation goes past the element of respecting the right not to be tortured, and triggers a positive 
obligation of the State Parties to fulfil the prevention obligation proactively. These scholars and 
the HRC and CAT Committee point to the duty of states to ensure measures taken by States 
remain within the general purpose of the UNCAT, and point to the equivalent interpretation of 
ICCPR Article 2(1)141. The CAT Committee has adopted this broad interpretation of UNCAT 
Article 2(1) in Guridi v. Spain142 where the Committee found that ‘the absence of appropriate 
punishment is incompatible with the duty to prevent acts of torture’. Similarly, the CAT 
Committee considers that the provision of no, or inadequate, reparation to victims of torture also 
is incompatible with the spirit of the UNCAT. The HRC has also interpreted the obligation to 
prevent torture as requiring states to take various positive and effective measures of a preventive 
character to prevent torture from occurring.143 In this vein, authoritative IHRL bodies144 have also 
stressed that impunity for acts of torture constitutes a clear violation of State Parties’ obligations 
under Article 2(1) to take effective judicial measures to prevent acts of torture.145 
                                                     
138  SPT, the Approach to the Concept of the Prevention of Torture’ (2010), para. 3; see also analysis in Murray, Steinerte, Evans, 
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promotion and prevention, Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009); HRC, General Comment No. 
7; CAT General Comment No. 2. 
139  Nowak and MacArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (2007). 
140  See, for example, CAT General Comment No. 2; CAT Committee’s adoption of this broad interpretation of Article 2(1) in 
Guridi v. Spain, CAT/C/34/D/212/2002, 24 May 2005, Thirty-fourth session 2-20 May 2005, Decision, Communication No. 
212/2002. 
141  MacArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (2007); CAT Committee, General Comment No. 
2; HRC General Comment General Comment No.20. 
142  Guridi v. Spain, CAT/C/34/D/212/2002, 24 May 2005, Communication No. 212/2002. 
143  HRC, General Comment No.20.  
144  SPT, ‘SPT Approach to the Concept of Prevention’, 4th Annual Report; SPT, ‘Provisional statement on the role of judicial 
review and due process in the prevention of torture in prisons’, adopted by the SPT at its sixteenth session, 20 to 24 February 
2012, CAT/OP/2. CAT Committee General Comment No. 2; UN SRT, China Report on China Visit 2005, CPT, CPT 
Standards, ‘Combating Impunity’, Part VIII, (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 for more details).  






International and regional courts are increasingly taking a similar position. They build their views 
upon several layers of reasoning: the rationale for positive obligations generally, initially in the 
right to life and genocide cases, and then building on this to read across to similar obligations to 
the requirement to prevent torture. For instance, in the case of Velasquez Rodriguez,146 in the 
context of the violation of ACHR Article 4 (right to life), the IACtHR found that “taking the 
above evidence, along with the State’s failure to investigate or to take steps to prevent such forced 
disappearances from happening, the Court found that the State violated Article 4 (right to life).” 
While the positive prevention obligation was referenced in the context of its reasoning on Article 
4 (right to life) specifically, the Court also acknowledged that forced disappearance and torture 
findings can be intrinsically linked. Although there was no direct evidence showing that Mr. 
Velásquez Rodríguez was tortured, the Court concluded that Mr. Velásquez Rodríguez was 
‘disappeared’ (kidnapped and imprisoned) by government officials, and, because the State had 
been shown to subject detainees to torture in the past, the Court held that the State had violated 
Article 5 (right to humane treatment) in this case of forced disappearance. 147  Equally, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has shown in the case of 
Furundzija - in the context of torture - that states have the obligation to ‘expeditiously institute 
national implementing measures’148 as part of an integral part of the torture prohibition obligation. 
Here, States were found to be required to immediately undertake all those procedures and 
measures that may make it possible, within their municipal legal system, ‘to forestall any act of 
torture or expeditiously put an end to any torture that is occurring.’149 
The different layers of prevention  
Scholars Evans, Murray, Hallo de Wolf and Steinerte highlight findings of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) to argue that no exhaustive content of the prevention obligation exists in treaty 
law. They argue that in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro150 case, while 
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recognising the existence of the general obligation to prevent, the ICJ refrained from outlining the 
contours of any general normative content of prevention obligations, and has limited itself to 
determining the scope of the prevention obligation within the framework of the Genocide 
Convention.151 They highlight this case as providing “a rare example of a state being found liable 
for a breach of a preventive obligation in inter-state litigation in a human rights context.”152 This 
case is considered to help shape the interpretations that the various IHRL mechanisms and 
scholars in torture prevention have had regarding the potential scope of a prevention obligation.153 
Other torture prevention scholars154 support this view, considering the methodology that the ICJ 
uses to explore the scope of a prevention obligation as important, albeit in the context of the 
prevention of genocide, rather than torture per se. Hallo de Wolf highlights the importance of the 
ICJ’s reasoning in the construction of the prevention obligation: “the obligation to prevent 
genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide, and that legislation 
punishing genocide has a deterrent effect and could thus be considered as meeting the 
undertaking to prevent the crime of genocide.”155 The ICJ also is seen to go a step further, and 
specifies that it is the positive obligation of a state to prevent acts of genocide from occurring, 
through stopping an action and more broadly from deterring it from re-occurring.156 Thus, the ICJ 
Bosnia case is considered to reference the different layers of prevention157. The first legally 
enforceable layer is the absolute prohibition against genocide and measures to be taken to ensure 
this prohibition through criminalisation, prosecution and punishment (i.e., reactive measures to 
penalise and stop acts of genocide).158 Then, there is an additional, positive obligation to take 
further steps necessary beyond what is required by the relevant Convention.159  
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156  Bosnia Genocide case, para. 432; and, more generally, Hallo de Wolf, ‘Prevention under International Law’ (2009), p. 2. 
157  See Hallo de Wolf, ‘Prevention under International Law’ (2009), p. 2; and M. Evans, ‘The Legal Concept of Prevention?’, 
shared with author on 19/04/2012, p. 5. 
158  Ibid. 






The treatment of the general obligation to prevent is an important foundation for the treatment of 
the specific obligation to prevent torture. IHRL bodies and scholars160 have stressed that the two 
layers are important for any prevention obligation and should be extended to the prevention of 
torture. The criticism of only taking into consideration one layer of prevention (i.e., the initial 
reactive measures) is that it needs the act to have occurred in the first place; the positive duty 
includes proactive measures to deter an act from materialising. 161  In the context of torture 
prevention, the solution to an only reactive prohibition of torture is seen to lie in the concept of 
complementarity and the establishment of various ‘ancillary obligations’,162 such as various due 
process rights for detainees, which complement the prohibition of torture. Cumulatively, these are 
considered to reach further than the obligation of prohibition and carry their own legal 
standing.163 Evans argues that while the obligation to prevent torture does have a standing in 
international law, the legal standing of the complementary prevention obligations does not 
necessarily need to be established in international law.164  
The relationship between a primary legal obligation and linked ancillary obligations also can be 
seen in practice in the regional sphere, epitomised in the relationship between the ECPT and the 
ECHR. The ECPT Explanatory Report directly refers to the judicial sphere of competence of the 
ECtHR as assessing violations of ECHR Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and mandates a 
preventive monitoring body (the CPT) to work alongside and complement the ECtHR in its work, 
through normative but non-judicial monitoring work. This has the aim to proactively identify 
risks of torture and other ill-treatment, contributing to the prevention of torture.165 This model can 
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also been seen at the international level, in a similar (but not identical) fashion with the SPT, 
NPMs and their relationship with the OPCAT.166  
IHRL bodies, such as the SPT, the CAT Committee and the UN SRT, and scholarly literature167 
increasingly interpret this ‘second layer of prevention’ as comprising “as many as possible of 
those things which in a given situation can contribute towards the lessening of the likelihood or 
risk of torture and ill-treatment occurring.”168 This positive preventive obligation can comprise a 
range of different measures and work cumulatively to complement the prohibition of torture; its 
crucial element being its requirement for the plurality of measures to act in a given situation to 
counter the risk of torture. 
The obligation to take proactive preventive measures in specific contexts has also been examined 
at the regional levels by regional human rights mechanisms. In Europe, the ECtHR has 
established the interpretation of a positive obligation under Article 2 (Right to Life) of the ECHR, 
where the state is under an obligation to proactively take preventive measures to protect a life at 
risk169; and similarly, in the Americas, with the case of Velasquez Rodriguez170. The ECtHR has 
also held that the procedural obligation for a State to carry out an effective investigation, applies 
to breaches of the substantive limb of ECHR Article 3 (torture and ill-treatment) (among other 
Articles), as it would be ineffective in practice if there existed no procedure for reviewing its 
breach.171 The ECtHR has held that this derives from the general duty under ECHR Article 1 
(obligation to respect human rights) and is distinct and broader than from obligations deriving 
from ECHR Article 13 (effective remedy). 172  This increasingly goes further than the mere 
prosecution of torture as a crime in a given state’s national jurisdiction, but, cumulatively (in line 
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with the gradual development of ECtHR jurisprudence173 and soft law norms)174 it requires the 
creation of the right environment for a holistic platform in states to investigate torture allegations 
adequately175 and impartially, 176 a duty to effectively prosecute,177 promptly impose sentences 
commensurate with the crime of torture178 and to enforce such sanctions properly.179  
Given the indefinite nature of the preventive obligation, interpretations and parameters of the 
prevention obligation have evolved over time and the scope of the obligation remains flexible.180 
Evans suggests that this should deliberately not be defined:181 he argues torture prevention should 
not be constrained by an exhaustive proscribed list of activities.182 Yet, IHRL mechanisms such as 
the CAT Committee and HRC see the need for some more specific indications as to the content of 
preventive measures that states should take to be in compliance with the prevention obligation. As 
outlined above, the CAT Committee has been evolving a more detailed interpretation of UNCAT 
Article 2, to understand and promote the some core elements of prevention as minimum standards 
to which states should comply. While it is generally acknowledged that preventive measures 
continually evolve, some key preventive measures have been identified by IHRL bodies, legal 
scholars and experts as contributing elements to reducing and preventing incidences of torture and 
ill-treatment.183 These can be considered as some of the minimum core elements required to 
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prevent torture effectively.184 For the purposes of this analysis, they can be roughly collated into 
five thematic groups and will be examined, in turn, below.185 
1.3 Architecture of key ‘preventive measures’  
1.3.1 Criminalisation, prosecution and punishment: the legal prohibition 
One of the precepts upon which torture prevention is based is the fundamental prohibition of 
torture and other ill-treatment in international law and in any given country’s domestic legislation.  
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an absolute prohibition 
established by various international human rights treaties 186  and by wider humanitarian and 
refugee law. The prohibition of torture is generally recognised as one of a small number of 
fundamental peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens); 187  and is widely 
recognised as a rule of customary international law, binding on all nations irrespective of any 
ratification of any given treaty.188 The prohibition is also established in the core laws that form 
the body of International Humanitarian Law.189 The prohibition has been widely recognised and 
extensively commented upon by various experts on this area.190 This research will therefore not 
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undertake a detailed analysis of the prohibition of torture, but instead summarise some key facets, 
for context. 
Scholars and practitioners of public international law consider the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) to have entered the sphere of general international law191 and to be 
binding on all States.192 Article 5 of the UDHR prohibits torture or other ill-treatment. In respect 
of treaty law, the ICCPR establishes that torture and ill-treatment shall be prohibited (Article 7) 
and, in its Article 10 states that all persons who have been deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with dignity and humanity. These stipulations are absolute in so far as international law does not 
allow for any derogation. 193  The UNCAT 194  comprises the most detailed international treaty 
prohibiting torture and other ill-treatment. Moreover, it also confers some obligations upon 
ratified states to undertake various measures of torture prevention. In addition, many other 
international treaties contain articles relating to the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and 
have the purpose to protect groups of persons, that would make torture or ill-treatment a violation 
of the respective treaties195 in a variety of different contexts. 
At the regional level, regional human right treaties and standards have also been established to 
prohibit torture. In Africa, torture and ill-treatment are prohibited by Article 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).196 In the Council of Europe geographic sphere, 
the ECHR197 Article 3 prohibits torture and ill-treatment; the ECtHR has shaped the interpretation 
and understanding of the content of Article 3 in its jurisprudence.198 This case law is also shaped 
by findings of non-judicial mechanisms established to prevent torture at the regional level, such 
as CPT, mandated by the ECPT. In the Americas, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is 
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established in both Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)199 and the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 200  The IACtHR has shaped the 
interpretation of the content of this prohibition through its case law.201 In the Middle East, the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights was adopted and provides for the prohibition and prevention of 
torture in its Article 8, but it does not yet have an operational regional court.202 Unlike other 
regions, Asia remains without a single comprehensive human rights convention, treaty or court 
that can be compared to those of its regional counterparts. However, some sub-regional groupings 
do exist that have established loose declarations on the protection of human rights, such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations203 and Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights. 
In short, as a jus cogens and as established in international human rights law, the torture 
prohibition is applicable to all states universally, regardless of any treaty ratification and its 
obligation is absolute. Its relevance to torture prevention is clear; it is widely considered as the 
‘first layer’ of prevention and should be the reactive and essential first component to any state’s 
prevention efforts. 
1.3.2 Protective safeguards for detainees and correct detention practice 
The legal framework to criminalise, investigate and prosecute torture and other ill-treatment has 
been considered insufficient in and of itself fully to reduce or prevent the risk of torture.204 Legal 
procedural safeguards and guarantees designed to protect detainees from torture and afford them 
certain rights can complement the legal prohibition framework; these are widely considered to 
contribute significantly to reducing the risk of torture.205  
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Treaty requirements, such as those contained in the UNCAT, OPCAT and other regional treaties, 
such as the ECPT, explicitly refer to some preventive measures, but by no means all of the 
measures.206 The CAT Committee207 and HRC208 have identified some specific safeguards that 
they consider as key to preventing torture effectively. These include, inter alia,  
 the systematic review of interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as 
well as arrangements and on-going staff training for the custody and proper 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, 
 ensuring that detainees are held in places officially recognised as places of detention, 
 right of third party notification of the fact of detention and provisions made against 
incommunicado detention,  
 maintaining an official register of detainees’ names and detention locations,  
 the right of detainees to be informed of their rights,  
 the systematic recording of the time and place of all interrogations, together with the 
names of all those present, and this information being made available for judicial or 
administrative proceedings,  
 the right promptly to receive independent legal assistance, independent medical 
assistance, and (under appropriate supervision when the investigation so requires) to 
family members,  
 ensuring that places of detention are free from any equipment liable to be used for 
inflicting torture or other ill-treatment,  
 establishment of impartial mechanisms for inspecting and visiting places of 
detention and confinement, and  
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 availability of judicial and other remedies to detainees and persons at risk of torture 
and ill-treatment that will allow them to have their complaints promptly and 
impartially examined, to defend their rights, and to challenge the legality of their 
detention or treatment.209  
These measures are non-exhaustive and are considered as some of the minimum guarantees that 
State Parties to the ICCPR and UNCAT should have in place in order to fulfil their prevention 
obligation under Article 2 of UNCAT and their obligations under Article 7 ICCPR. 
Various other measures have also been considered as ‘preventive’ by the CAT Committee and 
HRC, 210  the UN SRT, 211  the SPT 212  and CPT. 213  These include training and educating law 
enforcement personnel on professional ethics and on the prohibition of torture, on the prohibition 
of refoulement, the prohibition of the use of evidence obtained by torture in court, among others. 
Indeed, various preventive safeguards, such as training law enforcement personnel in the 
prohibition of torture,214 prompt and impartial investigation of alleged acts of torture,215 the right 
to complain of alleged torture to, and to have his/her case promptly and impartially examined by 
competent authorities216 are explicit obligations under UNCAT. 
Other broader safeguards highlighted by the IHRL mechanisms are not specifically referenced 
within the UNCAT or ICCPR, but stem from them and are considered necessary for the intent of 
the UNCAT prevention obligation to be able to take effect.217 These include preventive measures 
designed to target institutional sub-cultures within the police or law enforcement agencies, to 
ensure that, institutionally, torture is viewed as unacceptable. These are manifested in a variety of 
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recommendations by preventive monitoring bodies, such as the SPT or the CPT, for example, to 
ensure that a state establishes whistle-blower protections in its regulations.218  
While some of these safeguards are not explicitly established in international treaty law, one of 
these safeguards, preventive monitoring, is specifically provided for in its own treaty. At the 
universal level, there is an established obligation enshrined in the OPCAT for State Parties to 
establish National Preventive Mechanisms against torture (NPMs), as well as for the SPT to 
monitor all places of deprivation of liberty in ratified states. 
Preventive monitoring has been established as one of the key measures in preventing torture and 
ill-treatment. While previously it has not been the subject to much scholarship, this is changing 
and there is an increasing focus on this area developing in scholarly literature and through 
developing monitoring practice.219 In the regional sphere, the ECPT220 establishes the role of 
preventive monitoring, in the form of the CPT, as necessary and complementary to the ECtHR’s 
reactive and judicial role regarding the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment (ECHR, Article 3). 
The ECPT recognised that in order to effectively stop torture from occurring both 
criminalisation/prohibition (Article 3) and the establishment of preventive measures, such as 
monitoring, are required.221 The preventive measure of monitoring is generally accepted as an 
effective (but not the only) means of preventing torture and other ill-treatment.222  
Various due process guarantees have also been identified as crucial for the prevention of torture. 
These procedural safeguards include the right of habeas corpus (the right of the detainees to 
challenge the legality of their detention) and provisions against incommunicado detention, 
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including the right of third party notification to be afforded at all stages of detention.223 These 
guarantees are enshrined in international treaty law.224 Equally, these two due process rights have 
been considered by many IHRL mechanisms and scholars225 to have become part of general 
international law: as a norm of customary international law (incommunicado detention) and as a 
jus cogens (habeas corpus), and thus carry the legal status of having universal applicability, 
regardless of any treaty ratification. Scholars point to an increasing body of jurisprudence, state 
practice and opinio juris supporting this (such as States’ deliberations during drafting, ratification 
and compliance with the ICPED).226  
Other procedural safeguards have been established in the form of soft law normative standards 
that regulate the treatment and conditions in detention at both the international and regional level. 
For example, in the universal sphere, these are evident in the revised Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners (the ‘Nelson Mandela Rules’),227  the Basic Principles for the 
Treatment of Prisoners,228 the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment,229 Rules for the Protection of Juveniles deprived of their 
Liberty230 and UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and non-custodial Measures for 
Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).231 Other standards have been established that regulate 
the work of law enforcement officials.232  
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Equally, similar normative standards that regulate the treatment and conditions in detention exist 
at the regional level, and help inspire or form part of the sources of general international law. At 
the European level, the European Prison Rules (EPRs) and the standards set by the CPT include 
various safeguards that have been considered as crucial to preventing torture or other ill-treatment. 
These cover all stages of deprivation of liberty, and especially during the first 24 hours of initial 
police custody, which many IHRL mechanisms233 consider as one of – if not the – time of the 
highest risk of torture.234 These are based around a core trinity of safeguards: access to a lawyer, a 
doctor and notification of the fact of detention to a third party. These safeguards are derived from 
more than 25 years of the CPT’s preventive monitoring experience and have been compiled into a 
body of standards, which go in depth into the range of procedural and other guarantees that 
should be in place to protect persons deprived of their liberty from the very outset of their 
detention.235 These standards are derived from CPT visit reports and their recommendations. 
These reports start as confidential – given to a visited state a few months after a CPT visit – and 
then the relevant state decides whether to allow publication of the report (most do). Certain 
recommendations and standards that may applicable more widely and are repeated in a variety of 
different contexts are discussed by the CPT and added thematically into a body of public 
standards, the so-called ‘CPT Standards’. The CPT Standards go beyond protecting detainees 
during the initial detention process and cover all stages of detention and all types of safeguards. 
These include the need for decent and safe living conditions, medical screening and assessments, 
effective complaints’ avenues, regular contact with the outside world, limitations of use of 
solitary confinement, safeguards around the use of restraints and seclusion, amongst others.236  
Although many of these procedural safeguards are set out in non-binding soft law norms, 
considered as codes of conduct, scholars237 consider that they provide ‘concrete guidance’.238 
They have been used as benchmarks against which state practice is assessed by the IHRL 
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mechanisms, such as the HRC (regarding ICCPR Articles 7 and 10), 239 UN SRT240 and the CAT 
Committee.241 At the regional level, the ECtHR has also developed a range of its own safeguards 
in its case law, adding the weight of legally-binding case law to the original normative status of 
the soft law normative safeguards, such as those in the European Prison Rules (EPR) and the CPT 
Standards. For instance, now more than 900 ECtHR cases refer to the CPT’s reports and 
standards and many of the CPT’s standards have been relied upon in the Court’s rationale in its 
findings of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and ill-treatment) violations.242  Similarly, in the 
Americas, there has been a rapid development of a considerable body of jurisprudence by the 
IACtHR243 and IHRL mechanisms.244 Equally, in the African sphere, safeguards necessary for the 
prevention of torture have been incorporated in soft-law norms, such as the ‘Robben Island 
Guidelines’. 245  These highlight the importance of certain basic procedural safeguards for 
detainees, considered essential to prevent torture. These include notification of detention to third 
parties, access to a lawyer and an independent doctor, and the use of only officially registered and 
authorised places of detention for any deprivation of liberty.246  
As for their effectiveness, until recently relatively little scholarly analysis had been undertaken 
into measuring the effectiveness of safeguards in particular. One of the reasons is that these 
safeguards link substantively with other prevention measures, such as preventive monitoring and 
complaints avenues247, that also include monitoring compliance with procedural safeguards. One 
recent scholarly work that has managed to isolate the impact of procedural safeguards as a 
preventive measure against torture is that of Carver and Handley.248 These scholars assessed the 
impact of detention safeguards and correct detention practice as a preventive measure, in 
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comparison to three other measures, in a series of different countries. They concluded that 
establishment and compliance with detention safeguards had significant impact on reducing the 
incidence of torture.249 
1.3.3 A more effective criminal justice system, without impunity for abuse 
In addition to a robust and comprehensive legal framework required at the domestic level to 
prohibit and prevent torture, it has become widely recognised250 that the legal prohibition has 
little weight without an effective criminal justice system; one that can adequately prosecute 
torture allegations and ensure that impunity is not afforded to perpetrators of acts of torture. 
There is no specific reference to the obligation to eradicate impunity per se in the UNCAT or 
other international or regional treaties that concern the prohibition and prevention of torture. Yet, 
many provisions in the UNCAT are inherently connected with this principle through the 
cumulative effect of specifying the requirements for a strong judicial process, including the 
establishment of an adequate investigation and prosecution system of cases of alleged torture, as 
well as requiring states to offer sufficient redress to the victims.251  
Removing impunity for acts of torture is increasingly considered as a key preventive measure by 
IHRL mechanisms, scholars and legal practitioners.252  Each considers that ensuring adequate 
prosecution and ending impunity is crucial to preventing torture from re-occurring.253 IHRL treaty 
law, jurisprudence and concluding observations show that there is a requirement for states to 
ensure they have a legal system that adequately addresses torture with a fully functional and 
impartial judiciary, thorough and adequate investigation and prosecution mechanisms, a system 
free of judicial corruption and one that ensures a fair trial. These are considered fundamental parts 
                                                     
249  Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016).  
250  N. Rodley and M. Pollard, ‘Criminalisation of Torture; state obligations under the UNCAT’, ECHR Review (2006), p.115; see 
also Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016).  
251  Such as Articles 4 to 16 of the UNCAT 
252  See CAT Committee jurisprudence and reports (such as on Spain) on UNCAT Articles 4 to 16; UN SRT, see China Report 
2015, 2010 (Follow-up); SPT, Provisional statement on ‘the role of judicial review and due process in the prevention of torture 
in prisons’ (1 October 2012); ECtHR Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (Application no. 23458/02), Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç 
v. Turkey (Application (no. 24014/05), Kaya v. Turkey, (Application no. 158/1996/777/978); CPT Standards, Part VIII; see 
‘Eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations’, Guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 March 
2011 at the 1110th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, among others.  
253  Ibid; see also detailed analysis in, inter alia, Rodley and Pollard, ‘Criminalisation of Torture; state obligations under the 
UNCAT’ (2006); Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016), p. 12; Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture: 
A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 






of any rule of law system254 and key measures to ensure that torture prevention is effective (both 
in terms of effective prohibition and as a deterrent for any potential acts of torture). 255 
Consequently, this means that a legal culture that tolerates abuse and allows impunity for abusive 
acts is an environment where it is likely that torture prevention measures would be hindered from 
operating effectively. Such a culture cannot provide an adequate environment in which the 
preventive safeguards necessary to prevent torture can operate effectively.256  
Various scholars have analysed the link between impunity and the heighted risk of torture. 
Studies on the impact and effectiveness of torture prevention have shown that in many countries 
impunity was the biggest obstacle to effective torture eradication. For example, in Turkey and 
Albania, legal scholars, Carver and Handley, point out that “torture persists when certain 
preventive steps are absent. Impunity for alleged torturers is frequently cited as a key factor.”257 
Scholar Sebnem Korur Fincanci argues that, in the context of Turkey, impunity can significantly 
influence the resilience of torture practices and that a persistent state policy for torture can exist, 
despite the state’s ratification international treaties:258 ‘impunity has a significant influence on the 
persistence of torture, since this result indicates a state policy for torture, despite ratified 
international treaties, and the expression of “zero tolerance for torture”’.259 Equally, in the context 
of the penal system in Albania, Blitz argues that ‘in spite of its considerable investment in 
Albania, the European Union and associated partners have not managed to curb occurrences of 
torture and have had a limited impact over substantive penal reform […].’ Blitz finds ‘the 
principal reasons for Albania’s non-convergence with European norms lie with the weakness of 
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Albanian state structures and the persistence of systemic illiberal practices’, including a culture of 
impunity. Reform of the judiciary is a key pre-condition to curbing torture.260  
Similarly, Rejali261 and Karstedt262 examine whether the prevalence of torture is causally linked to 
a non-democratic environment. Rejali concludes that although democratic structures are not a 
preventive factor per se to counter torture (i.e., torture could, and did, still happen in democratic 
countries), impunity and adequate legal systems to counter it was still an important factor in 
reducing incidences of torture.263 Karstedt264 supports this view but nuances this further. She 
argues that both inter-personal abuse (i.e., murder or bodily harm) and state abuse (including 
torture) is more likely in a transitioning governance model (i.e., one that is transitioning from 
authoritarianism towards democracy), rather than in a full democracy (with some notable 
exceptions (the United Sates being one)) or a full authoritarian state. Indeed, Karstedt concludes 
that while democracy is not the pre-condition for less state abuse, there is a correlation between 
established and effective rule of law structures and reduced incidences of state violence.265  
While facets of the rule of law go hand in hand with the model of democratic structures and 
institutions, scholars point out that it is too simplistic to attribute a reduction in torture in a given 
state to democracy alone. For instance, scholars Rejali and Karstedt, point out that despite 
democratic institutions having a positive influence on the incidence of torture, torture persists in 
modern-day democracies. While democracy has not been proven as a pre-condition for effective 
torture curtailment, however, findings by IHRL mechanisms266 and scholarly analyses do note 
that incidences of torture occur less in democratic societies. Nevertheless, the same analyses also 
point to the continuance of torture practices in some modern-day democracies.  
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While not all democracies respect the principles of torture prevention,267 scholars and torture 
prevention treaties bodies, such as the UN SPT, underline the correlation between democracy, the 
rule of law and effective torture prevention. The SPT, for instance, views democracy and the rule 
of law as crucial elements to torture prevention: “democracy inhibits repression, and where 
democracy and the rule of law are absent, the incidence of torture, ill-treatment and corruption is 
generally greater since such acts go undetected or unpunished. In a democracy where, inter alia, 
transparency, a free press, freedom of information, education of the public to curb corruption and 
human rights abuses, independent oversight and complaints mechanisms, and an independent and 
impartial judiciary and judicial process are all valued and protected, there is more information 
available relating to the actions of State agents and hence greater accountability. Accordingly, the 
importance of adherence to democratic principles in effectively preventing and eradicating torture, 
ill-treatment and corruption cannot be overstated.”268 
This is not to say that torture prevention cannot work in all States with de facto ‘Rule of Party’, or 
even autocratic (i.e., ‘Rule of Man’) governance models. Notionally, in these contexts when an 
order is given to prohibit torture and establish prevention measures, it is followed through. 
Professor Sir Nigel Rodley cites the former Soviet Union as an illustration of this and argues that 
while in Soviet Russia there were extremely problematic issues with the gulags and re-education 
concept, police torture through coercive extraction of information from suspected ‘ordinary 
criminals’ was rarer. 269  This could of course, to some extent, be attributed to the natural 
deterrence of a reign of terror and fewer citizens daring to step out of line. However, it also could 
be that law-enforcement officers were expected to toe the official line or face similar 
consequences. Either way, it is not a given that a ‘Rule of Party’ or ‘Rule of Man’ State cannot 
protect its citizens from torture. This view is supported by research in the criminological field. 
For instance, scholars such as Lafree, Pinker and Karstedt, have undertaken empirical research 
across 138 countries (including China) to support the nuanced view that democracies are not a 
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sole pre-requisite for reducing inter-personnel violence (such as homicides) and state violence. 
These scholars support the view that “democracies obviously have the potential to reduce 
violence to the lowest levels; however, they share this with a number of autocratic states. The fact 
that ‘nearly democratic’ and ‘mixed regime types’ have the highest homicide rates points to 
towards a role for institutional stability, more generally, and an interactive effect between regime 
type and stability/weakness of institutions.”270 While democracies are not a pre-requisite for lower 
levels of violence (inter-personnel or state), as prominent exceptions such as the USA indicates,271 
scholars are finding a correlation that the rule of law situation in a country can affect its violence 
levels. For instance, Pinker and Karstedt point out “that highly functional rule of law institutions 
are related to distinctly lower levels of violence.”272 In their empirical research, ‘low’ rule of law 
countries do generally correlate with higher levels of state violence. 
Both impunity and corruption (police and judicial) also have been considered to increase the risk 
of torture. Many IHRL bodies, legal, criminological and psychology scholars and civil-society 
experts stress that a reduction in police abuse can often be linked to concerted efforts by states to 
reduce systemic police corruption and tackle a culture of impunity for the perpetrators.273 Police 
reform in Georgia can be seen as an example of this. 274 From 2004, the Georgian authorities 
recognised that they had a systemic problem of police corruption. Georgia undertook a series of 
police reforms including abolishing problematic police units, reducing other units, including 
dismissing staff suspected of involvement in corruption and other illegal and/or abusive acts. 
Overall, around half the police force was dismissed. The remaining police officers were issued 
with redesigned uniforms and were given increased salaries and careful selection and training of 
new recruits was undertaken. Although the direct impact of these reforms are difficult to link 
causally, scholars and civil-society experts have highlighted some improved police practices, 
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mirrored in subsequent findings in reports by IHRL bodies275 and regional monitoring bodies, 
such as the CPT. 276 These bodies have long recommended various measures needed to counter 
both corruption and impunity as an integral part of a broader approach to torture prevention. 
Many focus their recommendations on the strengthening of the judicial process, including the 
establishment of adequate prosecution and sanctions commensurate with the crime of torture in 
domestic legislation as these are considered crucial elements for deterrence. 
A legal system that tolerates impunity and circumvents legal safeguards has been widely 
considered to exacerbate not only the risk of torture but also the probability of widespread 
endemic torture. 277 For instance, the CAT Committee278 stressed that a culture of impunity led to 
systemic police violence in Nepal. 279 The CAT Committee found, in 2011, that torture practices 
had become routine and pointed to the climate of impunity for human rights violations as a 
contributing factor. It underscored that there was a general failure to prosecute torture (i.e., there 
were few to no torture prosecutions or convictions in Nepal). Further, it found that police 
generally refused to register alleged cases of torture and /or, together with prosecutors, delayed or 
only conducted cursory investigations. The situation was exacerbated by too few (and too lenient) 
disciplinary sanctions imposed for torture or other abuse and very little criminal prosecution. All 
these factors, according to the CAT Committee, contributed to the culture of impunity. 280 Nepal 
is not alone; generally the Indian Sub-Continent has frequently seen a culture of impunity leading 
to systemic police violence.281 
This view is supported widely; IHRL bodies have increasingly perceived combatting impunity as 
a key element in torture prevention. For example in 2005, the UN highlighted its overall 
increasing concerns in this area by updating its set of principles for the protection and promotion 
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of human rights through action to combat impunity. 282 The UN SRT has found that impunity has 
been a root cause of ongoing torture in many countries and becomes systemic “when rule of law 
institutions fail to provide accountability, including through impartial investigations and 
prosecution of perpetrators.” 283 This view has broad support; for instance, on the regional level, 
the CPT considers, in its standards284 (and more specifically in its 2013 reports on Cyprus285 and 
Montenegro286), that countering impunity was key to reducing the risk of torture and other ill-
treatment in these countries. 
The principle of the Rule of Law inherently includes the need to address impunity and strengthen 
the judiciary to properly fulfil its task impartially and independently. Lord Bingham, 287 in his 
analysis of the practical working definition of the Rule of Law, accentuated the key and widely-
recognised principle of the structural separation of the judiciary from the Executive and 
Legislative bodies in any given State claiming to be one governed by the Rule of Law. Bingham 
argued, drawing upon his judicial experience and precedent,288 that a situation where a single 
person, government or any body stood above the law (even in exceptional circumstances) 
effectively resulted in an erosion of the concept of the Rule of Law. He further links the analysis 
of the gradually curbing of the commission of routine acts of torture across Europe to the 
increasing power of the law and the strengthened judiciary. In other words, the contributory 
factors to the prevention of torture are a strong and independent judiciary with robust criminal 
justice legislation, which applies to all and acts as a check and balance on those in power. 
Conversely, a state with a weak judiciary, a legal system that tolerates impunity and 
circumvention of criminal justice safeguards could foster an environment that is conducive for 
torture to become embedded. This has been increasingly recognised both in the legal / 
criminological sphere, but also in other academic fields. For instance, psychologists Zimbardo (in 
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the context of US soldiers’ abuses in Abu Ghraib),289 Zimbardo, Huggins and Haritos-Fatouros 
(in the context of military and civil police in former military-rule Brazil) 290 and Lifton (in the 
context of armed forces in the Vietnam war) 291 argue that the checks on the power of the police 
(in Brazil) and US armed forces (in Iraq and Vietnam) were eroded as the wars or internal strife 
progressed. While relevant rules existed (albeit to differing extents) that prohibited abuse of 
civilians, in both situations, the police and soldiers were gradually conferred an increasingly 
broad mandate, with few limits imposed on them by the authorities or the judiciary and minimal 
oversight or structures of accountability, thus allowing them to circumvent established 
protections.292  
In short, an effective and independent criminal justice system that does not tolerate (i.e., that 
adequately investigates and prosecutes) acts of torture can be considered as a prerequisite element 
of a state’s torture prevention obligation. 
1.3.4 Regular independent monitoring of all places of deprivation of liberty 
Overview 
Independent preventive monitoring has been increasingly recognised at the international level,293 
the regional level294 and at the national levels (by a considerable number of States that have 
ratified the OPCAT and established NPMs) as being a key tool in preventing torture. Preventive 
monitoring was set up to complement and strengthen the prohibition of torture in international 
and domestic legislation and normative standards.295 It aims to establish a system of regular 
independent national and international regular visiting of all places of deprivation of liberty in a 
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given state to identify protection gaps and promote their closure by legislative or administrative 
means.296  
As a preventive measure, monitoring has a privileged legal status in comparison to many of other 
prevention measures discussed above in that it is expressly provided for in treaty law, the OPCAT 
and, at the regional level, the ECPT. For those states that have ratified OPCAT, there is an 
obligation to set up a fully functional and independent NPM within one year of ratification,297 to 
publish its findings298 and to allow the UN SPT to visit its places of deprivation of liberty and 
make recommendations for improvements.299 Various IHRL mechanisms300 consider that even for 
those countries that have not ratified OPCAT (but have ratified UNCAT), regular monitoring is 
still an effective prevention measure against torture and ill-treatment and can be linked to a wider 
prevention obligation in light of UNCAT Article 2(1). It is noteworthy that some States that have 
not ratified OPCAT, such as Russia, are still setting up preventive monitoring bodies (for 
example, Russia’s Public Monitoring Committees). As preventive monitoring has been widely 
considered one of the core elements of torture prevention, has a large number of bodies and 
standards in this sphere and because of its privileged legal status, this research undertakes a 
relatively more detailed analysis of this preventive measure. 
 Effectiveness & Impact of preventive monitoring  
Measuring the effectiveness of preventive monitoring is challenging given that the practice is 
essentially forward-looking. It can be difficult to establish concretely and causally that torture did 
not occur due to one specific reason; usually a range of different elements are responsible for a 
reduction in torture and it can generally be difficult (but not impossible301) to isolate a single 
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reason.302 Equally, establishing a system of regular monitoring can also lead to an increase in the 
number of actual complaints of torture due to improving detainees’ ability to communicate with 
the outside world and the creation of complaints/investigative procedures or mechanisms. Thus, 
an increase of complaints may not mean that the incidences of torture have increased but that the 
reporting structures or more contact with outside monitoring bodies are picking them up more; or, 
conversely, it may actually mean torture is, in practice, on the rise. This highlights one of the 
complexities of assessing the effectiveness of torture prevention measures. 
The question of the impact of preventive monitoring is increasingly being examined. The CPT for 
example has been taking concrete steps to investigate its own impact following through its 
recommendations in successive visit reports to see what can be improved and what has worked.303 
For instance, an example of concrete change pursuant to a CPT recommendation can be seen 
following the CPT’s Cyprus visit of 2013. The Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner 
visited Cyprus in 2016 and both he and the Cypriot authorities publicly cited that the capacity of 
the Cypriot immigration detention centre (Menoyia) had halved (creating better conditions) as a 
direct result of the CPT’s 2013 report recommendation.304 In addition, parts of the Cypriot Prison 
Regulations that currently impose severe restrictions on inmates undergoing disciplinary solitary 
confinement are being amended as a direct result, according to the Cypriot authorities, of the 
ECtHR ruling of a violation of ECHR Article 3 (Onofirou v Cyprus)305 and in light of the CPT’s 
2013 visit recommendations made in this respect.306 
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The SPT and NPMs also examine ways to improve their own impact, through bi-and multi-lateral 
work and through peer-review.307 Bristol University and Ludwig Boltzmann Institute conducted a 
recent study to examine how NPMs assess their own impact and what methodology NPMs were 
using to measure this. Some NPMs, such as the UK NPM, have initiated peer-review mechanisms 
such as its NPM Self-Assessment Tool (based on the SPT’s NPM Assessment Tool)308 to seek 
and measure their own impact incorporating input and advice from other NPMs, civil-society 
experts and IHRL mechanisms, such as the UN SPT.309 Many monitors can see regular impact 
and change as a result of their preventive monitoring work: through assessment during follow-up 
visits, interviews with detainees and staff, reforms in law and policy in line with past 
recommendations. Overall, preventive monitoring bodies are gradually gaining a greater 
understanding of the impact of their work.310  
Scholarly debate and critique on the impact (and limitations) of preventive monitoring is also 
increasing.311 Carver and Handley have conducted a study into the effectiveness and impact of 
torture prevention measures.312 They conclude that preventive monitoring has a tangible effect in 
reducing or preventing torture in the 16 country case studies they researched.313  
Where their recommendations have not been acted on, monitors can, and regularly do, insist on 
implementation with the institution management, and will report to other relevant authorities, if 
needed.314 Repeated non-fulfilment of recommendations can end up in a public statement (in the 
case of the CPT, for example, with Greece on immigration detention issues), in High-Level Talks 
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with the authorities315 or in submissions to national Parliaments (in the case of NPMs). The 
relative lack of such public statements / submissions is indicative that monitors believe that the 
majority of their recommendations are being acted upon. 
The SPT has developed a non-exhaustive list of the guidelines for NPM monitoring to be 
effective in its ‘SPT Guidelines for NPMs’ and ‘SPT Assessment Tool for NPMs’.316 In summary, 
some of the requirements considered as key for monitoring to be effective include, inter alia: 
- the monitoring body to be functionally, personally and institutionally independent, with 
this independence enshrined by law, with specific immunities and protections so 
monitoring bodies are not hindered in giving truthful recommendations, 
- a body with sufficient resources to carry out its mandate, 
- have adequate powers and guarantees, especially unrestricted access to all places of 
deprivation of liberty at all times, 
- ability to interview any person (staff or detainees), 
- opportunity to meet those in charge of the place of incarceration; before, during and after 
the visit to those incarcerated,  
- permission to collect, receive and compile data on the occurrence of torture and verify 
whether there has been any change in this over the years,  
- powers to make recommendations to the authorities following a visit and to discuss those 
recommendations with the authorities in charge of the actual place of detention as well as 
national authorities, and  
- make reports of its activities public. 
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 Limitations of preventive monitoring 
Monitors can also see the limitations of preventive monitoring. For example, Hindpal Singh Bhui, 
Lead Inspector on Immigration Detention at Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) (part 
of the UK’s NPM), has reflected on the impact of HMIP in preventive monitoring in immigration 
detention. He examines whether monitoring can indeed produce meaningful change. Singh Bhui 
explores the effectiveness of the current detention inspection undertaken by HMIP and others – 
and argues that inspecting can produce meaningful change in certain aspects but not without 
compromise and inherent limitations. He ultimately argues that “in liberal-democratic societies 
there are two broad approaches to promoting human rights reforms and challenging abuses: 
working from the inside to achieve progress with the risk that principles may be compromised 
and good intentions confounded; or promoting change from the outside, which is more 
uncompromising but less influential, at least in the short-term. This is a dilemma that confronts 
human-rights based inspection of immigration detention in the UK. The main focus of HMIP is 
on improving the treatment of detainees and conditions in detention, not challenging the system 
of detention, even if immigration detention policy arguably lacks legitimacy in a way that 
criminal imprisonment does not.” 317  Civil society experts argue that while the emphasis on 
preventive monitoring in the overall range of preventive measures has been positive, it is 
important to see this measure as one of many, acting in combination to best counter and prevent 
torture.318  
Other limitations on regularity or quantity of preventive monitoring visits include budgetary 
hurdles, such as limited resources given by states or internationally. This can be seen for example 
with some of the NPMs. The Cypriot NPM for example has only 50% of one staff member to 
plan and conduct all of its NPMs functions. This was considered woefully inadequate by the CPT 
in 2013319 and the SPT in 2016.320 Despite the recommendations to confer additional resources on 
the NPM Unit within the Ombudsperson’s Office, this has still not been implemented. 
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Resource constraints do not only limit the impact of NPM work, but it has also had an impact on 
the work of international monitoring bodies, such as the SPT. The SPT itself increased from 10 to 
a 25 strong-member body, making it the largest treaty body in the United Nations. However, even 
with the enlarged membership, the numbers of places of deprivation of liberty to cover is 
significant.321 The role of the SPT cannot feasibly be one of deterrence through regular visiting to 
every country under its mandate, as this is impossible in practice. Further, the SPT has been 
under-resourced since its inception, hindering the SPT from conducting regular visiting to every 
OPCAT ratified-member states (i.e., even as often as once every 4 to 5 years).322 Although the 
UN General Assembly established a Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, the Fund has, for a 
long time, not been able to provide the requisite funding to the SPT or NPMs and the SPT 
Secretariat functions with a minimal staff provided by the OHCHR. The financial restrictions 
initially severely hindered the work of the SPT, and the SPT Chairman, Sir Malcolm Evans, 
points out that the SPT has had to re-look at its own role and what it can feasibly and realistically 
do given the funds and resources it has available. The SPT then concentrated its efforts into 
undertaking fewer preventive visits itself but more NPM ‘advisory visits’, with the aim of 
strengthening those who can more regularly inspect all places of deprivation of liberty nationally. 
More recently, the SPT has changed its focus away from NPM advisory visits to more general 
visits and high-level talks on the wider political environment in a given state.323  
According to the former SPT president, Dr. Silvia Casale, “it is generally agreed that the current 
provision of resources for the SPT to visit – permitting three to four visits a year in other words, 
one visit ‘regularly’ every 12-17 years to each state Party – is woefully inadequate.”324 However, 
Dr Casale argues that the accumulation of visits by the different monitoring bodies at different 
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levels “may hold the key to regularity, or increased frequency, of preventive visiting.”325 This is 
where the two-pillar (SPT and NPM) system shows its benefit. Given that the challenges that the 
SPT is facing, it has been argued that the future of the regularity of visiting, and deterrence that 
this brings, falls increasingly to the NPMs. Casale argues “for the foreseeable future, it will fall to 
the NPMs, the unique feature of the OPCAT, to form the front line of preventive visiting, a role 
that they are best suited to perform, given that they are on the spot” and that “State Parties 
undertake to make available the necessary resources for the functioning the NPMs”326 . The 
current SPT chairman emphasised “with such a double-tier system, the OPCAT can almost 
guarantee very frequent oversight over the places of deprivation of liberty in state parties, 
ensuring the true regularity of systematic visiting”.327 
However, as the number of preventive monitoring bodies increase, there is an urgent need for 
more co-operation between the different torture prevention bodies.328 This need for co-operation 
to avoid duplication or overlap was an initial concern at the drafting stage of OPCAT after 1991 
as the UN watched the European model of preventive monitoring progress.329 It is has now 
become all the more crucial given that there are up to three specifically mandated torture 
prevention bodies with similar complementary - but not identical - mandates, who could 
theoretically operate within the same countries (e.g., in Europe, the SPT, CPT and NPMs). The 
complexities of, and continued need for, ensuring complementarity of monitoring between the 
bodies was highlighted at a recent conference in June 2017 in Strasbourg between the 
international preventive monitoring bodies (SPT, CPT, NPM and others). 330  Here, the SPT 
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representative331 explained that the SPT’s work is based on the principle of non-selectivity and it 
must ensure that all regions are treated equally. Consequently, it has become difficult for the SPT 
not to focus on all NPMs (including in Europe) and not to carry out fully-fledged visits in the 
same way it does in other regions, which may occasionally overlap with the more regular Council 
of Europe region monitoring work of the CPT. Thus, there was indeed a need for on-going co-
operation between the two monitoring bodies. 
The need for more co-operation and communication between the different layers of torture 
prevention bodies has been raised at various other international and regional consultations, 
including those organised by the OHCHR332 and by the CPT.333 Members of the CAT Committee, 
the SPT, CPT and UN SRT highlighted the growing impact of NPMs and their advantage over the 
international bodies in terms of, in particular, regularity of visits. The local knowledge, language, 
contextual cultural understanding and other factors also put NPMs in a strong position to have 
impact in both monitoring and other torture prevention work, such as addressing 
recommendations on legal or administrative frameworks or legislation that hindered effective 
torture prevention. The CPT, who has also been reaching out to increase communication with 
other torture prevention bodies,334  stressed the need for increased direct contact and regular 
communication between the international, regional and national torture prevention bodies. This 
aims to foster complementary activities between the international torture prevention bodies and 
the NPMs,335 to strengthen both in the common goal of the reduction and prevention of torture. 
Despite the challenges and limitations of resources and coordination, Casale considers that the 
advent of the SPT and NPMs has heralded, ‘a new era of prevention of ill-treatment’.336 Yet, 
preventive monitoring cannot be a panacea: while it can help identify systemic issues that create 
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protection loopholes, it cannot alone address the facilitating/influencing cultural factors that can 
lead to torture. It needs to act in combination with the other preventive measures identified above. 
1.3.5 Confidential complaints mechanisms  
The availability of internal and external complaints’ mechanisms has increasingly been cited as 
an example of a concrete measure of prevention in normative standards established to protect 
those deprived of their liberty by human rights mechanisms, scholars and civil society.337 Non-
judicial external complaints mechanisms, such as Ombudspersons and National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRI), have grown rapidly in recent years, in part due to a sustained campaign by 
UN and regional bodies (such as the Council of Europe) to promote such bodies.338 This has also 
been reflected at the regional level, with, for example, increasing funds provided by the European 
Commission339 to support the establishment and growth of independent NHRIs, Ombudsperson 
institutions and NPMs. These bodies have been considered to have the potential to act as an 
important conduit for torture and other ill-treatment allegations to be aired externally, investigated 
and reach the prosecutorial authorities, if necessary. 
The principle is that detainee complaints’ systems are accessible channels for a detainee to 
confidentially air grievances, including on abuse, about a situation or member of staff. These can 
be internal (to the detention facility director and complaints handling staff) or external (to outside 
bodies). They can mostly be resolved non-judicially, but serious complaints should be passed on 
to prosecutorial authorities in the relevant country to investigate the complaint further. It is 
important that the channels are both easily accessible to detainees and confidential to reduce the 
risk of any staff reprisal or intimidation for the act of complaining. IHRL mechanisms, such as 
the CAT Committee, the SPT, the UN SRT and regional preventive monitoring bodies, 340 such as 
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the CPT341 and national preventive bodies, such as the NPMs,342 have stressed the importance of 
providing detainees with an effective avenue to complain confidentially, internally and externally, 
as a measure to reduce and prevent torture and other ill-treatment. The ECtHR, for instance, 
regularly draws upon findings from Ombudspersons on their received complaints in its reasoning 
on ECHR Article 3 (torture and other ill-treatment) cases.343 The CPT also considers that both 
internal and external confidential complaints avenues are important in all types of deprivation of 
liberty settings, including immigration detention settings 344  and, increasingly, even custodial 
police settings. Thus, in its Gibraltar report, the CPT has recently said that an independent police 
complaints body should regularly visit police stations to collect complaints from detainees in 
police initial custody.345 
There has been relatively limited scholarly literature that analyses the effectiveness of complaints 
mechanisms per se as a preventive measure, with the exception of Carver and Handley’s recent 
work.346 Carver and Handley have assessed its impact as a preventive measure in comparison to 
three other measures. They concluded that: “complaints mechanisms are the one set of preventive 
measures that, according to our analysis, have no significant impact on the incidence of torture.” 
They do concede, however, that there was an exception to this general finding, namely, when a 
complaints mechanism is ‘tied organically’ to the process of prosecuting torturers.347 They argue 
that complaints mechanisms that are mandated to refer cases directly to the prosecutor 348 
correlate more strongly with a decline in torture than mechanisms that do not. 
Nevertheless, despite some doubts raised over the relative effectiveness of this preventive 
measure, it is generally acknowledged 349  that effective complaints mechanisms can play an 
important role – in combination with other preventive measures – in preventing torture. 
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348  Such as those complaints mechanisms in Northern Ireland, England and Wales and South Africa. 







There is a wide (and non-exhaustive) range of measures of prevention required under the 
‘prevention obligation’ in UNCAT 2(1) of torture. Some of the key ones can be grouped into five 
thematic areas: the legislative prohibition, established procedural safeguards in the law for 
detainees, a robust criminal justice system, along with an impartial and independent judiciary to 
confidently prosecute and adequately sanction crimes of torture, regular independent preventive 
monitoring and accessible external and internal complaints mechanisms within places of 
detention. 
Prevention measures need to operate in combination with each other to offer the most effective 
protection against torture. Equally, each measure individually needs to be as effective as possible. 
Yet, to be as effective in preventing torture, they also need the right environment in which to 
operate successfully. By way of illustration, the procedural safeguard of affording a detainee 
‘access to a lawyer’ is rendered less effective, if not obsolete, if the lawyer cannot bring 
proceedings after meeting the detainee, either directly or through the competent prosecutorial 
authorities. Equally, the safeguard is rendered meaningless if the allegation cannot be impartially 
investigated, nor does the safeguard work if there is no fully functional and impartial criminal 
justice system to allow proper prosecution, confer a sentence on the perpetrator that is 
commensurate with the crime of torture and enforce that sentence (i.e., a system that does not 
tolerate impunity for abuses). Without all the different elements in place, this safeguard becomes 
meaningless and the detainee could quickly lose faith in the system of protections available. The 
preventive measures thus interweave together and need to be considered in their wider context. 
This Chapter sets out the framework of necessary prevention measures under IHRL, in order to 
provide a yardstick by which to understand and examine the current situation in China in Part II. 
Part II examines the nature and scope of torture and other ill-treatment in China, identifies which 
prevention measures are in place and which are missing, the type of environment in which they 






effectiveness of the identified prevention measures in China and an indication of the current level 
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Chapter 2: China’s current legal system and available protections 
against torture and ill-treatment  
2.1 Introduction  
As a result of the ratification of the UNCAT,350  China has an obligation to take ‘effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction’,351 and the obligation also extends to other ill-treatment.352 To examine how, 
and to what extent, China’s legal system meets this obligation, this chapter examines the current 
system in place that protects detainees from, and prevents, torture and other ill-treatment and 
assesses the scope of these protections. 
The analysis first focuses on the most common type of deprivation of liberty, namely, pursuant to 
the criminal justice system and criminal law in China. It examines the scope of the available 
protections currently afforded in law to those arrested and detained in initial custody and pursuant 
to the Chinese criminal-law system. This analysis also situates and contextualises detention 
external to the criminal-law (i.e., non-criminal detention) and thus provides a meaningful 
comparison. 
The analysis next explores two types of justice process that lie parallel to the criminal-law in the 
administrative justice sphere, as well as the Party justice process: first, administrative detention 
pursuant to the Law on Administrative Penalties for Public Security; second, Compulsory Drug 
Rehabilitation (CDR); and third, detention pursuant to the Party interrogation and discipline 
process known as ‘Shuanggui’ for infraction of Chinese Communist Party norms. It examines the 
background to these detention powers, their legislative frameworks, recent reforms, the 
availability and scope of the protections against torture and other ill-treatment in law and the 
continued justification offered by the national authorities for their use. 
                                                     
350  UNCAT, adopted by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987. 
351  UNCAT, Article 2(1). 






The core (but by no means the only) elements necessary for effective torture prevention under 
IHRL, examined in Chapter 1, will be used as a framework for analysis of these three justice 
processes. These are: (i) the legal prohibition of torture, (ii) availability of preventive safeguards 
and guarantees, as well as regulation of correct detention practice, (iii) an effective and fully 
functional criminal justice system, (iv) regular, independent preventive monitoring of all places of 
deprivation of liberty, and (v) confidential complaints’ mechanisms. Cumulatively, they are some 
of the key measures of prevention (hereafter ‘key preventive measures’). By assessing the 
different forms of detention against this framework, this analysis derives the availability and 
scope of key current preventive measures in China. 
2.2 Political & Governance models in China 
A full legal analysis of torture prevention in a One-Party State, such as China, needs to be seen in 
the context of the wider governance model and political landscape. This is the backdrop to 
China’s justice system, its laws and scope of regulation and protections available for detainees. 
This also defines the context in which reforms are happening, or are likely to happen, and helps 
situate the contours of any hindrance to effectiveness. 
All of China’s governance structures, including its legal system, are interwoven into its Soviet 
legacy and the current rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The One-Party State model 
means that the CCP has overarching responsibility for all elements of governance and increasing 
amounts of central control. Political and legal reforms cannot be divorced from each other; and 
thus need to be examined hand-in-hand. 
President Xi has summarised his vision for his leadership term in a guiding motto: “the Chinese 
dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”353 No other recent official CCP document 
epitomises this more than CCP official communiqué, Document no. 9, which includes the “Seven 
Nos.” This sets out, in its first paragraph, an assertion that Western constitutional democracy 
                                                     
353  See Article 1, “Document No. 9”, April 2013, CCP Central Leadership, Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological 
Sphere, A Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office Provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities directly under the Party committee, Central ministries and state organs, Party ministries, People’s 
Liberation Army headquarters, major Party committees, and Party leadership groups of civilian organizations’, April 22, 2013; 






negates key features of the Chinese socialist system.354 Its second paragraph asserts that the 
promotion of “universal values” weakens the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership.355 
A China scholar has critiqued this document as “one of the most conservative documents in 
official channels since the reform period”356 (i.e., the period when China emerged out of the 
Cultural Revolution (late 1970s) and started a new policy, from the 1980s onwards, of developing 
and then expanding economic development pursuant to the policy of ‘改革开放’ (gaige kai fang)). 
Since 2012 and the start of the Xi rule, there has been a steady agenda for economic, structural 
and institutional reform evident in China’s Five-Year Plans (medium-term objective setting) and 
the CCP Plenums (annual assessment and direction setting of the Party). 357  The changes 
underway aim to strengthen economic progress and ensure national stability.358 Hand in hand with 
this push for national stability through economic reform is the authorities’ campaign or ‘war’ 
against corruption (fu bai). 359  Xi’s reforms aim to eradicate vested interests, or procedural 
fiefdoms, which he considers to have prospered and become integral to the governance process 
and bureaucracy under his two predecessors.360  
Eradication or ‘weeding out’ of corrupt officials is considered to have two advantages. The first is 
that, publicly, Xi is seen to prioritise ensuring that society gets an honest, professional service 
from its governance officials and structures. Xi’s aim is that this will lead to increased public trust 
in government and CCP leadership. This also links to a socio-political advantage, according to 
                                                     
354  Article 1 ‘Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with 
Chinese characteristics system of governance’, in Document No. 9, April 2013. 
355  Ibid, Article 2. 
356  A. Saich, ‘Controlling Political communication and civil society under Xi Jinping’, in China’s core executive, leadership styles, 
structures and processes under Xi Jinping, eds. Heilmann and M. Stephan, MERICS, No 1 Series, June 2016.  
357  2012 – 2015 China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: primarily focused on social development, whereas the 2016 – 2020: China’s 13th Five 
Year Plan focuses on deepening economic development, promoting national unity / harmony, tighter national security (as 
epitomised in the New Security Law, 1 July 2015) and consolidating CCP central co-ordination and control; see highlights of 
the 13th Five Year Plan at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2015-11/04/c_134783513.htm; See analysis in ‘Policy Brief, 
China’s 13th Five-Year Plan: In Pursuit of a “Moderately Prosperous Society”’, Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales CEPII – Policy Brief No 12, September 2016 and K. Koleski, ‘The 13th Five-Year Plan’, U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 14 February 2017. 
358  Ibid. 
359  Notice from the CCP’s General Office, ‘Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere’, Introduction: ‘[…] The 
new session of the central leadership group has: put forth a series of new principles for conduct in political administration, 
furnished an interpretation of the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, improved our work-style, 
maintained close ties with the masses, rigorously enforced diligence and thrift, opposed extravagance and waste, increased 
vigour in the fight against corruption, and won the widespread endorsement of cadres and the masses’ [sic], Document No. 9, 
April 2013; See also Fu Hualing, ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in Comparative 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013). 
360  See, inter alia, scholarly critique in V. Shih, ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate 
Chinese politics after the 19th Party Congress’, Merics China Series (June 2016); R. MacFarquhar, ‘Leadership styles at the 






scholars, in that increasing public trust in government may correlate to decreasing the use of 
social pressure as an avenue to complain (so-called “petition”) to government. This in turn can 
contribute to reducing common catalysts for social unrest.361 Further, Xi considers that corruption 
jeopardises economic progress and is an ill imported from the West, as a by-product of 
capitalism. 362  As such, stemming corruption also carries nationalistic overtones, frequently 
expressed as a political desire to promote pride in Chinese culture, learn from ancient China and 
move away from perceived Western values and influence.363  
There is a traditional Chinese saying “the heavens are high and the Emperor is far away” (天高皇
帝远 (tian gao, huangdi yuan364)), alluding to local officials’ potential to disregard the wishes of 
central authorities in distant Beijing. 365  To counter the risk associated with this, the second 
advantage of Xi’s focus on eradicating corruption is that this supports the consolidation of CCP 
power at a centralised rather than local, municipal or provincial level. Since coming into power, 
Xi has personally led a wide-scale crackdown on corruption across government.366 Key members 
of the secret services, members of the (originally nine, now seven-person) most senior Politburo 
Standing Committee, senior figures in the Army, as well as many senior provincial/local 
government officials 367  have been charged with corruption. China scholars argue that Xi’s 
                                                     
361  12th Five-Year Plan included improving avenues for petitioners (public complaints); however, the draft proposals for the 13 th 
Five Year Plan show an emphasis on social management and control and only refer to ‘orderly public participation’ in decision-
making. 
362  See Minister of Education removal references to Western values and concepts at Chinese universities, The Guardian: ‘China 
says no room for 'western values' in university education’, these include ‘separation of powers’, multiparty elections and the 
corrupting influence of capitalism, 30 January 2015; for scholarly critique see A. Saich, ‘Controlling political communication 
and civil society under Xi Jinping’, MERICS China Series (June 2016); author’s interview with Mr. Y (name anonymised by 
request), Chinese national and teacher, Strasbourg, April 2016.  
363  See Osnos, The Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China (2014), p. 285 describing how Confucian 
scholars have been taken on board as private advisers on Confucian thought employed by Xi; echoed in discussions during 
author’s interview with Mr. Y (name anonymised by request), Chinese national and teacher, Strasbourg, April 2016. 
364  Author’s translation. 
365  See S. Heilmann, B. Conrad and M. Huotari, ‘Scenarios for Political Development under Xi Jinping’s Rule’, MERICS China 
Series (June 2016). 
366  See, inter alia, Fu Hualing, ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in Comparative 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013); R. MacFarquhar, ‘Leadership styles at the Party centre: From Mao Zedong to 
Xi Jinping’, Merics Papers on China (June 2016); See ‘China’s corruption crackdown 'netted 300,000 in 2015', BBC, 7 March 
2016.  
367  China has investigated around 300,000 officials for corruption in 2015. 200,000 officials were given so-called "light 
punishment", while more severe penalties were conferred further 80,000, according to official statistics released during China's 
annual parliamentary session; See ‘China’s corruption crackdown 'netted 300,000 in 2015', BBC, 7 March 2016; see also the 
investigation into Zhou Yongkang, who was one of the nine most senior politicians in China until 2012. The former Head of 
China's Security Services was investigated by the Communist Party Discipline Committee for various serious disciplinary 
violations, including charges of corruption, bribery, abuse of power and leaking state secrets. He was expelled from the CCP in 
December 2014, investigated during several months and is currently in prison; See also Fu Hualing, ‘The upward and 






consolidation of CCP power at a centralised level is being achieved through the removal of other 
factional vested interests that were integral to his predecessor’s (Hu Jintao) system of 
governance.368  
While the two above advantages may appear to be of equal benefit to the CCP, according to many 
China scholars, 369  the second is prioritised over the first: 370  the key reason for the war on 
corruption has been to avoid fragmentation of centralised CCP power – with the added benefit of 
increasing societal trust in government. Moreover, according to some critics, the war on 
corruption has provided Xi with an opportunity to remove or ‘purge’ potential political 
opponents.371  
Reform and consolidation of power may appear paradoxical, yet scholars argue that the reform of 
certain areas does not necessarily equate with opening up or the conferring of greater protections. 
China scholars acknowledge that Xi’s rule builds on factors of stability, such as improving living 
standards, strengthening Central CCP leadership and institutions of control, economic progress 
and development. 372 Yet, they also point to ‘powerful sources of fragility’ that undermine the 
CCP’s claim to power, such as external and internal market pressures, monopolistic political 
control and the gradual tightening of control over alternative voices or competition to the status 
quo.373  
                                                     
368  Similarities and differences in Xi’s leadership style to all of his predecessors have been highlighted in a Panel discussion with 
leading sinologists and scholars in a Podcast aired on 23 June 2016, “The Xi Jinping challenge: Will top-down leadership 
achieve political stability in China?” with R. McGregor, R. MacFarquhar, S. Heilmann and A. Saich; for more details on the 
operation of the CCP see ‘the Party’, R. McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Leaders, (UK; Allen 
Lane, 2010); See also Xi’s approach to recent reorganisation (2015-2916) of the PLA (China’s Military), where China scholar, 
You Ji, ‘Military reform: The politics of PLA reorganisation under Xi Jinping’, argues that ‘the emphasis on Central Military 
Commission chair one-man rule, along the lines of a Maoist Politburo, will further fragment civilian oversight of People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) activities’, MERICS China Series (June 2016), p. 46.  
369  See V. Shih, ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after the 19th 
Party Congress?’, MERICS China Series (June 2016); See Panel discussion with leading sinologists and scholars in Podcast 
aired on 23 June 2016, ‘The Xi Jinping challenge: Will top-down leadership achieve political stability in China?’ with R. 
McGregor, R. MacFarquhar, S. Heilmann and A. Saich; See also Anna L. Ahlers and Matthias Stepan, ‘Top-level design and 
local-level paralysis: Local politics in times of political centralisation’, MERICS China Series (June 2016). 
370  See Panel discussion with leading sinologists and scholars in Podcast aired on 23 June 2016, ‘The Xi Jinping challenge: Will 
top-down leadership achieve political stability in China?’ with R. McGregor, R. MacFarquhar, S. Heilmann and A. Saich.  
371  Ibid; see also Fu Hualing, ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in Comparative 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013). 
372  Heilmann, Conrad, Huotari ‘Scenarios for political development under Xi Jinping’s rule’, MERICS China Series (June 2016); 
Shih ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after the 19th Party 
Congress?’, MERICS China Series (June 2016). 
373  Heilmann, Conrad, Huotari ‘Scenarios for political development under Xi Jinping’s rule’, MERICS China Series (June 2016); 
Shih ‘Efforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping: Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics after the 19th Party 






The Chinese authorities have acknowledged the challenges of juggling the needs of a rapidly 
more informed society (and along with it the need for economic, social and legislative 
development) with the ongoing need to retain State unity, stability and harmony.374 This balance 
manifests itself as progress, on the one hand, on some rights – articulated in three-yearly Human 
Rights Action Plans (HRAP) (the most recent of which is for 2016-2020)375 – while, on the other, 
continuing to restrict other rights that help the State deal with individuals that jeopardise public 
order.376 Even within the sphere of the HRAP, the balance is weighted towards certain rights over 
others and the predominant emphasis remains on economic, social and cultural rights, as 
illustrated in a recent White Paper on assessing the impact of the most recent HRAP.377  
The authorities have highlighted significant developments in many areas of human rights’ 
protection, but also acknowledge that certain areas of human rights are in need of further 
strengthening:378  
“There is no best, only better human rights protection. The Chinese government is keenly 
aware it still faces many challenges despite China's tremendous achievements in the 
development of human rights. Its economic development mode is still crude and it is still 
fraught with problems from unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development. 
There is still a big gap between urban and rural development. There are still problems of 
immediate concern to the people remaining to be solved […]. The corruption and misconduct 
in some sectors cannot be ignored. There is still a long way to go to realize higher-level 
protection of human rights in China and hard efforts must be made.” 379 
                                                     
374  Fifth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, October 2015 and the proposals for the 13th Five Year Plan, 2016.  
375  From 2009 onwards China has been publishing tri-annual Humans Rights Action Plans (HRAP), see the most recent HRAP 
(2016-2020): the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020) issued by the State Council Information Office of 
the PRC on 29 Sept 2016 at: http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/09/29/content_281475454482622.htm [accessed 
29 June 2017]. 
376  See Chapters 3 and 4. 
377  The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, White Paper entitled "Assessment Report on the 
Implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015)", Published 14 June 2016 on Xinhuanet news; 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-06/14/c_135435326_3.htm. 
378  Ibid, part I. 






While there is a focus on economic, social and cultural rights’ development in policy-setting, 
there is less emphasis on civil and political rights’ development.380 Moreover, even in the sphere 
of social, economic and cultural rights, it is clear that the weight of emphasis is on protecting 
national harmony and security.381 Following along these lines, two recent laws have been passed 
that illustrate this priority, namely, the National Security Law, adopted on 1 July 2015382 and the 
2016 Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities within 
Mainland China.383 Both underline the weight that the authorities are currently giving to national 
unity and security and both curb freedoms previously available.  
A recent comparison of the most recent two Five-Year Plans and outcomes from the annual 
October CCP Plenums by sinologist and political-science scholar, Antony Saich, highlights an 
emphasis in the reform policy agenda away from promoting public involvement in economic 
development and other reforms to a newer emphasis on tighter central control in all aspects of 
governance. 384  Saich highlights: “the difference in attitude towards civic association from 
encouragement to control is shown by the different treatment in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Five-
Year Programmes (2011–15 and 2016–2020 respectively). The Twelfth Programme devoted a 
whole section to social management innovation. It called for more public participation to improve 
public services and policies using the phrase the ‘Party leads, government takes responsibility, 
society coordinates, and the public participates.’ This progress seemed to be maintained in the 
resolution of the 18th Central Committee’s 3rd Plenum (December 2013) where ‘social 
management innovation’ was replaced by ‘social governance’, encouraging social actors to have a 
role in governance alongside government and business. Subsequently, the actions outlined above 
reveal that the CCP has pulled back from this stance, presumably fearing the kind of activism that 
                                                     
380  See, for example, the ordering and priorities elaborated in the two most recent Five-Year Plans (12th and 13th), in China’s HRAP 
(2016-2020) and in the CCP central policy setting agenda to improve the living conditions and prosperity for the average 
Chinese citizen (see above).  
381  See Panel discussion with leading sinologists and scholars in Podcast aired on 23 June 2016: ‘The Xi Jinping challenge: Will 
top-down leadership achieve political stability in China?’ with R. McGregor, R. MacFarquhar, S. Heilmann and A. Saich; see 
also Saich, ‘Controlling political communication and civil society under Xi Jinping’, MERICS China Series (June 2016). 
382  National Security Law of the People's Republic of China, passed at the 15th Meeting of the 12th National People's Congress 
Standing Committee on 1 July 2015. 
383  PRC Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities within Mainland China, adopted at the 
20th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress on 28 April 2016. 






it seemed to be encouraging. By contrast, the recent Thirteenth Five-Year Programme 385 
emphasises control and monitoring.” 386 The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2016–2020) seeks 
to address China’s ‘unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable growth’ and create a 
‘moderately prosperous society in all respects’ through innovative […] and inclusive growth.387 
The section on innovation in social governance calls for a ‘law-based social governance system 
under the leadership of party committees.’388  
This background provides context to the priorities steering the CCP as it embarks on a series of 
law reforms. It aims to give a flavour to the constant pull evident in the later analysis of the 
reforms of the criminal justice sphere, towards the conferring of more protections for detainees, 
while at the same time, tightly controlling any aspect that might be considered as jeopardising 
stability. 
2.3 The Chinese criminal justice system: an overview 
The Chinese legal system has two main processes that allow for the deprivation of liberty of a 
person: the criminal-law justice system and administrative law. There is, in practice, an additional 
track, an unofficial tertiary process: the Party Constitution and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
discipline regulations that govern the shuanggui detention and interrogation of Party officials for 
unspecified durations of time on suspicion of violations of Party norms389 – most notably in the 
area of official corruption.  
As such, persons deprived of their liberty can be subject to one of three systems: criminal 
detention (police initial custody and remand in police detention) and then imprisonment; punitive 
administrative detention (de jure or de facto); or under shuanggui rules. The interplay between 
                                                     
385  13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2016. 
386  Saich, ‘Controlling political communication and civil society under Xi Jinping’, MERICS China Series (June 2016). 
387  K. Koleski, ‘The 13th Five-Year Plan’, U.S. China-Economic and security review Commission: Policy Brief, February 14, 
2017, ‘The 13th Five-Year Plan’, Executive Summary. 
388  Ibid, p. 24. 
389  Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on establishing Central and Local Commissions for 
Discipline Inspection; 9 November 1949, Article 2; as translated by F. Sapio, China scholar, blog Forgotten Archipelago, 






these three ‘justice pillars’ is ambiguous, boundaries can be porous, and detainees can be moved 
from one to another relatively easily. 
The two main pillars of the legal system (criminal and administrative) are intrinsically linked. 
Both deal with acts that are contrary to the relevant laws, however, the difference hinges on 
whether the given crime or infraction is, in the given circumstances, “minor” or “severe.”390 The 
relevant laws (the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Laws and punitive administrative laws391) are, 
in essence, codes proscribing a variety of actions as offences or administrative misdemeanours. 
The administrative laws cover, in theory, less serious actions and can result in shorter, 
administratively conferred, detention sanctions. Whereas the criminal laws cover more serious 
offences and can result in longer, and heavier, penalties. National and international scholarly 
discourse has focused on the term “circumstances”, which is not defined in the relevant laws. 
Scholars generally agree that it has a very broad meaning and that the Supreme People’s Courts 
and procuratorates have a key role to play in providing interpretation and clarification. 392 For 
example, Ira Belkin, a China law scholar, has stressed the importance of different bodies’ roles in 
helping to guide and interpret administrative and criminal law in China:  
“The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) […] publishes non-binding interpretations 
of the law that guide procurators nationwide, while the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
publishes binding interpretations and the Public Security Bureau (PSB) publishes 
advisory interpretations. These interpretations are important because Chinese 
legislation, particularly criminal legislation, is often vague. Determining what constitutes 
a criminal and capital offense can turn on interpretations of phrases such as ‘serious,’ 
‘large amount’, or ‘special circumstances”’.393 
                                                     
390  V. Mei-Ying Hung, ‘Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-Education Through Labor Be Abolished?’, Columbia 
Journal on Transnational Law, 41:303, 2003, p. 304.  
391  Each analysed in turn, later in the below Section. 
392  For examples see Shizhou Wang, ‘The Judicial Explanation in Chinese Criminal Law’, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 569, 575 (1995); 
see also Hung, ‘Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-Education Through Labor Be Abolished?’ (2003); see also I. 
Belkin, ‘China’s Criminal Justice System: a Work in Progress’, Criminal Justice in China, Washington Journal of Modern 
China, 2000. 






Belkin also points to the crucial need for such interpretation, given that the Chinese legal system 
overall is a civil one, based on statutory law; judges’ reasoning are not accompanied by written 
legal opinions, nor do judicial decisions set precedent, although they are binding. This view is 
mirrored in national discourse. For example, a leading national criminal justice scholar, Shizhou 
Wang, considers such guiding interpretation as ‘indispensable’ for lawyers, procurators and other 
relevant bodies to fully understand and practice Chinese law. 394  Nevertheless, other national 
scholars, for example Veron Mei-Ying Hung, have pointed to the limitations in such 
interpretations. Hung argues that the language found in the interpretations is often so broad and 
indeterminate that it still affords a wide scope of discretion in application and often lacks genuine 
clarification and guidance.395  
It is clear that interpretations evolve; allowing the guidance and interpretations to develop 
continuously. For example, a comparison by the author between the First Set of SPP Guiding 
Cases in 2010 and the most recent Set 7 in 2016, as well as the recently published SPP provisions 
on Case Guidance Work 2015, shows a relative increase in the detail and sophistication of the 
judicial reasoning. 396  Some of the guidance instruments are becoming comparatively more 
specific and progressive. An illustration of this is the Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on 
the Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of 2012, which recognises the infliction of mental 
suffering as torture and thus prohibits it. 
Background  
The current Chinese criminal justice system is relatively new397 and has undergone significant 
overhaul in recent years. 398  From a modern historical perspective, China’s legal institutions 
                                                     
394  Shizhou Wang, ‘The Judicial Explanation in Chinese Criminal Law’, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 569, 575 (1995). 
395  V. Mei-Ying Hung, ‘Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-Education Through Labor Be Abolished?’ (2003), p. 304.  
396  The "Supreme People's Procuratorate Provisions on Case Guidance Work", Gao Jian Fa Yan Zi [2015] No.12; Set 1 of SPP 
Guiding Cases in 2010 and Set 7 in 2016. 
397  China’s Criminal Law was adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on 1 July 1979 (revised 
subsequently but remains approximately its original format) and China’s 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, also adopted by the 
NPC in 1979, which was revised on 14 March 2012, when China's National People's Congress (NPC) adopted a series of 
amendments.  
398  For a detailed analysis of the origins and early reforms of China’s criminal justice system see K. Turner, J. Feinerman and R. 
Kent Guy, the Limits of the Rule of Law in China, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2000); in particular the 
problem of paradigms, p.3; see also Yuanyuan Shen, ‘Conceptions and Perceptions of legality: understanding the complexity of 
law reforms in Modern China’, The Limits of the Rule of Law in China, eds. K. Turner, J. Feinerman, and R. Kent Guy, 
(Washington: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 20; Nesossi, Biddulph, Sapio and Trevaskes, Legal Reforms and 






struggled to develop during much of the early and mid-twentieth century until the start of the 
Deng Xiaoping era399 and the start of far-reaching and wide-scale reform across many of China’s 
governance and judicial structures.400 China scholar Belkin describes post-imperial China from 
1911 to 1979 as a bleak period for the Chinese legal institutions with ‘little opportunity to 
develop during much of the twentieth century amidst the chaos of civil wars, World War II, and 
disruptive political campaigns’.401 The most recent and one of the most chaotic of these political 
movements was the Cultural Revolution, from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s. This resulted in 
almost all of legal institutions being abolished, including the traditional court and prosecution 
system. With Deng Xiaoping, the reform era began in 1979 and the legal institutions were 
gradually re-established.402 The CCP, however, remained both the predominant motivator and 
influencer in the decisions on how to shape and model the legal institutions, which reflect Soviet 
legacies and priorities, most notably in the structure and operation of the procuratorate.403 
Scholars specialising in China’s criminal justice system point to an increasingly number of 
protections for detainees in the revised criminal justice sphere as evidence of the political appetite 
to reform the legal system.404 There are various indications of positive developments from the late 
1990s onwards.405 These include the reform of the practice of prosecution by analogy ‘whereby a 
person could be charged with a crime if their conduct was analogous to other conduct specifically 
prohibited, even if the offence in question was not delineated in the criminal code’.406 Other early 
reforms included the abolition of the administrative detention ground of ‘shelter and 
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investigation’, whereby police could hold a suspect indefinitely while investigating the person's 
actual identity.407  
In March 2012, there was a second revision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). The revision 
affected a large number of Articles, and expands the CPL from 225 to 290 Articles. The CPL, in 
force from 1 January 2013, has been strengthened considerably and establishes various procedural 
guarantees for criminal suspects. It now specifies timeframes and required steps in the 
interrogation and initial detention process and restructures (and curbs) of the powers of law 
enforcement bodies.408 This has the objective of rendering the procedure more transparent. 
The Criminal Law (CL) has also undergone an overhaul, and was amended in 2015. In contrast to 
the CPL revisions, which saw protections added, the reforms here are reflective of a tougher 
stance on social and official control. The additions confer heavier sentences for various offences, 
inter alia, endangering the public security of the state (for example, amended Article 120), 
officials’ abuse of power (amended Article 164, on bribery prohibition), obstruction of the 
administration of social order (amended Article 291-1, on additional sanctions for prohibition of 
assembling a crowd in a public place to disrupt public order), expanded crimes of organising 
mystic sects or cult organisations and exploiting superstition to undermine the implementation of 
law (amended Article 300) and obstruction of justice (for example amended Articles on ethical 
conduct in court and court order (Articles 307 to 313).409  
The 1994 Detention Centre Regulations, which also govern the treatment of, and safeguards for, 
criminal-law suspects on remand (as well as some non-criminal (administrative) detainees) in 
KSSs, are in need of significant revision. The main problem is that the Detention Centre 
Regulations currently in force still date back to the early 1990s and confer only bare minimal 
guarantees and protection for detainees. The need for significant revisions to the KSS Centre 
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Regulations has been widely highlighted by Chinese and international scholars and civil 
society.410 While the Regulations have been widely criticised, nonetheless, despite the reform 
momentum in other areas, holistic revision and the much-needed conversion of these Regulations 
into legislation had stalled. 411  In 2014, China’s MPS announced that that the Ministry was 
drafting a new Detention Centre Law (DCL). The progress of the passage of the DCL in 2015-
2016 had stalled, and in some scholars’ views,412 has been stymied, but as of 2017, it appears to 
be back on track.  
In 2017, a proposal for a draft law was published for public consultation. The MPS underlined 
that the draft DCL is focused on bringing the law into line with the new Criminal Procedure Law 
(CPL) in order to serve the entire criminal justice system better. In June 2017, a draft proposal of 
a PRC Detention Centre Law was published for public consultation.413 While this draft law does 
propose more concrete safeguards for detainees (better access to bail and medical care for 
detainees and mandatory audio and video recordings of interrogations), other provisions have not 
changed and KSS remain under the sole responsibility of the PSB/police. 414  National legal 
scholars415 argue that while it is a step forward,416 it may well have a limited impact on reducing 
police torture given that despite repeated calls for courts or prosecutors to have control over 
detention centres (in light of many deaths in custody due to extraction of confessions) these 
remain under the responsibility of the PSB, along with insufficient transparency and oversight.417 
So far, there has been criticism levelled at the proposed draft law by lawyers and national scholars, 
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who foresee that the proposed revisions do not go far enough to eradicating the risk of torture 
(coerced confessions) by leaving the process under the sole responsibility of the PSB, without 
sufficient transparent and external oversight mechanisms in place.418 
The Chinese authorities, in a recent White Paper on the (self) assessment on the implementation 
of China’s most recent Human Rights Action Plan (2012 – 2015) have highlighted their efforts at 
reforming the criminal justice system:  
“to deepen the reform of the judicial system, to optimize the allocation of 
judicial powers, to improve the system of judicial responsibilities and to 
promote judicial transparency. The system of legal proceedings was revised 
and improved and the legal principles were strictly implemented to ensure 
legally prescribed punishment for a crime, innocence until proven guilty and 
the exclusion of illegal evidence. Stringent efforts were made to guarantee 
lawyers' rights to perform their duties and to guard against and rectify wrong 
or false convictions. Guarantees were in place to ensure that judicial organs 
can perform their duties independently and justly in accordance with the law. 
Citizens' rights of the person and rights to a fair trial were protected in 
accordance with the law to ensure that they can feel fairness and justice in 
every judicial case.”419 
Equally, some China legal scholars point to a general gradual ‘softening’ or leniency in terms of 
sentence lengths and alternatives to imprisonment, compared to two decades earlier.420 Legislative 
changes have also been in line with the national authorities’ emphasis on the policy of ‘yifa 
xingzhong’ (‘administrative rule according to the law’).421 Scholarly critique of the reforms has 
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generally acknowledged that the reforms have been significant and are slowly moving the 
Chinese criminal justice system to becoming closer in line with international human rights law, 
while arguing that many key areas need further attention and strengthening. 422  Some China 
scholars, such as Belkin and Lubman, point out that while the concept of ‘rule of law’ (yifa 
zhiguo) is an official policy of both the Chinese Communist Party and the government, ‘it would 
be more accurate to describe the rule of law as a long-term goal. China's legal system is, in fact, 
very much a work in progress’.423  
There remain tensions between this long-term goal of ‘rule of law’ (yifa zhiguo) with the actual 
policy of ‘administrative rule according to the law’ (yifa xingzhong). Such tensions have been 
subject to detailed debate in national academic and wider circles to establish whether China 
should, or would want, to adhere to a wider notion of the ‘rule of law’, which is seen by many 
Chinese to be a ‘Western’ and non-culturally specific concept.424 Moreover, various documents 
setting out the CCP’s wider political agenda, such as Document No. 9, establish that the ‘Western’ 
concept of ‘rule of law’, (separation of powers and complete judicial independence) 425  is 
explicitly not considered by the Chinese authorities to form part of the ‘socialist rule with Chinese 
characteristics’. 426  This policy is an illustration of the underlying precept that, in China, 
governance should be regulated by, and abide by, laws and regulations, to ensure greater 
transparency; but that this does not imply the separation of powers, as all elements of governance, 
including the judiciary, ultimately are subject to Party rule. 
Equally, many China legal scholars point to other limitations in the reforms undertaken in the 
legal sphere since 2012. They argue that the reforms reflect Xi Jinping’s wider political objectives 
and ensure top-level centralised CCP influence remains over the legal system.427 They point to the 
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contrast between judicial reform at the local level, which is gradually rendering local judicial 
organs more independent from local government interference, compared to the lack of similar 
reform to protect against top-level central government interference.428  In addition, many are 
concerned at the remaining procedural protection gaps in the revised laws, as well as pointing out 
that the letter of the law – with the notional added protections - does not necessarily equate with 
the actual practice in China currently.429 Indeed, many China scholars see a pattern and current 
contraction in the reform process: while on the one hand strengthened rights are gradually being 
afforded, one the other more restrictions are being applied (e.g., increased restriction placed on 
the conduct of lawyers, internet censorship, on civil society, etc.).430 Scholars argue that this 
reform cycle does not necessarily equate with the adoption of more liberal, or strengthened, rights 
in practice.431 
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2.4 Analysis of the scope of existing protections & key ‘preventive measures’ 
in three justice processes: Criminal, Administrative and Party 
This Section identifies and documents the extent to which any protections, safeguards and 
‘preventive measures’ are available within the three Chinese justice processes in focus (criminal, 
administrative and Party), and examines their current scope, in light of the requirements under 
IHRL.432 Chapter 3 will examine the effectiveness of the measures in practice, and assess any 
deficiencies or protection gaps evident in these safeguards. 
I. Analysis of current criminal law prevention measures & their scope 
The numerous laws and regulations governing criminal procedure in China have been subject to a 
series of reforms. The primary texts, in this respect, are the CPL, which was significantly revised 
in 2012 and the CL, revised in 2015. Other laws and regulations have also been changed or are 
under revision, including the People's Procuratorate Rules of Criminal Procedure (Provisional) 
and the Detention Centre Regulations. Both primary criminal law instruments (CPL and CL) set 
out the parameters of the various criminal offences, grounds for arrest, investigation and initial 
custody by law enforcement officials (PSB/police and – in some cases433 – procurators).434  
Within the Chinese criminal-law justice process, the groups of key ‘preventive measures’, as 
identified under IHRL norms (Chapter 1), are examined in turn: 
(i) Torture prohibition 
The Criminal Procedure Law (Article 50), the Criminal Law (Articles 247 and 248) and the 
Detention Centre Regulations (Article 3) prohibit and punish specific acts that could be 
considered as torture or other ill-treatment. There are also similar prohibitions in the Prison 
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Law,435 the Judges Law,436 the Prosecutors Law and the Police Law,437 as well as the Chinese 
Constitution (although not as an explicit prohibition438). There are, however, concerns that those 
provisions do not include all the elements of the definition of torture set out in Article 1 of the 
UNCAT.  
IHRL bodies, including the CAT Committee and the UN SRT, have underscored their serious 
concerns about the lack of a comprehensive definition of torture in China and its effect on 
prevention.439 The concerns include that acts in the above laws focus primarily on extracting 
confessions through torture or obtaining witness statements through violence (xingxun bi gong). 
Issues lie in the ambiguity in the national legislative prohibitions of torture and ill-treatment, as to 
specifically what types of acts can qualify as ‘torture’. There has been some progress in the 
definition in China and some interpretative guiding texts have been drafted (such as the SPP’s 
Provisional Criminal Procedural Regulations) 440  and the SPC has now published its own 
interpretation regarding the torture definition in the CPL, as including direct bodily punishment, 
indirect physical punishment and “use of other methods that cause the defendant to suffer severe 
pain or suffering, either physically or mentally”.441 However, the CAT Committee, civil society 
bodies and national scholars are concerned that these interpretations are perceived as primarily 
applying to issues of exclusion of evidence rather than criminal responsibility.442  
IHRL bodies and civil society stress that lawyers and procurators are regularly encountering 
definitional challenges, highlighting perceptions held by procurators and the judiciary that acts 
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such as punching, kicking, beating with water bottles, prolonged exposure to cold and heat are not 
being considered as ‘serious’ enough to qualify as torture. 443 These point to both regulatory 
protection gaps in the torture definition in national legislation, but also to implementation gaps in 
understanding and applying the few existing protections in practice.  
Another regulatory deficiency is evident in article 247 of the CPL, which specifies that extraction 
of confession by torture needs to be carried out by ‘judicial officers’ (sifa gongzuo renyuan). 
These are defined in article 94 of the CL as including investigators, procurators, adjudicators, 
supervisors and court officials. Article 248 of the CL does cover prison or KSS staff abuse of 
detainees and prisoners and issues of inter-prisoner violence when instigated by officials or 
through negligence to protect detainees. Nevertheless, these above provisions do not cover all 
persons that could be involved in torture or ill-treatment, such as CCP discipline officials or 
private individuals or companies acting with consent of, on behalf of, the state. This regulatory 
protection gap has drawn severe criticism internationally. The CAT Committee has specifically 
expressed its concern that the Chinese torture and other ill-treatment prohibition does not cover 
all public officials and persons acting in an official capacity.444 It highlights that the crime of 
beating or ill-treating detainees (Article 248 of the Criminal Law), ‘restricts the scope of the 
crime to the actions of officers of an institution of confinement or of other detainees at the 
instigation of those officers. It is also restricted to the infliction of physical abuse only’. 445 
Overall, all these concerns persist, despite the reforms of 2012 (which have not specifically 
addressed these), and notwithstanding the deficiencies being highlighted repeatedly by IHRL 
bodies such as the UN SRT and the CAT Committee,446 China scholars447 and civil society.448 
Thus, despite some progress, China still lacks a comprehensive definition of torture and ill-
treatment in its national law. This is a clear regulatory protection gap that needs to be addressed. 
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Further, it impacts how investigators, procurators and the judiciary view abuse and what can or 
can’t constitute torture (as seen above). If these bodies and persons consider an act to not be 
serious enough, many potential torture or ill-treatment allegations will not be investigated or 
prosecuted. This could be one (of many) reason(s) for such low prosecution of torture cases in 
China (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). It also links with the issue of impunity (Chapter 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.), 
as underlined by the CAT Committee that considers that discrepancies in torture definitions 
generally,449 and in China specifically,450  create a loophole in which impunity flourishes.451 
(ii) Key existing preventive safeguards and guarantees in Chinese criminal 
law 
While there have been various protections added to the CPL, this section selects, for analysis, 
certain of the core procedural guarantees and safeguards most relevant for the context of torture 
prevention. The section identifies the existing safeguards in Chinese law and examines their 
scope.452 Chapter 3 will look at their actual practice, and assess any deficiencies or protection 
gaps evident in these safeguards. 
The system of interrogation and detention is complex but can be unpacked into discrete sections 
depending on the nature of the crime allegedly committed and by whom. The areas of police 
custody depend on different levels of police hierarchies. At a national level there are ‘gong an bu’ 
(national police HQ), at a provincial level, ‘gong an ding’ (provincial police Headquarters), at a 
city level, ‘gong an ju’ (city police stations), at a township and village level, local police station 
HQs and local police stations. The PSB/police investigate ordinary crimes and a branch of the 
procuratorate investigates crimes allegedly committed by public officials. 
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 Time-limited police custody & right to be brought before a judicial authority 
promptly  
Time-limited custody 
The CPL specifies that for criminal offences the PSB / police has the power of arrest on various 
grounds, including on suspicion of the commission of a crime.453 The arrest454 is subject to the 
approval of the Procuratorate455 or the Courts.456 The CPL stipulates that police – or in specific 
cases, the procurators – shall conduct interrogation within 24 hours of detention.457 However, this 
is subject to certain exceptions. 
While maximum time-periods for interrogation and the interrogation process have been revised, 
some lengthy exceptions remain. The practice, until recently, was that once arrested, suspects 
were held in initial police custody and initially interviewed, then held in ‘juliusuo’ (further police 
custody), where they could remain while the police further investigated and gathered evidence to 
prepare a case against them. In the case of minor crimes, if the police need longer to investigate a 
given case, detainees could be taken from the ‘juliusuo’ to a ‘juyisuo’ – a police lock-up or 
custody suite facility from post-charge and pre-sentence or for sentenced prisoners of minor 
crimes. 
A recent amendment in the law458 stipulates that detainees should now be moved to a Kanshousuo 
(KSS) police-run pre-trial detention centre within 24 hours of arrest. Some Chinese scholars459 
consider that this was a move initiated by Chinese legislators to try to mitigate the risk of torture 
and other ill-treatment in initial police custody and to move detainees to police detention centres 
(for those on remand and under PSB or procuratorate investigation, or those sentenced to an 
administrative detention penalty460).461 Nevertheless, in practice, suspects can be taken out from, 
and slotted back into, the KSSs throughout the investigation for interrogation purposes. Before 
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procurator approval of deprivation of liberty (the official ‘arrest’ approval), detainees can be held 
for up to 15 days, and with exceptions, up to 38 days.462 Once arrest has been approved by the 
procurator, there is technically a maximum of two months to prepare the case; however, this can 
be extended for certain complicated cases to a maximum of 7 months,463 including all permissible 
delays and exceptions.464 In practice this can be far longer.465 
The CPL itself, however, creates so many exceptions that many detainees, due to the seriousness 
or complexity of their alleged offences, by law, stay in some type of police custody (whether 
initial custody, interim policy custody or pre-trial police detention) for weeks, if not months, into 
the investigation. Even when moved across to different places of police detention, they ultimately 
remain in the same place for interrogation and custody operated by the same body, the PSB, with 
procuratorial oversight. 
The Procuratorate has seven days from receipt of the investigator’s request to approve the arrest. 
The Procuratorate itself is an administrative body that retains some judicial characteristics in that 
although it is not part of the Court system, it retains an official oversight function of the legality 
of the processes run by the respective bodies over which it has jurisdiction and, in addition, 
exercises prosecutorial powers.466 Once the arrest has been approved, the time limit for holding a 
criminal suspect in the police detention facility (KSS) during investigation is a maximum of two 
months, which is extendable for another month for normal cases and by another two months and 
then two more months for complex cases. 467  The maximum timeframe that a case can be 
investigated for and that a detainee can be held in a KSS on remand / pre-trial is up to 13 
months.468 If sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment, those detained on remand are then 
moved to a ‘jian yu’ (prison). KSSs can also hold some persons sentenced to administrative 
                                                     
462  See Article 89, exceptions cover major crime suspect involved in crimes committed in different places, repeated commission of 
crimes / recidivism, or crime committed in a gang’; See also Part VII on CPL revisions in Comparative Perspectives on 
Criminal Justice in China (2013). 
463  Summary of CPL criminal procedural maximum timeframes: Criminal Procedure Timing Chart, dated 07/10/2015, depending 
on PSB or Procuratorate investigation, at http://chinalawtranslate.com/case-handling-chart/. 
464  M. Dutton and Xu Zhong Run, ‘A question of difference: the theory and practice of Chinese prison’, Crime, Punishment and 
Policing in China, ed. Børge Bakken, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005); see the revisions in the CPL in 2012 
and 2014 in Criminal Procedure Timing Chart, dated 07/10/2015 at http://chinalawtranslate.com/case-handling-chart/. 
465  Author’s interview with wife of Mr. X, (a detainee in remand detention) (name anonymised) and see Thesis Chapter 3. 
466  Article 5, CPL. 
467  Articles 124 – 126. 






detention penalties, compulsory measures ordered by PSB or procurators in investigation, and 
those awaiting deportation.469 
The right to be brought before a judicial authority speedily 
There are several concerns regarding the full respect of the right for a criminal suspect to be 
brought promptly before a judge or competent judicial authority as well as the possibilities, 
permitted by law, of prolonged detention. The right of the criminal suspect to be brought before a 
judicial authority and of anyone deprived of their liberty to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention (habeas corpus) have been widely recognised as rights established in general 
international law and as necessary guarantees to prevent torture.470 Various problems are evident 
in this respect in China’s CPL. First, China’s criminal suspects are not brought before a judge, 
instead it is a procurator who is involved in approving detention (i.e. an administrative, rather 
than judicial, authority). Second, the procurator remotely approves the arrest (i.e., does not 
directly see the suspect). Third, the need for short time-frames in initial police custody and the 
nature of being brought ‘promptly’ before a judge has been subject to detailed examination by the 
IHRL bodies and international and regional courts, with some bodies (such as the HRC) holding 
that this should be within 48 hours and others (such as ECHR case law) underlining that four days 
is the maximum time-limit. The seven-day period in which the procurator can approve the arrest 
would be unlikely to be considered ‘prompt’ under IHRL, in line with the obligations and 
jurisprudence highlighted in Chapter 1. 
The permissibility of extended detention / prolonged detention had been a cause for concern 
nationally, especially in the legal circles and academic discourse.471 So much so that the Chinese 
Ministry of Justice has, in 2015, issued ‘Provisional Provisions on Efforts to Prevent and Correct 
Cases of Extended Detention and Prolonged Detention without Resolution by Criminal 
                                                     
469  See list and analysis of China’s Administrative Detention Regulations in Biddulph, Legal Reform and Administrative Detention 
Powers in China (2007); Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, Part V (2013); and Biddulph, ‘What to make 
of the abolition of re-education through labour?’, Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016); 
and Part 1 of Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016). 
470  See Thesis Chapter 1. 
471  See Nesossi and Cheng Lei, ‘China’s pre-trial detention centres: challenges and opportunities for reform’, Legal Reforms and 
Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China (2016); MacBean, ‘Addressing the ‘hide and seek’ scandal: restoring the 
legitimacy of Kanshousuo’ (2016); Sapio, Trevaskes, Nesossi and Biddulph, Part III, Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty 






Enforcement Prosecution Departments of People's Procuratorates’.472 This includes the definition 
of extended detention in Article 2:  
“Where the period of detention for criminal suspects or defendants in the investigation, 
review for prosecution or trial phases exceeds the legal prescribed period of detention, it is 
a case of extended detention. Where criminal suspects or defendants have been detained 
for more than five years, and the case is still in the investigation, review for prosecution, 
first-instance or second-instance trial phase, [these] are cases of prolonged detention with 
no resolution.” 
It also sets out how the issue of extended detention should be countered in Article 3: ‘prevention 
and correction of cases of extended detention and prolonged detention without resolution, follows 
the principles of peer supervision, hierarchic oversight, facilitating work, and emphasizing 
prevention’. Articles 17 and 18 specify that corrective opinion or discipline sanctions will be 
given by the chief procurator for prosecuting procurators’ use of extended detention and ‘where 
the circumstances are serious or a crime is suspected, pursue criminal liability in accordance with 
law’. To bolster the review system of the necessity of detention, in 2016 the Procuratorate issued 
the ‘People's Procuratorate Provisions on Handling Cases of Reviewing the Necessity of 
Detention (Provisional)’473 in order to ‘strengthen and normalise the review of the necessity of 
detention, safeguard the lawful rights and interests of criminal suspects or defendants under arrest, 
and to guarantee the smooth proceedings of criminal procedural activities.’474 
These ‘Provisional Provisions’, however, act as interpretative guidance to prosecuting procurators 
only, and do not alter the CPL or CL. The fact of initial steps to address the problem of prolonged 
detention is a positive move. Nevertheless, four problems with the current system remain. 
                                                     
472  Provisions on Efforts to Prevent and Correct Cases of Extended Detention and Prolonged Detention without Resolution by 
Criminal Enforcement Prosecution Departments of People's Procuratorates (Provisional), April 2015 (人民检察院刑事执行检
察部门预防和纠正超期羁押和久押不决案件工作规定（试行）). 
473  The Judicial interpretation of 22 January 2016; and accompanying Circular of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the 
People’s Republic of China, Gao Jian Zhi Jian [2016] No. 37, Circular on Issuing the Guiding Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate’s Prison Management Bureau on Implementing the Provisions on the Handling of Detention Necessity 
Review Cases by People’s Procuratorates (for Trial Implementation), 8 July 2016. 






a) Permissibility in the law per se allows for prolonged extension – and the legally 
permissible terms are extremely, if not excessively, long. 
b) Even these long permissible terms can be bypassed in reality, to such an extent 
that procurators are being reminded to keep the legal limits in check. 
c) The inherent set up of the procuracy: prosecuting procurators extending detention 
terms for reasons of prolonging investigation times, onsite procurators 
supervising lengths of detention terms and higher-level procurators overseeing 
and able to criticise the extensions. The current structural set-up lacks checks and 
balances. 
d) There is no explicit right in law affording the suspect to be brought in person 
before a judge or proactively to challenge the detention decision (lack of habeas 
corpus rights).475  
 Audio-visual recording of interrogations & physical separation  
Other strengthened preventive safeguards in the CPL taken with a view to mitigating the risk of 
torture and other ill-treatment include the requirement of CCTV in police interrogation rooms, 
physical separation of the interrogator and suspect, a requirement of no fewer than two 
investigators to conduct the interrogation / interview and increased recordings of interrogations.476 
These are seemingly positive moves towards establishing the necessary safeguards in law to 
strengthen detainees’ protection and help prevent torture.477 Nevertheless, these are subject to the 
discretion of the interviewer, in the law, and are only applicable for suspects of certain crimes. An 
illustration of this is the safeguard of audio-visual recording of interrogation, established in 
Article 121 of the CPL. This stipulates:  
“When investigators interrogate a criminal suspect, they may make audio or video 
recordings of the interrogation process, for suspects that might be sentenced to life in 
                                                     
475  See further analysis in Chapter 3 and the deficiencies and protection gaps identified with this safeguard. 
476  For example, Articles 116 to 121, CPL. 
477  See Chen Wei Dong and T. Spronken, Three Approaches to Combatting Torture in China, (Intersentia 2012); MacBean, 






prison or death, or in other major criminal cases, they shall make an audio or video 
recording of the interrogation process. Audio or video recordings shall be made of the 
entire process, to preserve their integrity.”478  
This preventive safeguard is only available for suspects of major crimes (such as gang-related 
crimes, repeated public order crimes), due to the fact that heavier penalties are specified in law 
for recidivism, cases of corruption, bribery or graft, or those suspects who, if sentenced, face 
potential life-imprisonment or the death penalty (i.e., not ‘ordinary’ / ‘run of the mill’ criminal 
suspects). This is an area where the ‘ordinary’ suspect (the majority) is afforded less protection in 
regulation than suspects of more serious or sensitive offences (the minority).479  
In order to help interpretation of this safeguard, in 2014 the MPS issued the ‘Regulations on 
Making Audio-Video Recordings by the Public Security Organs When Interrogating Criminal 
Suspects’ and the SPP amended the ‘Provisions on Making Synchronous Audio-Video 
Recordings Throughout the Entire Process of Interrogation of Duty-Related Criminal Suspects’. 
Both guide interrogators to use audio-video recording throughout the entire process of 
interrogating all criminal suspects. Nonetheless, they act as guidance only. As it is not the law, it 
is unsurprising that in practice there are no systematic and full recordings of all suspects’ 
interrogations.480  
 Access to a lawyer, doctor and third party notification guarantees 
The ‘trinity’ of core procedural safeguards for those deprived of their liberty, namely (i) access to 
a lawyer and (ii) doctor, as well as for (iii) notification of detention to a third party are established 
in the CPL in China for criminal suspects. Some of these (i and iii) are also afforded in the current 
Detention Centre Regulations governing KSSs (police-run remand detention centres)481. 
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Articles 31 to 47 of the CPL stipulate that suspects have the right to contact legal defence lawyers 
or other representatives, whom they can consult in private. Nevertheless, the scope of this right is 
limited. First, access to a lawyer is only mandatory within 48 hours of deprivation of liberty and 
only possible after the initial interrogation has taken place. 482  Further, this safeguard is not 
afforded to all criminal suspects, only those suspected of ‘ordinary’ crimes. For those suspected 
of more serious crimes, and any crime endangering national security, permission has to be first 
sought from the procurator for a detainee’s access to a lawyer. This permission may be withheld, 
without specifying a time limit for review of the reason. 483  These are all contrary to the 
international law requirements regulating this area, identified in Chapter 1. 
Similarly, suspects are afforded, in law, the right of third-party notification of the fact of their 
detention484  and the right only to be detained pursuant to a valid detention order/warrant.485 
Regarding right of third-party notification of the fact of their detention, the CPL establishes that:  
‘the family of the detainee shall be notified of the detention within 24 hours [of] the 
detention, unless the notification cannot be processed or where the detainee is involved in 
crimes endangering State security or crimes of terrorist activities, and such notification 
may hinder the investigation. The family of the detainee shall be notified of relevant 
information immediately after the circumstances impeding investigation has been 
eliminated.’ 486 
As is clear from the wording of this safeguard, the scope is limited. The same potential for 
indefinite delay for certain suspects (those endangering national security) as seen in the access to 
lawyer safeguard is also applicable to this third party notification right. Moreover, the right is not 
available from the very outset of detention and the wording lacks precision and legal certainty, 
leaving considerable room for ambiguity. China legal scholars, such as MacBean, Lubman, 
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Trevaskes and Pils,487 have pointed out that there remain various controversial aspects to the 
CPL’s amendments including that the new provision (Article 83) does not include a requirement 
to indicate the person's whereabouts to the relatives.488  
Automatic access to a doctor from the outset of detention is not established as a right in the CPL. 
Article 130 does however stipulate that ‘to ascertain certain features, conditions of injuries, or 
physical conditions of a victim or a criminal suspect, a physical examination may be conducted, 
and fingerprints, blood, urine and other biological samples may be collected. If a criminal suspect 
refuses to be examined, the investigators, when they deem it necessary, may conduct a 
compulsory examination. Examination of the persons of women shall be conducted by female 
officers or doctors.’ This is a generally weak safeguard owing to non-systematic nature of initial 
medical screening for all detainees upon arrival. 
 Safeguards to protect lawyers and ensure they can represent clients 
Criminal Law provisions have been amended in 2015, to better guarantee the Courts’ independent 
and impartial adjudication according to the law. In this respect, there are two notable amendments. 
First, the criminalisation of ‘conduct of judicial personnel, defenders, agents ad litem or other 
parties to litigation who reveal information that should not be disclosed about a case that, 
according to the law, should not be tried in public’, and disseminating such information openly 
(Article 34). Second, the amendment to the crime of ‘disrupting the courtroom order’ and its 
expansion to ‘gathering a crowd to racket or attack the court, beat judicial work personnel’ as 
well as ‘other conduct that severely disrupts the courtroom order’, including insulting, defaming 
or threatening judicial work personnel or other parties to litigation, and generally not obeying the 
courts’ orders (Article 35). These provisions are aimed at improving professional ethics and 
                                                     
487  See MacBean, ‘Addressing the hide and seek scandal’, Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China 
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courtroom etiquette, in that they criminalise improper behaviour. They do not per se act as 
safeguards to ensure that lawyers can defend their clients without hindrance or fear or reprisals.489  
 Exclusion of evidence obtained under duress 
Another recent amendment to the CPL, made to strengthen the protection against torture in initial 
police custody, is the addition of the new provision to exclude any evidence coerced by means of 
torture from being used as evidence in court proceedings.490 Scholars and civil society have 
acknowledged this as a positive move.491 Yet, this protection too has seen gaps between the 
theory of the law and actual practice: its effectiveness has been questioned by legal scholars, 
IHRL bodies and civil society and is examined in Chapter 3.492 
 
(iii) Overall functioning of the criminal-law justice system: current status 
The criminal justice system operates along the lines described above. The objectives of the recent 
reforms to the criminal justice system have been to deepen transparency, accessibility, cut 
bureaucracy / ‘red-tape’ and remove previously embedded interference from local government in 
the remit of judiciary (i.e., to strengthen the institution of the judiciary from local bureaucracy 
and interference). As emphasised in the authorities’ own assessment of their progress in 
implementation of the China’s NHAP 2012 – 2015, reforms in the criminal justice sphere now 
ensure  
‘legally prescribed punishment for a crime, innocence until proven guilty and the 
exclusion of illegal evidence. Stringent efforts were made to guarantee lawyers' rights to 
perform their duties and to guard against and rectify wrong or false convictions. 
Guarantees were in place to ensure that judicial organs can perform their duties 
independently and justly in accordance with the law. Citizens' rights of the person and 
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490  Article 54. 
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rights to a fair trial were protected in accordance with the law to ensure that they can 
feel fairness and justice in every judicial case.’493  
The rationale and scale of the reforms have been examined in detail by various China legal 
scholars, such as Lubman,494 Chen and Shi-Kupfer,495 McConville and Pils,496 Nesossi, Sapio, 
Biddulph and Trevakes.497  Chen and Shi Kupfer argue that ‘Xi’s new blueprint for judicial 
reforms is different to those of his predecessors in that it neither allows local Party committees to 
exert overwhelming control over the local court system (as under Jiang Zemin), nor imposes 
severe punishment on judges for making controversial court decisions that may have widespread 
social impacts (as under Hu Jintao).’498 They point to reforms undertaken to restore a credible 
court system by curbing nepotism and corruption and moves to make courts and procuratorates 
more independent from local governments to preclude interference and enhance working 
efficiency. They also highlight evidence indicative of change: ‘starting in 2015, the CCP 
leadership has transferred the power of local governments over the budget plans of judicial organs 
in their administrative districts uniformly to financial departments at the provincial level. 
Moreover, some pilot local courts (e.g., in Shanghai) have been established to hear trials across 
different jurisdictional zones. These measures mark a progressive reform scheme that permits the 
convergence of budgetary control of all the judicial organs within a province only at the 
provincial government level. As the financial nepotism between sub-provincial governments and 
judicial organs in their municipalities is cut off, the political clout of those local governments 
with local judicial organs dwindles.’ 499  
Nevertheless, these same scholars argue that despite some moves to rationalise the operation of 
the judiciary, in reality the reforms serve to ‘amplify the fundamental lack of judicial 
independence at the central level’. They argue that ‘the judicial reforms so far have turned the 
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heat on local judicial and government functionaries. Whereas local judicial organs may be more 
independent from local governments than before, Xi and his colleagues are well aware that the 
monopolistic rule of the Party may soon disintegrate if they introduce an exhaustive process of 
liberalising China’s judicial system. The failure to adopt equally efficient measures for 
inoculating judicial organs against political control at the central level, remains a fundamental 
flaw that enervates the professional ethos of judges even at higher levels.’500  
These findings are supported by many other China scholars,501 who point to obstacles facing the 
judiciary’s notional impartiality and a pattern of persistent CCP top-level interference in judicial 
affairs, despite the legal reforms that, in theory, have been aimed at strengthening the overall 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
(iv) Complaints avenues 
There is scant publicly available information, even in Chinese, about the complaints’ mechanisms 
in places of detention in China. This may reflect that it is a nascent and developing area. This 
analysis draws on two main sources: one publicly accessible, from the Chinese authorities’ 
detailed response to the CAT Committee’s List of Issues sent to China in June 2015, and 
responded to in October 2015, in preparation for China’s Fifth Periodic Reporting cycle; the 
second is information shared with the author by Renmin University Chinese scholars, senior 
procurators and their partners, who are advising the government and leading the work on draft 
proposals for legislation in this area.502 Since 2006/7, they have been working in partnership with 
external international partners such as the Great Britain China Centre (GBCC) (a specialist body 
that implements projects and facilitates exchanges on judicial and legal reform in China), the Max 
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Plank Foundation and Essex University (Professor Sir Nigel Rodley), among others, on proposals 
to strengthen certain torture prevention measures in China, including the complaints mechanisms 
in KSSs and, increasingly, in prisons. 
China has recently trialled and then introduced an internal complaints’ system in both the prisons 
system and in the KSSs (police-operated remand detention); first, in various regions across China, 
and then, increasingly, nation-wide. Hundreds of procurators are now based in prisons (‘onsite 
procurators’) and KSSs across China, mandated, among other aspects, to receive and address 
detainee and prisoner complaints.503 Moreover, onsite procurators can now receive and address 
complaints about different aspects of the nature of detention (previously, procurators were only 
mandated to examine the legality of detention). This includes the right of the detainee to contact 
and see the procurator in person with complaints about potential ill-treatment, inter-prisoner 
bullying, aspects of his/her solitary confinement for discipline purposes or for the purpose of the 
protection of self or others, as well as other grievances that detainees may wish to air.504  
The legal basis of prisoner and detainee complaints stems from Articles 21 to 24 of China’s 
Prison Law. These establish: 
Article 22: 第二十二条 对罪犯提出的控告、检举材料，监狱应当及时处理或者转送公安机关
或者人民检察院处理，公安机关或者人民检察院应当将处理结果通知监狱。 (A 
prison shall without delay handle the complaints or accusations made by 
prisoners, or transfer the above material to a public security organ or a people's 
procuratorate for handling. The public security organ or the people's 
procuratorate shall inform the prison of the result of its handling.)  
Article 23: 第二十三条 罪犯的申诉、控告、检举材料，监狱应当及时转递，不得扣压。 (A 
prison shall transfer without delay the petitions, complaints and accusations made 
by prisoners and shall not withhold them.)  
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These provisions, along with the general right of complaint to the procurators established in the 
CPL (Articles 107 and 115) currently form the legal basis of detainees’ right to complain in a 
prison setting.  The scope of this legal basis has, however, been criticised by various Chinese 
scholars and legal practitioners in this area. In their view, there is lack of detail or guidance on 
complaints mechanisms at the national level in law, regulation or advisory texts, and this has led 
to problems in the implementation and standardisation across prisons across the country. In KSS 
settings, the legal basis for complaints’ has until recently not existed, however, the recently 
proposed draft Detention Centre Law,505 and MPS Regulation on KSS Handling of Detainee 
Complaints506 aim to regulate this area, albeit relatively vaguely. In practice, current complaints 
mechanisms in KSSs and prisons vary significantly and there remain significant protection 
gaps.507  
The Renmin University’s Judicial Reform Research Centre (CCJR) and GBCC, through their 
project to strengthen complaints mechanisms in KSSs and, increasingly, in prisons in certain 
regions in China, have been able to shed light on the current practice in certain KSS and 
prisons.508 The pilot detention places focussed upon had established a variety of avenues for 
complaints to reach the prison authorities and onsite procurators. These include (i) a complaints 
box, (ii) interviews with prison officers (should the detainee so request), (iii) the ‘Detainee 
Handbook’ (with compulsory weekly ‘reflection forms’ to be completed by detainees, where they 
can theoretically voice concerns or complaints) and (iv) access to the onsite procurator (with 
whom the detainee can request a one-one interview) and who is accessible, theoretically, on 
his/her daily walk around the detention areas. 
The Chinese authorities have openly acknowledged that it has not established a completely 
external body that receives complaints in the form of an Ombudsperson or similar body, but they 
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argue that there are, nonetheless, many public institutions that undertake similar duties.509 For 
example, mechanisms exist within the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for 
complaint letters and calls. The PRC government, at various levels, can also accept, investigate 
and deal with complaints. The higher levels of the Procuratorate are mandated by law to carry out 
the supervision of detention facilities and can also receive and address complaints concerning 
detainees’ safeguards and protection rights.510 Yet, there remain various obstacles facing nascent 
complaints’ mechanisms and their effective operation in practice; these are examined in Chapter 4. 
 
(v) Preventive monitoring 
A recent Opinion from the Ministry of Justice on ‘deepening transparency in prison affairs’511 
underscores the authorities’ view that supervision / oversight is an essential measure to prevent 
abuse in prison:  
“The guiding thoughts for further deepening openness in prison affairs are: […] (3) 
The principle of strengthening oversight. Strengthen internal oversight, lawfully 
accepting supervision of the procuratorates, conscientiously accepting supervision 
from people's congresses and political consultative conferences as well as social 
supervision; ensuring the sustainable and healthy development of openness in prison 
affairs.”[sic] 512 
A system of inspections and a type of (limited) preventive monitoring of some places of 
deprivation of liberty has, since 2006, started to be trialled in China. The prison system is also 
showing signs of become slightly more transparent and open in that Deputies to the People’s 
Congresses and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members can 
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inspect prison on an annual basis, and certain are open to the public during specific periods.513 
Equally, there are indications of some reforms in the KSSs where, according to the authorities, 
“specially invited supervisors, and more than two supervisors may inspect the detention house at 
any time.”514 Further, KSSs can also invite Deputies to the People’s Congresses and CPPCC 
members to inspect them. The authorities emphasise that procuratorial organs have from 2008 
until May 2015 undertaken 14,070 unscheduled visits to detention facilities and reported their 
findings to the Deputies to the People’s Congresses.515  
Moreover, the authorities point to a concerted push, by the MPS, to make KSSs more open and 
transparent.516 This has been prompted, some scholars believe, by a series of scandals involving 
numerous reports of abuse, 517  with a view to increasing public scrutiny and confidence, by 
enabling visits by lawyers, the (strictly controlled) media, and – with valid permissions – visitors 
to detainees.518 The authorities acknowledge, however, there is no data available showing the 
visitation of local civil society organisations.519 
The first steps towards the recognition of the need for preventive monitoring, and consequently, 
the trialling of the preventive monitoring concept in China are significant and positive 
developments. These were initiated by Chinese scholars, lawyers and senior officials of the 
Procuratorate and Ministry of Justice, with the authorities’ endorsement and active participation, 
in partnership with external experts.520 The first trial pilot project began in 2006, to test the 
preventive monitoring concept in a selected recognised problematic detention sphere in China, 
                                                     
513  See China’s Response to List of CAT Issues, para. 20. 
514  Ibid. 
515  According to the Chinese authorities, there were: 1,498 visits in 2008, 1,618 in 2009, 1,743 in 2010, 1,729 in 2011, 1,792 in 
2012, 1,981 in 2013, 2,342 in 2014, 1,367 in January to May of 2015; see China’s Response to List of CAT Issues, para. 20.  
516  China’s Response to CAT Committee List of Issues (2015), para 20. 
517  See, inter alia, Nesossi and Cheng Lei, ‘China’s pre-trial Detention Centres: challenges and opportunities for reform’, in Legal 
Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty, (2016) and MacBean, ‘’Addressing the hide and seek scandal: restoring the legitimacy of 
Kanshousuo’ (2016).  
518  China State Party Response to CAT Committee List of Issues (2015), para. 20. 
519  Ibid. 
520  Interview and correspondence with M. Mella, Senior Project Manager, Great Britain China Centre (GBCC), 23 November 2016 
and September 2017; and author’s interviews and participation in components of the ‘torture prevention’ Project in China run 
by GBCC from 2013 to 2016: including acting as an expert on Chinese delegation study visit to Hackney police station (August 
2013) with focus on preventive monitoring; and presenting and discussing challenges in torture prevention with a specialist 
Chinese delegation of torture during a Study Visit to the CoE (August 2016) where the author presented training on NPM and 
CPT standards and methodologies in preventive visiting and discussed experiences with the senior Chinese delegates and senior 
prosecutors from the Department of Supervision of Detention Facilities of the Procuratorate and the Prison Bureau of the 
Ministry of Justice and scholars from the Centre for Criminal Justice and Reform (CCJR), Law School of Renmin University. 
Other external experts and bodies involved in torture prevention initiatives in China include the Max Plank Institute, the Rights 






namely the KSSs/remand detention centres. Pilot projects continued to test the feasibility of 
monitoring until 2012, when basic regulations were established to require KSSs to let monitors 
have access to their establishments.521 While this is a start, there have been various hurdles facing 
the nascent monitoring system both in the regulations and in practice (Chapter 4). Moreover, it is 
notable that the legal requirement to preventively monitor is restricted to KSSs (and not other 
places of deprivation of liberty).522 
 
Section Summary: protections in the criminal-law justice process 
Scholars specialising in this area have acknowledged that the revised CPL, and associated other 
laws and regulations governing the criminal justice process, have made the criminal justice sphere 
considerably stronger than it was in terms of protection for criminal suspects and prisoners.523 
Protection in prisons and KSSs has been further strengthened by increasing procuratorial onsite 
presence and police / PSB and prison staff training, awareness-raising of human rights and other 
judicial, legislative and administrative prevention measures undertaken in the sphere of criminal 
justice.524 Chinese and international scholarly discussions have noted the reforms made by the 
CPL and other relevant laws, and consider this a significant step forward in addressing the risk of 
torture and other ill-treatment. Yet, some scepticism persists given that deficiencies remain in the 
revised law, and the risk of circumvention of the nascent protective measures.525  
At first sight, recent reforms to the Chinese criminal justice sphere are encouraging, and there are 
indications that certain torture prevention measures, including some safeguards and guarantees 
established in the law, are now in place in the criminal justice sphere. For example, hundreds of 
procurators are now based in prisons and KSSs across the country and, in theory, should be 
                                                     
521  Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, ed. McConville & Pils (2013), ‘Postscript: the 2012 PRC Criminal 
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Contemporary China (2016), Part II and Part III (Nesossi, Biddulph, Sapio, Trevaskes, Lei Cheng and MacBean). 
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523  For example, Chinese scholars Chen Weidong and Cheng Lei; de Jonge, Lubman, Chen and Shi-Kupfer, MacBean, among 
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524  See Chen Wei Dong, and Spronken, Three Approaches to Combatting Torture in China, (2012); UNCAT Committee 
Concluding Observations on China, December 2015. 
525   Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, ed. McConville & Pils (2013), ‘Postscript: the 2012 PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law’, Part VII, p. 455-503 (Rosenweig, Sapio, Jue, Biao and Pils); Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in 






providing an essential oversight safeguard. These should increase accessibility of complaints’ 
mechanisms for detainees’ torture allegations and consequently amplify the possibilities and the 
number of prosecutions for torture allegations that progress to the Chinese courts. 
Nevertheless, there remain two overarching issues. First, the scope of many of the preventive 
measures is limited; not all criminal suspects are afforded the same safeguards as ‘ordinary’ / 
normal criminal suspects (i.e., not those suspects considered ‘serious’ or ‘endangering public or 
state security’). Second, many, if not virtually all, of the safeguards and preventive measures, 
established in law or regulation, are deficient in some way. Many allow for exceptions that 
effectively serve to negate the protection conferred (e.g., deferral in access to a lawyer or third 
party notification; permissible prolonged extensions to general deprivation of liberty and 
interrogation time-limits; lack of judicial approval of detention; lack of habeas corpus right; non-
confidential avenues of complaints; limited scope and lack of independence of monitoring). These 
are regulatory protection gaps that are in need of closing and protections need to be established 
for all categories of suspect. In some cases, some aspects of the protection are missing, in others, 
whole protection provisions are entirely missing. In sum, many of the safeguards, as currently 
regulated, are not robust enough to confer adequate protection to all detainees. Regulatory gaps 
can make the law open to abuse, either through only partial protection afforded in the law (as for 
‘sensitive case’ suspects), or in legal provisions that are ambiguously drafted – lacking legal 
certainty and specificity. Both can lead to considerable room for manoeuvre and implementation 
abuse by officials (c.f. for example, rights to lawyer and third party notification that can be legally 
delayed without time-limit for certain categories of suspect, and the indefinite withholding of 
these rights in practice).  
This analysis supports, in some respects, various China scholars’ analysis of the general trend of 
the CPL revisions: that ultimately the revised law will strengthen the protection of 'ordinary' 






certain categories of criminal suspects on a scale worthy of a police state”.526 This is due to the 
official priorities placed on state stability, security and unity and the consequent tightening of 
control over elements seen as hindering the achievement of these. 527  However, there are 
regulatory protection gaps and deficiencies evident in the existing criminal-law safeguards and 
preventive measures even for ‘ordinary’ criminal suspects (i.e., the majority); and the situation in 
the law is worse for a minority of suspects (especially those who repeatedly cause social disorder 
or endanger state or public security and state harmony). ‘Ordinary’ criminals are still not afforded 
the full range of preventive guarantees and safeguards that they should be in law, as required for a 
state’s torture prevention measures to be implemented effectively (pursuant to UNCAT 2(1)), to 
which China is bound. 
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II. Administrative justice & detention (administrative offences & 
Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation (CDR)) 
Overview  
The explanation for treating punitive administrative detention as a parallel system to the criminal-
law justice process is benign. It is justified by the principle that those who commit minor 
misdemeanours or specific types of infractions should not be given the stigma of having 
committed a serious criminal offence, with the consequent repercussions of a criminal record.  
The Public Security Administrative Penalties Law of the People’s Republic of China (PSAPL) 
emphasises “that if a person’s act that disrupts public order and causes social harm is not severe 
enough to be subject to criminal punishment, it shall be subject to public security punishment in 
accordance with this law.”528 The interplay between the PSAPL and the CPL is established in 
Article 2 of the PSAPL: “with regard to an act of disrupting public order, encroaching upon the 
right of the person, the right of property or impairing social administration, if it is of social 
harmfulness and constitutes any crime as provided for in the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China, it shall be subject to criminal liabilities. If it is not serious enough to be 
subject to a criminal punishment, it shall, in accordance with this law, be subject to public 
security punishment by the public security organ.” During the PSB investigation, the public 
security organ has the possibility to decide ‘where the violation is suspected to constitute any 
crime’, to transfer the investigation ‘to the competent organ to subject the violator to criminal 
liabilities’ [sic].529 
Similarly, the authorities’ motivation for treating a misdemeanour that involves substance abuse 
on a parallel track to that of criminal law (with exceptions530) is because it is considered that this 
is better addressed by a non-criminal (i.e., an administrative and thus non-judicial) process and in 
an environment that is better geared to ensuring more appropriate treatment of substance-
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abusers.531 The administrative law regulating this area is the Drug Control Law of the PRC532 (as 
supplemented by the PRC Mental Health Law). 533  It specifies that if a person refuses an 
administrative order for community rehabilitation they shall be detained in a Compulsory Drug 
Rehabilitation Centre for a certain period of time. These facilities are regulated by the 
Regulations on Drug Rehabilitation.534  
The collective objective of these types of justice processes that can result in punitive 
administrative detention is to promote adherence to a set of laws or regulations that are 
established to ensure social order.535 Infractions that cause social harm, and are prohibited by such 
regulations, result in, from the official perspective, the requirement of education and punishment 
to teach respect of social mores and promote social harmony. This principle is seen in the opening 
Articles of the relevant administrative laws. For example, Article 5 of the PSAPL includes the 
“principle of combining education with punishment to tackle public administrative security 
cases”; Article 3 of the Regulations of Administrative Detention specifies that “a detainee shall 
observe laws, administrative regulations, and administrative provisions of the detention facility, 
obey administration, and accept education.” The Drug Control Law focuses on its objective to 
“prevent and punish drug-related illegal and criminal behaviours, protecting the physical and 
mental health of citizens and maintaining social order”536  combined with a period of either 
community-based or compulsory rehabilitation. 
The legal basis of the administrative sanctions’ system for public security has undergone a series 
of gradual reforms from its origin in the 1980s. The administrative penalties were first set out in 
the Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties in 1986, which were revised in 1994 and 
turned into a law in 2005, namely the Law of the PRC on Penalties for Administration of Public 
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Security.537 In late 2012, it was again revised under the new government administration headed by 
President Xi Jinping. During 2017, another round of revision has been envisaged, but remains in 
draft form only and is at the stage of public consultation at the time of writing.538  
The legal basis for regulation of substance abuse, the Drug Control Law of China and 
accompanying Regulations of Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation were drafted and came into force 
in 2007. Most recently, in June 2016, the authorities (the Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council) circulated a draft of the Regulations on Compulsory Treatment Centres for comment 
(notionally by July 2016). These draft Regulations had the official objective “to further 
standardize compulsory treatment efforts, to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of persons 
subject to compulsory treatment, and to preserve social order and public safety.”539 
That the administrative penalties and drug control laws have been elevated to the status of a law 
from previous regulations, and are consequently binding in a court of law, and have been subject 
to revision, is noteworthy. Further, the crux of the revisions means that certain basic procedural 
guarantees have recently been added into the laws. These are positive developments in the context 
torture prevention. 
However, the recent revisions to the sphere of Chinese punitive administrative detention have 
been relatively minor in comparison to those undertaken to the criminal justice system legislation. 
The PSAPL does now offer some basic procedural safeguards after some revision in 2012 and 
pending draft revisions in 2017. 540  Nevertheless, the majority of the PSAPL’s grounds and 
specified penalties have remained the same in purpose, scope and sentencing procedure as in the 
previous 2005 Administrative Penalties Law,541 and many are still almost identical to their 1994 
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and 1986 precedent regulations.542 The same goes for the Drug Control Law, which has, despite 
revisions, still fewer procedural safeguards in place. Thus, overall, the administrative justice 
processes have not changed substantively after the recent round of reforms. There has been, 
however, a notable positive development in the sphere of punitive administrative detention, which 
saw the abolition of the widely criticised543 Re-education through Labour (RETL) system in 2014. 
(a) Analysis of the Administrative Penalties laws / PSAPL: administrative 
offences 
Punitive administrative detention in China is a multi-layered concept. The PSAPL focuses on acts 
that disrupt public order and cause social harm, which are not severe enough to be subject to 
criminal punishment but comprise an administrative misdemeanour, offence or infraction. The 
PSAPL administrative offences can be best described as the first stage of the administrative 
sanction system: they generally result in lighter sanctions (of between 5 and 15 days 
administrative detention) spent usually in either a KSS or in a police station. Repeated infractions 
of the PSAPL previously used to result in a sanction of RETL, the second – and harsher – stage of 
the administrative justice process. The new PSAPL has been subject to little critique so far as 
compared to RETL,544 but both the process and grounds of punitive administrative detention for 
misdemeanours can be considered problematic.545  International jurisprudence and treaty-body 
reports, scholarly critique and civil society analysis and discourse have – in the context of China – 
primarily focused on one of its forms: Re-education through Labour (RETL).546 The reason for 
                                                     
542  The list of administrative infractions has increased and modified over time, but the substantive purpose, type, length, sentence 
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this overarching focus by the international bodies on this form of PAD was that it had been 
widely considered one of the most problematic forms of administrative detention, due to its 
prolonged length (it could last for up to four years with minimal regulation law) and limited 
safeguards.547 There has been considerable national and international scholarly debate on RETL 
and on its key issues. In a debate in front of the US Congressional‐Executive Commission, during 
a China Roundtable on “The End of Re-education through Labour? Recent Developments and 
Prospects for Reform” in mid-2013,548 one scholar, Ira Belkin, asked: 
“Has Re-education Through Labour served the purpose of maintaining social 
stability?[…]. The point is that the standards for R[E]TL are so vague and ambiguous 
and the decision-making process so lacking in due process and transparency that it seems 
that R[E]TL could be used, or in the view of some, abused, to incarcerate a whole host of 
people the police simply find to be annoying or obnoxious. A system such as this can also 
be used and appears to have been used to stifle the freedom of expression and dissent.”549  
However, Belkin also pointed out that “while R[E]TL gets most of the attention, I would urge the 
United States government to also take note of these other forms of detention and include them in 
its efforts to engage with the Chinese government.”550 
IHRL bodies, international and, increasingly, national scholars and civil society have all voiced 
concerns over the lack of due process in the way the RETL was undertaken and cited numerous 
allegations (and convictions) of torture and other ill-treatment in the RETL camps551. When open, 
and fully functional, the risk of torture and other ill-treatment remained high in such facilities. 
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In 2013,552 the CCP Central Committee abolished RETL, and there is evidence to suggest that the 
RETL detainees have been released.553 In practice, however, it is as yet unclear what will replace 
the RETL system, if anything, or whether the specific grounds for RETL (for repeated 
administrative offences/misdemeanours) will be incorporated into a revised administrative 
penalties law (PSAPL) or into the criminal CPL.554 International555 and national civil society556 
have noted that the centres themselves have not been closed down; the staff are allegedly being 
re-trained and that these will be used for compulsory drug rehabilitation557 or for ‘legal education 
classes’.558  
PSAPL: analysis of legal framework and current protections  
The PSAPL is one of the key pieces of Chinese legislation that regulate the area of administrative 
justice. While recent revisions have been proposed by the MPS,559 these remain in draft form only, 
thus this analysis will focus the PSAPL currently in force (since 2012), and will refer to any 
likely revisions where relevant. The five categories of key prevention measures under IHRL, 
selected and grouped together in Chapter 1, will be examined in the context of the PSAPL. This 
provides an indication of the available protections in the administrative justice system and acts as 
a yardstick by which to measure and compare the compliance with a selection of key IHRL 
prevention requirements.   
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 (i) Torture prohibition 
There are various legal provisions in place in the punitive administrative justice process that 
prohibit torture and certain (but not all) types of ill-treatment. Article 5 of the PSAPL establishes 
that: 实施治安管理处罚，应当公开、公正，尊重和保障人权，保护公民的人格尊严 (the 
imposition of public security administration punishments shall be correct, impartial and fair, 
shall respect and guarantee human rights and shall protect the personal dignity of the citizens).560  
Article 79 “prohibits the use of physical or verbal threats of torture during investigation and 
renders any illegally obtained evidence inadmissible in the administrative sentencing process”: 严
禁刑讯逼供或者采用威胁、引诱、欺骗等非法手段收集证据。 以非法手段收集的证据不得
作为处罚的根据.561  
Article 113 forbids the police/PSB to mistreat, humiliate or beat suspects. The Administrative 
Detention Facilities Regulations, Article 3, specifies, “A detention facility shall protect the 
personal safety and lawful rights and interests of a detainee. It may not insult, physically punish, 
or maltreat detainees, or incite or conspire with any other person to do so.” The Detention Centre 
Regulations also prohibit inter-detainee bullying or violence: 在押人员必须履行以下义务: (四）
不准拉帮解伙、恃强凌弱，不准殴打、体罚、虐待、侮辱其他在押人员，不准打架斗殴。562 
Equally, the PSAPL establishes that there will be criminal liability or administrative sanction 
(depending on the nature of the case) for police who commit acts, inter alia, of “torture, ill-
treatment, abuse or humiliation”563: 人民警察办理治安案件，有下列行为之一的，依法给予
行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任： （一）刑讯逼供、体罚、虐待、侮辱他人的. 
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(ii) Procedural guarantees and safeguards against torture 
The PSAPL and Detention Centre Regulations also afford some procedural guarantees and 
safeguards against torture and ill-treatment. Within this justice process, this section identifies the 
existence and scope of protection (or lack thereof) of certain key safeguards examined in Chapter 
1, inter alia:  
 Interrogation in a timely matter, time-limits for initial custody and habeas corpus  
There is an obligation on the PSB to conduct the interrogation in a ‘timely manner’ and that the 
interrogation should not exceed eight hours (Article 83, PSAPL): 对违反治安管理行为人，公
安机关传唤后应当及时询问查证，询问查证的时间不得超过八小时；情况复杂，依照本法
规定可能适用行政拘留处罚的，询问查证的时间不得超过二十四小 时.  
However, Article 83 also stipulates an exception in that, where the circumstances are 
‘complicated’ and if the “punishment of administrative detention may be applicable”, then the 
time for interrogation should not exceed 24 hours. Equally, although the administrative sentences 
can appear relatively short (maximum 15 days), the time in detention permitted by law is in 
reality far longer. Article 99 of the PSAPL specifies that the PSB has 30 days to investigate the 
case and another 30 if the case is complex, and, all the while, unless and person can afford bail, 
they are held in police custody. This is not likely to change under the 2017 draft revisions to the 
PSAPL, and the equivalent provision (draft Article 126) remains substantially the same as above, 
along with the same timeframes. In summary, the law permits administrative offence suspects to 
be held in initial or interim police custody during investigation for long periods of time. Equally, 
there is no right of habeas corpus, in that suspects do not have any judicial involvement in their 
deprivation of liberty, nor are there any avenues for detainees to be brought before a judge to 







 ‘Trinity’ of safeguards: notification of fact of custody, access to a lawyer and access to 
a doctor  
Unlike in the CPL where there is a set timeframe (within 48 hours) for third party notification of 
custody, Article 83 of the PSAPL only specifies that “the public security organ shall inform a 
family member of the suspect the reason of the summons and his whereabouts in a timely manner.” 
(公安机关应当及时将传唤的原因和处所通知被传唤人家属 ). While the safeguard is 
established in law, there are various concerns with the scope of this safeguard. For example, there 
is no definition of ‘timely’ and no interpretation or guidance is given in respect of maximum 
timeframes. Moreover, the Detention Centre Regulations create permissible delays to this 
safeguard, in that a detainee first has to seek approval from the unit handling the case, this can be 
delayed indefinitely on the ground of potential hindrance to its own investigation. 564  These 
concerns indicate that the protection offered by this safeguard can be diluted or circumvented. 
Leading Chinese legal scholar, Associate Professor Cheng Lei, who specialises in criminal and 
detention centre reform, underlines that due to the Detention Centre Regulations requiring prior 
approval from the unit handling the case, in practice, the unit often does not permit contact with, 
or visits from, third parties in order to facilitate its own investigation. Moreover, Cheng Lei 
argues that the lack of clarity around the legal provisions in the Detention Centre Regulations 
causes “deviations in enforcement that lead to detainees being deprived of their lawful rights.”565  
The situation is worse as regards access to a lawyer. In direct contrast to the CPL, there is no 
right for the detainee to access to a lawyer at all if detained pursuant to the current PSAPL. 
Likewise, the PSAPL does not include the safeguards of prompt detainee access to a doctor and 
independent medical examination. However, the Chinese authorities consider that various 
normative documents (without specifying which) that guide interpretation in this area specify that 
all the detention centres should implement a system of medical examinations upon entry.566 While 
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establishing compulsory medical screening upon entry to a detention centre would be a positive 
move towards preventing torture, there remain serious concerns about the independence of the 
doctors and medical confidentiality processes at the Detention Centres. The effectiveness of this 
overall safeguard has been questioned by both the UN SRT567 and, more recently, by the UNCAT 
Committee in 2015.568  
 Audio-visual recording of interrogation: lack of a requirement under the PAD system 
In the administrative justice track, there is no requirement or reference at all in law to audio or 
visually record the whole interrogation. This is a structural safeguard to help keep the 
interrogation process as transparent as possible, and to enable its use as evidence to hold 
interviewers to account, or to prove their innocence, should an allegation be made of abuse during 
the interview. This is in direct contrast to the CPL. The only obligation is a requirement to make a 





 Approved detention order & timely notification: no requirement under the PAD system 
Under Chinese criminal law, a public security organ must produce a detention warrant (Article 
82), but there is no such warrant under the Administrative Penalties Laws. 
In summary, there are different and more limited procedural guarantees and safeguards in law for 
those persons going through the administrative punitive legal system than those in the Chinese 
criminal legal system. 
(iii) Overall operation of the administrative justice system: administrative penalties 
The justice system in the context of administrative penalties is relatively straightforward. The 
PSB/police are mandated to investigate suspected administrative offences and, at county-level, 
                                                     
567  During his visit to China in 2005 and Follow-up in 2010/2011.  
568  See Chapter 3 for analysis and concerns raised by the IHRL bodies, for example, the CAT Committee has raised its concern that 
PSB officials in KSS can verify the health examination form recorded by doctors, and that doctors must report to the 
supervisory department of the PSB organ whenever they identify signs of torture. The Committee argues that these 
arrangements create a conflict of duties for medical practitioners and expose them to pressure to supress evidence.  






decide on the administrative punishment (Article 91, PSAPL). An appeal can be made about the 
sanction conferred by ‘application for reconsideration’ or lodging an administrative lawsuit. No 
details are specified as to whom the appeal should be addressed, the timeframes within which to 
appeal or any other modalities to follow if a detainee wishes to appeal. Equally, with no right to 
access a lawyer while detained during an investigation into a suspected administrative offence, 
appeal would, in practice, be difficult. 
Although the administrative detention sentences appear relatively short (maximum 15 days), the 
time deprived of liberty is in reality far longer. There is no compensation specified in the PSAPL 
for the length of time spent in detention should there not be enough evidence to confirm guilt. 
Equally, if a detainee has spent 60 days in custody pending investigation and the maximum 
administrative sanction is 15 days, while the amount of time spent during the investigation can be 
deducted from the sentence (15 days), there is no compensation available for the excess time 
spent in custody.570 The long investigation period also renders the actual administrative sentence 
meaningless. 
Most problematic is the lack of separation of powers of the PSB in the investigation and 
sentencing process. Similar to the criminal-law system, detainees are effectively investigated and 
detained by the same body (PSB). In the context of the administrative justice track, those detained 
pursuant to the PSAPL are not then brought before any independent judicial body or even quasi-
judicial-administrative (such as a procurator) either to approve detention or to sentence. Rather, 
they stay within the same body’s jurisdiction for investigation, initial custody during investigation, 
the sentencing process and the administrative detention sanction. Permission to withhold or 
restrict certain detainee rights and safeguards is made by the same body as that conducts the 
investigation. This creates an inherent potential for abuse. 
Moreover, while some possibilities exist to transfer administrative suspects across to the criminal 
justice process to stand trial; generally, all cases deemed ‘non-serious’ will stay within the remit 
of the PSB, which has no external oversight other than higher levels of itself (i.e., different 
                                                     






hierarchies of internal oversight). This complete discretion conferred on the PSB creates an 
unprotected space, lacking oversight and safeguards. 
(iv) Complaints Avenues and Monitoring 
Unlike the criminal law process (CPL, CL and the Prison Law), there is no legal basis for the 
right for detainees to complain within the PSAPL track. There is only a possibility of filing an 
administrative lawsuit against the administrative sentence. 571  Nevertheless, some early stage 
initiatives are underway to render China’s Detention Centres / KSS more transparent, where PAD 
detainees can serve out their administrative sentences. For example, as outlined above, the CCJR 
at Renmin University is working with the MPS to carry out pilot reform projects in KSS in some 
regions across China, including in the spheres of developing and improving complaints and 
monitoring.572 Also, there are now MPS Regulations on the requirement for the establishment of 
these preventive measures in KSS, as well as a new draft Detention Centre Law that proposes to 
regulate for detainee complaints and monitoring,573 albeit vaguely (Chapter 4).   
Summary: protections in punitive administrative justice process pursuant to the PSAPL 
In general, in comparison to the criminal law process and the CPL, the administrative justice 
process (the PSAPL) lags behind in a number of aspects. First, there are more limited protective 
guarantees and safeguards currently afforded in law to detainees within the administrative justice 
track. Second, complete discretion is afforded to a single overarching body, the PSB (including its 
different layers). This means that administrative offence suspects stay within the same body’s 
jurisdiction for investigation, initial custody during investigation, the sentencing process and the 
administrative detention sanction. Inherent in this lack of structural separation, is a risk of abuse. 
Third is the problematic inter-play between the two justice processes (criminal and 
administrative). This provides for an element of fluidity between the two processes with a porous 
border. The interplay between the PSAPL and the CPL is established in Articles 2 and 95 of the 
PSAPL. Article 2 of the PSAPL stipulates that “with regard to an act of disrupting public order, 
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572  See above Section and see analysis of effectiveness (Chapter 3) and obstacles encountered (Chapter 4). 






encroaching upon the right of the person, the right of property or impairing social administration, 
if it is of social harmfulness and constitutes any crime as provided for in the Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China, it shall be subject to criminal liabilities. If it is not serious enough to 
be subject to a criminal punishment, it shall, in accordance with this law, be subject to public 
security punishment by the public security organ” [sic]. Equally, at the end of the PSB 
investigation, according to Article 95 of the PSAPL, the public security organ has the possibility 
to decide “where the violation is suspected to constitute any crime”, to transfer the investigation 
“to the competent organ to subject the violator to criminal liabilities”.574 The CPL allows for a 
similar transfer of a suspected criminal case into the administrative process, should the 
investigator decide that it is more appropriate to do so (“protection arbitrage”). The administrative 
justice process’s comparative lack of transparency and lesser guarantees for detainees on this 
track, coupled with the ease of transfer between the two justice processes, renders circumvention 
of more stringent CPL protections possible. Ultimately, the more opaque administrative justice 
process creates a less regulated – thus a risker – environment for detainees. 
Fourth, in every prevention measure examined, the underpinning regulation is weaker in the 
administrative penalties than the criminal-law justice process. The preventive safeguards afforded 
to such detainees under the PSAPL, including in the proposed reforms, are deficient, and provide 
weak regulatory protection and permissible exceptions in law. There are many aspects of the law 
where fundamental regulatory protections are only partially provided for PAD detainees (e.g. 
access to a lawyer and third party notification, without a time limit), subject to exceptions (c.f. 
lengthy exceptional extensions permitted for timing of investigations) or are entirely missing (for 
instance, there is no right to access to a doctor from the outset of deprivation of liberty under the 
PSAPL). Further, there are significant indications of implementation gaps, where certain suspects 
should be investigated within the criminal law framework, but instead ambiguities in the relevant 
laws and considerable overlap between offences mean that suspects can instead be slotted into the 
lesser-regulated and less transparent PAD framework (c.f. Chapters 3 and 4.2).    
                                                     






However, merely bringing the administrative justice process in line with current protections 
afforded in the CPL may not itself guarantee better protection. The protections in the CPL are 
themselves insufficient to afford comprehensive or adequate protection, albeit comparatively 
stronger than those afforded in the administrative justice laws.575  
  
                                                     






(b) Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation (CDR) and drug offence investigation 
process 
The PRC Drug Control Law specifies that its main objective is “to prevent and punish drug-
related illegal and criminal behaviour, protecting the physical and mental health of citizens and 
maintaining social order”576 combined with a period of either community-based or compulsory 
rehabilitation. The Drug Control Law of China came into force in June 2008. This is 
supplemented by accompanying Regulations of Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation of 2011 and by 
the relevant provisions of the CL, CPL and the Mental Health Law.577 The investigation into 
suspected drug offences and the sentencing process are both conducted by the PSB. Moreover, 
the administrative detention sanction of CDR is undertaken in facilities run by the MPS under the 
State Council. 
In June 2016, the authorities publicly circulated an MPS draft of the ‘Regulation on Compulsory 
Treatment Centres’ 578  for comment. 579  These proposed draft Regulations have the official 
objective “to further standardise compulsory treatment efforts, to safeguard the lawful rights and 
interests of persons subject to compulsory treatment, and to preserve social order and public 
safety.”580 One of the proposals is that the measures for determining substance addiction should 
be determined by the Administrative Department of Health, the Drug Supervision and 
Administration Department and the Department of Public Security under the State Council. 
Analysis: legal framework and available protections 
(i) Torture prohibition 
As stipulated in the current Regulations, staff at the drug rehabilitation centres “may not 
physically punish, abuse or insult drug addicts.”581 This prohibition may be supplemented and 
expanded by new draft Regulations (still in draft form), which propose to establish that 
“compulsory treatment facilities shall ensure the lawful rights and interests of persons subject to 
                                                     
576  Article 1, Drug Control Law of the PRC, adopted at the 31st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China on December 29, 2007, in force as of 1 June 2008. 
577  The National People’s Congress adopted the first national Mental Health Law of the PRC on 26 October 2012. 
578  The Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council. 
579  July 2016. 
580  Article 1, draft Regulation on Compulsory Treatment Centres (Draft for Deliberation), June 2016. 






compulsory treatment, and must not insult, physically punish, or abuse persons subject to 
compulsory treatment, or direct or tolerate others to insult, physically punish or abuse persons 
subject to compulsory treatment.”582 
(ii) Safeguards and guarantees 
There are few procedural guarantees and protective safeguards afforded in the current drug laws 
for detainees undergoing the investigation and administrative detention sanction of CDR. The 
existing safeguards in place are: (i) the decision of the PSB to isolate a drug addict should be in 
written letter format and served on the persons before effecting the isolation decision;583 (ii) the 
family of the relevant person should be notified within 24 hours after the letter has been given;584 
and (iii) the person who has been served this compulsory rehabilitation decision has the right to 
apply for administrative reconsideration or appeal on administrative law grounds. Further, (iv) 
minors under 16 years old who are addicted to drugs should not automatically be subject to 
compulsory drug rehabilitation and instead have community drug rehabilitation; and (v) detainees 
are held separately according to their gender, age and type of addiction.585 
Should the proposed draft Regulations be adopted, they would confer significantly more 
protection than the ones currently in force. Most notably, there is a provision establishing that the 
decision for CDR will be one made by the court (rather than as originally by the PSB)586. A 
judicial written compulsory treatment decision and written notification of enforcement of 
compulsory treatment would be required where it currently is not. The draft Regulations also 
contain reference to the possibility of meeting a lawyer, where the current Regulations and Drug 
Control Law do not. Draft Regulation Article 24 specifies that “where lawyers retained by 
persons subject to compulsory treatment or their guardians or immediate family members request 
to see persons subject to compulsory treatment, they shall hold the lawyers' practice certificate, 
their proof of law firm and a retention document or legal aid letter.” The scope of this provision is, 
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however, limited. This is not a guarantee of access to a lawyer from the outset of a deprivation of 
liberty. 
In the event of a death of a detainee in CDR, an additional level of oversight has been included in 
the draft Regulations. The proposed draft regulations specify that the PSB “shall make an 
evaluation of the cause of death. Where the guardians or immediate family members have 
objections to the evaluation of the cause of death, they may submit these to the People's 
Procuratorate.”587  
In the Drug Control Law and current Regulations there are currently no safeguards regarding 
regulation of the use of means of restraint. However, the proposed draft Regulations may change 
this. They specify that “compulsory treatment facilities may employ restraints, isolation or other 
protective treatment measures against persons subject to compulsory treatment who carry out or 
will carry out conduct that harms themselves, endangers others’ safety, or disrupts the order of 
medical treatment. Persons subjected to protective treatment measures shall be closely observed, 
and after the possibility of dangerous conduct occurring has dissipated, the compulsory treatment 
facility shall immediately remove the protective treatment measures. The implementation of 
protective treatment measures shall follow medical diagnostic standards and treatment regulations, 
and their use to punish persons subject to compulsory treatment is prohibited.”588 Moreover, a 
detainee will be able to be visited by relatives under proposed new draft Regulations, Article 23. 
Yet, not all the proposed new amendments strengthen the protective guarantees and safeguards 
afforded to detainees. For example, in respect of notification of detention, draft Article 13 
proposes a time-limit of up to five days before a third party is required to be notified of a 
detainees’ detention for CDR. This directly contrasts with Article 40 of the Drug Control Law, 
with a timeframe of 24 hour-limit on family notification. Further, while some additional 
safeguards may be strengthened should the draft proposed regulations be adopted, many of these 
safeguards remain far from conferring watertight protection. For example, the references to a 
lawyer in the draft Regulations do not guarantee access to a lawyer from the outset of the 
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deprivation of liberty. Worse, they provide situations where a lawyer can be denied access if, for 
example, they do not have the required or correct paperwork. Similarly, while there is a provision 
specifying that children under 16 years old should not be subjected to automatic CDR,589 a recent 
PSB official interpretation of this prohibition has, however, specified that in the most severe cases 
a minor can still be sentenced by the PSB to compulsory drug rehabilitation.590 The legal status of 
the draft MPS Regulations and current Regulations means that they are supplementary but 
subservient, in the case of conflict or contradiction, to the Drugs Law, which itself remains 
unamended since 2007. The view that not all the proposed new amendments actually serve to 
strengthen protections for detainees is also reflected by China administrative law scholars, such as 
Sarah Biddulph.591  
(iii) Overall operation of the investigation and justice process for drug 
abuse 
Articles 38, 40 and 41 of the Drug Control Law592 outline the grounds under which the PSB can 
make a decision to order isolated compulsory drug rehabilitation. This can be when community 
drug-rehabilitation programmes have not worked for persistent or serious drug re-offenders.593 
Thus, it is ultimately the PSB that investigates and sentences a suspect of offences pursuant to the 
Drug Law to a two-year extendable period (for a further year) of administrative detention in a 
CDR facility.594 This may change under proposals for new Regulation, which specify that the 
decision for CDR should be in the remit of a court.595 This would change the nature of the 
sanction and would confer a degree of transparency into the current administrative process. 
Further, new proposed regulations also propose that the decision is not made solely by the PSB 
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590  ‘[…] where the drug addict has dropped out of school for more than one year and his or her guardian refuses to perform 
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591  See Biddulph, ‘Rights in the new regime for treatment of drug dependency’, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in 
China (2013). 
592  Drug Control Law of the PRC, 2007. 
593  Article 38, Drug Control Law of the PRC, 2007. 
594  Article 47, Drug Control Law of the PRC, 2007. 






but “the measures for determining drug addiction are determined by the administrative 
department of health, the drug supervision and administration department and the department of 
public security (PSB) under the State Council.”596 Nevertheless, it remains unclear when the draft 
Regulations will be adopted and in what form, and how they will interact with the unrevised Drug 
Control Law, which provides different and, in some instances, contradictory provisions to those 
proposed (for example, the differing timeframes for family notification) and currently confers less 
protective guarantees for detainees. 
One of the significant omissions from the current Drug Law and Regulations is that there is no 
clarity or precision on whether healthcare professionals – doctor, nurse or psychiatrist – should be 
involved in giving an opinion regarding the initial involuntary placement of a person deprived of 
their liberty in obligatory drug rehabilitation facilities, resulting in a two-year period of work, 
education and treatment. As regards international norms on a similar area, namely, involuntary 
placement and treatment in psychiatric institutions, the IHRL bodies consider that there should be 
an obligatory psychiatric expert opinion (independent of the hospital in which the patient is 
placed) in the context of the initiation and review of the measure of involuntary hospitalisation. In 
the context of CDR in China, the current processes of involuntary placement and involuntary 
treatment are problematic, given the lack of any reference to a healthcare professional opinion in 
the initial placement or review (let alone a second independent opinion) and almost complete lack 
of any safeguards regulating the involuntary treatment process or around the use of restraints in 
general. 
(iv) Complaints’ avenues and monitoring 
Currently, there is no guarantee in law affording detainees the right to make a complaint and there 
are no complaints mechanisms in place to provide an avenue for detainee complaints. Moreover, 
there are no provisions in law to enable the external independent monitoring of CDR facilities; 
thus this does not happen in practice.597 This may change, to some extent, if the proposed Draft 
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Regulations are adopted, which propose an additional degree of oversight (of the PSB) by the 
procuratorate, albeit not independent.598 Yet, in a similar vein to the CPL, while this would be 
external to the PSB, it would not be independent, as the procuratorate is the administrative organ 
of the State for oversight for compliance with China’s laws.  
No information is publicly available as to whether there are similar initiatives (establishing 
nascent complaints’ mechanisms and preventive monitoring) underway as they are in KSSs and 
some prisons. Indeed, meetings between leading procurators in the field of legal supervision and 
the author indicate that the nascent system of procuratorate and special supervisors’ inspections 
does not extend to CDR facilities.599  
Section Summary: Protections in CDR 
Given the long duration of the period of administrative detention (potentially up to three years), 
the current safeguards in the law and current Regulations in force afford detainees only minimal 
protection. Yet, the landscape of protections to detainees undergoing the CDR process is likely to 
change. There is a degree of reform proposed and protections for detainees undergoing the CDR 
process may be increased. Yet, the proposed change is minimal and various protections, even in 
revised form, are diluted or missing. Currently, it remains the case that it is the PSB that 
investigates and sentences a suspect of drug offences to a two-year extendable period of 
administrative detention in a CDR facility. It is also the PSB that places in custody, undertakes 
the investigation, sentences and operates the administrative detention facilities. If a person is 
suspected of having committed a crime (for instance, dealing drugs) he/she can be handed over to 
the criminal-law process to stand trial; otherwise all stages of their case will stay within the remit 
of the PSB, which has no external oversight. Appeal rights, mechanisms or avenues are not 
specified in any detail to make them readily comprehensible or accessible. These are similar 
concerns to those in the administrative penalties’ justice process. In particular, the absolute 
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discretion conferred on one body, with no external oversight, contributes to rendering the process 
opaque, exacerbated by the existence of few protective safeguards. There is one specific area that 
may change under proposals for new Regulations, which propose that the decision for CDR 




                                                     






III.  ‘Shuanggui’ 
 Overview 
‘Shuanggui’ involves a period of de facto administrative detention for the purposes of 
investigating violations of Party regulations and discipline, most notably in the area of official 
corruption. It comprises, in essence, another parallel ‘justice’ process to the criminal justice track. 
It is officially premised on the concept that infractions of Party discipline should first be 
investigated by Party Discipline bodies and then, if deemed appropriate, handed over to either the 
criminal or administrative system or kept within the Party discipline process. The concept of 
Party discipline was originally established in the 1997 Administrative Supervision Law and the 
1994 Party document “CCP Disciplinary Organs’ Working Regulations on Case Investigation.” 
These have since been amended and ‘Shuanggui’ is governed by a variety of piecemeal and 
different regulations, as well as the CCP Constitution and CCP Discipline Regulations.601 
The Communist Party Constitution602 and new CCP Disciplinary Regulations, adopted in early 
2016, currently regulate this Party justice process and establish Central and Local Commissions 
for Discipline Inspection. Article 2 of the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP 
emphasises that one of the objectives of these bodies is to strengthen discipline within the Party. 
This aims to ensure that “Party members and cadres strictly observe Party discipline, carry out 
Party resolutions and government ordinances, to realize the unity and centralisation of the entire 
Party.” These bodies have the power to discipline Party members (including all government 
officials (as to become, and meaningfully progress as, a government official, one has to be a Party 
member) if infractions are found. 603  The Central and Local Commissions for Discipline 
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Inspection (the Party discipline bodies) are mandated under the CCP Constitution to investigate 
and verify the facts of suspected violations of Party laws and regulations604. 
Little is known or published nationally or internationally on the details of the operation of 
shuanggui. 605 At the international level, until the CAT Committee Concluding Observations on 
China in late 2015, it had been only mentioned (critically) in passing in reports and never 
examined in depth.606 Other than an analysis by scholars Fu Hualing and Flora Sapio,607 there has 
also been relatively little scholarly discourse on this area, and almost none in Western scholarship. 
Even in the CAT Committee’s treatment of the system only three aspects are (very briefly) 
examined. First, in the context of reported cases of officials who have been subject to torture and 
other ill-treatment under this system; second, that the discipline inspection commissions can 
summon and investigate officials outside the ordinary law enforcement system; and third, that 
suspects do not have a right to access and retain a lawyer during the interrogation, which leaves 
them at risk of torture. Equally, at the national public level, there have been reports that the 
shuanggui process is so little understood that it has been open to imitation and manipulation by 
non-Party discipline officials to extort money.608  
The obscurity of the process is fuelled by it not being run by the PSB but by Party discipline 
cadres often in different facilities and places of detention than those run for the criminal and 
administrative suspects. Further, it is a process that, up until 2015, has had very little grounding in 
legislation or regulations, and its legal framework has been in piecemeal, and often inaccessible, 
opaque Party norms. Moreover, the interplay between the jurisdictions for investigations by the 
PSB, the procuratorate and the CCP Discipline Committee has been relatively obscure. The 
division of investigation responsibilities appears to be as follows: the PSB has the power to 
investigate ordinary crimes and a branch of the procuratorate investigates crimes by public 
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officials under the CPL. More or less all public officials are CCP members as, in reality, they 
have to be to meaningfully progress in their careers.609 Thus, they are additionally regulated in 
their conduct by a parallel justice process governed by the CCP Constitution and the CCP 
Disciplinary Regulations. The bodies responsible for overseeing correct CCP conduct in line with 
these regulations are the CCP Disciplinary Committees at county-level.610 Therefore, a public 
official could be investigated by the procuratorate for a suspected crime (e.g. corruption) as a 
public official and by the CCP Investigatory branch for improper conduct (e.g. corruption) 
contrary to the CCP Constitution and regulatory norms. In practice, the CCP Investigation is 
conducted first and then the official may be transferred to the criminal justice process and the 
procuratorate. The decision to transfer or not remains solely within the remit of the CCP 
Disciplinary Investigation, as the latter has its own parallel justice process, sentencing procedure 
and sanctions. 
In line with reform of the Chinese legal landscape, this justice process has become more regulated 
pursuant to reforms undertaken in 2015/2016, namely, the adoption on 1 January 2016 of the new 
CCP Disciplinary Regulations. These new Regulations, however, have not substantially added 
any protections for detained officials undergoing the shuanggui process, but have merely 
expanded the list of offences and list of sanctions. It remains a justice sphere that is non-
transparent and little understood. This is exacerbated by many of its texts being difficult to access, 
being piecemeal and remaining only in the original Chinese.611  
Analysis of legal framework and available protections against torture 
(i)  Torture prohibition 
The CCP Constitution and CCP Disciplinary Regulations do not specifically mention that torture 
or ill-treatment is prohibited during investigation by CCP Discipline Investigation Committees. 
Regulations merely refer to the requirement that shuanggui should be undertaken in compliance 
with the Chinese Constitution (which itself does not explicitly prohibit torture). Further, Article 
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43 of the CCP Constitution establishes the requirement for application of shuanggui in a ‘safe and 
proper manner’ in accordance with the law (without specifying which). Indeed, the Chinese 
authorities, in response to a List of Issues sent to them by the CAT Committee in the preparation 
of the CAT Committee’s Fifth reporting cycle on China, state that: shuanggui is a legal system 
and Party discipline of China; it is based on explicit provisions in national laws and Party rules. 
The torture to persons subject to shuanggui is not allowed by national laws, Party disciplines or 
government disciplines.”612 There is, however, no indication of which rules explicitly prohibit 
torture in the context of a CCP Discipline Committee investigation. The legal torture prohibition 
is at best weak, at worse, non-existent. 
(ii)  Safeguards and procedural guarantees 
Despite recent reform in 2016 of the shuanggui process, no additional protective safeguards or 
procedural guarantees have been added to this justice process. The only safeguards remain 
embedded in Article 41 of the CCP Constitution. This establishes that, first, “when a Party 
organisation is deciding on a disciplinary measure against a Party member, it should investigate 
and verify the facts in an objective way.” Second, that the Party member suspect should be told 
the reasons for a disciplinary sanction: “[...] be informed of a decision regarding any disciplinary 
measure to be taken and of the facts on which it is based.” Third, the Party member should be 
heard during the investigation: “the person concerned must be given a chance to account for 
himself or herself and speak in his or her own defence.” Fourth, there is an appeal right to the 
next, higher, level of the CCP Discipline organ: “if the member does not accept the decision, he 
or she can appeal, and the Party organisation concerned must promptly deal with or forward his or 
her appeal, and must not withhold or suppress it.” The guiding principle for the investigation is 
that “those who cling to erroneous views and unjustifiable demands shall be educated by 
criticism.”  
There are several concerns with this article. First, the Party Discipline Commission’s 
investigation is not time-limited as is the case in the Chinese criminal and administrative justice 
                                                     






processes. The only restriction is that the investigation should proceed ‘objectively’. Second, the 
right to self-defence and the right to appeal are not defined with sufficient clarity to enable 
certainty as to where one can appeal. In practice, this is merely to higher-level disciplinary 
committees.613 Third, there is a lack of precision and legal certainty around the clause “those who 
cling to erroneous views and unjustifiable demands shall be educated by criticism”, which could 
be readily open to abuse. 
These are the only safeguards afforded in law to a detainee undergoing the shuanggui 
investigation process. Thus, there is a lack of almost all of the safeguards necessary to prevent 
torture (especially, the right of third party notification, access to a lawyer or the right of habeas 
corpus, among others). 
(iii)  General operation of the shuanggui investigation and sentencing process 
Article 44 of the CCP Constitution outlines the Discipline Committees’ main task:  
“To uphold the Constitution and other statutes of the Party, to check up on the 
implementation of the line, principles, policies and resolutions of the Party and to 
assist the respective Party committees in improving the Party's style of work and in 
organizing and coordinating the work against corruption.”  
Oversight is in the form of higher-level Party Discipline Committees. Higher levels of the 
Discipline Committee have the mandate to ‘oversee Party members holding leading positions in 
exercising their power; they shall examine and deal with relatively important or complicated 
cases of violation of the Constitution or other statutes of the Party by Party organizations or Party 
members and decide on or rescind disciplinary measures against Party members involved in such 
cases; they shall deal with complaints and appeals made by Party members; and they shall 
guarantee the rights of Party members.’614 ‘Higher’ discipline committees have the power to 
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examine the work of the lower commissions and to approve or modify their decisions on any 
case.615  
The CCP Constitution and norms governing shuanggui investigations into Party violations, 
establish that it is the same overarching body, in this case the Disciplinary Inspection Committees, 
which enforce the Party laws and regulations, investigate suspected cases, decide to detain and for 
how long, and address appeals or complaints. 616  In short, similar to the PAD and CDR 
administrative detention processes, there is no structural separation (i.e., safeguards that 
structurally separate out the responsibility for investigation with those of custody and sentencing) 
for detainees going through the shuanggui procedure. 
(iv) Complaints and monitoring mechanisms 
There is currently no external monitoring undertaken of ‘Shuanggui’ interrogation and detention 
facilities run by the CCP Discipline Committees; nor are there external detainee complaints 
avenues in place. The only available avenue either to appeal or to complain about the 
investigation’s conduct is contact a higher-level Disciplinary Committee. 617  Details are not 
published on modalities on how to appeal or on the number of complaints that have reached a 
higher-level Discipline Committee or their outcomes (i.e., any prosecution or disciplinary action 
taken). 
Section Summary: Protections in ‘Shuanggui’ 
The shuanggui process remains deficient in many respects when assessed against the key 
preventive measures needed to counter the risk of torture. The torture prohibition is weak, there 
are few safeguards and guarantees and none of the core procedural safeguards needed to prevent 
torture (right to third party notification/prohibition of incommunicado detention, access to a 
lawyer or doctor from the outset of the deprivation of liberty, no right of habeas corpus, etc.).  
When examined through the lens of the protections necessary for the prevention of torture, 
‘shuanggui’ falls short. First, there are many aspects of the CCP norms where fundamental 
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protections are entirely missing, creating entire protection gaps or vacuums for corrupt official 
detainees. Virtually the whole raft of regulatory protections needed to adequately protect against 
and prevent torture of detainees is missing. This creates a significant regulatory protection gap. 
Second, there are systemic deficiencies evident in China’s CCP justice system that enable CCP 
inspection and discipline officials to stand above or outside of the (very few) protections in the 
norms and result in discretionary and misuse of numerous laws and regulations. This is also 
pervasive across the whole of the investigation and sentencing procedure when it comes to 
allegations of corruption: it is evident not only with the lack of fundamental procedural and 
protective safeguards in the CCP shuanggui system , but also with the permissible exceptions in 
the criminal justice laws that afford suspects facing corruption charges lesser protections. It can 
also be seen in the co-ordination and influence that the central CCP and government yield over 
bodies such as the judiciary (cf. Chapter 4.3). In summary, in the case of ‘shuanggui’, the law 
remains protection-deficient and thus open to abuse; when corrupt officials are slotted back into 
the criminal justice route, ambiguities in the CL and CPL (Chapters 2.3 and 3.2) mean that the 
protections in the law can be deliberately overridden for this category of suspect. 
Similar to the PAD and CDR administrative detention processes, there are no structural 
separation safeguards for detainees going through shuanggui interrogation and detention 
procedure and it is the same overarching body that arrests, detains in custody, investigates, 
sentences and operates detention sanction premises. There are no external bodies in place for 
oversight or to monitor; nor is there an external process by which complaints may be made 
outside of the structure of the Party Discipline Committees. The decision to transfer a suspect into 
the criminal justice process is one made by the Party Committee Investigators, if they consider 
that the official has also committed a crime, as well as a Party norm infraction. There is, however, 
no external body oversight of, or involvement in that decision. 
‘Shuanggui’ is an opaque process, sparsely regulated, governed by piecemeal regulations, the 
grounds and offences of which are vague and readily open to abuse. The deficient regulation 






officials. Reform has come in the form of new Regulations, yet they do nothing to strengthen 
safeguards for detainees, rather they extend the offences, sanctions and powers of investigation. 
Indeed, in line with Xi’s spearheading of the fight against corruption, the expansion of types of 
CCP infractions and extension of investigatory powers sits in line with the general current 
political trajectory and approach of establishing tougher measures to counter corruption (the ‘iron 
fist’ approach). This CCP justice process can thus be seen as an important and flexible tool for the 








Recent legal reforms mean that some justice processes have had certain protective and preventive 
measures afforded to detainees established in the relevant laws. Yet, there remain fundamental 
flaws and systemic deficiencies with the regulation and scope of the protections conferred by the 
measures. These deficiencies are evident in all types of justice processes examined, but the extent 
of the deficiency varies depending on the type of process. 
Recent reforms in the Chinese criminal law now establish some aspects of the core safeguards 
and measures needed to prevent torture. There is a generic prohibition in torture in law, yet, it 
remains relatively weak and there are credible concerns about its limited scope. Similarly, there 
are some procedural guarantees and preventive safeguards afforded in law for detainees on the 
criminal justice track (access to a lawyer, third party notification of the fact of detention, etc.). 
Nevertheless, these available safeguards have three key fundamental flaws. First, they are limited 
in scope, in that they do not cover all criminal suspects. Second, many are diluted or negated by 
permissible exceptions provided for in the law. Third, the guarantees and safeguards themselves 
are not comprehensive: significant areas that should be regulated are left without protection. 
While there is evidence of significant reform of the criminal justice system to deepen 
transparency and remove avenues of interference from local government, interference in judicial 
matters by Central Party (i.e., top-level) remains possible. Complaints’ avenues and monitoring 
systems are nascent but evident in the criminal justice sphere, yet are minimally regulated for in 
law, and mechanisms vary by institution and region due to a lack of standardisation. 
In comparison to the criminal-law justice process, the three non-criminal processes assessed are 
far less regulated. While the punitive administrative process pursuant to the PSAPL affords some 
basic protections to detainees, this remains a sphere that lags far behind the reforms seen in the 
criminal law. Detainees are afforded fewer and weaker safeguards than their criminal-law 
counterparts. While there is an element of fluidity between the criminal and administrative justice 






detainee into the criminal track or not – for alleged infractions or/and crimes that are nearly 
identical (for example, gathering a crowd to disrupt social order) and turns upon the ‘severity’ of 
the alleged offence. Without any external or judicial involvement either with the judiciary or the 
state administrative law supervision organ (the Procuratorate), as in the criminal-law process, the 
discretion as to which justice process to follow remains with the PSB investigator. Equally, this 
element of discretion is amplified by keeping the whole process of investigation, sentencing and 
detention process solely under the responsibility of one overarching body, the PSB. Complaints’ 
avenues and monitoring are nascent, and do not cover places of initial police custody, where the 
risk of torture is greatest. The PSAPL has undergone some (very) limited reform, but still does 
not offer sufficiently robust protection to detainees, nor does it fully address and eliminate risks 
of torture. Its 2017 draft revisions do not substantially alter the current provisions and thus do not 
address these concerns and do not significantly reduce the risk of torture. The 2017 proposed 
revisions to the Detention Centre Regulations (into law) are following along a similar trajectory. 
In the area of administrative detention pursuant to China’s Drug Control Law and Regulations, 
there are also indications of some potential reform. Nevertheless, as the laws and regulations 
currently stand, this sphere also remains an area with few protective guarantees or safeguards. 
Those safeguards that do exist are relatively weak and do not comprehensively cover all the areas 
of risk. Investigation and sentencing currently remains with one body (the PSB) (although this 
may change), with no external oversight. There are also no rights established in the relevant 
current laws and regulations enabling detainees to complain about their treatment or to ‘lift the 
veil’ and allow external monitoring of the CDR facilities. The protections for detainees may be 
expanded if the new Regulations that are currently being proposed come into effect. Yet, in a 
similar situation to the criminal-law reform, proposed reforms superficially look encouraging and 
may strengthen protection, yet, when examined in detail, many of the proposals remain weak and 
confer diluted protection. 
The shuanggui process remains deficient in many respects, when compared to the criminal – and 






safeguards and guarantees, and none of the core procedural safeguards needed to prevent torture. 
Similarly to the administrative detention processes, there are no structural safeguards for 
detainees going through shuanggui interrogation and detention procedure, and it is the same 
overarching body that arrests, detains in custody, investigates, sentences and operates detention 
sanction premises. There are no external bodies in place to monitor, nor is there an external 
process by which detainee complaints can be made. Moreover, given the official policy of 
eradicating corruption and the reforms that are tightening State control of this sphere, this CCP 
justice process can be a seen as a key instrument of State control; it is therefore unlikely to be 
reformed in the direction of the expansion of protective safeguards for its public official detainees. 
The criminal-law process stands out, comparatively, as the most regulated sphere with relatively 
more safeguards afforded to detainees than the others in focus. Yet, even in this sphere, many of 
these guarantees only confer diluted protection, they only selectively cover some detainees and 
are negated by permissible exceptions to the safeguards, remain deficient or virtually non-
existent: in short, more legal regulation does not mean better protection for all detainees. It is not 
a guarantee that should the other forms of non-criminal law justice process follow reforms in a 
similar vein to the criminal law, their protection would not suffer from the same deficiencies as 
the criminal-law safeguards. 
Overall, none of the detention processes examined here provides the robust preventive measures 
in law needed to fully prevent the risk of torture. Worse, those safeguards established in general 
international law and applicable to all States worldwide, namely the prohibition of 
incommunicado detention (i.e., right of third party notification about the fact of detention and 
communication with the outside world) and the right of habeas corpus, 618 remain deficient or 
virtually non-existent. 
  
                                                     






Chapter 3: Effectiveness of China’s preventive measures & 
current nature of torture and ill-treatment  
This Chapter examines whether the protections that are afforded in law actually work in practice. 
It considers each of the justice processes outlined in Chapter 2: criminal, administrative and Party, 
and examines each justice process in turn, starting with the criminal-law and then turning to the 
two other justice processes that lie external to the criminal-law system, namely, administrative 
and Party justice. In each sphere, it considers the effectiveness of existing safeguards and the 
nature of any protection gaps in law or gaps in implementation of the law (i.e. gaps between law 
and practice). It documents various torture and other ill-treatment allegations and cases emanating 
from each area examined, to give an approximate indication of the scope and type of abuse in 
practice. Ultimately, this Chapter seeks to understand and assess, on the information available 
from interviews and research, the likelihood of whether torture and other ill-treatment in police 
and Party-operated detention is reducing as a result of the legal reforms and preventive measures 
taken, or whether it remains resilient despite the reforms. 
3.1 The criminal-law justice process: effectiveness of legal safeguards  
This section examines the protections offered under China’s criminal law system619 and gaps in 
implementation of those legal safeguards identified in Chapter 2, shaping their effectiveness in 
practice. They follow approximately the same sequence and grouping as in Chapter 2. 
3.1.1 Protection & implementation gaps 
(i) Torture prohibition 
China still lacks a comprehensive definition of torture and ill-treatment in its national law (c.f. 
Chapter 2(4)(I)(i)). This is a clear regulatory protection gap that needs to be addressed. Moreover, 
it can impact how investigators, procurators and the judiciary view abuse and what can or can’t 
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constitute torture. If they consider that an act is not serious enough, then many cases will not be 
investigated or prosecuted. This could be one (of many) reason(s) for such low rates of 
prosecution of torture cases in China (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). It also links with the issue of impunity. 
The CAT Committee has expressly underscored that discrepancies in torture definitions risk 
creating loopholes in which impunity flourishes – and has directly raised this concern in its 
treatment of China.620 Equally, this also links with how progress on reduction of torture and its 
prevention is perceived by the Chinese authorities and national scholars. This partially explains 
how national scholars and authorities can think that torture (but not ill-treatment) has significantly 
reduced, if not been effectively curbed, in police-run KSS (c.f. Chapters 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 and 4.4.), 
while IHRL bodies, national lawyers and civil society consider both types of abuse as pervasive, 
based on receiving hundreds of allegations of torture and ill-treatment emanating from Chinese 
places of detention every year (c.f. Chapter 3.1.2 (i) and (ii)).  
Through the lens of prevention, the above is concerning; it shows discrepancies in regulation, in 
implementation and in approach. Progress in torture prevention needs, at the very least, the 
respective state’s national law to be fully compliant with the UN CAT (c.f. Chapter 1), and in 
China’s case, it is not. A good starting point would be both to address the regulatory gaps and to 
ensure training and awareness-raising for all persons involved in investigation, custody and 
detention of suspects and prisoners – including lawyers and the judiciary - for alleged criminal, 
administrative or Party infractions, of what constitutes torture and ill-treatment (c.f. Concluding 
recommendations (i) and (iv) and Conclusions, Section C (ii)).  
(ii) Time-limited police custody, the right to be brought before a judicial 
authority speedily and requirements for judicial oversight621  
The CAT Committee has clearly highlighted its concern that China has not shortened the 37-day 
maximum legal period during which detained persons can be exceptionally held in police 
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custody.622 This includes an initial seven-day time limit before the procuratorate has to approve 
arrest.623 The Committee has underlined that the “excessive period of time during which public 
security officials may detain persons without independent supervision624 may increase the risk of 
detainees being subject to ill-treatment or even tortured.” 625  The ‘routine use’ 626  of this 
exceptional prolongation to 37 days’ custody has concerned not only the CAT Committee,627 the 
UN SRT,628 scholars and civil society,629 but also the Chinese authorities themselves, as seen in 
the Ministry of Justice’s 2016 ‘Provisional Provisions on Efforts to Prevent and Correct Cases of 
Extended Detention and Prolonged Detention without Resolution by Criminal Enforcement 
Prosecution Departments of People's Procuratorates’.630  
There are several concerns here. First, the permissibility in the law allows for prolonged 
extension – and the legally permissible terms are extremely, if not excessively, long.631 Second, 
even these long permissible terms can get bypassed in reality. The CAT Committee cites ‘routine 
use’ of the maximum 37-day timeframe in practice.632 The SPP published guiding cases, which 
serve as a source of interpretation of the CPL, but also serve to show this. SPP cases show that 
detainees are often being kept in police custody for one month before arrest, and a further two 
months for the investigation and then a further month for prosecution review and preparation 
before trial.633 Thus, the seven-day time limit for approval by the procuratorate of arrest can be 
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circumvented by exceptions in the law, and often is in practice.634 The CPL itself creates so many 
exceptions that some detainees, due to the seriousness or complexity of their alleged offences, 
stay in police custody (whether initial custody, interim policy custody or pre-trial police 
detention) for weeks, if not months, into the investigation. 635  Throughout the arrest and 
investigation period, suspects are held in custody by ultimately the same body, the PSB. All of 
these aspects can heighten the risk of torture or other ill-treatment, as identified in Chapter 1. 
National lawyers, scholars and civil society bodies have outlined extensively how the system 
works in practice.636 Briefly, the police first summon a suspect; they can then hold them for up to 
24 hours before formal criminal detention is authorised. Thanks to reforms in the CPL,637 suspects 
must be moved to a KSS within 24 hours of formal detention. However, there are various ways to 
circumvent this requirement: suspects can be held in police custody for many hours before they 
are put under formal detention. In practice, the police delay formal detention in different ways. 
These include issuing a 传唤 (chuanhuan), a non-coercive summons allowing for an additional 
24 hours under the CPL or for informal ‘chats’ with the police (colloquially known as an 
invitation “to drink a cup of tea” (喝一杯茶) (he yi be cha)); or conduct an administrative 
detention investigation 留置盘查（liuzhi pancha), which under the Police Law enables suspects 
to be held for an additional 48 hours. According to national lawyers, police routinely – not 
exceptionally – take up to the full 37 days to hold a suspect, before the procuratorate approves 
their arrest. The CPL then allows for many months for the police to conclude their investigation 
and the procurator decides to prosecute the suspect. 
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As previously established,638 the risk of torture remains at its greatest in initial police custody. 
Time limits, designed to ensure people are transferred out of initial police custody as quickly as 
possible given the risks of coercion of confessions, are not working in practice in China. They are 
not working because the transfer is simply to another place of police detention (KSS), where 
investigation can continue by the same ultimate body (albeit differing departments) that 
investigates and detains. Circumvention of the protections conferred by the CPL is thus both 
possible and happens routinely. Notwithstanding the safeguards in law to separate investigators 
from suspects, record (some) interrogations, etc.639, the whole set-up of this model means the 
investigators ultimately are in control of the length of custody. This presents a risk of potential 
manipulation using custody to facilitate their investigation. Prolonging police detention during 
arrest and investigation has thus become a routine and systemic practice.640  It has not been 
resolved by legal reforms of the CPL in 2012. This issue has become so acute that Chinese 
procurators, in 2016, have been officially reminded by the SPP to keep the legal limits in 
check.641 
Equally, even when detainees are transferred to KSSs, the investigation continues for months, 
during which time, suspects can be removed from KSSs for interrogations and returned to the 
KSSs afterwards.642 Various Chinese procurators point out that is it both illegal and very hard in 
practice to take suspects out of the KSS.643 Yet, some national lawyers and civil society bodies 
say that there are ways to do this and to circumvent the protections and infrastructure established 
by the CPL, such as the need for audio-visual recording. 644 Unofficial interrogations can happen 
in “offices of the police responsible for criminal investigations (xingjing dadui, 刑警大队), and in 
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police stations (paichusuo 派出所), hostels, and other police-controlled facilities such as drug 
rehabilitation centres.”645 
An illustration indicative of the practice of using long extensions to police custody can be seen in 
an interview conducted by the author with the wife of a current detainee in KSS remand detention, 
Mr. X.646 While it remains unverified, it does serve to illustrate the issue at hand.  
Mr. X 647  is a Chinese national who was involved in various commercial developments in 
Province Y and was apprehended and detained in a KSS in late 2015, where he remains (2017). 
During the apprehension, initial custody and detention, he was allegedly not permitted contact 
with his family. He was not initially allowed direct contact with his lawyer, although the lawyer 
was able to speak with the Country B’s police, however, no specific grounds for the arrest were 
given. One week after the detention in the KSS, the family received official notification of 
detention (see Section below ‘third party notification’). This notification still did not include any 
grounds of detention or reasons for arrest, but offered the possibility to appeal/challenge the 
detention. The deadline for the appeal had already expired before the notification was received. 
In 2017, Mr. X is still in the KSS and still has had no direct contact with his family; he is not 
allowed to write, call or meet them. His only means of communication is through his lawyer, who 
passes on updates to the family. Even though he has been in detention since late 2015, his first 
court appearance to be placed formally on remand was in late 2016, almost a year after first being 
detained. 
While this remains only a single case, notably it provides context to what can happen in practice 
within the criminal justice process, despite the safeguards in place requiring shorter detention 
timeframes and prohibiting prolonged police custody without judicial authorisation. 
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More generally, national legal scholars, such as those at Renmin University, 648 voice various 
concerns with the current situation, notably, that in practice “arrest mostly means [a] certain 
period of custodial detention.” They also point out that as Detention Centre Regulations stipulate 
that the suspect should be detained in the KSS governed by the police, this means that during 
investigation the suspect is “totally controlled by the detection [investigation] organs.” Further, 
they underline that “to meet the needs of their [police] own work, the compulsory measure, 
especially detention and arrest, is widely used to limit suspects’ liberty more than the factual 
requirements of the situation in case would call for.”649  
There is no explicit right in law for the criminal suspect to be brought promptly, and in person, 
before a judge after apprehension by the police. Nor is there a right in law to challenge the 
detention decision proactively before a judicial authority (habeas corpus) for the long period of 
police custody while under arrest and investigation. In this context, it is thus unsurprising that 
detainees generally do not challenge the long period of police custody before a judicial authority; 
they cannot: it is the Procuratorate that has the mandate to supervise the legality of detention, and 
it is an administrative State organ reporting to Congress, rather than a judicial authority.650  
The long extensions of police custody and the role of the procurator in approving and reviewing 
detention have been subject to critique by international bodies.651 Recently, the issue of lengthy 
extensions has become the subject to additional regulation, along with tighter provisions around 
detention reviews, as the 2012 reforms the CPL still allowed for multiple extensions.652 Scholars 
at Renmin University and the GBCC have recently organised a seminar on detention review. 
                                                     
648  See the Research Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law of Peking University Law School, Implementation of the 
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650  Law on the Organisation of People's Procuratorates; see analysis of this area by the UN SRT, in the UN SRT Reports on China 
2005 and 2011; see also analysis in Thesis Chapter 4. 
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China (2015/2016), among others. 
652  SPP, ‘Provisions on Efforts to Prevent and Correct Cases of Extended Detention and Prolonged Detention without Resolution 
by Criminal Enforcement Prosecution Departments of People's Procuratorates’ (Provisional), 2015; and in 2016 the 
Procuratorate issued the ‘People's Procuratorate Provisions on Handling Cases of Reviewing the Necessity of Detention 
(Provisional)’, and accompanying Circular, Circular of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China, 
Gao Jian Zhi Jian [2016] No. 37, Circular on Issuing the Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s Prison 
Management Bureau on Implementing the Provisions on the Handling of Detention Necessity Review Cases by People’s 






Experts and procurators discussed the need to clarify the objectives of the review system to 
develop an adequate system to prevent any unnecessary deprivation of liberty; the need to ensure 
pre-trial detention judicial review (many Chinese scholars and the authorities consider the 
procuratorate a “quasi-judicial” body and thus competent to conduct the reviews); the need to 
simplify the (currently complex) procedure; and ensure that detention is a measure of last resort. 
Differing views were advanced by international experts, national scholars and participating 
procurators. International experts pointed out that given the mandate of the procuratorate, it was 
unlikely to be considered as meeting the criteria for a competent judicial authority, namely that 
the body be judicial, and has a degree of separation – or independence – from the investigative 
function. The Chinese scholars and many procurators considered that the current situation of 
having a different department of the procuratorate handle review is a positive step towards 
achieving more independence.653 SPP Provisions where adopted in 2013 and 2016 to help judicial 
interpretation on the need to restrict prolonged extensions of custody and to regulate the review of 
the necessity of detention. These specify that the power of supervision should be centralised into 
one department of the Procuratorate, the Investigation Supervision Department, to make the 
procedure easier to handle.654  
According to international bodies, extensions to initial police custody, lack of prompt judicial 
approval of detention and the lack of habeas corpus have not improved since the revision of the 
CPL. These have been repeatedly highlighted as problematic by IHRL bodies, including the UN 
SRT, who recommended in 2005, and again in 2011, that “those [persons] legally arrested should 
not be held in facilities under the control of their investigators for more than the time required by 
law to obtain a judicial warrant for pre-trial detention [UN SRT recommends 48 hours]. After this 
time, they should be transferred to pre-trial detention facility under a different authority where no 
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further unsupervised contact with investigators is permitted.”655 This was not the case in 2005 or 
in 2011. Equally, the UN SRT recommended in 2005 that all detainees should be guaranteed the 
ability to challenge the lawfulness of their detention decision in front of an independent court or 
judicial authority (habeas corpus). The UN SRT noted that the procuratorates did not constitute 
an independent judicial authority, nor did the judicial system guarantee independence from 
political interference, to enable it to be considered as truly independent.656 He observed that the 
situation had not changed in 2011 in his Follow-up report on China.657 The CAT Committee also 
made the same criticisms in 2008 and again in its most recent Concluding Observations on China 
in December 2015. Similarly, despite legal reforms to strengthen the judiciary from 2012 onwards 
(including the Lawyers’ Law),658 the judiciary is, in many respects, still widely considered not to 
be truly independent (Chapter 4).659  
The Procuratorate is an administrative organ and responsible to the National People’s Congress. 
Procurators are starting to discuss disquiet among their colleagues – along with some reported 
resignations – due to the role of the procuratorate being subject to government proposals for 
reform. In 2016/2017 the Chinese authorities are discussing the possibility of removing the 
mandate of prosecution of corruption charges from the procurators (where it traditionally lay, 
providing an exception to most investigations conducted by the police) and instead transfer this 
role to a different department for supervision. Various pilots/trials in this area are coming to an 
end and it is nearly certain that a centralised State Inspection Committee will be created. However, 
there are practical difficulties in the creation of the new Committee and, according to leading 
scholars, it is important that this Committee operates using criminal procedure and is equipped 
with a special criminal investigation department (which is not currently envisaged). 660  The 
concern is that on current trajectory, it may operate outside of the CPL, and its regulated 
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safeguards. This proposed reform is an unpopular initiative, with the procuracy at least, as it 
would remove some of its mandate. This also shows the relative lack of power the Procuratorate 
has over decisions about its own mandate. 
Some reforms are gradually coming to this area, however, despite the law undergoing a series of 
revisions in 2012, the problems of prolonged extensions of time in police custody, the lack of 
prompt competent judicial approval of the deprivation of liberty, as well as the absence of 
avenues to ensure an effective habeas corpus right remain and continue to stymie China’s 
criminal justice process. 
(iii) Trinity of legal preventive safeguards – access to a lawyer, doctor and 
notification of detention to a third party  
Another illustration of a protection gap in practice in the Chinese criminal justice system can be 
seen in the context of the ‘trinity’ of core preventive procedural safeguards: namely, access to a 
lawyer and doctor, as well as for notification of detention to a third party. In particular, the 
effectiveness of the rights of third party notification and to access, or communicate with, third 
parties has been subject to wide criticism, despite undergoing reform in the CPL.661 As already 
established,662 this right can be severely limited, by law, through the indefinite withholding of 
investigators’ permission necessary for this right for certain groups of suspects, including those 
endangering public security, those suspected of malfeasance in public office, amongst others.663 
Even for those categories of detainees who could be afforded this safeguard under law, it appears 
to be restricted in reality. The CAT Committee, among others,664 have pointed to “consistent 
reports indicating that public security officials constantly refuse […] notification to their relatives 
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on the grounds that the case concerns State secrets, even when the detained person is not charged 
with State security crimes.”665  
Likewise, despite CPL reforms to strengthen safeguards against incommunicado detention, civil 
society organisations and China legal scholars 666  have documented several recent cases of 
criminal suspects who were not afforded the right of third party notification for several weeks, if 
not months, after arrest. These include the case of Su Changlan, who “was taken away by police 
on 27 October 2014. It was not confirmed where she was being held until her family received a 
notice of the charges against her on 3 December [2014]. Her family has not been able to visit her 
since she was first detained, despite repeated requests, and she was only allowed to see her lawyer 
for the first time in May 2015.”667 Further, this right has been denied in the cases of various 
prominent Chinese human rights lawyers and human rights defenders (including Wang Yu, Bao 
Longjun, Sui Muqing, Xie Yang, Liu Sixin, Wang Quanzhang, Zhao Wei (a.k.a. Kao La), Lin Bin 
(a.k.a. Monk Wangyun), Gou Hongguo, Xie Yuandong, Gao Yue, Li Chunfu and Li Heping).668 
In July 2015, they were apparently placed under residential surveillance at unknown locations 
without access to their lawyers and family members and have spent many months (in some cases 
years (Li Heping))669 ‘disappeared’.670  
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Professor Lubman argues that, in practice, “despite the law on the books, the police have caused 
the 'disappearance' of criminal suspects and activists.”671 Lubman notes “in the recent past the 
police have held dissidents such as Ai Weiwei and human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng in 
undeclared locations for months without notifying family members.” Pursuant to the amended 
Law, he points out, “law enforcement agencies […] still have the power to detain persons 
suspected of crimes related to national security or terrorism in a designated location of the 
agencies' choice for up to six months and they would be allowed to deny suspects' access to a 
lawyer for the duration of the detention.”672  
Equally, the effectiveness of the safeguard of a detainee’s access to a lawyer has also been a 
subject of widespread concern.673 Similar restrictions in the CPL, as for the above safeguard of 
third party notification, are legally permissible and the right is not afforded from the outset of 
deprivation of liberty but within 48 hours. Various issues contribute to a lack of effectiveness of 
this safeguard. First, the law is not in conformity with the required safeguard, as identified by the 
CAT Committee and others, in that it does not guarantee the right of the detained person to meet a 
lawyer from the very outset of the detention (only within 48 hours).674 This is the time of the 
greatest risk of torture. This is particularly concerning in a country that has a legacy of reliance on 
confessions as the primary source of evidence during investigations. Second, in certain cases, 
such as those of “endangering State security”, “terrorism” or “bribery”, the lawyer must obtain 
prior permission from public security investigators to meet the suspect, which may legally be 
withheld for an indefinite period of time, on the grounds that it could hinder the investigation or 
could result in the disclosure of State secrets.675 Similarly, there is the potential for outright 
refusal by the investigators. Here, the CAT Committee has pointed to “consistent reports 
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indicating that public security officials constantly refuse lawyers’ access to suspects […] on the 
grounds that the case concerns State secrets, even when the detained person is not charged.”676  
Those suspects allowed to benefit from this right can find that, in practice, this safeguard can still 
be rendered obsolete by several other restrictions to its impact. National scholars at the China 
University of Political Science and Law, have pointed out that “there are many restrictions when 
defence lawyers apply for the meeting with their clients, and because of the lack of regulations or 
judicial interpretations to elaborate these restrictions, it is easier for the investigation authorities 
to apply random explanation[s] or even extravagant explanation[s] to prevent lawyers from 
meeting with their clients. […] Meanwhile, [the] traditional stereotype that lawyers may hinder 
investigation authorities from resolving criminal cases is an important obstacle to […] the defence 
lawyer’s right [ability] to meet their clients.” 677  
Another factor that goes to the heart of this safeguard’s lack of effectiveness is the protection 
vacuum that is created by the criminal laws. First, there is no right to access a lawyer from the 
very outset of deprivation of liberty for any criminal suspect. Further, access to a lawyer is not a 
mandatory right for the initial interview/interrogation. Indeed, regulations specify that initial 
interrogations should now be conducted within the first 24 hours of custody. These legal 
provisions thereby facilitate a timeframe whereby, in all likelihood, a lawyer will not be there 
during the very time that is considered to be the riskiest time for the commission of acts of torture. 
In practice, the lack of prompt access to legal counsel, coupled with the lack of third party 
notification and access, means that many people can be, and are in practice, held incommunicado 
for many weeks, if not months. 678  Prolonged incommunicado detention in and of itself can 
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as further increasing the detainee’s risk 
of torture.679 The UN SRT and civil society organisations, such as Amnesty International, have 
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documented several recent cases of suspects being denied their right of notification of detention, 
or access, to their relatives or third parties and their lawyers. These include, inter alia, “Tibetan 
writer Druklo (pen-name Shokjang) [who] was taken away by national security police on 16 
March 2015 and has had no access to a lawyer or family since. The authorities have not told his 
relatives the reason for his detention or the charges for which he is detained.” 680 Likewise, is the 
case of “Tibetan monk Choephel Dawa [who] has not been heard from since he was detained by 
police on the night of 28 March 2015.  It is not known where he is being held and the reason for 
his detention. He has not had any access to his lawyer or his family.”681 In 2016, the UN SRT, in 
his recent report on communications received concerning China, 682  concluded that “the 
Government of China, by failing to protect the physical and psychological integrity of Mr. Tang 
Zhishun and Xing Qingxian [human rights defenders], including by subjecting them to enforced 
disappearance and prolonged incommunicado detention, has violated their right to be free from 
torture.”683  
It is of concern that this safeguard may be legally delayed without periodic reviews or maximum 
time limits for all suspects. It is worse, however, for categories of suspects, especially suspected 
corrupt officials, petitioners, complainants against the status quo or ‘Falun Gong’ practitioners,684 
among others. It is these groups of persons who are generally perceived by the authorities as 
having the potential to repetitively disrupt public order and thus present a risk to the government 
priority of social harmony and economic development. They can be, and have been in practice, 
denied this right in the interest of the investigation.685  
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(iv) Exclusion of evidence obtained under duress 
Another significant recent amendment made to the CPL to strengthen the protection against 
torture in initial police custody, was the addition of the new provision to specifically exclude any 
evidence obtained by means of torture from being relied upon in court.686  Moreover, this has 
been supplemented by recent Provisions on Several Issues regarding the Strict Exclusion of 
Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases’. 687  This has been widely acknowledged as a 
positive move by scholars and civil society.688 It has also started to be seen in court practice.689 
China, in its State Party report to the UNCAT Committee argued that the exclusory rule is 
operational and effective and cited a few cases in support of this. These include, inter alia, the 
case of Lu Wu: “the defendant Lu Wu was arrested as a suspect of the crime of transporting drugs 
in 2013. In the hearing, while Lu Wu said his confession of guilt to the public security organ was 
extorted by torture […]. The court thinks, multiple evidence[s] can prove the condition of Lu Wu 
with cyanosis around eyes and a swollen face, while the procuratorial organ fails to provide more 
powerful objective evidence[s] such as synchronous audio or video recording. According to the 
existing evidences and clues, the existence of the unlawful collection of evidence[s] by the public 
security organ is not beyond reasonable doubt, all confessions of Lu Wu before the hearing are 
excluded.” [sic]690 
Yet, this reform too has seen gaps between the law and actual practice and has also been subject 
to much IHRL bodies’ criticism and scholarly critique.691 Scholars and experts worry that this 
safeguard risks remaining a concept only – a ‘paper tiger’ (zhi lao hu) – a protective safeguard 
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with no ‘bite’ that does not translate into implementation or practice.692 Likewise, there is a 
concern that the development of the exclusionary rules are overshadowed by long-standing major 
issues, which remain pertinent, such as the fact that ‘the new rules inexplicably impede defence 
attorneys’ access to some of the most critical evidence for requesting exclusion, which will 
inevitably cast doubt on the legitimacy of the entire process.’693 The IHRL bodies, such as the 
CAT Committee, as well as numerous civil society bodies, remain concerned that “courts often 
shift the burden of proof back to defendants during the exclusionary procedures and dismiss 
lawyers’ requests to exclude the admissibility of confessions.” 694  Amnesty International, for 
example, in its Shadow Report to the CAT Committee illustrated how the burden of proof can be 
readily shifted in practice on to the defendant, in an extract from Feng County People’s Court 
criminal verdict, 11 February 2015: 
“…though the defendant […] claimed that his confession of guilt was extracted by 
investigators through torture, he did not provide any concrete leads or relevant evidence 
to prove the claim. Moreover, he never raised objections to his confession of guilt 
regarding these facts during his time in the Feng County Detention Centre. Therefore, 
this court rules that [the defendant’s] confession can be used as evidence.”695 
Likewise, Human Rights Watch, which examined 432 court cases involving allegations of torture 
from January to April 2014, found that “only 23 resulted in evidence being thrown out by the 
court; none led to acquittal of the defendant.”696 
(v) Audio-visual recordings of interrogations & physical separation 
interrogator from suspect 
Other strengthened procedural safeguards in the criminal law sphere have been taken with a view 
to mitigating the risk of torture and other ill-treatment. These include the requirement of CCTV in 
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police interrogation rooms in some cases (death penalty and other ‘serious’ suspected crimes, 
including corruption), physical separation of the interrogator and the detained person undergoing 
interrogation, no fewer than two investigators participating in the interrogation/interview and the 
possibility for recording the interrogation.697 These are all positive developments. 
That said, without any monitoring of the implementation of this (or of any) safeguard(s) in police 
stations,698 the authorities simply do not know whether this is, in practice, fully complied with. 
Many bodies, such as the CAT Committee, suspect not; it flagged its concern about the dubious 
independence of the auditing of these recordings. The Committee, in its most recent Concluding 
Observations on China, indicated that it had received evidence from several sources indicative 
that the police selectively only record a certain part of the interrogation or use areas outside of the 
camera’s coverage to commit acts of alleged torture or ill-treatment.699  
Professor Margaret Lewis700 has examined the effectiveness of this safeguard and how it works in 
practice. Lewis considers that despite the positive move in establishing this safeguard in the 
criminal law,  
“Preliminary indications are, however, that recording interrogations is not significantly 
changing the culture of extreme reliance on confessions as the primary form of evidence 
in criminal cases. When I viewed an interrogation room in a Beijing police station last 
October, the staff was keen to point out the videotaping technology. What I could not help 
but notice was the slogan “truthfully confess and your whole body will feel at ease” (that 
was written in large characters on the floor in front of the metal, constraining 
interrogation chair, otherwise known as a “tiger chair”). Faced with this slogan during 
prolonged questioning makes crystal clear to the suspect that there is no right to silence 
in Chinese law.”701 
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Lewis argues that “what are lacking are additional reassurances that these procedures are 
sufficiently rigorous to prevent tampering with the process, […] the value of recordings is further 
limited if the court does not view the interrogation process with a sceptical eye, if the defence has 
a difficult time accessing the recordings, or if there simply is no defence lawyer […].”702  
The use and effectiveness of this safeguard is inherently linked to the wider context, operation 
and structure of the overall criminal justice system, which has a part to play in the safeguard’s 
ultimate effectiveness. It is also linked to the embedded culture of the primacy of the confession 
as evidence in the investigatory process in China, despite reforms seeking to counter this. Many 
scholars support this view.703 Further, it is not mandatory to tape all interviews, just the ones for 
suspected serious crimes and, in practice, many interviews are not recorded.704 
There are also signs of deliberate circumvention of these infrastructural protective safeguards in 
practice. Various national lawyers and civil society bodies have pointed to the removal of 
suspects to other offices by police investigators during investigation. This includes removal back 
to areas where there are less regulated safeguards in place, such as areas without CCTV coverage, 
recording equipment, etc., in initial police custody (police stations) offices, or to other locations, 
such as CDR facilities or unmarked hostels or hotels, without infrastructural protective safeguards 
in place.705 
(vi) Pockets of ‘protection vacuums’ for certain groups of detainees within the 
criminal-law process  
Although there are now more protective safeguards in the criminal law than previously, there are 
still segments of the criminal suspect population who can be held with less transparent procedural 
protections in all aspects of the criminal justice process. This, in effect, creates pockets of safety 
vacuums. These include those held on charges of ‘endangering state security’, ‘bribery’ or 
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‘terrorism’. Indeed, it can also affect certain groups of detainees, such as disabled detainees or 
pregnant or nursing mothers.706  
An illustration of a safety vacuum within the CPL is residential surveillance / confinement in a 
designated location (RSDL) (指定居所监视居住 (zhidingjusuo jianshijuzhu)).707 This measure 
remains within PSB or procurators’ discretion and can be in any designated place other than a 
KSS or prison. While it is ‘designated’, it is often unknown (to relatives and third parties), and, 
reportedly, on occasion, it has been in shuanggui facilities.708 These detainees have diluted legal 
safeguards, including that there is no full requirement (i.e., it is subject to exceptions) of 
immediate and notification to the family of the whereabouts of detention (the law states that the 
suspect’s family shall be informed of the placement under RSDL within 24 hours, unless 
notification cannot be processed).709 Equally, there no right to prompt and effective access to a 
lawyer from the outset of detention at the RSDL, (indeed, the suspect “shall not meet or 
correspond with any one without the permission of the executing organ”).710  They are also 
typically held for longer periods of time than the general timeframes allowed for by law: six 
months rather than the 37 days for other criminal suspects in initial custody. This is an area within 
the criminal law sphere that epitomises the possibility of circumvention of protections afforded in 
the CPL. It is a detention process that is governed by the CPL (Articles 72-77), yet this 
discretionary custodial measure lacks virtually all preventive safeguards. RSDL comprises a high-
risk opaque environment within the criminal justice process whereby torture can occur, and has, 
according to numerous reports.711 
Scholars, national and international alike, have argued that as regulation develops, especially in 
the criminal sphere, there is an ‘implementation gap’, a gap between the law and practice in many 
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areas.712 As Teng Biao, a Chinese legal scholar, has argued, “the major problem with rule of law 
in mainland China is not establishing legal provisions but rather implementing laws.”713 Others 
argue that this is exacerbated by deficiently protective regulation in the first place.714 Overall, 
however, there is wide support for the view that the letter of the law does not necessarily translate 
into implementation or practice in China’s places of detention.715 
 
3.1.2 Current reality and nature of torture in police custody & detention 
According to the Chinese authorities, cases of torture and other ill-treatment in initial police 
custody and cases of abuse in KSS have fallen since the 2012 reforms. 716 This needs to be 
unpacked and separated out: torture in initial police custody from torture (mostly through 
coercive interrogation) and other ill-treatment (often in the form of management-sanctioned 
intimidation or lack of protections from inter-detainee violence) in KSSs.717 The authorities base 
their assertion on the number of cases that the SPP prosecute before the courts. They underline in 
their UNCAT submission that by approximately late 2014 more than 1000 cases nationwide of 
torture and ill-treatment have come before the courts since 2008. 718  This averages out at 
approximately 140 cases per year over a seven-year period. This is a surprisingly low number of 
cases for a country with a population greater than 1.3 billion, 2,800 KSSs, thousands of police 
stations, 700 prisons and a police force two million strong. Given the population size, according 
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to these statistics, there is some 0.0001% chance of torture or ill-treatment in detention in China. 
At face value, these figures suggest that the risk of torture and ill-treatment when deprived of 
liberty in China is extremely low. Virtually every other source on the frequency of torture in 
China, including cases on the SPP database, show differing statistics and a different perception of 
the frequency of torture and ill-treatment. 
There are various problems with the statistics presented by the national authorities. First, they are 
not disaggregated by place and therefore it is impossible to determine whether these cases only 
involve police torture and ill-treatment in initial police custody or elsewhere, such as KSSs. The 
CAT Committee has criticised this.719 Second, SPP cases from January to April 2014 alone show 
432 cases involving allegations of torture. Definitive statistics on torture and ill-treatment are 
difficult to obtain for various reasons but they vary widely. An interview with Renmin University 
Associate Professor Cheng Lei, confirms the difficulties encountered in gathering definitive 
information on the frequency of torture in China. This is especially challenging, he points out, in 
the non-criminal and extra-legal justice spheres such as administrative detention, where there is 
little oversight and very little co-ordination between different institutions and regions.720 Cheng 
Lei shares Renmin University’s developed methodology, whereby to form opinions on the current 
state of torture and other ill-treatment, they examine SPP cases on torture and gather empirical 
data from their three pilot region KSSs. Here they have monitoring and complaints mechanisms 
established and they have begun to analyse the effectiveness of these measures. This analysis, 
however, is limited to KSSs only and is in only in three of the 2800 KSSs that exist across the 
country. By amalgamating data from onsite procurators in their projects and those cases that have 
reached the court, they have come to a clearer view in the frequency and nature of torture and ill-
treatment in China.721 Third, these low torture statistics also may be indicative of the general lack 
of operational complaints mechanisms and reporting structures in all places of detention in China. 
While they are gradually increasing in KSSs and some prisons, in most others there generally 
lacks the reporting mechanisms in place to systematically receive and pass reports on to 
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prosecutorial authorities to bring cases of alleged torture to the courts. While the procurators do 
feel they can follow up cases of abuse and they do, the reality of the general discipline and 
accountability structures might mean that the perpetrator is not removed immediately from the 
vicinity of the victim or later adequately punished.722  
The authorities assert that torture and ill-treatment has generally decreased and in KSSs in 
particular, given their focus from c. 2009 onwards on decreasing abuse in KSSs.723 One of the 
reasons for this was social pressure generated by the many publicised detainee deaths from 
‘Detention Centre bullies’ or ‘cell bosses’ in 2009, including the “hide-and-seek” death of Li 
Qiaoming.724 The public outrage was so widespread that this forced the authorities to recognise 
the problem of ‘cell bosses’ - detainees who are linked to the guards and who supervise, organise 
and abuse others on behalf of detention authorities when required to do so. In 2009, the SPP and 
the MPS announced a series of measures, including increased monitoring of detainees’ 
accommodation areas, to prevent violence by cell bullies. 
Local and international civil society bodies725 report that cell bosses continue to be commonly 
used as de facto managers of cells and act as the intermediaries between detainees and the police 
officers. Many facets of detainee life are under the management of the cell leaders. Equally, there 
are reports of severe ill-treatment as punishment for actions done within the detention centres 
(KSSs). For example, Amnesty International has documented cases where detainees have 
allegedly been punished with sanctions that, in its view, could well be considered as amounting to 
torture and other ill-treatment: the ‘activist Yang Mingyu had his hand and feet cuffed to a bed for 
three days in retaliation for his complaint about the quality of food he was given in detention. As 
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a result, he had to eat, urinate and defecate while strapped to the bed’.726 Allegations of permitted 
inter-prisoner/detainee intimidation and violence exist both pre-and post-2012 reforms.727  
First-hand interviews with a senior staff member of the Wuzhong (Ningxia province) KSS and 
the Regional Procurator for Wuhu (Anhui province) KSS, suggest that torture had significantly 
(and other-treatment, to some extent) decreased in their KSSs. They highlighted that only one or 
two cases of ill-treatment had occurred in their institutions over the last four years (post 2012).728 
Both underscored that torture had reduced dramatically in their institutions; however, they 
acknowledged that there were cases of torture or ill-treatment by the police, which could be seen 
when the detainee arrived at their institutions. Both also emphasised that, in their opinion, the 
CPL reforms and preventive initiatives were starting to have some effect. 
The authorities also assert that torture has decreased in initial police custody but do not have 
sufficient evidence to support this.729 This assertion is not echoed by national scholars, nor by 
KSS management or front-line staff. Many believe that torture is still a pervasive problem in 
initial custody and during interrogation.730 While according to the authorities it has reduced, no 
official statistics are gathered or analysed to be able to isolate the number of cases of police 
torture. Moreover, there are no oversight, co-ordinating or monitoring mechanisms that cover 
police stations, unlike the developing situation in the KSSs. The Procuratorate, the body 
responsible for oversight of the implementation of the laws, does not regularly assess the 
implementation of CPL safeguards inside police stations. In practice, it is left to the discretion of 
the MPS to examine their own implementation. The jurisdiction between the MPS and the 
Procuratorate is siloed and discrete, and while there is some co-ordination and overlap, for 
example in prosecution powers of certain categories of suspects, the two entities remain discrete 
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and relatively autonomous. Moreover, traditionally the MPS has been extremely powerful within 
China and the Procuratorate far less so. Power dynamics are changing but have not radically 
changed so far. 
Post-2012, cases of police abuse in initial police custody, as well as in Chinese police detention 
(KSS), resulting in injury or death of a detainee are numerous, with many additional cases likely 
unreported. So numerous are cases of torture in Chinese places of detention, that many legal 
scholars and IHRL bodies731 have labelled China’s use of torture as ‘systemic’ and ‘pervasive’ in 
2015 and 2016 respectively. There is however a wide disparity of views on this. Some Chinese 
legal scholars and procurators argue that while various forms of ill-treatment may be evident 
across the detention system and especially in initial police custody, torture may be less so.732 
Relying on the separate (and deficient, according to the CAT Committee) definitions of torture 
and ill-treatment in the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Law, they argue that ill-treatment (and, 
to a lesser extent, torture) is systemic only as regards police initial custody – and then in the first 
24 hours or so – or while extensions persist during investigation outside of the KSS. They 
acknowledge, however, that their views are limited only to police detention and KSSs733 and not 
to Party detention, where there are no official statistics on the frequency or current nature of 
torture and ill-treatment therein. 
Definitive information on torture and other ill-treatment is difficult to obtain for various reasons, 
including the lack of fully-functional and effective complaints mechanisms in all detention 
settings, the lack of independent monitoring, restrictive media and internet censorship (the “Great 
Firewall”), under-reporting, as well as an underlying fear of detainees of the risk of reprisal by 
staff.734 This fear also extends to the lawyers. Even if a detainee did get access to a lawyer 
immediately, some lawyers are fearful of taking cases that could jeopardise their own safety, lead 
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to harassment or damage their professional career trajectory.735 Further, few detainees get any 
access to a lawyer for various reasons including cost, hindered access or a lack of awareness of 
this right, and around 70% of detainees are unrepresented at criminal trial.736 According to Mr. 
Zhang Qingsong, a leading defence lawyer from the Shangquan Law Firm in Beijing, there are no 
official national statistics, but some lawyers and justice bureaus estimate that the number of cases 
in which defence lawyers are active in China is about 20%.737 
Even if cases do reach the Courts, and few do, international jurisprudence has shed light on the 
questionable independence of the judiciary, which itself hinders the number of violations of 
police torture and other ill-treatment found and published.738 Cases of torture and ill-treatment in 
initial police custody and in police detention (KSS) do exist and have been recognised as such by 
the courts in China. Many more have been documented by IHRL bodies, civil society and in the 
international media. 739 These occurred both before the revisions to the CPL came into force in 
late 2012 and thereafter. These cases include: 
(i) Torture and ill-treatment in police custody: case examples of national courts’ 
findings of torture or reasoning on the likelihood of torture  
The following are two of the most prominent cases that have reached the Chinese national courts 
and have led to judgments on findings of police abuse. These are examined below with the 
objective of showing that cases of torture and other ill-treatment in police custody do exist and 
have been recognised as such by the courts in China. 
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In July 2002, Li Jiuming was held in initial police custody in Hebei on suspicion of murder and 
was taken by PSB officers 740  to the No. 1 Criminal Police Team of Tangshan PSB for 
interrogation. Li’s fingers and toes were tied, and electric shocks were repeatedly administered. 
He was coerced into signing a fabricated confession (which he subsequently retracted). He was 
then transferred to another police custody facility in Yutian and interrogated again for seven days, 
which resulted in a confession that led to a suspended death penalty sentence for murder. Later, 
another man confessed to murder and Li’s case was retried in August 2004 and he was acquitted. 
In December 2004, the provincial Procuratorate brought cases against the police officers involved, 
and the court of Hebei found the PSB officials guilty of inflicting excessive force to extract 
confessions. They were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.741  
Given the reforms in 2012, one might expect the situation to have improved. Nevertheless, there 
are various examples of the national and district Courts findings of cases of torture or ill-
treatment post-2012. For example, in March 2013, Liang Shiquan was detained by the PSB / 
police in Harbin on suspicion of drug trafficking and died in initial police custody after police 
administered electric shocks and hit him in the face and head with a shoe.742 Liang’s case, as well 
as seven other cases involving alleged ill-treatment by the PSB was investigated by the local 
Procuratorate and taken to court. The Daowai District People’s court found three police officers 
and four police assistants guilty of extracting confessions by means of torture743 and sentenced 
them to prison terms of between 12 and 30 months. According to the court judgment, one of the 
other detainees detained in the same PSB station at the same time on the same drug trafficking 
charges as Liang Shiquan, Mr. Zhai, had had mustard oil poured into his nose during the PSB 
interrogation and had been tied to a metal stool and subjected to electric shocks. 
Other cases of torture during police interrogation have been cited by the Chinese authorities, in 
China’s State Party report to the UNCAT. While the references were made to illustrate the 
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operation of the new provisions in the CPL of exclusion of illegal evidence derived from torture, 
of relevance here is that they give the court’s views on the likelihood of police torture. These 
include the following cases, from 2012 onwards (i.e., after the CPL reforms), where the Chinese 
courts have considered that investigator’s evidence was inadmissible due to the probability of 
torture, in line with Article 53 of the CPL:  
The case of Tang Qihua: “the defendant Tang Qihua was arrested as a suspect of the crime of 
robbery in 2012. In the hearing, Tang Qihua said his confession during the criminal investigation 
was extorted by torture […]. The court considers [that, due to] the recording of skin wounds on 
the defendant’s legs in the physical examination form upon his arrival at the detention house, the 
statement on the non-existence of extorting confession by torture provided by the public security 
organ cannot act as the single proof for lawful collection of evidence. Therefore, the existence of 
unlawful obtainment of confession is not beyond reasonable doubt, the confession of Tang Qihua 
during the criminal investigation is excluded.”[sic]. 
The case of Xiang Fazhi: the defendant Xiang Fazhi was arrested as a suspect of the crime of 
offering bribes in 2013. In the hearing, Xiang Fazhi said that the confessions made in the criminal 
investigation are false, and are made due to extortion by torture, extended interrogation, hints and 
inducement. The court thinks, as the procuratorial organ fails to provide sufficient evidences to 
prove the legality of Xiang Fazhi’s confessions before the hearing, such confessions cannot serve 
as the basis of conviction.’ [sic]744  
Moreover, the Chinese authorities have specified that there have been more than 1,000 cases 
opened of torture and ill-treatment since 2008, nationwide. 745  Nonetheless, on analysis of 
provided breakdown of statistics, these resulted in only around 500 prosecutions for torture and 
other ill-treatment and fewer than half of those resulted in convictions. 
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(ii) IHRL findings and case examples of torture/ill-treatment of criminal and 
administrative suspects in initial police custody 
The CAT Committee, in its two last periodic reports and concluding observations on China (2008 
and 2015 respectively),746 has raised significant concerns “about reports of abuses in custody, 
including the high number of deaths, possibly related to torture or ill-treatment, and about the lack 
of investigation into these abuses and deaths in custody.”747 The Committee recommended that 
China “should take prompt measures to ensure that all instances of deaths in custody are 
independently investigated and that those responsible for such deaths resulting from torture, ill-
treatment or wilful negligence are prosecuted.”748 The CAT Committee has also raised a number 
of specific concerns on cases where it received credible allegations of torture and other ill-
treatment of detainees by the police during interrogation in initial custody, which had not been 
fully or effectively investigated. These included the cases of Gan Jinhua, Yang Chunlin, Fan 
Qihang, Liu Ping, among others. Both Gan Jinhua and Fan Qihang, who had been sentenced to 
the death penalty in 2010 and 2012 respectively, were executed despite including allegations in 
their appeals that their confessions had been coerced. 749  The Chinese authorities have not 
(publicly) replied on the latter two cases in their response the CAT Committee’s List of Issues nor 
in their State Report to the CAT Committee on the outcome or status of these cases. The 
authorities have, however, responded on the cases of Yang Chunli and Liu Ping. In the case of 
Liu, the authorities specified that the court had required explanations from the procurators 
regarding the allegations of torture (head wounds sustained during interrogation). The Court 
found the defendant’s allegations were too ambiguous to be credible, and no detainee complaint 
had been made on arrival at the detention centre and no injuries had been recorded on the medical 
screening entrance forms.750 As regards Yang Chunli, the Chinese authorities stated that “as Yang 
had made no complaint during his appeal, there was no reason for an investigation.”751 
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The UN SRT, during his 2005 mission to China emphasised his serious concern that despite some 
reforms then underway in China to counter torture, torture still remained widespread in China.752 
The UN SRT repeated similar concerns in 2010, when examining China (among other countries) 
jointly with three other UN Special Procedures in the context of counter-terrorism, 753 as well as 
in 2011 in the UN SRT’s Follow-up Report to his predecessor’s 2005 report on China.754 The UN 
SRT raised a number of cases of alleged torture and other ill-treatment in police custody, in 
particular during interrogations, derived from interviews during his and his predecessors’ visits, 
which he considered as strong indications of cases of ill-treatment and torture. He pointed out that 
he had received more than 1,160 cases over a five-year period755 from individuals and third 
parties about torture or ill-treatment allegations in Chinese detention. He stressed that this number 
was not indicative of the true scale of the problem, but was rather the ‘tip of the iceberg’.756 These 
allegations included, inter alia, Liu Xinjian, who petitioned the Communist People’s Congress 
about the illegal demolition of her home and alleged abuse by village security brigade personnel. 
[Liu] “was subsequently detained on 16 February 2003 by police officers of Qibao Police Station, 
beaten by personnel with fists and feet, taken for a psychiatric evaluation, and held there for two 
days before being transferred to the Minghang Detention Centre. On 20 February, she was 
transferred to the Ti Lan Qiao Prison Hospital, restrained to a bed for five days and sedated, 
before being taken to the Minghang Psychiatric Hospital.”757  
The UN SRT noted in 2011, in a Follow-up Report on the 2005 China visit findings and 
recommendations, that confessions obtained under torture were still happening in China and was 
disappointed at the lack of response and progress that the Chinese authorities had made on many 
of the issues raised in the 2005 visit, which remained pertinent in 2011. In particular, the UN SRT 
“remains concerned about the reported cases of confessions obtained under torture […][and] the 
reports of excessive use and length of pre-trial detention, the lack of guarantees to challenge the 
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lawfulness of detention and the lack of the guarantee of the right to fair trial. He reiterates that the 
period of holding detainees in police custody should not exceed 48 hours, and that no detainee 
should be subject to unsupervised contact with investigators.”758 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in its jurisprudence, has also cited numerous 
allegations of ill-treatment in Chinese police custody, albeit as part of the contextual background 
that led, amongst other factors, to findings of arbitrary detention. One such case is the case of Ms. 
Gulmina Imin, where the WGAD references her attempts “to address the court with regard to the 
torture and ill-treatment she had experienced during her time in police custody.” The WGAD also 
cites that [Ms Imin] “indicated that she and other detainees had been coerced into signing a 
document without knowing its content”759. While not specifically concluding that these persons 
were tortured, the WGAD did take account of these torture allegations as an element in its 
reasoning for its conclusions on arbitrary detention.760 
(iii) Selected examples of allegations of torture in initial police custody and 
detention documented by civil society (scholars and specialist NGOs) 
Numerous allegations of recent, post-2012, police torture in initial custody or in pre-trial 
detention (the KSS) are evident in national and international scholarly analysis and in Shadow 
Reports submitted by expert national and international civil society organisations in the run-up to 
China’s UNCAT review in 2015. 761 These include: 
“Beijing lawyer Yu Wensheng, was tortured or otherwise ill-treated during his 
detention in 2014 at the Daxing Detention Centre in Beijing, in order to get him 
to confess to having encouraged the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests. 
During the 99 days of detention without trial, in which he was housed together 
                                                     
758  UN SRT 2011, J. Mendez, Follow-Up Report on China, 2011 A/HRC/16/52/Add.2, p.50. 
759  WGAD Communication No. 29/2012 (China), Communication addressed to the Government on 21 March 2012, Concerning 
Gulmira Imin. 
760  Ibid, Conclusions. 
761  See He Jiahong and He Ran, ‘Wrongful convictions and torture confessions: empirical studies in mainland China’, Comparative 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013); Belkin, ‘China’s tortuous path towards ending torture in criminal 
investigations’ (2013), MacBean, ‘China’s pre-trial detention centres: challenges and opportunities for reform’ (2016), 
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with death-row prisoners, Yu was questioned for 15 to 16 hours every day while 
seated on a rigid restraint chair, handcuffed for long hours and deprived of 
sleep. Prominent Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti, was not given food for two 10-
day periods and had his feet placed in shackles for more than 20 days in 2014 
at the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Detention Centre in 
Urumqi, the provincial capital of the XUAR. Detained for supporting the 2014 
Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, Wang Zang was interrogated non-stop for 
five days, during which he was kicked, beaten and prohibited from sleeping 
when he was detained at Tongzhou Detention Centre in Beijing.”762  
Various types of abuse derived from recent allegations against the police include: “being hit with 
hands, police batons, electric batons, hammers, iron bars; kicking; spraying with pain-inducing 
substances including chilli [and mustard] oil (poured into one’s nose or onto one’s genitals); 
exposure to sustained cold (cold water sprayed on a naked suspect in a sub-zero temperature 
room); blinding with a hot, white light; forcing individuals to maintain a stress position for 
prolonged periods; deprivation of sleep, water, and food.”763 
These and numerous other alleged cases764 of police abuse in initial PSB custody have been 
documented by civil society organisations,765 by other experts and scholars,766 by international – 
and increasingly – national media.767 Many of these involve the use of the so-called “tiger bench”, 
                                                     
762  Interviews conducted by Amnesty International, evidence submitted to the CAT Committee in 2015 in advance of the 5th 
periodic reporting cycle on China, December 2015. 
763  See Human Rights Watch report, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015). 
764  For example, ‘Chinese Poet 'Tortured,' Suffers Heart Attack in Police Custody: Lawyer’: “Beijing poet and political activist 
who posted a performance art “selfie” in support of Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement has been subjected to torture and 
mistreatment while in police detention, his lawyer said on Friday [26/12/2014]. Wang Zang is being held in Beijing's No. 1 
Detention Centre on suspicion of "picking quarrels and stirring up trouble," after being taken away by police on Oct. 1. His 
detention came after he posted a photo of himself in gesture in support of Hong Kong's Occupy Central rallies. According to his 
lawyer Sui Muqing, Wang was held in a padded cell for the first five days of his detention and subjected to intense stress, 
leading to a heart attack. "He was deprived of sleep and forced to remain standing for four nights in a row, which led to his 
heart attack," Sui told RFA, adding: "He had never been diagnosed with heart disease up until that point."”, Radio Free Asia, 26 
December 2014; In December 2011, Xue Jinbo, died in a police cell in Wukan, Guangdong. International media and China’s 
own People’s Daily, cited the fact that Chinese citizens openly are doubting the reason of death on the official given reason of 
grounds of a natural heart attack; ‘It is widely believed in China he was beaten to death during PSB interrogation’; cited in Chen 
Weidong, ‘Three Approaches to Combatting Torture in China’ (2012), p. 116. 
765  Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015); HRW ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015); Shadow Reports to the CAT 
Committee (2015). 
766  See Statements M. Lewis and T. Biao, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China “China’s pervasive use 
of torture”, (2016); He Jiahong and He Ran, ‘Wrongful convictions and torture confessions: empirical studies in mainland 
China’, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China (2013); Belkin, ‘China’s tortuous path towards ending torture 
in criminal investigations’ (2013). 
767  See, for example, in February 2009, the “hide and seek case” the reporting of the death of Li Qiaoming, a criminal suspect in 






whereby “the individual’s legs are tightly bound to a bench, and bricks are gradually added under 
the victim’s feet, forcing the legs to bend backwards” 768  or the ‘hanging restraint chair’ 
(‘diaodiaoyi’), whereby “a person seated in this restraint chair will be unable to lean back or have 
his/her feet rest on the ground. The chest will be bound to a board while the hands are cuffed, 
rendering the entire body immobile.”769 The Chinese authorities have not denied the use of these 
chairs, on the contrary, they have explicitly authorised their use as a means of restraint for 
detainee’s ‘self-protection’ or for ‘protection from harm to others’. 770  There are widespread 
concerns about the use (and abuse) of these chairs both during police interrogations and more 
generally. The CAT Committee “expresses concern at the State party’s explanation that the use of 
the so-called “interrogation chair” is justified ‘as a protective measure to prevent suspects from 
escaping, committing self-injury or attacking personnel’, which is highly improbable during an 
interrogation.”771 
The Chinese authorities maintain that torture has reduced; one area that has partly contributed to 
this, according to Renmin University Professor Cheng Lei, is that “now, [after the 2012 CPL 
reforms], these temporary releases [from KSSs] must first get the signed approval of the principal 
person in charge at the local public security bureau, and [the law] requires that detainees be 
returned the same day and prohibits them from being held overnight. Moreover, [detainees] must 
be given physical examinations before they leave and upon return to the facility.”772 Yet, Cheng 
Lei notes that, despite these safeguards, ill-treatment and (to a lesser extent) torture still occurs. It 
has adapted so that “coercion of confessions through torture usually takes place prior to arrival at 
the detention centre or during temporary transfers outside the detention facility.” This assertion is 
widely supported, by many civil society bodies,773 scholars774 and even members of the Chinese 
procuratorate. They argue that the police have adapted their locations and methods to coerce 
                                                     
768  Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015). 
769  Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015) 
770  The Chinese delegation’s explanation of these, raised at the CAT Committee meeting on the Concluding Observations on 
China, in Geneva in December 2015. 
771  The CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China, 2015, para. 26. 
772  Cheng Lei interview with Di Hua NGO, cited in ‘Is the Detention Centre Law Enough to Prevent Police Abuse?’, Di Hua 
Human Rights Journal, 2 July 2014; Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell bosses’ (2015). 
773  See Shadow Reports submitted to the CAT Committee by Amnesty International, the Rights Practice, Human Rights Watch in 
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information from detained suspects. Police now appear to shift torture and ill-treatment to other 
areas with less strict monitoring including police stations, hostels and drug rehabilitation centres 
they control.775 Procurator Wu Yanwu supports this view and considers that “the period between 
when suspects are apprehended and when they are taken to a detention centre is a period with 
high incidence of torture.” 776  Moreover, civil society bodies highlight that police have 
increasingly learnt to “administer beatings and other torture in ways that left few or no marks but 
still caused significant suffering” to ensure that as few a possible indications of torture are 
evident.777  
China legal scholars and civil society bodies778 point out that despite several years of reform 
torture persists: “police still torture criminal suspects to get them to confess to crimes and courts 
are convicting people who confessed under torture.”779 They argue that until detained suspects 
have adequate safeguards in practice, such as “lawyers at interrogations and other basic 
protections and until police are held accountable for abuse, these new measures [the 2012 
reforms] are unlikely to eliminate routine torture.”780 
Many of the above torture and ill-treatment allegations have not been prosecuted at the local or 
national courts, nor raised at the international levels and there are various reasons for this 
including the lack of ready access to lawyers, costs of lawyers, detainees’ limited awareness of 
nascent complaints mechanisms, limited faith in those mechanisms and fear of reprisals. 
 
 
                                                     
775  Human Rights Watch, Shadow Report to the CAT November 2015; The Guardian, ‘Torture still routine in Chinese jails’ (May 
2015), Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015). 
776  Human Rights Watch Report to CAT Committee (November 2015) citing Wu Yanwu. 
777  See Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015); HRW ‘Tiger Chair & Cell Bosses’ (2015). 
778  See Statements M. Lewis and T. Biao, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China “China’s pervasive use 
of torture”, (2016); He Jiahong and He Ran, ‘Wrongful convictions and torture confessions: empirical studies in mainland 
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779  S. Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, testimony at US CECC Congressional Hearing (14 April 2016). 
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Bosses’ (2015); Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015); the Rights Practice, CAT Committee Shadow Report 






3.1.3 Summary: Current nature of torture in police custody and detention 
within the criminal justice system 
The national authorities, procurators and national scholars point to a reduced level of torture cases 
in previously problematic police-run KSS, despite the limitations apparent in the evidence to 
support this. Yet, they acknowledge that ill-treatment in particular remains a problem in initial 
police custody.781 IHRL mechanisms, international China law scholars and civil society experts 
generally argue that while torture and ill-treatment may have slightly decreased since the previous 
decade, numerous allegations of both torture and ill-treatment still are reported and many argue 
that they are still ‘pervasive’. The number of actual cases going through the courts remains 
relatively low, but, for example, under-reporting and deficiencies in reporting mechanisms, 
among other factors (Chapter 4), can significantly skew the overall picture. 
An overall trend in the nature of the current cases or allegations of torture and ill-treatment 
emanating from police detention can be extrapolated, namely, the element of coercion of 
confessions by the police or investigating procurators. This, many argue, it still an embedded and 
systemic practice in police interrogation, despite reforms. It is evident to such as extent that 
national and international legal scholars, 782  IHRL bodies 783  and civil society bodies 784  have 
identified that there is still a culture of over-reliance on confessions. 
The revisions in 2012 were designed to establish protective safeguards to stem the culture of 
confession coercion but, in nearly every instance, their effectiveness appears diluted in practice. 
Thus, torture and ill-treatment post-2012 still remains a credible risk in police custody and 
detention. While it may be still relatively early to judge the reform measures taken in 2012 to 
strengthen detainee protections, sufficient time has now passed to be able to assess the law and 
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early practice. Moreover, it is not too early to identify various indications of implementation 
deficiencies, where the safeguards are known but are ignored in practice (i.e. merely ‘paper 
tigers’). These types of procedural and regulation protection gaps, as well as implementation gaps 
(gaps between law and practice), may not disappear over time with better legal regulation or 








3.2 Justice processes external to the criminal law: effectiveness of legal 
safeguards 
This section examines the effectiveness of existing safeguards, as well as the current nature and 
scope of torture and other ill-treatment allegations and cases, in the contexts of the punitive, wider 
administrative and Party justice processes.785   
3.2.1 Punitive administrative detention: administrative offences 
Little had been published nationally and internationally specifically about administrative 
detention for administrative punishments for public security violations pursuant to the PSAPL. 
The focus has tended to be on the RETL process and facilities.786 In addition, interviews with 
national scholars, procurators and a member of senior management of a KSS787 show that the 
punitive administrative detention process has not been subject to the same level of attention and 
scope of reform as the criminal justice process in terms of regulatory change, development of 
preventive measures or external scrutiny. China law scholars support this view.788 
Places where the sanction of administrative detention are generally undertaken are police stations, 
interim police custody or KSSs. KSSs are used primarily for criminal suspects held on suspicion 
of violations of grounds of the CPL. They can, however, also hold some short-term prisoners (less 
than three months criminally-sentenced prisoners), those sanctioned to punitive administrative 
detention (PAD), immigration detainees or some death penalty cases. 
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The nature of allegations of incidents of torture or ill-treatment by the PSB in police initial 
custody and detention (KSS) has been examined above. The risks remain the same for 
administrative suspects as for criminal suspects. The difference is that in addition to the risks of 
coercion with the objective to extract information during interrogation and the period of initial 
custody during an investigation, the punitive administrative detention sanction operates in an 
environment that is high-risk for ill-treatment, or even torture, meted out as a punishment. 
The CAT Committee has raised its concerns at numerous and consistent allegations of torture and 
ill-treatment in the form of punishment during the administrative justice process and detention 
sanction pursuant to the PSAPL. It highlighted allegations of torture or other ill-treatment of 
lawyers, allegedly in retaliation for defending activists, dissidents or petitioners. These included 
the cases of ‘Teng Biao789 […], arrested on 19 February 2011 and allegedly ill-treated during 
detention; Yu Wensheng, detained in October 2014 and allegedly tortured during detention; 
Wang Yonghang, detained on 16 June 2009 and allegedly ill-treated in detention; and four human 
rights lawyers, who complained on 25 March 2014 of being arbitrarily detained, assaulted and 
tortured by police after demanding to visit their clients held in an education centre in the city of 
Jiansanjiang.’790  
The Chinese authorities responded to these concerns, underlining that “after inquiry, […] the 
public security organ did not take coercive measures on Teng Biao, and there is no so-called 
“torture.” Yu Wensheng and Wang Yonghang were not ill-treated. On March 22, 2014, 
Heilongjiang Jiansanjiang Agricultural Reclamation Public Security Bureau imposed a five-day 
administrative detention sanction on Zhang Junjie in accordance with law because he used cultic 
activities to disturb the social order, [and] imposed a fifteen-day administrative detention sanction 
on Jiang Tianyong, Wang Cheng and Tang Jitian, and imposed a fine of 1,000 Yuan. The licences 
of Jiang Tianyong and Wang Cheng to practice law as lawyers were taken back and revoked by 
the original verifying and issuing authorities of the places where they practices law. Tang Jitian 
[had] his licence to practice law revoked due to the reason of “disrupting the court order or 
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interfering with the normal conduct of litigation.” Zhang Junjie still practices law as a lawyer at 
present. There were no so-called “assault and torture” during the detention of these 
persons.”[sic]791  
The CAT Committee has also raised concerns about the quality of the investigations into these, 
and other, allegations of torture or ill-treatment. Of relevance here is that allegations of ill-
treatment and torture can be seen in the context of reprisals or punishment for an action, rather 
than792 as a method to extract information and/or confessions, in this context. In the above cases, 
the alleged torture or other ill-treatment is as de facto punishment for lawyers acting in defence of 
their clients. 
Linked to the risk of torture or other ill-treatment as a punishment during administrative detention 
for certain actions or views, are the overly broad and overly ambiguous administrative offences, 
which lack legal specificity and certainty, according to IHRL mechanisms and scholars. The loose 
definitions of the grounds of detention, according to the CAT Committee, the UN SRT and 
members of international and national civil society,793 allow for administrative penalties to be 
used as ‘catch-all’ offences to de facto punish dissenters to the status quo.  
Yet, this is not only pertinent to the PSAPL sphere, the criminal law also suffers from various 
‘catch-all’ offences, such as ‘creating a public disturbance by gathering a crowd’ and ‘inciting 
illegal assembly’.794 Chinese scholarly debate795 has recently highlighted their concerns about the 
almost identical ground to that in the PSAPL of ‘creating a serious disturbance’ contained in 
Article 293 of the CPL. This provision, in their view, has become a ‘pocket crime’. By this they 
mean an overly vague and non-defined crime that can become open to abuse by virtue of its lack 
of specificity. Various leading China legal scholars796 have noted that the charge of ‘creating a 
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serious disturbance’ […] has increasingly been applied in cases involving speech by citizens. 
Recent international criticism has been levelled at the detention of three women protesting about 
violence against women, who were detained on generic public disorder offences pursuant to the 
Administrative Penalties Laws for de facto reasons of peaceful protest797. 
While these ‘pocket crimes’ or ‘pocket administrative offences’ can be seen in both the 
administrative and criminal justice spheres, the CPL has been comparatively ‘cleaned up’ since 
2012 in this regard. This CPL now contains fewer ill-defined offences than the PSAPL.798 These 
grounds can still be seen in multiple parts of the PSAPL, despite its reform in 2012. Some 
illustrations of this can be seen in the following examples. Article 27 of the PSAPL stipulates: 
“Anyone who commits any of the following acts may be detained for not less than 10 
days but not more than 15 days, […] (有下列行为之一的，处十日以上十五日以
下拘留，可以并处一千元以下罚款): 
(1) Organizing, instigating, intimidating, inducing or inciting any other 
person to carry out activities of any cult or superstitious sect or secret 
society, or disturbing the social order or impairing the health of any other 
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(2) Disturbing the social order or impairing the health of any other person 
in the name of any religion or Qigong. (（二）冒用宗教、气功名义进行
扰乱社会秩序、损害他人身体健康活动的).”  
Other Articles in the PSAPL that are also open-ended and lack legal precision and certainty 
include: Article 54 (new draft Article 69)799, persons engaging in activities without a licence 
[issued by the PSB] (without specific definition of the activity) can be detained for between 10 to 
15 days and fined; Article 55 (new draft Article 71) specifies that persons who incite or organise 
illegal gatherings, parades or demonstrations can be detained for 10 to 15 days and fined. 
The case of Li Weiguo illustrates the concern about ‘pocket crimes’ or ‘pocket administrative 
offences’: a court in Guangzhou addressed a complaint submitted by Li Weiguo (李维国) about 
his punishment ordered by the PSB, for inviting people, in May 2013, to witness his delivery of 
applications to police authorities seeking permission to hold a march and a candlelight vigil to 
mark the anniversary of the June Fourth crackdown on the 1989 Democracy Movement .800 On 
23rd May 2013, police from the Haizhu District Sub-Branch of the Guangzhou Public Security 
Bureau placed Li under a 15-day administrative detention for “inciting illegal assembly.” In 
August 2013, Li filed a complaint at the Guangzhou Municipal Haizhu District People's Court 
against the police for deprivation of liberty and violation of citizens' constitutional right to 
freedom of assembly. The court initially refused to hear the case, but was ordered to do so by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court in its 29 December 2013 ruling on an appeal 
filed by Li. Later the Haizhu District People's Court ruled that the information Li posted online to 
invite the public to observe his delivery of the applications on 22 May — where two spectators 
were present — constituted ‘inciting illegal assembly’, and that the police acted in accordance 
with the law in subjecting Li to punishment. The court cites Article 55 of the Law on Penalties for 
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Administration of Public Security, which states that “A person who incites or engineers an illegal 
gathering, parade or demonstration and refuses to listen to dissuasions shall be detained for not 
fewer than 10 days but not more than 15 days”801. Chinese civil society bodies have voiced their 
concerns that the grounds of administrative penalties are so vague and lack judicial oversight that 
they can facilitate the abuse of certain fundamental rights – such as freedom of expression. This 
would most likely be considered a form of arbitrary detention (and similar cases have been)802 
contrary to international law.803  
While China has not ratified the ICCPR, which includes the prohibition of arbitrary detention, it 
is still bound to not arbitrarily detain people, along the following principles. First, it has signed 
the ICCPR, and thus needs to ensure it does not act contrary to the spirit of the Convention804 and 
the treaty prohibition on arbitrary detention (ICCPR Article 9(1)). Second, the principle of the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention has become widely considered as a jus cogens norm of 
international law, and is thus applicable to all States regardless of any treaty ratifications.805 
Equally, as regards the process involved with deprivation of liberty and the protection against 
arbitrary procedure, in the context of Chinese PAD and the context of the prevention of torture, 
there is a lack of preventive safeguards against torture, including some key guarantees needed 
under international law including third party notification / the prohibition of incommunicado and 
the right to habeas corpus. In this respect, the safeguards against torture are the same safeguards 
as those against arbitrary detention, which protect against arbitrary procedure. Moreover, the risk 
of retaliation or punishment remains especially pertinent in a more opaque detention process, with 
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fewer preventive safeguards and due process guarantees in place. This is illustrated in the ‘opacity 
paradigm’: in darker (i.e., closed and less transparent) spheres, the risk of torture and other ill-
treatment is greater. This is the case with the PAD justice process. Thus, it risks being both 
arbitrary in its grounds and in its procedure and, intrinsically linked to this, a sphere in which 
there is a genuine risk of torture. 
3.2.2 Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation process (CDR)  
The CDR system affects a significant number of people; in 2000, UNAIDS estimated that half a 
million people are confined in such centres in China at any given time.806 According to the 
authorities, this number has reduced, and the number detained in CDR facilities in China remains 
around 200,000.807 There have been some minor reforms made to increase the regulation of this 
administrative process and detention type. Interviews with a senior staff member of a CDR 
facility indicate that there are national-level discussions underway examining the possibility of 
increasing procurator presence in CDR facilities.808 The CDRs are often linked with nearby KSSs, 
share staff809 and are seen as places of punitive re-education facilities run by the MPS, rather the 
health-care staff-led places of therapeutic support for those suffering from substance abuse and 
addiction. These issues manifest themselves, in practice, in the existence of numerous allegations 
of inhumane conditions and ill-treatment occurring in CDR facilities.810 In short, the risk of 
torture or other ill-treatment in CDR facilities in China remains high. 
IHRL bodies811 and international and national civil society, have repeatedly accentuated their 
concerns about the risk of torture or other ill-treatment in China’s CDR facilities. In 2012, twelve 
UN bodies812 issued a Joint UN Statement for the closure of CDR facilities, and their replacement 
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with voluntary, rights-based, evidence-informed programmes in the community.813 The UN Joint 
Statement stresses that “the existence of CDR centres, which have been operating in many 
countries for the last 20 years, raises human rights issues and threatens the health of detainees, 
including through increased vulnerability to HIV and tuberculosis (TB) infection.”814 
Both the UN SRT815 and the CAT Committee816 have also raised concerns about ill-treatment 
allegations in Chinese CDR facilities. In particular, they criticise the lack of access to effective 
drug dependency treatment and alleged torture and other ill-treatment in coercive quarantine for 
drug rehabilitation. They have also raised concerns about due process issues.817  
Scholars818 and civil society bodies819 report of ‘abusive conditions’ prevalent in many of China’s 
compulsory drug detention centres, notwithstanding China’s 2008 Anti-Drug Law that referred to 
drug users as “patients” and promised some legal protections for them. They point to issues in the 
law itself that gives the PSB widespread discretion to detain individuals suspected of drug use – 
without trial or judicial oversight. Civil society bodies have documented allegations of individuals 
who have been detained in Chinese drug detention centres who have been “routinely beaten, 
denied medical treatment, and forced to work up to 18 hours a day without pay.”820 One such 
report, documented by Amnesty International, is the case of Yu Zhenjie.821 Yu was transferred to 
the Heilongjiang Provincial Enforced Drug RTL. Yu Zhenjie recounts her arrival at the CDR 
facility:  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Children’s 
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815  UN SRT Report on China (2005) and Follow-up report (2011). 
816  A/HRC/13/39/Add.6, para. 20 and p. 47; and CAT Committee, List of Issues prior to the submission of the fifth periodic report 
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817  2011 UN SRT Follow-up report on China, p.50-65. 
818  See Biddulph, ‘‘Rights in the new regime for treatment of drug dependency’, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in 
China (2013). 
819  Human Rights Initiative, Briefing No. 4, Human Rights and Drug Policy, Compulsory Drug Treatment, p. 2; the Open Society 
Initiative, ‘UN on Drug Detention: Ineffective. Illegal. Close it Down’, March 12, 2012; Human Rights Watch Shadow Report 
to the UNCAT Committee (2015), among others.  
820  Human Rights Initiative, Briefing No. 4, ‘Human Rights and Drug Policy, Compulsory Drug Treatment’, p. 2; See also Human 
Rights Watch, the Rights Practice and Amnesty International’s Shadow Reports to the CAT Committee, November 2015. 






“When I first arrived at the camp the police told me “we’ve heard you are really fierce”, 
and they put me into an iron cage and tied me to an iron chair. They asked me, “So, can 
you fly out of there? Then they gave me a shot. They told me I must be suffering and 
offered me a glass of water. I drank it without thinking. Then I lost feeling in my mouth. I 
began having extreme pain in my head. It felt like my head was being hit against a wall. 
Then they tied me up and gave me an IV drip. Suddenly I was unable to move. I fainted. 
They sent me to the Heilongjiang Provincial Hospital. The RLT police, who were 
monitoring me at all times in the hospital took off all my clothes – I was naked on this 
stretcher. The doctors there thought I was pretending to be sick and not able to move. 
They took something hard and stabbed my arm and leg. I couldn’t move. They thought I 
was going to die. It was so painful and humiliating, worse than death. They left me there 
for three days.”[sic]822 
Amnesty International is also concerned that while RETL has been officially abolished, the law 
regulating RETL has still not been repealed. It has also identified a trend that is indicative of the 
notional closure of RETL camps and their re-labelling as CDRs, while maintaining similar staff, 
regime and operational models. It argues that:  
“Based on individuals detained in drug R[E]TLs who spoke to Amnesty 
International, these institutions appear to operate very similarly to the regular 
R[E]TL camps, with the principle difference being that a greater proportion of their 
detainees may be drug addicts. […] The Dalian R[E]TL, for instance, which was 
reported to have shut down in September 2013, with at least some of its detainees 
being sent home is reported to have been renamed a drug R[E]TL camp. The 
Xinjiang Women’s R[E]TL has also been reported to have been shut down but 
renamed an enforced drug R[E]TL camp in September, although it was not known 
what proportion of its detainees remained when this happened. The Jiangsu 
Province Women’s R[E]TL reportedly changed its name to the Jiangsu Province 
                                                     






Women’s Enforced Drug R[E]TL. Other RTL camps that have been reported to have 
been changed into enforced drug camps include the Sichuan Province Mianyang 
City Xinhua R[E]TL, the Shanghai Qingpu No. 3 Women’s R[E]TL, and the Jilin 
Province Women’s R[E]TL. This raises the concern that many former R[E]TL 
camps are simply being transformed into, or may re-open in a short while, as 
enforced drug R[E]TLs.”823  
CDR facilities have been widely considered as a sphere where, in practice, detainees may be held 
for a number of years without due process, “in which harsh regimes of enforced labour are 
imposed, and in which torture and other ill-treatment are common.”824 There is relatively little 
information about CDRs in China from official sources. Interviews with a senior member of the 
KSS and CDR of Wuzhong indicated that there might be now more weight afforded to the 
opinions of doctors in the placement decision and reviews.825 However, this is institution-specific 
and is not an initiative led centrally, nor is it contained in the regulations, or likely evident in 
other CDRs nationwide. There are no centrally co-ordinated national bodies that collect, share, or 
indeed analyse, statistics of complaints or cases of torture or ill-treatment in this sphere. 
The 2007 Drug Control Law and associated Regulations while overtly purporting to be a more 
humane and rights-based approach for CDR patients and their rehabilitation, actually increases 
the time a patient can be compulsorily detained in a specific CDR facility. CDRs also lack 
resources – financial and human – to afford a purposeful regime and environment for therapeutic 
rehabilitation. Patients are required to work to cover the costs of running the facilities, in poor 
conditions.826  
The evidence presented above is primarily based on former detainee testimony collected by 
NGOs. This reflects the challenge in obtaining direct onsite detention access and private detainee 
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interviews. This is also the case for the Chinese monitors (who themselves cannot interview 
detainees without the presence of a staff member (c.f. Chapter 4.5), which inherently limits the 
quality of the information obtained, and also means that interviewers have to be careful about not 
putting the detainee at risk of reprisals (i.e. the ‘do not harm principle)(c.f. Chapter 1) after they 
have left the institution). That said, these secondary interviews – in addition to international and 
national scholarly research into this area (c.f. below) and the author’s own primary interviews 
with Chinese monitors, procurators, detention staff and members of the nascent complaints 
mechanisms (c.f. Chapters 3 and 4.4 and 4.5) – do cumulatively indicate a potential emerging 
pattern and snapshot of the state of prevention in this area both in theory and in practice. 
As such, the above analysis of this area indicates there are, in fact, few to no safeguards for CDR 
patients, who can be detained for up to three years. It is an area that lacks both necessary due 
process safeguards – the ultimate decision of placement, and its extensions, is opaque and rests 
for the PSB. In addition there is no independent oversight of these facilities or for the process.827 
It is also an area that has been subject to some – albeit limited – reform, but this has not served to 
better protect those detained. One of the reforms has been to remove the CDR element from (now 
closing-down) RETL camps, and establish specific CDR centres and to split the operation of them 
between the Ministry of Justice and the PSB (aiming to separate out the investigation competence 
from the custody competence). It has not worked, and has resulted in a confused system. In theory, 
patients serve the first six months in their local PSB run CDR before being moved to a Ministry 
of Justice-run CDR. However, without sufficient resources or regulatory clarification, in practice 
patients tend to be kept under PSB responsibility.828 It is also unlikely to be reformed more from 
the perspective of affording a greater number of protections for detainees, given how it sits 
squarely within a political social order and control management imperative by the CCP.829 
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Ultimately, this is a less regulated sphere where the few preventive safeguards available and the 









3.2.3 Party justice: the ‘Shuanggui’ investigation process 
An interview with leading scholar Cheng Lei, Associate Professor at Renmin University (who 
along with Professor Chen Weidong have helped advise the authorities on legislation on torture 
prevention measures as well as conduct pilot feasibility test of prevention measures that were then 
rolled out nationwide in KSSs), has shed some light on the legal basis and practice of this opaque 
Party justice process in China. He emphasises that the shuanggui investigation process is 
regulated by the CCP Constitution and discipline norms and is premised on the notion of advance 
consensual detention of the CCP member being investigated. The Party discipline system does 
not officially consider the shuanggui investigation as a deprivation of liberty. The concept of a 
CCP member’s systematic advance consent to be subjected at a later date, if needs be, to the 
investigation and discipline by CCP Discipline Committees is part of the act of becoming a CCP 
member in the first place. Professor Cheng Lei acknowledges that this may raise concerns about 
the notion of advance consent to deprivation of liberty. Permissible deprivation of liberty must 
meet various criteria under IHRL: it must be necessary, proportionate, time-limited, judicially 
sanctioned, subject to habeas corpus and not arbitrary in character. Moreover, the analysis of the 
deprivation is a snapshot of the current situation: where one is not free to leave at will. Implied 
advance consent to later investigatory detention, as a mandatory element of becoming a CCP 
member, would in all likelihood be considered as de facto detention. Equally, it would also likely 
be considered arbitrary detention, given the lack of the necessary procedural guarantees (its lack 
of regulation, unlimited timeframes, lack of access to outside world, non-judicially sanctioned, 
etc.).830  As mentioned above, the prohibition of arbitrary detention is a ius cogens norm of 
international law, applicable to all countries, including China. In addition, China has signed (but 
not ratified) the ICCPR, which includes in its Article 9 a prohibition against arbitrary deprivation 
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of liberty. Upon signature, China is obliged to act in a way that is congruent with the spirit and 
content of the treaty.831 
The risk of torture and other ill-treatment during the shuanggui (双规) period of interrogation and 
custody by the CCP Investigation and Discipline Committees, is not just extremely high, it is a 
reality in many cases. This is an extremely opaque process; there are limited records of cases of 
the use of shuanggui publicly available (and many references to it are censored from the 
internet832). Nevertheless, over time, a steady stream of allegations of torture and ill-treatment 
have arisen around this interrogation process, used primarily to fight official corruption, which is 
itself a violation of Party laws833. The numbers of allegations have been increasing since 2012 and 
the start of Xi Jinping’s presidency, as it is much-used Party-justice process to investigate 
corruption. Equally, shuanggui can also be considered a tool of political control, given that to be a 
high-ranking official within the government or senior leader within a state owned enterprise one 
has to be a member of the CCP and thus subject to Party discipline.834 Thus, the nature of the 
CCP and government become intrinsically intertwined, and the CCP discipline and control 
mechanisms can reach into the heart of government. 
Since 2012, there have been reports of various top-ranking officials who have been subjected to 
shuanggui investigation and detention.835 As the deprivation has no time limit, the detention 
period under the CCP disciplinary investigation can last months, even years. Moreover, there is 
no obligation to hand the suspect over to the criminal-law system, as the CCP Party Discipline 
regulations provide for its own system of justice, along with its own procedure and sanctions. An 
illustration of this is the case of Wan Qinqliang. On 30 June 2014, the State-sponsored national 
media reported that the Chinese central authorities had announced that President Xi Jinping’s war 
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on corruption had found another high-ranking Party official guilty. In this case, Wan Qinqliang, 
former Party Secretary (and thus the highest-ranking politician) of the city of Guangzhou, had 
been subject to shuanggui. China’s official media reports that Wan "allegedly committed serious 
disciplinary and legal violations", but gives no details about what his crimes might be or if he will 
be afforded any form of due process.836 Only in 2016 (i.e. two years later), was Wan handed 
across to prosecutors for prosecution under the criminal justice process. On the 30 September 
2016, the Court sentenced Wan to life-imprisonment.837 Other cases of high-ranking officials 
recently subjected to shuanggui interrogation include Su Rong, formerly Vice Chairman of 
China’s Parliamentary Advisory Body, and Wang Guangxun, former Head of Public Security at 
China’s Railway Corporation.838 The investigation process into alleged CCP officials’ corruption 
is so commonplace that it has its own colloquialisms: the investigation of high-ranking CCP 
officials is known as “catching tigers”, and mid-to low-ranking officials, as “catching flies”.   
Civil society organisations argue that some of the key problems with shuanggui in practice are the 
limited preventive safeguards available for suspects; legal scholars support this view.839 Many 
argue that shuanggui is generally conducted in secret, without time limit. Suspects are denied any 
form of legal counsel or family visits and are at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill-
treatment.840 For example, in April 2013, Yu Qiyi, a chief engineer at the state-owned Wenzhou 
Industry Investment Group, was detained on suspicion of receiving a 2 million RMB bribe from a 
local company CEO, and died during his shuanggui interrogation. 841  The news caused a 
significant degree of public shock and outrage especially when pictures circulated online of his 
bruised and swollen body.842 In May 2013, Jia Jiuxiang, a Henan court official subjected to 
shuanggui for a property-related graft investigation, also died whilst in detention. The authorities’ 
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claims that Jia died of a heart attack were rejected by his family, who stated that he had no history 
of heart problems.843 
A recent Guangzhou report in the South Review (南风窗) 844 has shed a degree of light onto the 
practice of the shuanggui process and locations, which include specific CCP discipline facilities, 
state hotels (mostly commonly used), guest houses and military bases. It also notes that there is a 
degree of flexibility in the conduct of the shuanggui process. Interrogators number between six 
and nine, working three eight-hour shifts and are selected by the CCP Investigation and 
Discipline Committees from different organisations or offices on a temporary basis. 
The concerns around the opaque process and the lack of procedural safeguards are manifold. 
These include the risks of incommunicado detention and the creation of a legally grey zone where 
abuse can be facilitated rather than prevented. The international community has raised numerous 
reports of allegations of torture and ill-treatment arising from the shuanggui detention period, 
including "sleep deprivation, simulated drowning, burning the detainee’s skin with cigarettes, and 
beating.”845  
Fu Hualing is one of the very few scholars who has published research in this area,846  and 
supports these concerns. Fu emphasises that this sphere has been traditionally one with very little 
regulation and at the total discretion of Party investigatory officials. Some regulation is gradually 
coming to the area, however, the major change is not greater protection for detainees but rather 
the movement of power from the local CCP to the central CCP. Over the past few years the 
responsibility for investigating corruption has been taken away from its traditional roots of the 
local CCP and the procuratorate (if passed to them as a crime) and moved to the central-level 
CCP discipline and investigation committees. These are becoming increasingly more powerful. 847 
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In the absence of legal safeguards, the Party discipline process becomes an opaque sphere. Here 
there is a heightened risk of torture for those undergoing interrogation and sanction not only due 
to the lack of safeguards, but exacerbated by the heightened incentive of confession-extraction to 
provide evidence for the top-level prioritised ‘war on corruption’. Torture is not just a risk but, 







3.3 Summary of key IHRL mechanisms’ recommendations for the PRC 
There are signs of some incremental positive change in China in the sphere of torture prohibition 
and prevention. That said, despite reform in some areas, most notably in the criminal law, many 
of the CAT Committee and other IHRL bodies’ recommendations (such as the UN SRT, UN 
CRC, UNCERD, UN Special Procedures848 remain unchanged over several reporting cycles (i.e., 
over many years) and remain focused on effective torture prevention and issues of lack of 
implementation. 
There is repeated only partial, or non-, implementation of most of the recommendations made by 
various IHRL bodies in the remit of torture prevention in China. By way of illustration, the CAT 
Committee, in its most recent Concluding Observations of China, has directly criticised the 
deficient implementation of specific prevention safeguards.849 The state of non-implementation of 
these safeguards remains almost the same as the previous CAT reporting cycle, seven years 
previously. 850  Indeed, some areas are distinctly worse than before (notably the situation of 
lawyers and human rights defenders in China and the increase of the use of shuanggui practices, 
among others). Equally, many similar concerns raised and recommendations made by the UN 
SRT in his 2005 China report851 remain unimplemented and in the same – or a worse shape – in 
2011 during his Follow-up Analysis,852 than when identified in his 2005 China report. 
Likewise, the CAT Committee has repeatedly expressed significant concerns regarding China’s 
failure to fully comply with the UNCAT prohibition of torture and prevention obligations, as 
established in Articles 1 and 2. In its previous Concluding Observations on China in 2008, the 
CAT Committee underlined its deep concern regarding “the continued allegations, corroborated 
by numerous Chinese legal sources, of routine and widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of 
suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal 
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proceedings.”853 In its 2015 Concluding Observations, the CAT Committee stresses its continued 
concerns that “notwithstanding the numerous legal and administrative provisions prohibiting the 
use of torture, the Committee remains seriously concerned over consistent reports indicating that 
the practice of torture and ill-treatment is still deeply entrenched in the criminal justice system, 
which overly relies on confessions as the basis for convictions.”854 In short, there are numerous 
indications that torture remains unabated, and is still a resilient problem in China, seven years on. 
The CAT Committee acknowledged some developments, such as the 2012 amendments to the 
CPL and the abolition of the RETL system in 2013/2014, but underlines that the overall outcome 
remains the same for many persons detained by the police in China: there is a high risk of torture 
in initial police custody (among other detention spheres). Moreover, it explicitly mentions that it 
“regret[s] that recommendations identified in the previous concluding observations have not yet 
been implemented.” These recommendations relate to “the legal safeguards necessary to prevent 
torture; the State Secrets Law and reported harassment of lawyers, human rights defenders and 
petitioners; [and] the lack of statistical information and accountability of the events in the 
autonomous region of Tibet and neighbouring Tibetan prefectures and counties.”855 The repeated 
non-implementation of UNCAT recommendations in China has also been raised as a concern by 
national and international civil society.856  
The UN SRT visited China in 2005 and highlighted a series of areas in need of reform to 
strengthen torture prevention. The UN SRT followed up on the recommendations made in the 
2005 report in 2011. Each recommendation was assessed in light of its current state of 
implementation. Out of all the recommendations, the UN SRT identified that only very few had 
been fully implemented. The majority remained in the same, if not in a worse state, six years 
on.857 
Other IHRL mechanisms have also examined China relatively recently. These too have echoed 
the same persistent concerns as those highlighted by the UN SRT in 2005 and the UNCAT in 
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2008 respectively. Many of their concerns have remained unchanged in nature, despite 
recommendations for change. For example, in 2010, a “Joint Study on global practices in relation 
to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism” undertaken by four UN Special 
Procedures, namely, the then UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, the UN SRT, the WGAD and the 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. These mandate-holders all voiced 
their concerns regarding cases of alleged torture and other ill-treatment and alleged secret 
detention of ethnic minorities. These involved, in particular, the treatment and detention of 
Tibetans accused of separatism and other State security offences, as well as the secret detention of 
various Uyghur Muslims in the aftermath of unrest in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in July 
2009. The same, or similar, problematic situation concerning the treatment and detention of 
ethnic Tibetans and Uyghur Muslims was found in 2015 when highlighted by the CAT 
Committee its Concluding Observations on China.858  In short, the situation had not improved 
despite repeated IHRL mechanisms’ recommendations for change. 
Despite some positive signs of change in China’s torture prevention efforts, some of which in line 
with recommendations made by the IHRL bodies, these remain in selected areas only. This may 
reflect that China perceives these recommendations as ‘Western’ imports,859 rather than as norms 
of universal applicability and concern – as well as a matter of obligation under China’s 
ratification of the UNCAT.860 In general, repeated non-compliance with the UNCAT and other 
human rights’ treaties has been the subject to extensive scholarship. 861  In some cases, non-
compliance may reflect States using – and potentially abusing – the ambiguity conferred in 
UNCAT 2(1), despite the identification of a list of concrete safeguards offered by the CAT 
Committee and others. This ambiguity allows States to focus on some areas of reform only. In 
China, this is manifested through the concentration on criminal law reform, leaving other parallel 
processes under-regulated. 
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3.4 Summary  
This chapter has examined the effectiveness, in practice, of the preventive safeguards afforded to 
detainees in law and, assessed the scope and current nature of the allegations and cases of torture 
and ill-treatment in the three justice process in focus, criminal, administrative and Party. The 
criminal-law justice process has seen significant amount of reform and affords the most 
protection to detainees. Interviews with scholars, procurators, police detention staff/guards, 
lawyers, scholars and detention centre management indicate that they are hearing of fewer cases 
of torture and other ill-treatment within KSS detention centres.862 A leading national scholar also 
considers that generally torture appears to be reducing, and it is ill-treatment only that is now 
mainly evident in initial police custody, but it has not entirely disappeared elsewhere.863  
The impression is that ill-treatment in KSSs still does occur and is problematic across all 
detention locations864 but due to the existence of very limited mechanisms in most places of 
detention, and likely under-reporting, it is extremely hard to adequately assess the true 
situation.865 The UN SRT has also noted the steady decline in torture and ill-treatment since the 
1990s, in his 2005 report and follow-up in 2011. Yet, the UN SRT still flags that torture remains 
prevalent throughout Chinese places of detention. Many IHRL bodies and international scholars 
torture remains ‘pervasive’ throughout the detention system in China.866  
Numerous allegations of severe abuse continue to emanate from detention institutions, in addition 
to police stations (places of initial police custody). In practice, concrete and aggregated data that 
reflects the true situation across China is lacking and thus the true situation is impossible to 
                                                     
862  Author’s discussions and interviews with Chinese procurators, preventive monitors, KSS detention directors, member of the 
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KSS’, organised by Great Britain China Centre and Renmin University in Wuhu, China, 23-24 November 2017. 
863 Author’s interview with Associate Professor Cheng Lei, Renmin University, in Wuhu China, on 24 November 2016. 
864  Belkin, ‘China’s tortuous path towards ending torture in criminal investigations’ (2013); Z. Guo, ‘Exclusion of illegally 
obtained confessions in China: an empirical perspective’, International journal of evidence and proof, Vol. 21, no. 1-2, Sage 
publisher; J. Daum, ‘Tortuous progress: Early cases under China’s new procedures for excluding evidence in criminal cases’, in 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2011, 43(3): 699–712; He JiaHang and He Ran, ‘Wrongful 
conviction and tortured confessions: empirical studies in mainland China’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in 
China, (2013). 
865  Author’s interview with Associate Professor Cheng Lei, Renmin University, in Wuhu China, on 24 November 2016. 
866  Belkin, ‘China’s tortuous path towards ending torture in criminal investigations’ (2013); Z. Guo, ‘Exclusion of illegally 
obtained confessions in China: an empirical perspective’, International journal of evidence and proof, Vol. 21, no. 1-2, Sage 
publisher; J. Daum, ‘Tortuous progress: Early cases under China’s new procedures for excluding evidence in criminal cases’, in 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2011, 43(3): 699–712; He JiaHang and He Ran, ‘Wrongful 
conviction and tortured confessions: empirical studies in mainland China’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in 






determine. One of the reasons for this is that no one body is responsible for overseeing or 
collecting data across all areas of deprivation of liberty in China, or for assessing the impact of 
the CPL’s and other relevant legislative safeguards. 
From the limited data and information that is available through interviews and research, there are 
enough indications to suggest that, at the very least, ill-treatment still occurs in some detention 
areas. This means that the effectiveness of many of the revised CPL’s safeguards have been 
negated or, at least diluted, in practice. Numerous scholars have argued that this is due to a gap 
between law and practice, namely an implementation gap.867 In the criminal-law context, proper 
implementation of the existing safeguards is indeed needed. The revisions in 2012 were designed 
to stem the culture of confession coercion, but in nearly every instance, their effectiveness 
appears diluted and torture post-2012 still remains a credible risk in police custody and detention. 
The volume of torture and ill-treatment allegations in China do however highlight that the 
preventive safeguards are not working effectively. Not only is torture still prevalent, it also 
appears to be resilient in pockets of detention, despite efforts made to eradicate and prevent it 
through legal reforms undertaken at the national level and despite repeated recommendations 
made at the international level. Torture was previously acknowledged to be a problem in China; 
the problem now is that torture has remained resilient despite the various legal measures taken to 
prevent it. 
The problem however runs deeper than mere implementation gaps. First, the criminal laws do not 
afford comprehensive protection in their current reformed state and, worse, the law permits 
circumvention. Thus better implementation is insufficient: there needs to be oversight and 
accountability. 
Turning to the administrative justice process (with the examples of (i) PAD and (ii) CDR) and to 
the examination of the effectiveness of its safeguards and the current nature of torture in this 
                                                     
867  See Introduction and Conclusions, Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, ed. McConville & Pils (2013), 
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Lubman, ‘Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years’ (2000); Statement of Teng Biao, Hearing of the CECC 






sphere. Here, despite reforms, the safeguards lag behind the CPL and afford less protection in 
regulation. Worse, the few safeguards that are in place are not working in practice, as numerous 
torture allegations currently exist in these processes and places. Some of the torture allegations 
are slightly different in nature to those during the PSB or procuratorate criminal investigation, 
whereby the primary form seems to be the coercive extraction of information and/or confessions. 
In the punitive administrative context, the allegations also comprise physical and psychological 
torture and ill-treatment meted as a punishment. This appears to be as reprisal for certain actions 
that are considered to challenge ‘social order’ in China. Reforming this administrative process in 
line with the CPL reforms will not solve this, as it will likely rub up against the same problem, 
notably, that the criminal laws do not afford comprehensive protection in their current reformed 
state and they permit circumvention. Again, merely better regulating this administrative sphere 
will not be the key to affording adequate protection to PAD and CDR detainees (although it will 
be a start); deeper change may be needed. 
Turning to the Party investigation and disciplinary process and shuanggui, here the preventive 
legal safeguards are virtually non-existent; this is an almost completely opaque sphere with 
ultimate discretion given to CCP Discipline Committees with no oversight. It is a sphere in which 
CCP officials suspected of corruption can disappear for many months in de facto deprivation of 
liberty. This is a notoriously closed system and little information is available. It is also a process 
that goes to the heart of top-level CCP governance and is an instrument of Party control: it is used 
to target corruption, but also potential dissent or challenge to the status quo. It sits alongside the 
other legal justice processes and is self-regulated. It is thus unsurprising that this forms an 
extremely risky sphere for detainees and one where numerous allegations of torture emanate, 
despite tough internet and media censorship. This highlights a key challenge for torture 
prevention in modern-day China: the balance between the need to protect One-Party (CCP) rule 
and its commitment to effectively protect the rule of law and human rights.868 
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Overall, this assessment only partly agrees with the view of some scholars that the criminal 
justice system now affords ordinary, ‘run of the mill’, criminal law suspects the required 
protection against torture, and that the risk of torture lies primarily with the minorities or pockets 
of types of suspects. Indeed, the risk of torture is still prevalent for all criminal suspects, 
especially during the first 24 hours of deprivation of liberty. This is because the safeguards 
designed to prevent the risk are not working. That is not to say that that the risk of torture is not 
‘higher’ for some categories of criminal or administrative suspect. In all probability, it is. These 
are the minority of suspects who have allegedly done something to jeopardise social order and 
harmony, and have the potential to incite others, or hinder the smooth running of the economy 
and development or who question the government and the CCP. For these subjects, the risk of 
being transferred into (less protected) administrative processes is high, as is the risk of torture and 
other ill-treatment in administrative justice processes. For those suspects undergoing the Party 







Chapter 4: Wider institutional, structural and political obstacles 
to reform 
There has been relatively little scholarship on the influence of political structures and broad social 
processes on the effectiveness of torture prevention specifically, 869  even if practitioners and 
experts allude to these factors. 870 Although not the primary focus of their scholarship, the theory 
has been referenced in Carver and Handley’s examination of torture prevention:871 they highlight 
the importance of having an understanding of how preventive measures might work in different 
social and political contexts. They:  
“accept the assumption that certain political preconditions must be met to reduce or 
eradicate torture; conversely, we assume that in certain situations, where both the 
preconditions and political commitment are absent, it will be fruitless to use essentially 
technical measures to address the problem. Our study therefore takes account of the 
influence of political structures and broad social processes. In our country narratives, we 
have attempted to understand how specific political developments and social context have 
influenced the struggle against torture. In our quantitative analysis, we control for 
democracy, conflict and economic development. We still conclude that effective detention 
practice [i.e., robust work ethics, professional training to conduct law without abuse, etc.] 
contributes most to the prevention of torture.”872  
                                                     
869  Within the specific remit of torture prevention, there has been comparatively little focus of scholarship on the political and 
governance models needed for prevention to work. It has been alluded to in Evans and the SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the 
concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under OPCAT’, CAT/OP/12/6, 
30 December 2010; Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016)(briefly, mainly in Introduction) and, more 
generally on torture prohibition (i.e., outside the specific remit of prevention) by authors such as Rejali, Torture and Democracy 
(2007) and S. Karstedt, ‘Does democracy matter? Comparative perspectives on violence and democratic institutions’, European 
Journal of Criminology 12(4); APT, ‘What is torture prevention’, http://www.apt.ch/en/understanding-the-risk-of-torture/. 
870  Within the specific remit of torture prevention, scholarship has been comparatively little focus of scholarship on the political 
and governance models needed for prevention to work. It has been alluded to in Evans and the SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT 
to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under OPCAT’, 
CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010; Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016)(briefly mainly in Introduction) 
and, more generally on torture prohibition (i.e., outside the specific remit of prevention) by authors such as Rejali, Torture and 
Democracy (2007) and S. Karstedt, ‘Does democracy matter? Comparative perspectives on violence and democratic 
institutions’, European Journal of Criminology 12(4); APT, ‘What is torture prevention’, http://www.apt.ch/en/understanding-
the-risk-of-torture/.  
871  Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (2016), Introduction and Chapter 1. 






Thus, the wider social, institutional and political context and the whole governance model in 
China need to be examined to understand how it influences, and may impede, full torture 
prevention efforts. This chapter identifies and examines the broad structural, institutional and 
political factors that could present obstacles that underpin the protection gaps identified. This 
chapter loosely groups these obstacles into seven structural issues: 
i. A lack of separation of powers. 
ii. Parallel legal processes on unequal footings, allowing ‘protection arbitrage’. 
iii. A weak judiciary. 
iv. Signs of a degree of impunity for acts of abuse, along with limitations in 
effective investigations into allegations of abuse and nascent complaints’ 
mechanisms in need of strengthening. 
v. Preventive monitoring in its infancy and facing systemic challenges. 
vi. Restricted civil society, hindered from performing a ‘watchdog’ role. 
vii. Wider inhibiting socio-cultural aspects that can contribute to endemic torture 
practices in certain spheres. 
While some of these have been alluded to or described in previous chapters in the context of 
specific justice processes, this chapter examines the overall impact they each have currently on 
torture prevention measures underway in China and how, if left unaddressed, they can hinder 
torture prevention efforts. 
Above these sits one overarching structural, institutional and political influence on torture 
prevention measures, namely the influence of the CCP. This intrinsically cuts across and affects 
each of the structural issues. This is inherent in the nature of the CCP model in China. It yields 
ultimate control and explicitly acts to secure and retain a pervasive influence. This chapter 
examines this influence in each of the structural obstacles identified above: each has its own 






Thus, any torture prevention efforts undertaken in China cannot be examined without also 
examining the overarching role of the CCP. 
4.1 Lack of separation of powers 
On an institutional level, each of the institutional structures internally has multiple roles that can 
inherently conflict with each other. On a general level, each of the institutional structures, most of 
which were established in line with Communist Party thought, are, in practice, ultimately 
subservient to the will of the General Secretary of the CCP, who is also the President of China (a 
more ceremonial title).873 Not only does the CCP have the ability to control all institutions in 
China, it is increasingly doing so.874  
4.1.1 The multiple roles of the procuratorate in the criminal justice system 
In China’s criminal law sphere, the procuratorate plays multiple roles: that of the prosecutor (of 
certain complex and ‘serious’ cases875), approver of arrests in criminal cases, overseer of the 
correct application of laws and exercising oversight over the legality of detention. Having all of 
these roles undertaken by one body inherently creates tension and a conflict of interest, if 
examined through the lens of Dicey’s core components for the Rule of Law and, in particular, the 
need for the separation of powers.876  
Nevertheless, the need for formal structural separation of powers, as a core element of the Rule of 
Law, is considered by the Chinese authorities to be an ultimately Western-imported concept.877 
CCP Document No. 9 demonstrates the CCP thinking behind the concept of the Rule of Law. The 
rationale is that the Rule of Law does not need the formal separation of power, but merely to 
ensure that all institutions and processes are subordinate to the law. In this sense, this is more akin 
                                                     
873  See Thesis Introduction and Chapter 2 on the establishment of the modern Chinese legal system. 
874  Outlined in the Thesis Introduction and Chapter 2. 
875  CPL stipulates that the Procuratorate has the jurisdiction to, inter alia, investigate suspect gang crimes, recidivists’ offences, 
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to ‘rule according to the law’ theory.878 The CCP emphasises that legal reforms undertaken from 
2012 onwards have the ultimate aim to strengthen the laws, and thus fulfil this concept.879 
The question of the respective roles of the procuratorate and the judiciary has been subject to 
extensive scholarship and critique.880 Historically, the police and procuratorate compromised two 
of the most powerful institutions in the Chinese governance model and they enjoyed wide latitude 
of manoeuvre. Nevertheless, reforms have increasingly given the courts a comparatively stronger 
role than they once had. Judges tend to be better educated than the procurators appearing before 
the courts as a party to the legal proceedings, and procurators have to observe court rules.881 
However, the Chinese Constitution also affords the procuracy the mandate to supervise the courts. 
Chinese legal scholars, such a Randall Peerenboom 882  and Murray Scot Taner, 883  point to 
increasing tensions between the courts and the police and procuratorate as their respective roles 
flex and change shape with time.884 
This tension manifests itself, Peerenboom argues, in a number of negative outcomes.885 These 
include inconsistencies in interpretation of key legislation. For example, the procuracy openly 
criticised the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s practice of interpreting the law during the drafting 
of the Law on Legislation. Second, there are signs of co-operation failure between the procurators 
(and police) and the court. For example, police investigators often fail to provide documents or 
evidence requested by the courts. Third, there are numerous reports of police and procurators 
harassing lawyers and the detention of lawyers on trumped up or spurious charges (Section 4.3.2). 
Peerenboom argues that the nature of the CCP overarching control is that the Party is often forced 
to intervene in such disputes to maintain control. Nevertheless, Taner argues that there is a 
growing social consciousness and awareness of working officials and scholars/think-tanks within 
                                                     
878  See Thesis Chapter 2. 
879  See Thesis Introduction and Chapter 2. 
880  See, for example, R. Peerenboom, ‘Judicial independence in China: common myths and unfounded assumption’, Judicial 
Independence in China: lessons for global rule of law, (ed.) R. Peerenboom (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Zhu Suli, 
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the police,886 as in other institutions887, for more autonomy and less Party interference, despite the 
tight control still wielded by the Party over all institutions. 
The independence of the procurators’ supervision of the investigation of torture allegations in 
China has also been an ongoing source of concern to IHRL bodies, especially the CAT 
Committee. In 2015, it highlighted its concern that “the dual functions of the procuratorates, 
namely prosecution and pre-indictment review of police investigation, creates a conflict of 
interest that could taint the impartiality of its actions, even if carried out by different 
departments.”888 In terms of torture prevention, this structural conflict of interest could act as an 
impediment to fair and impartial prosecution of torture allegations, which is a requirement in a 
state’s effort to combat impunity for acts of torture and a fundamental aspect of a state’s 
prohibition and prevention obligation. 889  Additionally, the procurators’ role in approving 
detention is a concern, given that while it maintains links with the judiciary, it is, in essence, a 
governmental and non-judicial body. This poses serious questions as to the legitimacy of 
detention orders. It also raises questions as to the perception of impartiality, crucial to ensure trust 
in the oversight system and a key element needed for adequate independence. 
The situation of the dual role of the procurators has not changed substantively since the 2012 
reforms, and the procuratorate’s lack of true impartiality remains a source of concern to scholars, 
civil society and IHRL bodies.890 Despite a raft of legal reforms and despite repeated concerns 
raised by the IHRL mechanisms, little has changed. Back in 2005, the UN SRT raised concerns 
about the role of the procuratorate’s impartiality,891 and in 2008, the CAT Committee highlighted 
its concern about the lack of an effective mechanism for investigating allegations of torture, in 
particular, “serious conflicts of interest with the role played by the Office of the Procuratorate”;892 
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these concerns were echoed by the UN SRT in 2011.893 The Chinese authorities outlined various 
new procuratorial oversight measures adopted, in its State Party report to the UNCAT in 2014 (it 
has not formally responded to the UN SRT’s 2011 Follow-up Report). However, there remain 
significant doubts, raised by the CAT Committee, about several aspects of the operation of the 
procuracy and its independence.894 One of these relates to continuing ability for the CCP to 
influence the procuratorate. There is also a similar concern regarding the judiciary. This can be 
seen in the impact of the political-legal committees (zhengfawei政法委) on the functioning of the 
procuracy and the courts. These committees are tasked with “unify[ing] the thinking and actions 
of various political and legal affairs departments based on the Party’s line, principles, policies, 
and deployment. To achieve this aim, political-legal committees have intervened in “politically 
sensitive” cases, from the investigation stage (police), to the indictment stage (by the 
procuratorate), to the ruling of the case (by the court).”895 According to civil society reports, there 
have been various conflicting policy statements made regarding the political-legal committees. 
For example, Human Rights in China (HRIC), a specialist NGO, documents that “in late 2014, 
Meng Jianzhu, the current Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee, stated 
that “leaders should stop instructing on the handling of specific cases and allow all judicial organs 
to have a free hand.” However, at the same time, statements by Party leaders, including President 
Xi Jinping, emphasi[sed] the on-going importance of these committees.”896  
National critique of the current status of the Rule of Law in China and lack of separation of 
powers can be seen in the work of leading Chinese legal scholar He Weifang.897 He argues that 
the Rule of Law in China can only be achieved through an acknowledgement that formal 
separation of powers are needed in all Chinese institutions and legal processes. He calls for the 
“deconstruction of socialist ideology” in order to give way to a view of governance marked by the 
separation of powers, which he acknowledges would constrict the CCP’s current grasp on State 
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institutions.898 Many legal scholars agree and support these views.899 Ultimately, in the context of 
the procuratorate, the conflicts of interests inherent in the procuratorate’s many functions hinder it 
from being truly effective or free from political interference.  
Notably, it is the procuratorate in particular that is expected to take responsibility for many of 
China’s torture prevention measures, including significant involvement in the nascent complaints 
mechanisms and monitoring initiatives,900 as well as their traditional role as oversight over the 
correct application of the law. The lack of true separation of powers can, and does, adversely 
impact the work of torture prevention. Without formal separation of powers in all Chinese 
institutions and legal processes, or truly impartial oversight, it is hard to argue that China has the 
right foundation or environment needed to enable the necessary legal and technical preventive 
safeguards to operate effectively. 
4.1.2 Multiple roles of the police, and subject to Party oversight & involvement 
(i) Police: a triple role  
The PSB / police play a triple role in the administrative detention process where they are 
responsible for investigating, sentencing and managing detention. 
 This triple role is seen both in punitive administrative detention (PAD) and wider forms of 
administrative detention, such as Compulsory Drug Rehabilitation (CDR). Overall, the PSB is 
involved in the enforcement of the administrative laws, the placement in custody, undertakes the 
investigation, decides on the guilt and the duration of sentence, operates as an appeal body, as 
well as being responsible for the operation of administrative detention facilities. Exceptionally, if 
it is expressly decided, a person can be handed over to the procurators and will stand trial before 
the criminal court. Otherwise, the majority of administrative cases (all cases deemed ‘non-
serious’) will stay within the remit of the PSB, which has no external oversight body. Granted, 
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there are separate departments and organs within the PSB structure that take on the different roles. 
However they ultimately report to the differing higher levels of PSB direct hierarchy. 
The lack of separation of powers and functions is concerning in that it confers almost total 
discretion on police for the majority of administrative (both punitive and wider) detention 
sanctions with minimal external oversight. Surprisingly, this area has not been subject to as much 
scholarly analysis as the criminal law sphere and the general rule of law situation in China.901 The 
focus by legal scholars and IHRL mechanisms has commonly been on one of the more extreme 
aspects of punitive administrative detention: the sanction of Re-education through Labour 
(RETL).902 Administrative arrest / punitive administrative detention governed by the PSAPL, in 
particular, has been comparatively less critiqued. 
This is concerning due to the wide discretion afforded by the mandate and triple role of the police 
for the majority of administrative and punitive administrative sanctions, which is conducive to 
creating an insular and opaque environment. This can create a particular risk of torture and ill-
treatment. Unsurprisingly therefore, despite some reforms and some signs of a more “socially-
conscious” police force at an operational level,903 there are indications that torture, at least ill-
treatment, remains systemic in initial police custody.904  
(ii) PSB/police structure; pervasive CCP influence over the police 
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is responsible for the four levels of PSB and operates 
discretely, drafting its own regulations to regulate its own body.905 Nonetheless, there remains a 
pervasive Party and executive influence in the set-up, reporting lines and resources. IHRL bodes, 
such as the CAT Committee906 and the UN SRT,907 scholars and civil society908 have all flagged 
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their deep concerns about this. They point out that that, ultimately, it is the local leaders (CCP 
Committee and government officials) that fund the police force, appoint local police personnel 
(including local police chiefs), decide police salaries, and set the strategic vision and policies for 
policing. CCP control – or at least influence – over the police remains evident. This is manifested 
through CCP Committees in each level of the PSB, and, in particular, through its Political and 
Legal Committee (zhengfawei 政法委). The Political and Legal Committee plays a fundamental 
role, both leading and coordinating the police, the procuratorate, and the courts on law and order 
matters. While local political influence has been subject to reform, it remains powerful,909 and the 
police are susceptible to its influence. 
The dynamics between the PSB and CCP influence have flexed over time; the power of the PSB 
had been considerably strengthened under Zhou Yongkang MPS Minister (2002 to 2007).910 Zhou 
shifted the power dynamic by enabling police chiefs to be appointed as secretaries of the CCP 
Political and Legal Committees and expanded the powers of the police as a key to “stability 
maintenance.”911 However, with the shift in leadership priorities and the greater emphasis placed 
by Xi Jinping on reinforcing CCP-top level control over all institutions and eradicating local 
vested interests,912 the MPS has been progressively been put under greater control by the top-
levels of the CCP.913  
Yet, the PSB still remains extremely powerful, despite reforms to curb this and to pass more 
power to the judiciary. It can, and does, stymie reform in practice.914  Without a significant 
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recalibration of police powers, reforms are facing steep obstacles to their adequate operation.915 
This can be seen throughout the cross-section of detention types analysed here, including 
manifestly in the non-implementation of CPL safeguards, as well as in the (overly) broad police 
powers for CDR and PSAPL decision-making and lack of oversight (Chapter 3). 
Overall, there appears to be broad consensus916 that under the current set-up, the PSB has too 
many hats, maintains too broad a discretion in decision-making in its powers for coercive 
measures, and is not free from political control; all of which can impact its decision-making and 
its conduct. In the context of torture prevention, these ultimately can create an environment 
conducive to abuse. 
4.2 Parallel justice processes on unequal footings: ‘protection arbitrage’ 
The investigating police/PSB officer is, in effect, afforded the discretion to choose whether to 
trigger the criminal or administrative justice process for a given infraction or offence, in light of 
the degree of overlap in the nature of the grounds of the offences.  
4.2.1 Administrative and criminal justice spheres: unequal footing & 
‘protection arbitrage’  
An offence, for example, ‘picking quarrels’ or ‘disturbing public, or court, order’ can be a 
criminal offence or an administrative penalty/punitive administrative infraction.917 This affords 
the initial choice of which justice system to pursue. The ease of transfer between justice processes 
and discretion afforded to investigators to choose is compounded by overly broad offences 
creating a lack of legal precision and certainty. This is a particularly problematic area both in 
theory and practice (see below).918 Given that the punitive administrative detention process is one 
that is currently less regulated than the criminal one (and thus more flexible), it is hardly 
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surprising that there are instances where PSAPL grounds of ‘disturbing public order’ or ‘picking 
quarrels’ can be easily chosen over their CPL equivalents. This is especially pertinent in the cases 
of those who are seen to jeopardise social order by questioning the system and status quo.919  
This discretion not only acts as a protection gap but its existence is a structural impediment to 
effective torture prevention, given the choice to steer towards one more-regulated and protected 
system (affording some safeguards against torture and ill-treatment) or another under-regulated 
one. 
The general lack of accurate reporting in China, the lack of ready and private access by anyone to 
detainees920 (including limited access to detainees by their own lawyers and families) (c.f. below) 
and the fact that the PSB’s discretion in choosing one justice route over another is not transparent 
or recorded, all make providing concrete evidence that ‘protection arbitrage’ occurs challenging. 
That said, this research draws on primary interviews with those in regular contact with PAD 
detainees, such as procurators, monitors and complaints mechanisms’ members (cf. Chapters 
4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.5). Additionally, the author also conducted an interview with the wife of a 
detainee remanded in a KSS who is facing either a potential PAD infraction or a criminal charge, 
based on the same evidence (see below). These discussions all point to protection arbitrage 
occurring in practice, rather than being a theoretical – analytical – construct.  
The risk of abusing powers of investigation by using the porous borders between the different 
justice systems has been acknowledged by the SPP, but it has stopped short of proposing reform 
to address this. This can be seen in the SPP Guiding Cases. For example, in the Case of Hu X and 
Zheng X (Procuratorate Case No.7), CCP officials were accused of using their office for 
personnel enrichment by not transferring a case into the criminal justice system and keeping it 
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within the (less-regulated) administrative law enforcement sphere. This case has been cited by the 
SPP as a guiding case for other procurators to follow when prosecuting similar cases:  
“Supervision of proceedings is an important component of people's procuratorates’ 
lawful performance of legal supervision. In practice, procuratorates and case 
handling personnel shall attach equal importance to case handling and supervision, 
establish and improve work mechanisms effectively linking administrative law 
enforcement and criminal justice, beneficial to discovering all manner of leads on 
crimes abusing public office while handling cases. Where administrative law 
enforcement personnel selectively enforce for personal gain and do not transfer a 
criminal case, and this constitutes a crime, it shall be pursued for criminal 
responsibility in accordance with law.”921  
 
‘Protection arbitrage’ 
The risk of procuratorial or police abuse powers of investigation by using the fluid borders 
between the different justice systems can also be seen, in practice, from the interview with the 
family of Mr. X,922 a detainee currently held in KSS remand detention in China (Chapter 3). Mr. 
X’s lawyer was informed that the police were investigating Mr. X pursuant to two possible 
grounds simultaneously. The first was commercial corruption, contrary to the criminal law; the 
second was an administrative misdemeanour contrary to the administrative justice laws. The 
specific charges were not shared with the Mr. X or his lawyer. The lawyer has been informed that 
if the local government is ‘unhappy’ with Mr. X, then he will be sentenced for commercial 
corruption, a crime pursuant to the CPL. This carries a sentence of 10 years. If the government is 
‘ambivalent’, then the PSB/police will be permitted to sentence him for an administrative offence 
(unspecified). This sanction would be for the duration of less time than Mr. X has already spent in 
police detention (typically a sentence for 15 days, the investigation process, however, takes many 
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months923). In late 2016, a judge found that there was insufficient evidence to continue holding 
Mr. X in detention. This ruling has, however, been ignored by the police investigators, who 
continue to hold Mr. X in police detention.924  
While this is a single case only, it is illustrative of what can happen in practice. It is indicative of: 
a lack of legal certainty (simultaneous use of both criminal and administrative justice system and 
the possibility of ‘protection arbitrage’); using a lesser-protected (administrative) legal process to 
extend investigation and detention time to circumvent criminal law safeguards; systemic issues 
with the administrative offence process (which can result in a sanction of 15 days to be served in 
the same KSS, where the detainee has already served more than a year and a half in detention); 
and apparent non-implementation of judicial decisions by the police in ‘sensitive’ (corruption) 
cases. 
In other words, while legal reforms have strengthened the CPL, in practice they appear not to 
have taken the discretion or opportunity for ‘protection arbitrage’ away, which can facilitate the 
circumvention of detainees’ safeguards by investigators in the interests of their investigation. This 
legal and institutional discretion to choose a less-regulated justice process serves to weaken 
torture prevention. 
4.2.2 ‘Shuanggui’: an extra-legal, less-protected detention sphere 
Further, the shuanggui process is a parallel justice process that operates outside both the criminal 
justice and administrative justice processes. This process confers almost total discretion on certain 
administrative and political bodies to deprive persons of their liberty without any judicial 
authorisation or external oversight. 
CCP officials can disappear (no time-limit for family or third party notification of detention 
exists) into the shuanggui system and then be transferred to, and re-appear in, the criminal justice 
system months, if not years, later. The decision to transfer a suspect from the CCP Party justice 
sphere into the criminal justice process is one that the CCP investigators make without external 
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involvement or oversight (i.e., bodies outside the Party justice system). The lack of safeguards 
and the opaque process not only create great risk of torture, the number of torture allegations are 
reportedly increasing925. Scholars and IHRL bodies point to a credible and serious risk of torture 
in this tertiary justice system. Moreover, inherent in the CCP Investigatory and Discipline 
Committees’ name is an apparent flaw in its impartiality. These two elements – investigation and 
discipline – should be separated to reduce the risk of torture. When combined under one body’s 
responsibility there is a risk that investigators can use, and abuse, the threat of detention (and 
discipline) as incentives to facilitate their investigation. 
Ultimately, while shuanggui is its own discrete justice system, it also epitomises the current 
problem in China: namely, the ability of the Party to override the law when it suits its own needs. 
This is especially pertinent in areas that touch upon the CCP priorities, such as economic 
development, social harmony and public order. Thus, persons who have the potential to 
jeopardise or undermine credibility in the smooth operation of the economy, or threaten public 
order and harmony, or undermine CCP leadership and public faith in the governance system are 
at particular risk (e.g. corrupt officials, among others). Its existence is both a significant 
impediment to effective torture prevention efforts and epitomises the key problem with realising 
fully effective torture prevention in China: the Party’s ability to override the law when it needs to 
serve its interests.926  
4.3 A judiciary still subject to influence, despite reform  
4.3.1 A judiciary insufficiently strong to act independently 
There remains significant scope for political organs in China to interfere in court decisions. The 
CCP has the mandate to co-ordinate the work of the judicial bodies and can interfere in certain 
cases where it sees fit.927 IHRL bodies are concerned by the remit of various CCP political 
committees’ mandates, in particular the CCP and Law Committees, affording the possibility to 
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co-ordinate legal proceedings and thus interfere in judicial affairs. The Chinese authorities have 
underscored that various reforms have been undertaken regarding these political-legal committees 
and that they coordinate the work of judicial bodies without directly taking part in investigations 
or suggesting lines of action to judges. However, IHRL bodies, such as the CAT Committee928 
and the UN SRT929, and civil society bodies and scholars,930 remain concerned at the existence of 
a political body that co-ordinates and influences legal proceedings. The CAT Committee 
expressly points to the risk of political interference in judicial affairs, particularly in sensitive 
cases of political relevance or state security.931  
More generally, the question of the independence of the judiciary in China has been subject to 
wide scholarship and critique.932 There are those who, like Chinese scholar Zhu Suli, argue that 
“there is no universal framework of reference for evaluating when judicial independence exists 
and when such independence is beneficial or costly insofar as the larger constitutional order.”933 
In light of this, Zhu Suli argues that incremental reforms have – in the context of China – made 
significant inroads to strengthening judicial independence. Other legal scholars specialising in the 
Rule of Law in China agree to some extent, and acknowledge that there have been some reforms 
and tangible changes in strengthening some protections for judicial impartiality, integrity and 
against blanket political interference.934 Yet, many legal China scholars also point out that China 
is only ‘half-way there’ and that there is still a long way to go before China could safely be said 
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to have a comprehensively independent judiciary, free from Party political and other types of 
interference.935  
Some scholars, for example Zhu Suli, argue that influences are nuanced, and that political or 
other interferences should be differentiated. Zhu argues that “given the CCP’s far-reaching 
influence, it is often difficult to distinguish Party influence on the Court and influence by the 
government, people’s congress or other state actors.”936 Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
unpack and truly understand whether reforms have succeeded in reducing political influence. 
Further, Zhu argues that not all influences by Party members are consistent with Party politics 
and “legitimate Party influence should be distinguished from illegitimate Party influence by 
individual party members pursuing their own agendas.”937  
Nevertheless, other scholars938 argue that despite some progress, the Party and the Courts are still 
inherently interconnected and more could, and should, be done to separate and protect judicial 
independence. In a 2016 analysis of the impact of judiciary reforms, two legal scholars, Chen and 
Shi-Kupfer, argue that there has been some progress in the strengthening of judicial independence, 
but not enough. They argue that reforms have succeeded in curbing problematic local political 
interference with the judiciary work.939 This is a positive development as local interference in 
judicial matters was a significant hurdle to judicial impartial reasoning. However, they argue that 
top-level CCP control and political interference in judicial matters is still possible, despite 
reforms. This trend, they argue, is consistent with an analysis of current leadership priorities, to 
eradicate local vested interests and strengthen CCP top-level control over all elements of 
governance, including the justice process and the judiciary. Yet, these scholars consider that the 
central government continues to use arbitrary legal measures such as coerced confessions of guilt 
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on China Central Television. Equally, Chen and Shi-Kupfer point out that “Xi’s efforts to 
combine anti-corruption campaigns with judicial reforms can only be branded as selective, since 
the campaign has excluded important members of the coalition of princelings [children of veteran 
high-ranking early Communist cadres from the 1950s and 60s]. Consequently, local judicial 
functionaries will be punished for rent-seeking practices, whereas the egocentric behaviour of the 
central Party leadership (e.g., Panama Papers) is not subject to legal prosecution.”940 
Leading Chinese scholars He Wei Fang941 and Professor Xu Xin942 argue that it is fundamental 
that China ensures better judicial independence in order for it to achieve legal reform without 
revolution. In a series of recommendations, they argue that various key steps need to be taken to 
achieve this. These include, inter alia, that leadership over judicial reform should be given to a 
special committee of the National People’s Congress; that the presidents of Chinese courts should 
not be chosen by CCP officials as they are now, but by an independent selection committee; that 
there should be no CCP interference in the outcome of cases in the courts, and that there should 
be no CCP cells in courts or law firms; that the powers over judicial outcomes exercised by 
‘political-legal commissions’ composed of senior representatives of the courts, police and 
prosecutors must be reduced; and that a constitutional review agency or court should be 
established to measure official conduct against standards in the Constitution.943  
Numerous scholars support this stance:944 there is wide consensus that more reform is needed to 
strengthen the judiciary, including to strengthen meritocratic judicial selection process; ensure a 
greater role of the higher courts and other legal professionals in the judicial appointment process; 
ensure the judiciary is sufficient remunerated; publish more judgments with reasoned opinions; 
change the incentive structures so that judges are not penalised for reversals on appeal (as they 
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currently are), ensure immunity and sufficient protection for judges to fulfil their role on 
politically sensitive cases without fear of reprisals; eliminate the role of political-legal committees 
adjudicative committees from higher courts and lower courts due to the possibilities of judicial 
interference; and increase the supervision by civil society.945 
In the context of torture prevention, a strong and independent judiciary is an important condition 
for torture prevention measures to function effectively.946 It is crucial in a number of aspects. First, 
following on from the reasoning on the opacity/transparency paradigm (the more a detainee is 
isolated from contact with the outside world, the greater the risk of torture and ill-treatment),947 
the right to consult a lawyer is an important means to prevent torture and other ill-treatment, as 
well as a safeguard of due process.948 If a detainee either has no access to a lawyer, or if a lawyer 
is unwilling or unable to represent a detainee, then torture allegations are unlikely to surface. 
Second, a weak judiciary subject to interference is unlikely to rule independently or impartially 
on cases involving torture allegations. Consequently, incidences of torture could go unpunished, 
resulting in weak deterrence for repeated incidences torture. The need for effective investigations 
into allegations of torture goes beyond the need for an impartial and properly functioning 
judiciary, and extends to the complaints investigation process as a whole. Without these 
fundamental elements in place, there is a risk of the creation of a sphere where investigators and 
custody staff can act undeterred and unpunished (i.e., with impunity), and where torture practices 
can become entrenched. Countering impunity is an essential ingredient for effective torture 
prevention, especially in states where torture practices have become endemic. Yet, there are many 
indications that impunity remains a key problem in China. This is an obstacle to the building of 
the right environment for torture prevention safeguards to operate effectively; worse, it risks 
rendering them obsolete.949  
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An independent judiciary is also inherently linked to other fundamental due process safeguards 
necessary to prevent torture, such as the right of third party notification (and thus the prohibition 
of incommunicado detention) and of habeas corpus. As accentuated by the SPT, “State parties 
should consider effective judicial review and due process during the detention of individuals in 
criminal proceedings as a prerequisite for the prevention of ill-treatment or torture of persons 
deprived of their liberty and as a means of conferring legitimacy on the exercise of criminal 
justice.”950 Indeed, to enable the legal safeguards of prevention (such as access to a lawyer) to 
have their full effect, a strong and independent judiciary is an essential and foundational pre-
condition. Despite legal reforms in this area, China’s judiciary is still far from being truly strong 
and independent; this has direct implications for the effectiveness of many of its torture 
prevention measures currently in place. The absence of a strong and independent judiciary in 
China risks undermining the few torture prevention safeguards that it has established. 
4.3.2 Lawyers inadequately protected and actively targeted/harassed 
China officially considers that improvements to “the judiciary is an important part in the 
comprehensive promotion of rule of law in China, and relevant competent Departments are 
actively carrying out research on the introduction of specific measures, to further strengthen and 
[improve] the safeguard for lawyers’ right to practice law as well as relevant services and 
administration. Lawyers will play a bigger role in China in terms of promoting rule of law, 
safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of relevant parties as well as maintaining the social 
fairness and justice.”951 
This governmental focus underpins some positive developments in China’s efforts towards the 
Rule of Law;952 namely the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary from local level 
(but not top level) executive interference. At the political level, the Chinese authorities have 
stressed that they consider that “lawyers constitute an important force in China’s efforts to 
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implement the fundamental strategy of rule of law and to build a State ruled by law.”953 The 
authorities highlight that the Law on Lawyers was amended in 2007954 to strengthen the rule of 
law. It has been amended in a number of aspects including elaborating the professional goals and 
mandates of lawyers (i.e., protecting the legal rights and interests of a client), strengthening the 
scope of lawyers’ rights to practice law and their independence. In particular, it enshrines the 
rights of a lawyer to undertake his/her legal practice, including, inter alia, the rights to meet 
clients, consult evidential material and to investigate. The amendments are also geared at 
strengthening the regulation of legal conduct and bolstering supervision measures. To facilitate 
implementation of the Law on Lawyers, the ‘Measures for the Administration of Practicing Law 
by Lawyers’ were also amended in 2008. These regulate the licences of lawyers to practice law 
and regulate the conduct of lawyers in practice and in court. These measures were added to in 
2012 and 2015 by reforms to the CPL and CL, aiming to strengthen lawyers’ ethical conduct in 
their legal proceedings and in court conduct, such as extending grounds of criminal offences to 
include unruly behaviour in court, disruption of court proceedings, amongst others. Recently, the 
Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice have jointly promulgated the ‘Provisions on 
Legally Safeguarding the Right of Lawyers to Practice Law’.955 In all, China officials argue that 
China has “strengthened safeguards, improved remedies for infringement of the protections and 
improved accountability for those who infringe the safeguards.”956 
Yet, while these are positive developments in theory, they have been widely criticised by IHRL 
mechanisms, scholars and civil society for failing to strengthen the judiciary in practice. Scholars 
and IHRL bodies point out that these developments have actually served to weaken the protection 
of lawyers and have led to deteriorating conditions for lawyers to effectively practice law in 
reality. 957  The UN Special Rapporteur on Independence of the Judiciary, 958  the CAT 
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Committee,959 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination960 and the UN SRT961 
have all voiced their serious concerns that the relevant new laws and regulations are, in practice, 
actually curbing the independence and ability of many lawyers to fulfil their roles properly.  
These bodies have emphasised that various current and amended legal provisions undermine the 
independence of lawyers. These include Articles 306 to 315 of the CL and Articles 39 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law and amendments to the Law on Lawyers.962 These IHRL mechanisms, 
as well as many bodies in civil society, have criticised Article 306963 as the so-called ‘Big Stick 
306’.964 The result of Article 306, they argue, is that many Chinese lawyers fear being punished 
on spurious perjury grounds, under Article 306, for de facto defence work and for taking on cases 
that go against the status quo or for advising their client to repudiate a forced confession.965 The 
author saw an indication of this in a recent workshop on strengthening complaints mechanisms in 
China, in which she participated.966 The workshop focused on prisons but invited previous KSS 
staff project implementers to give encouragement to the prison implementers. Here Wuzhong 
procurators and management of its KSS shared a case where a lawyer, who represented a detainee 
complainant, had had their licence revoked after the (nascent/trial) KSS Complaints Handling 
Committee found the complaint to be a ‘malicious complaint’. While this is only one case 
illustration, it, cumulatively along with the above points, can be indicative of the various reasons 
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(2016). 
958  UN SRT, Report and Follow-Up on China (2005 and 2011).  
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960  CERD/C/CHN/CO/10-13, para. 19. 
961  UN SRT, Report and Follow-Up on China (2005 and 2011). 
962  See the CAT Committee List of Issues sent to China (2015); and the UN CERD, CERD/C/CHN/CO/10-13, para. 19. 
963  Article 306, CL: ‘In a criminal prosecution, a defender or agent ad litem who destroys evidence, fabricates evidence, helps a 
party destroy or fabricate evidence, or threatens or entices a witness to go against the truth and change their testimony or give 
false evidence, is punished by up to three years imprisonment or short-term detention, and where the circumstances are serious, 
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evidence.’ 
964  ‘The Big Stick 306’, New York Times, 5 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/opinion/06fri3.html. 
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why some lawyers fear taking on cases that could jeopardise their right to practice the law 
ongoing.967 
Other contentious amendments to the CL have also further extended potential criminal liability 
for lawyers for their conduct in legal proceedings. Amended Articles 309, 311 and 314 of the CL 
stipulate:  
Article 309 (Disrupting Order in the Court): “In any of the following circumstances [of] 
disrupting courtroom order, give a sentence of up to three years imprisonment, short-term 
detention, controlled release or a fine: (1) Gathering crowds to make a racket or attack the 
court; (2) Beating judicial personnel or litigation participants; (3) Insulting, defaming, or 
threatening judicial personnel or litigation participants and not heeding the court's 
admonitions, seriously disrupting courtroom order; (4) Exhibiting conduct disrupting 
courtroom order such as undermining courtroom operations or stealing or destroying 
litigation documents or evidence, where the circumstances are serious.”[sic]968  
Article 311: “Refusing to provide relevant evidence one has collected when so requested by 
judicial organs investigating a matter, while knowing that others have exhibited criminal 
conduct of espionage, terrorism or extremism, where the circumstances are serious, is 
sentenced to up to three years imprisonment, short-term detention or controlled release.” 
[sic] 
Article 313: “Where one has the ability to carry out a people's court's judgment or 
ruling but refuses to do so, and the circumstances are serious, the sentence is up to 
three years imprisonment, short-term detention or a fine; where circumstances are 
especially serious, the sentence is between three and seven years imprisonment and 
a concurrent fine.”  
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Many IHRL bodies, scholars and members of civil society consider that these grounds are overly 
broad, undermine the principle of legal certainty, and are open to abusive interpretation and 
application. 969  These bodies highlight a particular concern with unlawful or unjustified 
interference with the work of human rights lawyers, such as the detention or eviction from court 
of lawyers during the exercise of their duties. The CAT Committee has pointed to various recent 
reports of complaints received of cases involving lawyers, including:  
“Wang Quanzhang, detained in April 2013 in the courtroom allegedly for speaking 
loudly during a hearing; of Zhang Keke, detained in December 2014 in the 
courtroom; and of Xiangdong and Wu Liang Shu, evicted from the courtroom while 
exercising their duties as defence lawyers; and the revocation of lawyers’ licences to 
practice law, as in the cases of Tang Jitian and Lieu Wei and of Teng Biao, Jiang 
Tianyong, Li Heping, Wen Haibo, Liu Shihui, Chen Wuquan, Wang Cheng and Wan 
Quanping.”970  
China refutes that there has been unlawful or unjustified interference with the work of lawyers.971 
For example, in the case of Wang Quanzhang, the Chinese authorities have responded stating: 
“On April 3, 2013, when Jingjiang People’s Court was trying the case involving the 
public prosecution initiated by Jingjiang People’s Procuratorate against a defendant 
whose family name is Zhu for using a weird religious organisation to undermine the 
implementation of laws, the defendant’s defender Wang Quanzhang violated the 
order of the court hearing and the circumstances were serious, so Jingjiang People’s 
Court decided to detain Wang Quanzhang in accordance with law. On April 6, 2013, 
Jingjiang People’s Court decided to terminate the detention of Wang Quanzhang 
ahead of time as the detention has played the role as discipline.” [sic]972  
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The CAT Committee has underscored its ‘deep concern’973 about numerous and consistent reports 
of crack-downs on defence lawyers and activists974 and, in particular, those lawyers involved with 
cases of “government accountability, issues such as torture cases against public officials, the 
defence of human rights activists and religious practitioners.”975 Moreover, IHRL mechanisms 
and civil society flag that not only are many lawyers fearful in practice of reprisals for effectively 
doing their job, there are also numerous reports of lawyers being detained and some ill-treated for 
their defence work, on spurious de jure reasons. 976  The CAT Committee has criticised the 
authorities for the numerous reports received of lawyers being “detained on suspicion of broadly 
defined charges, such a ‘picking quarrels and provoking trouble’.”977 
There are also indications that the punitive administrative detention system is being used to 
punish lawyers. For example, in the cases of defence lawyers, Zhang Junjie, Jiang Tianyong, 
Wang Cheng and Tang Jitian, the administrative de jure ground relied upon was “cultic activities 
to disturb the social order.”978 This resulted in sentences of punitive administrative detention 
(ranging from 5 days (Zhang Junjie) to 15 days (Jiang Tianyong, Wang Cheng and Tang Jitian). 
Moreover, the licences of Jiang Tianyong and Wang Cheng to practice law as lawyers were 
revoked due to reasons of “disrupting the court order or interfering with the normal conduct of 
litigation.”  
Equally, the CAT Committee has received a number of allegations of torture and other ill-
treatment of Chinese lawyers by the police while in punitive administrative detention.979 China, 
however, refutes this and none of these cases have reached the courts.980 The CAT Committee and 
the UN SRT remain seriously concerned by reports of ill-treatment and torture as acts of punitive 
reprisals against such lawyers in detention.981 
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From July 2015, there has been a series of arrests of high profile lawyers, which has been the 
subject of wide criticism by the CAT Committee in December 2015982 and by many members of 
civil society. Amnesty International notes “the detention of lawyer Wang Yu and her family on 9 
July [2015] marked the beginning of an unprecedented government crackdown on human rights 
lawyers and other activists. Over the following weeks, at least 248 lawyers and activists were 
questioned or detained by state security agents, and many of their offices and homes were raided. 
At the end of the year, 25 people remained missing or in custody, and at least 12 of them, 
including prominent human rights lawyers Zhou Shifeng, Sui Muqing, Li Heping and Wang 
Quanzhang, were held in “residential surveillance in a designated location” on suspicion of 
involvement in state security crimes. […] Family members were also subject to police 
surveillance, harassment and restriction of their freedom of movement. Human rights lawyer Pu 
Zhiqiang was given a three-year suspended sentence on charges of “picking quarrels and 
provoking troubles” and “inciting ethnic hatred”, primarily on the basis of comments he had made 
on social media. He was barred from practising law as a result of the conviction. […].”983  
In 2016, reports of harassment of other lawyers, including Xia Lin, Ai Wei Wei’s former lawyer, 
continued to circulate. Xia Lin was sentenced to twelve years for fraud in September 2016.984 In 
June 2016, a lawyer (Wu Liangshu) was allegedly attacked (strangled, beaten, stamped upon and 
clothes ripped off) by court policemen in the Qingxiu district court in Nanning, Guangxi province, 
in front of two judges, after his request to file a case was rejected; photographic evidence of Wu 
leaving the court room with bruises and ripped clothing went ‘viral’ online.985 In May 2017, Le 
Heping, a human rights lawyer, emerged emaciated from an unknown detention location after two 
years of detention, where, his wife alleges, he was starved and beaten.986  
Many China legal scholars see the crackdown on lawyers as symptomatic of the trend of the 
gradual tightening of State control under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and consider the law as being “a 
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knife held firmly in the hands of the Party.”987 Jeff Wasserstrom, Professor of Chinese history at 
the University of California, has argued that “the trend lines, that seemed to be moving in at least 
[a] gradually encouraging direction, just don’t seem to be going that way anymore.[…] Faced 
with a slowing economy and widespread popular discontent […] China’s communist leaders 
appeared to have decided their country now needed to live under a near permanent “state of 
control.””988 Other China scholars, such as Lu Yiyi, agree and argue that the increasing trend of 
tightened control over Chinese lawyers is more evident than before. Lu highlights that “the 
authorities perceive human rights defenders and prominent lawyers as increasingly linking 
together, through social media and other avenues, to question the Party and system”.989 Previously, 
legal scholars and lawyers knew that they could critique and recommend some improvement to 
individual elements of the laws, under the understanding that legal reform overall strengthened 
China. However, Lu and other experts990 argue that lawyers are increasingly being perceived as 
crossing a ‘red line’ when they question the Party and the overall wider operation of the One-
Party system.991 Criticising the system has repercussions. Leading Chinese lawyer, He Weifang, 
who recommended systemic reform in his 2012 book on the Rule of Law in China, was ‘exiled’ 
(his own words) to a university in XinJiang for several years after publishing recommendations 
for systemic change to the Party and institutional bodies in China.992 
Access to a lawyer who is both willing and unhindered from acting in his/her client’s best 
interests to the best of their ability, is a pre-condition to enabling legal preventive safeguards such 
as ‘access to a lawyer’ to have any meaning or impact. This area is another illustration that mere 
implementation of the law (such as affording a detainee ‘access to a lawyer’) may not per se be 
sufficient to operate effectively as a safeguard against torture. The preventive legal safeguards 
                                                     
987  Ibid. 
988  Interview with J. Wasserstrom by the Guardian newspaper, ‘China; lawyer for Ai Weiwei jailed for 12 years in ‘severe 
retaliation’’, 22 September 2016; see also Amnesty International China Report 2015/2016; ‘Rule of law in China, a country 
which locks up its lawyers’, the BBC, 13 July 2015. 
989  Yiyi Lu, ‘Pushing Politics: Why China is Supercharging Dissident Trials’, 12 August 2016. 
990  See Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015); Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015); Yiyi Lu, 
‘Pushing Politics: Why China is Supercharging Dissident Trials’, 12 August 2016. 
991  He Weifang, In the Name of Justice: Striving for the Rule of Law in China, (2012); Yiyi Lu, ‘Pushing Politics: Why China is 
Supercharging Dissident Trials’, 12 August 2016; Pils, ‘China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance’ (2014); 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015); Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015). 
992  See Lubman, ‘The Path to Legal Reform without Revolution’, China Real Time Report, Wall Street Journal, Commentary, 7 






need certain wider conditions to operate meaningfully. Without the pre-conditions of a free and 
independent judiciary, where lawyers can represent their clients without fear, and a judge who 
can decide impartially, preventive legal safeguards are rendered ineffective. 
4.4 Signs of effective impunity for abuse perpetrators, non-independent 
investigations & complaints’ mechanisms in need of strengthening   
4.4.1 Nascent complaints’ system 
As outlined in Chapter 2, China is just beginning to introduce a complaints’ system in the KSSs 
(police-operated remand detention) and some prisons.  
The system has been introduced in certain pilot region KSSs, and looks set to roll out to all KSS 
nationwide.993 It has been regulated for in KSSs (only) by MPS Regulation no. 385, 2011.994 This 
area has seen a number of positive developments aimed at strengthening complaints’ avenues and 
the Chinese authorities have reached out nationally (to leading domestic scholars) and 
internationally, to work with penitentiary experts and monitoring experts. Thousands of 
procurators are now based in prisons and KSSs across China, mandated, among other aspects, to 
receive and address detainee and prisoner complaints.995 Moreover, in KSSs, procurators can now 
receive and address complaints about different aspects of the nature of detention (previously, 
procurators were only mandated to examine the legality of detention). This includes the right of 
the detainee to contact and see the procurator in person with complaints about aspects of his/her 
solitary confinement for discipline purposes or for the purpose of the protection of self or 
others.996 According to the Chinese authorities, the “12309 procuratorate reporting platform” has 
been the main channel for many torture and other ill-treatment allegations to reach the courts.997 
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The Chinese authorities have openly acknowledged that China has not yet established an 
independent body that can receive complaints, but they argue that there are, nonetheless, many 
departments undertaking similar duties.998 For example, mechanisms exist within the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for complaint letters and calls. The PRC 
government, at various levels, can also accept, investigate and deal with complaints. The 
Procuratorates carry out the supervision of detention facilities in accordance with law and can 
receive and address complaints concerning detainees’ safeguards and protection rights.999  
Careful thought and training have gone into initiatives to strengthen the role of onsite procurators, 
as a conduit for detainee complaints. For instance, there are internal prison rules specifying that 
onsite procurators should change / rotate posts every two to three years; with the aim to ensure 
their independence.1000 Likewise, pilot prison initiatives are underway to adopt an emergency 
complaints mechanism, whereby staff are obliged to immediately inform onsite procurators about 
violent incidents or complaints made by detainees who fear for their safety. Risk-assessment 
procedures are also underway to assess the level of risk of reprisal facing a complaining detainee 
or prisoner.1001  
It is both a positive and a significant development in the context of torture prevention that China 
is beginning to develop complaints’ mechanisms in some of its places of deprivation of liberty. 
Much thought and discussion has gone into the trialling of the feasibility of complaints’ 
mechanisms in KSSs and some pilot prisons.1002 Nascent Complaints Handling Committees do 
have certain positive features, including that they are made up of not just onsite procurators and 
managerial staff, but also, in some cases, external volunteers such as lawyers 1003  (carefully 
selected / invited).1004  
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While it is positive that complaints’ mechanisms are evolving, there remain various structural and 
deep-seated problems with their operation in China. These deficiencies can undermine the 
operation of the complaints mechanisms as key safeguards against torture. First, the complaints’ 
system does not cover all places of detention in China. At the moment, complaints avenues have 
been established in KSSs and in some prisons and do not extend to other places of deprivation of 
liberty, such as most prisons (although consideration is underway to extend to these), police 
stations, psychiatric facilities, juvenile or welfare homes that can hold persons subject to social 
welfare or care orders, court custody, military or immigration detention settings.1005 Second, there 
lacks standardisation and regulation of complaints procedures nationwide, with the result that 
each mechanism varies depending on the institution and region. Third, nationally there is no 
overall single body with the power to co-ordinate, gather and analyse complaints arising within 
the various different Ministries’ jurisdictions, as well as from the different operational bodies 
with their discrete functions. If established, this would allow for a comprehensive overview of 
patterns of problems within the different deprivation of liberty settings and enable a more 
strategic approach to addressing complaints and countering patterns of recurrent torture and ill-
treatment practices. 
Fourth, pilot projects run by leading Chinese scholars have highlighted that there remain some 
shortcomings with the current set-up of complaints system that they have examined, especially in 
the pilot prisons. These problems go to the heart of the whole functioning of the complaints 
mechanism analysed. For example: complaints boxes are situated in public areas under CCTV, 
and various prison officers have the keys and forward them on to the relevant department. This 
undermines the principle of being able to complain anonymously and/or confidentially and 
contributes to rendering the system one whereby prisoners feel they can only complain about 
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small issues, such as food and the points/rewards system, but would not dare to put forward 
complaints about potential staff member abuse.1006  
While there is notionally a channel of complaints through personal detainee interviews with 
prison officers, pilot project findings indicate that these interviews are in practice hard to organise 
and do not serve as a ready and regular channel. Similarly, in the context of KSSs, an interview 
by the author with an onsite procurator highlighted that the quality of the complaints’ channel 
depended significantly on the character or personality of the staff member or procurator involved. 
In positive cases, approachable procurators were able to instil some trust in detainees. However, 
this varied by institution and depended on the type of personnel.1007  
The ‘Detainee Handbook’, a booklet given to prisoners upon arrival in which they are meant to 
complete weekly self-assessments and raise problems, is also meant to serve as another channel 
for detainees to complain. Scholars assessing this area, however, have found that this is a 
deficient avenue in several aspects. First, it is not an anonymous form, and various prison officers 
read the detainee’s input on a weekly basis; second, its compulsory nature does not lend itself 
easily to the confiding of a sensitive complaint. 
Complaints’ mechanisms in need of development 
The Renmin University scholars, leading initiatives to strengthen the functioning of complaints 
mechanisms in prisons and KSSs, highlight that while the introduction of complaint channels is a 
significant and positive development, some serious concerns remain with the mechanisms that 
they have examined. They worry that the lack of accessibility to confidential avenues to complain 
promotes a lack of detainee faith in the onsite procurator as a complaint avenue. They also 
demonstrate that in one large prison (over 3000 inmates) examined, over a period of four years, a 
considerably low number of written complaints were received by the onsite Procuratorate. Of 
those few complaints received, only a third concerned matters related to the prison itself and then 
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only a couple about staff treatment and deaths in the prisons.1008 While the number of complaints 
did increase four times over the years examined, the total number was still minimal. Scholars 
consider that it is doubtful whether this number reflected the true situation in the prison. A 
comparison can be seen with the UK prison system, where prison complaints’ departments 
typically receive between 100-300 complaints per month. 1009  In general, Chinese scholarly 
analysis and ongoing national discussions highlight: the need to strengthen complaints 
mechanisms in prisons across China through better training of prison staff on complaints’ 
rationale and mechanisms; the need to strengthen the procurator’s role and legal mandate to 
systematically and promptly follow-up on complaints and ensure thorough and more effective 
investigations, among others.   
Equally, definitional discrepancies and an ambiguity, or misunderstanding, among some lawyers 
and procurators as to what actually qualifies as torture or ill-treatment does not facilitate the 
systematic identification of relevant allegations by complaints mechanisms (c.f. Chapter 2.4(I)(i)). 
Complaints mechanisms, composed of procurators, lawyers and others, have an active role play to 
play in correctly identifying allegations of torture and ill-treatment and, where necessary, passing 
them on to the competent authorities for investigation. The low numbers of abuse complaints 
received and passed on is indicative that this is not happening as much as it could or should (c.f. 
Chapters 4.4.2 and 4.4.4).  
Renmin University scholars have had unprecedented access to prisons and have been able to work 
alongside the procuratorate. These scholars have been trusted advisers to the government on 
criminal law reform and torture prevention safeguards, as well as having access to senior policy 
makers, operational managers and detainees.1010 They are not the only ones to assess the nascent 
complaints mechanisms; senior members of the judiciary and supervisory branch of the 
procuratorate have also discussed their concerns with the current complaints’ system. They worry 
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that onsite procurators can occasionally have too ‘cosy’ a relationship1011 to be fully impartial, 
and this can affect the quality of their work and hinder fully effective operation of complaints’ 
mechanisms as a safeguard against torture. 
The approach to strengthening detainee trust and faith in the nascent complaints’ system, and 
increasing detainee and prisoner use of this avenue to air concerns about abuse was the subject of 
a recent (2016) workshop in China, led by Renmin University and GBCC. Discussions between 
procurators, legal-political committee members, prison and KSS detention directors and front-line 
detention staff drew on experiences in two pilot KSSs, with input from two international experts 
(including the author). 1012  Many highlighted that the mechanisms were a valuable addition, 
however, they pointed out that too few detainees used the complaints’ system to air serious 
grievances about abuse, rather they only used the system to bring complaints about procedural, 
living conditions or more minor grievances. Even then, only few detainees used the system.1013 
Chinese scholars’ analysis of various trial project results, as well as detention staff and 
procurators themselves, all raised concerns that very few detainees were using the system to air 
torture or other ill-treatment complaints. While monitors have found that torture and other ill-
treatment had reduced, they noted that ill-treatment did still occur (especially in the form of inter-
detainee violence or sponsored abuse from detention officials);1014 and the avenues to complain 
about alleged acts of torture or ill-treatment were not as accessible or effective as they could 
be.1015 More faith in the system was needed to be established.1016 This was one of the reasons for a 
programme of ongoing training on complaints mechanisms’ establishment and functioning in 
KSSs and prisons, run by Renmin University and GBCC for police, local procurators, prison staff 
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and KSS staff.1017 Experts involved in trialling and setting up complaints’ mechanisms in KSS 
and prisons point out that while there are increasing numbers of such committees, and the 
importance of external oversight mechanisms is acknowledged in national legal circles, there 
remains, however, ongoing discussion about how to make the current committees fulfil their 
function, how to widen the scope of membership of the committees, to ensure that committee 
members have sufficient professional and impartial judgement and training. National and 
international bodies and experts are working on addressing many of these issues with the aim to 
strengthen complaints’ mechanisms to reduce risk of torture.1018   
It is, however, notable that no avenues exist, in addition to the establishment of these – nascent – 
internal avenues, for complaints of torture to be independently investigated by a completely 
external body. The Complaints Handling Committees comprise detention staff, Party Committee 
members, procurators and, sometimes, (carefully selected) lawyers. They all, in different ways, 
have links with the authorities. China lacks an Ombudsperson or equivalent external body that is 
independent and specifically competent to receive and address prisoner and detainee complaints. 
This had been identified as problematic by several IHRL bodies, 1019  including the CAT 
Committee. 
4.4.2 Limitations in procuratory supervision  
Compounding the lack of independent complaints’ mechanisms, there are deep-seated regulatory 
problems that currently hinder the complaints’ system and onsite procuratorial work in gathering 
and investigating complaints within detention settings. Procurators are sometimes hindered by 
regulations and policy from following up on complaints. The problematic legal basis for 
complaints can be illustrated with its main governing regulation, MPS Regulation no. 285, 2011 
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(for KSSs).1020 The MPS Regulation is broad and confers discretion on KSSs to use their own 
systems of complaints, within some broad framing guidelines. It mentions that complaints need to 
be responded to ‘in a timely fashion’ (without deadline)1021 and the onus is on the detainee to 
prove to the procurator that the ill-treatment has happened. Procurators can only tangibly follow-
up, investigate and prosecute an allegation if it constitutes serious enough abuse that they feel it is 
likely to reach the crime of torture or ill-treatment (which is a high and narrow definition within 
the CPL). This links to evidence presented by the IHRL bodies and civil society indicating that 
definitional discrepancies and ambiguities are hindering procurators and lawyers from fully and 
systematically identifying all relevant abuse allegations that could be investigated as potential 
cases of torture (c.f. Chapter 2.4(I)(i)). The low numbers of abuse complaints received and passed 
on for investigation, as well as the (below) low numbers of actual prosecutions is indicative that 
identifying, reporting and prosecuting of all possible torture allegations is not happening as much 
as it could or should (cf. Chapters 4.4.1 and 4.4.4).  
These issues may be addressed in the future (and solutions are being trialled in pilot projects), as 
the relative lack of power of procurators slowly changes and power increases. While prosecutors 
do feel they can follow up cases of abuse and they do, however, the reality of the discipline might 
mean that the police perpetrator is not removed immediately from contact with the victim or 
adequately punished. 1022  Thus, the current system may lack sufficient accountability and 
discipline of perpetrators to create an element of deterrence from repeat abusive acts; this is 
essential, otherwise detainees - and procurators - could quickly lose faith in the complaints’ and 
justice system and nascent protection measures. If left unaddressed, a culture of impunity can 
facilitate embedded torture practices (see below).1023 
IHRL mechanisms have recently underlined their concerns about the independence of the 
procurators’ supervision of the investigation of torture allegations in China and the consequent 
                                                     
1020  Translated by the author. 
1021  Nonetheless, pilot projects are starting to trial the implementation of time-limits in this respect, but it remains in the context of 
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1022  Author’s interview and correspondence with Marina Mella, Senior Project Manager, GBCC (a specialist body that implements 
projects and facilitates exchanges on judicial and legal reform in China), 23-24 November 2016, Wuhu, China, and September 
2017. 






impact on the effectiveness of procuracy supervisory work. The CAT Committee underscored 
that “it regrets that the State party has not provided disaggregated and complete information on 
the number of torture-related complaints, received from all sources, for each of the crimes that 
cover the various aspects of the definition of torture. It has also received no information on the 
number of investigations on torture allegations initiated ex officio by procuratorates or as a result 
of information reported by doctors.”1024 The Committee has also questioned the procedures in 
place to investigate deaths in custody, which “are often ignored in practice and relatives face 
many obstacles to press for an independent autopsy and investigation or to recover the 
remains.”1025  
4.4.3 Complainants ‘targeted’ 
Some complaints mechanisms have, occasionally, been reported to exacerbate the plight of 
complainants. It is precisely because of the act of complaining about a government policy or 
actions by a public authority (for example, land rights / governmental expropriation of property 
and the compensation schemes) that many persons have found themselves in punitive 
administrative detention in the first place.1026 IHRL bodies such as the CAT Committee and the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, the UN SRT, the WGAD and the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances1027 have all stressed their concern at consistent reports 
that petitioners, human rights defenders and ethnic minorities (amongst others) continue to be 
threatened or charged with broadly defined offences (such as ‘picking quarrels and provoking 
troubles’ or more severe crimes against national security), which lack legal certainty and act as 
deterrence to categories of persons from the legitimate exercise of various rights (including the 
right of freedom of expression and to petition / complain against government policies). All of 
                                                     
1024  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015). 
1025  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015), para. 24. 
1026  Sapio, Sovereign Power and the Law in China, (2010); and Biddulph, Legal reform and Administrative detention Powers in 
China (2007) and ‘What to make of the abolition of re-education through labour?’(2016); Osnos, The Age of Ambition: Chasing 
Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China (2014); see also Chapter 3. 
1027  Joint Study on Global Practices in relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special 
Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
Martin Scheinin; the UN SRT, Manfred Nowak; the WGAD, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group On Enforced Or 
Involuntary Disappearances, Jeremy Sarkin, A/HRC/13/42, 19 February 2010, para. 168 – 170; and CAT Committee 






these bodies highlight their significant concerns about both the arbitrariness of such detention and 
its link with the heightened risk of abuse in detention for such categories of person detained on 
the above or similar grounds. 
This context also contributes to an understanding of a socio-psychological element that may be 
one (of many) reasons why complaints mechanisms, where they exist, are not being used to 
complain about torture or ill-treatment by detainees in Chinese detention. If a person has faced or 
seen repercussions or reprisals, for complaining, it is unsurprising that they are unlikely to 
complain about staff behaviour in a setting where they are effectively the responsibility, or at the 
mercy, of the staff. 
In sum, while it is positive that there have been some early developments in this area, there are 
still no independent, effective and confidential mechanisms established to receive complaints in 
all places of detention in China (i.e. only in KSSs and some prisons). Where some nascent 
complaints mechanisms do exist, operational and structural deficiencies remain which limit their 
effectiveness as a genuine safeguard against torture. Overall, the lack of an effective complaints 
avenue is a significant impediment to full and effective torture prevention efforts in China. Even 
if the complaints system in place were to be better regulated, the system still would face some 
inherent structural obstacles (the mandate of the procurator, weak regulations, composition of 
committee members, among others) and cultural obstacles (underlying fear of complaining per se 
and of reprisals) to its effectiveness as a safeguard against torture. In short, currently there are not 
the pre-conditions in place to enable the safeguard of detainee complaints’ avenues to work as 
effectively as it could, and should, as a measure of prevention against torture. 
4.4.4  Few prosecutions and too lenient sentencing 
In its most recent reporting cycle, the CAT Committee requested from China the annual number 
of investigations into cases of torture and other ill-treatment that resulted in ex-officio 






following medical examinations of detainees and the outcomes of those cases. 1028  China 
responded that from 2008 to the first half of 2015 inclusive, the total number of cases involving 
allegations of confessions by torture and ill-treatment of detainees reported through the ‘12309 
reporting platform’ of the procuratorate was 1,321. 664 of these cases resulted in the suspected 
torture or ill-treatment perpetrators being found guilty and sentenced (396 torture cases and 268 
ill-treatment cases).1029 This is an average of around 88 successful prosecutions for the whole of 
China per year over the seven and a half year period. The type and duration of the sentences were 
unspecified by the authorities (although, as examined in Chapter 3, one can find several cases of 
sentences conferred for torture of 18 months to 2 years in length). The CAT Committee criticised 
the general lack of disaggregated data and complete information, for example: on the number of 
torture related complaints for each of the crimes under the torture definition, on numbers of 
torture cases initiated by procuratorates or any information about the criminal or disciplinary 
sanctions imposed on offenders of torture.1030  
Any analysis based on the limited information provided by the Chinese authorities and the little 
publicly available data is challenging. Nonetheless, this information does suggest that for a 
country with 1.4 billion population and more than 2 million police officers alone, coupled with 
the existence of numerous torture and ill-treatment reports and allegations,1031 such low numbers 
of prosecutions for torture and ill-treatment nationwide are indicative of rare prosecution. 
Moreover, scholarly research into this area shows some indications of significantly differing 
trends of statistics on numbers of prosecutions for abusive behaviour, albeit for 2007 (whereas the 
above statistics are from 2008 until 2015). For example, a research paper written by Chinese 
scholars at Renmin University shows that in 2007, reports of Supreme People's Procuratorate 
(SPP) identify that 930 state personnel were investigated and prosecuted by the procuratorate for 
taking advantage of their office for use of illegal detention or extraction of confessions through 
                                                     
1028  CAT Committee List of Issues on China (2015), para. 22. 
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and the ill-treatment of detainees respectively: 92 criminal suspects related to the extortion of confession by torture and 42 
criminal suspects related to the ill-treatment of detainees in 2008, 60 and 36 in 2009, 81 and 37 in 2010, 55 and 28 in 2011, 48 
and 33 in 2012, 37 and 44 in 2013, 20 and 43 in 2014, 3 and 5 in January to June of 2015’ [sic]. 
1030  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015), para. 22. 
1031  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015), para 20: ‘[the CAT Committee] remains seriously concerned over 







torture. This is in stark comparison to the statistics provided by the national authorities for 2008, 
which indicated that 92 suspects were sentenced for extortion of confessions by torture and 42 for 
ill-treatment. 1032  These national scholars demonstrate that extraction of confessions through 
torture as well as other acts of ill-treatment remain significant challenges facing China’s criminal 
justice system.1033 Similarly, considerably different numbers of cases involving torture and ill-
treatment from those above provided by the authorities have been cited by the NGO Human 
Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch highlighted, in a recent US Congressional Hearing on China, 
that it had examined some 158,000 criminal verdicts published online between 1 January 2014 
and 30 April 2014 alone and found 432 cases where torture had been alleged. Of the 432 cases 
(over four months), only 23 (five per cent), resulted in evidence being thrown out by the court; 
none led to acquittal of the defendant. It emphasised that, in practice, very few judges in China 
investigated torture allegations in any detail. This view is echoed by various China law scholars 
and experts.1034 This links to concerns raised by IHRL bodies and civil society that definitional 
discrepancies and ambiguities are hindering procurators and lawyers from fully and 
systematically identifying all relevant abuse allegations that could be investigated as potential 
cases of torture (c.f. Chapter 2.4(I)(i)) and could be contributing to low numbers of prosecutions. 
Moreover, the perception that torture has been effectively curbed in KSSs – one which many 
leading national scholars, as well as the Chinese authorities hold (see above) – can have a 
detrimental impact of their assessment on the state (and progress) of prevention in China. This 
might go some way to explaining the considerable differences in views between the IHRL bodies 
and Western scholarship that considers both torture and ill-treatment to be pervasive in China (c.f. 
Chapter 3) and the national authorities and some national scholars’ views that torture is reducing, 
especially in KSS detention (with an acknowledgement that ill-treatment remains a prevalent 
issue in initial police custody (see above)).  
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Equally, along with few prosecutions for the crimes of torture and ill-treatment, those sentences 
that are given are often not commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. 1035  By way of 
illustration, is the case of Liang Shiquan who was detained by the PSB in Harbin in 2013 on 
suspicion of drug trafficking. Liang died in initial police custody after police administered electric 
shocks and hit him in the face and head with a shoe.1036 While the Daowai District People’s court 
did find three police officers and four police assistants guilty of extracting confessions by means 
of torture,1037 it only sentenced them to prison terms of between 12 and 30 months imprisonment. 
IHRL bodies and civil society echo this concern. For example, the CAT Committee has criticised 
China for failing to produce information about the criminal or disciplinary sanctions imposed on 
offenders.1038 It recommended, inter alia, that “persons suspected of having committed torture or 
ill-treatment are duly prosecuted and, if they are found guilty, receive sentences that are 
commensurate with the gravity of their acts.”1039 Human Rights Watch, when examining the SPC 
verdict database for 2014 found only one prosecution of three police officers responsible for 
torture, but none served time in prison. It also underscored that the lack of prosecutions 
consequently meant that compensation or rehabilitation for victims was rare; “former detainees 
who had tried to press claims for compensation said that police at most offered them some money 
in exchange for their silence, and that it is very difficult to access formal state compensation. 
Detainees’ efforts to seek accountability have produced few positive results and in some cases 
have even led to further punishment.”1040  
This also links into concerns about the impotence of the current sentencing procedure in China as 
a form of deterrence and as a form of reparation: both key measures of prevention. Jurisprudence 
on the SPC database1041 shows that many sentences for torture, including where it resulted in the 
death of the victim, have only resulted in one to two years of imprisonment (c.f. above and 
                                                     
1035  See, inter alia, CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015); Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell 
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1036  http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-09/12/content_33491417.htm, accessed 10 January 2015 
1037  A crime stipulated in the revised CPL (Article 54), in force 1 March 2013; there was no murder charge, according to reports, as 
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Chapter 3, for example, the case of Liang Shiqian). Proper sentencing with a sentence that is 
commensurate with the crime of torture has been established by IHRL mechanisms (including the 
ECtHR,1042 the CAT Committee,1043 the SPT1044). The need for a fully functioning and robust 
judiciary has been underscored above as a key prevention measure. One of the reasons for this is 
to curb impunity, itself an issue that hinders effective prevention work (c.f. SPT1045 and CAT 
Committee’s1046 views on the causal link between impunity and the heightened risk of torture). 
Without a strong judiciary able to address issues of impunity, prevention measures such as those 
needed for fully adequate reparation for torture victims and/or their families are practically 
impossible to enforce and are thus extremely rare in China.1047 
Further, various national and international civil society bodies highlight that judges often only 
evaluate torture claims on the basis of documentary evidence that is either produced or controlled 
by the police and, unlike with live witnesses, is not subject to cross-examination.1048 This is 
illustrated in an analysis of the court verdicts from January to April 2014 undertaken by Human 
Rights Watch, who found that not a single defence witness or expert witness testified during legal 
proceedings involving torture allegations.1049  While legally the exclusionary rule in the CPL 
places the burden of proof on the procuratorate to prove that the evidence was obtained legally, 
                                                     
1042  ECtHR, A v. Croatia, Application no. 55164/08, October 2010. Para 66; Ali Ayse Duran v. Turkey, Application 42942/02, para 66; 
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1043  CAT, Guridi v. Spain, CAT/C/34/D/212/2002, May 2005, communication no. 212/2002. 
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Torture to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’, CAT/OP/12/6, 30 
December 2010. 
1045  See ‘UN torture prevention experts urge Mexico to focus more on the fight against impunity’, UN Statement of 23 December 2016; 
‘“Eight years after our first visit to Mexico, the different definitions of the offence of torture continue to generate actual or potential 
loopholes for impunity,” - said Felipe Villavicencio, who headed the SPT delegation. According to official statistics, at the federal 
level there are currently more than 4700 open investigations for acts related to torture. However, the number of sentences for 
perpetrators is disproportionately low.’; SPT, ‘Provisional statement on the role of judicial review and due process in the prevention 
of torture in prisons’, adopted by the SPT at its sixteenth session, 20 to 24 February 2012, CAT/OP/2’; see also SPT, ‘The approach 
of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment’, CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010.  
1046  UN CAT Committee General Comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2 by State parties. 
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‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015), Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015). 
1048  Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015), Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015) 






various civil society bodies point out that judges often continue to expect detainees to prove that 
torture had taken place.1050  
This situation also links into the current landscape of limited judicial independence, where there 
remains the potential for political and Party interference, especially on sensitive or political 
cases. 1051  This can lead to a credible risk of impunity for torture perpetrators, identified in 
numerous reports from civil society,1052 which consequently exacerbates the systemic nature of 
torture and ill-treatment in China. Actions observed by others that go unpunished can foster a 
sense of unaccountability.1053 In sum, current impunity in China, or even perceived impunity, for 
acts of abuse is an impediment to full and effective torture prevention efforts. 
4.5 Preventive monitoring: in its infancy and facing systemic challenges 
Chapter 1 identified that preventive monitoring is one of the key measures necessary to 
effectively counter and prevent torture and ill-treatment. As examined in Chapter 2, a system of 
inspections and a type of preventive monitoring of some places of deprivation of liberty has, since 
2006, started to be trialled in China. After a pilot project run by scholars and procurators in 
selected KSSs to test the feasibility of monitoring and the form it would take, in 2011, preventive 
monitoring was regulated for in the sphere of KSSs (only). There is now an MPS Regulation that 
obliges all 2800 KSSs in China to allow access to ‘specially selected monitors’.1054 All KSS 
across China now have to allow monitors access to undertake announced preventive monitoring. 
Procurators, Deputies to People’s Congresses and specially selected volunteer lay supervisors 
have started some announced inspections in KSSs across China. 1055  The Chinese authorities 
specify that procuratorial organs have, from 2008 until May 2015, undertaken 14,070 
unscheduled visits to detention facilities and reported their findings to the Deputies to the 
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People’s Congresses. 1056  According to the authorities, 10,316 ‘special invited supervisors’ 
currently work in criminal detention facilities throughout China, and 2,418 criminal detention 
facilities have been opened to the public (including both visiting families and persons with valid 
permissions).1057 
Further, a pilot project designed to train lay monitors has been underway since 2009, run by the 
GBCC in collaboration with Renmin University, the SPP and Ministry of Justice. The pilot 
project has presented some significant findings, according to Gerard De Jonge, a China legal 
scholar involved in the pilot monitoring project. De Jonge considers that “an important outcome 
of the pilot was that inspectors were quite explicit in pointing out many shortcomings in the living 
conditions of detainees […] they noted unhygienic conditions in the dining hall; the unavailability 
of boiled water; the small amount of living space per detainee (30m² for 12-22 detainees); the 
absence of a sick bay; the temporary inaccessibility of outdoor exercise caused by building works, 
added to not being allowed to be out of cells; few books and no newspapers in the library; 
unhygienic garbage disposal; insufficient medical staff and equipment; insufficient number of 
medical tests available; not all detainees receiving physical tests immediately after admission to 
the detention centre […].”1058 The pilot inspections did result in a long list of recommendations 
given to the KSS management, the local procuratorate and the PSB. As the inspectors were 
members of the local People Congresses, it was officially reported to the PRC’s Deputies 
Congresses. 
De Jonge highlights that one of the findings was that in using lay visitors/inspectors, with little 
specialist knowledge of normative standards for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, some 
recommendations were quite unexpected. For example, the specialised project research team 
found in their pre-pilot research that the budget for the food and drink for detainees was quite low 
– and below state standards – yet “15-20 of the inspectors rated the food and drink conditions in 
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the detention centre as ‘quite good’ and held the opinion that a difference should be made 
between what is normal food and drink in a compulsory [i.e., closed] setting of a detention centre 
and what is normal in the outside world.”1059 De Jonge argues that this was indicative of the 
tendency of the majority of these pilot-inspectors to view detainees, notwithstanding their status 
as suspects, “as ‘criminals’ who did not deserve the same treatment as civilians, just because they 
had been detained.”1060 This concern has been reflected in an interview with Renmin Professor 
Cheng Lei, who has been involved, with his colleague Professor Chen Weidong, in initiating and 
running the project (on trialling preventive monitoring) as well as advising the Chinese authorities 
on draft legislation and measures in the context of torture prevention. Professor Cheng Lei 
emphasises that one of the challenges facing the monitoring system was the belief in Chinese 
society that detainees and prisoners should receive poor conditions and treatment as an inherent 
part of the sanction of being deprived of their liberty.1061 This potentially weakens the torture 
prevention benefits of monitoring, in that China is using lay untrained members of the public as 
monitors, who may hold these views. 
Other outcomes of the pilot included findings from inspectors that while most detainees had been 
informed of their procedural rights, few had little understanding on how to exercise them. This, 
according to the national and international scholars on the project team, demonstrated the 
importance of free and timely access to legal assistance for detainees.1062 Moreover, De Jonge 
flags another outcome of the pilot was that the number of complaints rose substantially during the 
pilot, compared to the number received during the preceding years. Two of the most complained 
about areas included complaints about ‘prison bullies’ and extension of the pre-trial detention 
period.1063 The issue of ‘prison bullies’, whereby the staff make life easier for certain inmates if 
they help report on and /or control their dormitory or group of other inmates, has been widely 
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seen as an on-going and particular problematic aspect of China’s prisons and detention 
centres.1064  
As regards torture and other ill-treatment allegations, the pilot-inspectors found that torture or ill-
treatment primarily manifested itself in practice in beatings during the interrogation procedure 
and beatings in-cell in the KSSs by other detainees or prisoners (‘bullies’). This led to a number 
of recommendations, including that the authorities should establish a distinct and physical 
separation between interrogators and suspects, that interviews should be conducted by at least two 
officers and that the interviews are recorded.1065 Some of these are topics that have since been 
incorporated into the revised CPL (interviews by at least two interviewers and some interviews 
have to be recorded (others are discretional) and into the 2017 proposed draft Detention Centre 
Law.1066  
Other inspectors’ recommendations included that a doctor should undertake a medical 
examination, before and after the interrogation process, and that recording equipment be installed 
in cells.1067 These too have been subject to recent inclusion in the amendments made to the CPL 
in 2012 and, in the context of medical screening pre-and post-transfers out off / into the KSS, in 
the 2017 proposed draft Detention Centre Law.1068 Here the CPL and draft Detention Centre Law 
(yet to take effect)1069 specify that newly arrived detainees may undergo medical screening upon 
arrival; however, under the CPL, it is not a requirement. There are also indications that the courts 
are increasingly using the documentation from initial medical screenings as evidence in legal 
proceedings that involve allegations of ill-treatment. 1070  However, procurators and other 
inspectors involving in trialling monitoring voice a remaining concern, namely, that doctors still 
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do not systematically pass on suspicions of torture or other ill-treatment based on visible injuries 
to the competent prosecuting authorities;1071 a necessary preventive safeguard against torture.1072 
Also, the medical examination is discretional, and not an obligation, under the CPL. 
The pilot-inspection project at Liaoyuan has led to some significant findings, and is also an 
important step per se to show an acknowledgement by the intellectual and political circles that 
monitoring can be a useful contributing element to preventing abuse in closed detention settings. 
Notably it has, more recently, contributed to developing the blueprint for the model of monitoring 
now underway in some prisons and KSSs in China and its regulation.1073  
Nevertheless, the inspection system trialled at Liaoyuan and then rolled out to KSSs nationwide, 
had several limitations. Given that the monitoring model trialled at Liaoyuan was the precedent 
used for the nationwide rollout, such limitations remain widespread. Most notably, there were 
various institutional or structural impediments to the pilot that remain reflected in the scaled up 
set-up of inspections that can hinder full and effective torture prevention. 
First, published information on the monitoring underway in China is extremely limited. The 
analysis in this chapter depends on primary interviews conducted with national legal scholars 
involved in advising on draft legislation on complaints and monitoring systems in China,1074 
procurators and KSS detention staff,1075 lay monitors,1076 specialist advisory bodies1077 as well as 
from the Chinese authorities themselves.1078 However, it is almost impossible independently to 
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Spring 2017; and discussions between senior procurator prosecutors, KSS and prison senior management and front-line custody 
staff, members of the nascent complaints’ and monitoring bodies and Chinese scholars, held at the GBCC-Renmin University 
conference on ‘Strengthening complaints mechanisms’ held in Wuhu, China, on 23-24 November 2016, in which the author 
participated. 
1072  See Thesis Chapter 1. 
1073  Renmin University and GBCC, Report on Liaoyuan Trial Monitoring Mechanisms, 2008-2010; Author’s discussions with 
senior Chinese procuratorate and judiciary members of a visiting delegation on exchange of practices on torture prevention with 
the CPT at Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 23 August 2016 (organised by the GBCC and Renmin University); Author’s 
interview with Monitor A. (name anonymised), lawyer and monitor, 24 November 2017, Wuhu China; MacBean, ‘addressing 
the ‘hide and seek’ scandal: restoring the legitimacy of Kanshousuo’ (2016). 
1074  Author’s discussions held at the GBCC-Renmin University conference on ‘Strengthening complaints mechanisms’ held in 
Wuhu, China, on 23-24 November 2016, in which the author participated as an external expert; and author’s interview with 
Professor Cheng Lei, Renmin University, 24 November 2016, Wuhu, China. 
1075  Author’s interview Procurator Hu, 24 November 2016; discussions held at the GBCC-Renmin University conference on 
‘Strengthening complaints mechanisms’ held in Wuhu, China, on 23-24 November 2016. 
1076  For example, author’s interview with Monitor A (name anonymised), Wuhu, China, 24 November 2016. 
1077  Such as GBCC (a specialist body that implements projects and facilitates exchanges on judicial and legal reform in China), that 
runs projects jointly with its Chinese partners, aimed at eradicating torture in China and on establishing and improving 
prevention measures.  






access current detainees to get their views on current monitoring: an essential input into an 
assessment of effectiveness. 
Secondly, inspections are generally by ‘specially invited supervisors’ and procurators only. 
Deputies to the People’s Congresses and CPPCC members can also be invited to inspect at the 
KSS discretion and procuratorial organs continue to undertake scheduled and unscheduled visits 
to detention facilities and report their findings to the Deputies to the People’s Congresses. No 
visits by civil society bodies are permitted, even if lay members are also members of the 
public.1079 Nevertheless, the lay monitors are specifically chosen by procurators and approved by 
the MPS. There are thus indications that the inspection process is being conducted by people and 
bodies that are not as independent as they might be. 
Third, there is a lack of transparency and independence in the monitors’ reporting procedure, 
which is currently to a higher level of procurator, the PSB and to the Deputies to the People’s 
Congresses and CPPCC. These bodies are not obliged to address all the deficiencies highlighted 
by the monitors and reports are not published. 1080  An interview with a regional procurator 
confirmed that monitors’ reports are sent to him, and are not published.1081  
Fourth, while the Procuratorate (the SPP) ultimately reports into the National People’s 
Congresses, providing an element of separation from the police and prison authorities, SPP is 
ultimately the same body that investigates (certain cases), prosecutes and inspects, albeit with 
different departmental roles. There is the potential for non-impartiality, and consequent lack of 
trust in the system1082 thus rendering the monitoring safeguard against torture less effective than it 
could be. Likewise, the lack of oversight and multiple roles of the SPP create the potential for 
actual partiality or abuse of the system. 
Fifth, there does not appear to be any immunity in law, policy or practice, for the monitoring 
inspectors from any reprisals, should their findings prove sensitive. Indeed, monitors are required 
                                                     
1079  China’s State Report to the CAT Committee (2014): “no data is available on civil society visitation.” 
1080  Author’s interview Procurator Hu (procurator involved in trialing monitoring and complaints mechanisms in the Wuhu KSS), 
Wuhu, China, 24 November 2016. 
1081  Author’s interview with Procurator Hu, Wuhu, China, 24 November 2016. 
1082  Author’s discussions with discussions senior prosecutors, KSS and prison senior management and front-line custody staff, 
members of the nascent complaints’ and monitoring bodies and Chinese scholars, at the GBCC-Renmin University conference 






by law to keep to only factual observations and not deduce any judgments on any systemic 
issue1083 (an essential component of the monitoring process). 
Sixth, most monitoring visits have limited potential for deterrence and are at risk of missing 
crucial information in that they are announced or even at the invitation of some of the institutions, 
such as in the cases of KSSs. Further, the pilot-inspectors were not – and the ‘specially selected 
inspectors’ continue to not be – allowed full free access to all places of the KSS (they are 
accompanied by detention staff for ‘security purposes’ at all times, including during interviews). 
Seventh, reports are not published and management is not obliged to act on recommendations. 
Indeed, the MPS Regulations regulating the monitoring of KSS are extremely broad and confer a 
wider degree of discretion on institutions to choose their own monitoring model and reporting 
procedures.1084 As such, mechanisms can vary widely, institutionally and regionally. There is no 
body that oversees co-ordination of monitoring, seeks to identify patterns of recurrent areas of 
torture and other ill-treatment, or that publishes and shares general findings. 
Finally, while preventive monitoring has become a requirement, this only currently covers KSSs 
in China, and does not extend to all places of deprivation of liberty.1085  
As regards punitive administrative detention, CDR and Party discipline detention for 
investigation and sanction, these spheres are not covered by the current reach of the preventive 
safeguard of monitoring in China; neither are most prisons, police stations, psychiatric facilities, 
military detention or any other type of deprivation of liberty in China. These include some of the 
riskiest time-periods (first 24 hours of initial police custody) and places (the less regulated places 
of administrative detention) for ill-treatment.1086 This creates a significant protection vacuum in 
terms of effective torture prevention. In other words, despite some developments in preventive 
monitoring, the current inspection set-up is a long way from what OPCAT compliance would 
require. 
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1084  MPS Regulation 379, 2011, (Chinese only, translated by the author). 
1085  MPS Regulation 379, 2011, (Chinese only, translated by the author); Author’s interview Professor Cheng Lei, Wuhu, China, 24 
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Overall, it is encouraging that China has started to develop its own monitoring system of KSSs 
and regulated this in MPS Regulations for KSS monitoring. KSSs have traditionally been opaque 
places of pre-trial detention, where allegations and cases of abuse were commonplace. That the 
preventive safeguard of monitoring now renders such places marginally more transparent is a 
significant and positive development in the context of reducing the risk of torture and ill-
treatment generally. Nevertheless, despite encouraging first steps to design and establish 
preventive monitoring, there are risks that such inspection bodies (selected lay visitors, the 
procurators and detention management’s invited Deputies to the People’s Congresses and CPPCC 
members) could become a whitewash. Of particular concern are the lack of institutional 
independence of the monitors (who are selected and approved by the PSB and procuratorate), lack 
of co-ordination institution- or nationwide, the monitors’ limited powers, the lack of confidential 
access to detainees, and the lack of public reporting structures. This situation is exacerbated 
further by another structural impediment to fully independent monitoring, namely the lack of an 
uncensored media and public oversight of the monitors, in the form of a developed and 
unhindered civil society that can complement the work of monitors. 
4.6 Civil society and media: hindered ‘watchdog’ roles 
In general, despite sophisticated safeguards and deterrence protections and measures in place, 
preventive safeguards, such as monitoring, can still sometimes fail to identify and address 
systemic abuse. An example of this can be seen in the UK, namely, in light of the Medway Secure 
Training Centre (STC) scandal in late 2015. The findings of the Independent Inquiry 
commissioned to investigate in March 2016, and the Medway Improvement Board’s findings in 
May 2016, both show that despite a plethora of protective safeguards in place in the UK – and a 
sophisticated, independent and regular monitoring mechanism in place that conducts annual 
monitoring visits to juvenile establishments – detention staff can still occasionally get around the 
established protection measures. In the case of Medway STC, detention staff were involved in ill-






and were able to manipulate the preventive measures in place to bypass the safeguards. The 
recording mechanisms for violent incidents were amended, records changed, and other staff 
persuaded to change their debriefing reports on certain incidents that took place at Medway STC 
from October to December 2015.1087 Certain staff were able to manipulate the system such that 
monitors could not effectively identify problems and ultimately help prevent abuse.1088  
Monitoring and other preventive safeguards are not foolproof. Nevertheless, that is precisely 
when wider institutional protections add to torture prevention. In the case of Medway, the abuse 
was spotlighted by investigative journalism and flagged by an undercover reporter in the G4S 
custody system. Through this, the abuse was uncovered. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons 
(HMIP), as part of the UK NPM, reported on juvenile custodial institutions on a yearly cycle and 
although had some concerns, had not identified the extent of the abuse.1089 The UK was fortunate 
to have a strong independent media to complement the work of the other preventive measures in 
place to prevent torture. 
China is not in such a fortunate position. Media, local human rights defenders and NGOs are 
increasingly being hindered from being able to act as independent watchdogs. Censorship and the 
risk of punitive retaliation from the authorities effectively impede those external institutions from 
being able to perform an essential watchdog role and to identify and highlight situations where 
other preventive measures may fail. The situation regarding the freedom to report allegations of 
abuse is increasingly challenging. Indeed, China has the largest censorship operation and 
structure in the world, known as the “Great Firewall” (outside of China) or the “Golden Shield” 
(inside China), and it is widely acknowledged to be increasing its prohibitions and website 
blocks.1090  
Another aspect is new Chinese legislation recently enacted to regulate ‘social groups’ and 
associations. Such regulation would require compulsory registration of civil society bodies, 
                                                     
1087  Aired publicly by an undercover “Panorama” report on the subject in December 2015 / January 2016. 
1088  See HMIP official memo to the then Secretary of State for Justice (Michael Gove) concerning their findings in January 2016. 
1089  See Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons’ reports on Medway STC for the years 2014 and 2015. 
1090  See, inter alia, the CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015), the UN SRT Report and Follow-up on China 
(2005 and 2011); Osnos, The Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China (2014); Amnesty 






stringent criteria to establish a new entity, strict supervision with administrative offences as 
sanctions for non-compliance. This, according to the authorities, will enable them to identify and 
regulate social groups more.1091 However, this can also be seen as another measure to stifle 
freedom of expression, in addition to the existing harassment of human rights defenders and strict 
internet and publications censorship.1092 The legislation is reminiscent of Russia’s recent move to 
regulate civil society and in particular non-governmental organisations associated with perceived 
Western funding and/or anti-Russian views.1093  
The CAT Committee,1094 the UN SRT,1095 the UN SPT1096 the HRC and many other international 
treaty bodies and UN special procedures have stressed the important role civil society and the 
media can play in preventing torture. The CAT Committee1097 and the UN SRT1098 have flagged 
their concerns about the restrictions placed in China on civil society hindering full freedom of 
expression and press censorship, as well as increasing harassment and intimidation of human 
rights defenders. The CAT Committee has also explicitly criticised the lack of implementation of 
its recommendations in the sphere of reported harassment of human rights defenders and 
petitioners.1099 This is echoed by national and international civil society bodies, who are deeply 
concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and hindrance to their work 
in China as well.1100 China legal scholar Yiyi Lu1101 supports and clarifies this view: “Chinese 
rights defenders have typically had to be careful to portray their activities as non-political. 
                                                     
1091  Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Groups (Draft Revisions for Soliciting Comments); August 2016 
[Chinese]. 
1092  See, inter alia, the Guardian Newspaper interview with Ai Weiwei, prominent Chinese artist and human rights defender, the 
Guardian, 3 November 2016; Amnesty International, ‘No End in Sight’ (2015); Human Rights in China, Shadow Report to 
CAT Committee (2015). 
1093  "On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit 
Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent", 20 July 2012; see also, inter alia, Wall Street Journal, ‘Russia’s 
Putin Signs New Law Against ‘Undesirable’ NGOs: Legislation gives authorities power to shut down foreign and international 
organizations’, May 25, 2015; Human Rights Watch, ‘Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle Chronicle’, 24 July 
2017. 
1094  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015). 
1095  UN SRT Report and Follow-up on China (2005 and 2011). 
1096  SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under OPCAT’, Paragraph 5(a), CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010; see also Thesis Chapter 1. 
1097  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015). 
1098  UN SRT Report and Follow-up on China (2005 and 2011). 
1099  CAT Committee Concluding Observations on China (2015), paras. 6, 36 to 39. 
1100  See, inter alia, Shadow Reports submitted to the CAT Committee in advance of its Fifth periodic reporting cycle on China 
(August – November 2015); Human Rights Watch, ‘Tiger Chair and Cell Bosses’ (2015); Amnesty International, ‘No End in 
Sight’ (2015). 
1101  Yiyi Lu (research fellow at the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and an associate fellow at Chatham House), 
‘Non-Governmental Organisations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy’ (Routledge 2008); and ‘Pushing Politics: Why 






Sometimes this has involved recasting a political issue as a technical issue — as a failure within 
the system, rather than of the system. The reason is simple: once they cross the red line into 
political activism, they risk punishment by the authorities as well as disapproval from a public 
conditioned by propaganda to be suspicious of political action not sanctioned by the party.”1102 Lu 
argues that “in recent years, the government left manoeuvring space for activists to pursue causes 
that do not have direct political implications. They did this, in part, to provide a safety valve for 
the letting off of social pressure. […] The government [now] appears to think that the old 
arrangement created too many opportunities for its domestic and foreign enemies to covertly 
foment “colour revolution” under the cover of rights defence. […] Perhaps more worrying for the 
government, rights defenders are often able to develop organizational and communication skills 
and learn to network through their experience. In future, the government will very likely treat 
rights defence activities with more vigilance […] This corresponds to a more general trend of re-
politicising society that has gradually gained momentum in the past few years.”1103  
The risk is that these measures to regulate and restrict civil society further weaken civil society in 
China and hinders its essential ‘complementary’ role in the prevention of torture, as external 
watchdogs and public reporters of allegations of abuse. This is an area where a broader approach 
to torture prevention may be needed to ensure an environment in which preventive legal 
safeguards can operate as fully and effectively as possible. 
4.7 Broader socio-cultural obstacles to effective torture prevention  
Compliance with legal commitments may not itself be sufficient to comprise fully effective 
torture prevention efforts. This is in line with the UN SPT’s reasoning: “the prevention of torture 
and ill-treatment embraces – or should embrace – as many as possible of those things which in a 
given situation can contribute towards the lessening of the likelihood or risk of torture or ill-
treatment occurring. Such an approach requires not only that there be compliance with relevant 
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international obligations and standards in both form and substance but that attention also be paid 
to the whole range of other factors relevant to the experience and treatment of persons deprived of 
their liberty and which by their very nature will be context specific.”1104 It is also supported by a 
number of scholars and experts in the ‘torture prevention’ field.1105  
State-promoted nationalist ideology and political or national security policies can play a large part 
in motivating and justifying torture as part of the routine practice by police. This can go both 
ways. State-promoted national security policy can overtly prohibit torture, especially under an 
autocratic or One-Party system such as China. Conversely, it can also promote a “rooting out 
enemies of the state” security philosophy, which has been seen as a contributory factor of 
widespread police misconduct in certain countries (such as Brazil when formerly under military 
rule). 1106  In the context of China, Xi Jinping’s national campaign to eradicate entrenched 
corruption has had a significant impact on the direction of legal reforms. However, it has also 
investigated and punished, through the CCP Investigation and Discipline Committees, more than 
one million officials.1107  These officials range from the so-called “flies” (minor officials) to 
“tigers” (senior figures, including Zhou Yong Kang (former security chief) and top generals in the 
People’s Liberation Army). Their behaviour, according to Xi, and as reported by State media, 
“exposes not just their serious economic problems, but also exposes their serious political 
problems.”1108 Newly issued rules in November 2016 call on Party members to oppose all acts 
contrary to the CCP’s leadership.1109 
Faced with this top-level CCP leadership focus and consequent significant pressure to succeed in 
investigations, as well as the discretion conferred within the discrete CCP discipline sphere, State-
promoted nationalist ideology can, and does, play a large part in motivating and justifying torture 
                                                     
1104  SPT, ‘The approach of the SPT to the concept of prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under OPCAT’, Paragraph 5(a), CAT/OP/12/6, 30 December 2010, para. 3. 
1105  See Thesis Chapter 1; see also, inter alia, S. Casale, ‘A System of Preventive Oversight’, Essex Human Rights Law Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009, p. 9-19; Carver and Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work?, (Liverpool 2016); Giffard and Tepin (eds.), 
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Atrocities’ (2002); See Thesis Chapter 1. 
1107  See Thesis Introduction and Chapter 2, Section 3.2.3; see also commentary in the Guardian Newspaper, ‘Xi Jinping attacks 
'conspiracies' and 'lust for power' of China's enemies within’, 3 November 2016.  
1108  The Guardian, ‘Xi Jinping attacks 'conspiracies' and 'lust for power' of China's enemies within’, 3 November 2016. 






as part of the routine practice by CCP Investigation & Discipline Committee officials. This can be 
illustrated in a recent case from a second-instance trial carried out by the Chongqing Number 
Two Intermediate People's Court. In this case, a local official was sentenced on grounds of 
corruption and dereliction of duty. The official alleged that discipline inspectors “had dragged 
him from his office to the basement of a local hotel, where they used "many types" of torture to 
extract his confession” 1110 . The court reasoned that “the allegations involved a "lawful" 
investigation by the Discipline Inspection Committee, that evidence obtained during this 
investigation had not been used as the basis for conviction in his case, and that the legality of 
Discipline Inspection Committee procedures did not fall under the purview of Chinese people's 
courts. Consequently, the court denied the request to seek closed-circuit camera footage from the 
hotel or carry out forensic tests on clothing worn during the investigation.”1111 The CCP national 
policy to ‘root out’ corrupt officials and pressure on investigatory organs to succeed in corruption 
cases can clearly lead to torture. Combined with the lack of safeguards, this can contribute to 
creating situational influences that make torture by CCP Discipline Inspection Committee 
officials more likely. 
In addition, there are certain socio-cultural facilitating factors involved in making torture a 
resilient practice in initial police custody and during the investigatory period in China. These 
include the weight placed on the primacy of confessions, which has become a systemic part of the 
police investigatory process. There are immense pressures placed on investigators to complete 
cases quickly. Equally, there is limited training of the police regarding other investigatory 
techniques in evidence gathering. Junior investigators have seen the importance that their seniors 
and, until relatively recently, the courts, placed on obtaining a confession from a suspect.1112 It is 
unsurprising that this is emulated. The CAT Committee has called on the authorities to improve 
investigation methods to end practices whereby confessions are relied on as the primary and 
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central element of proof in criminal prosecution.1113 This is a socio-cultural factor to facilitating 
torture.1114 Indeed, the existence of such a culture can inherently obviate the effectiveness of more 
technical torture prevention measures, such as legal guarantees. For example, even if the CPL 
guarantees notionally protect suspects from torture, in practice methods and avenues circumvent 
protected locations and procedures, rendering the guarantees obsolete and heightening the risk 
that torture remains a resilient practice. 
The culture of the primacy of confessions is exacerbated by various other socio-cultural aspects in 
China, including the deep-seated concepts of respect and obedience for hierarchy in Chinese 
society. This is especially evident within the Chinese police work culture.1115 That is not to say 
that other cultures do not have the similar lines of hierarchy and respect obligations; in police 
forces around the world, hierarchy is important. However, China, like many other countries, 
especially in Asia, has such an ingrained rigid hierarchical structure in which it would be 
unthinkable to question the orders of a superior, even if one thought the order was unlawful.1116 
Further, China has little to no regulatory protections available to protect police whistle-
blowers.1117 Neither does it have procedures established to help potential whistle-blowers know 
how and where to report abuse, nor is information provided on protection from potential reprisals 
at work and beyond. Equally, tough censorship and apparently stringent new regulations on the 
use of social media for the posting of any "rumour" subsequently shared 500 times or more online 
has been criminalised.1118 Nevertheless, whistleblowing about official corruption specifically has 
started to develop, either as part of senior politicians’ anti-corruption campaigns or at grassroots 
level, in line with the Central CCP’s ‘war on corruption’. 1119  Whistle-blower protection has 
started to be regulated in this context.1120 However, this area is discrete and remains currently 
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only evident in the area of official corruption. In practice, there remains little ‘whistle-blowing’ 
on abuse from police officers on their colleagues or superiors in the Chinese police force. 
4.8 Summary 
Torture prevention in China is impeded by a lack of separation of powers, the existence of 
parallel legal systems on uneven footings, a weak judiciary and signs of effective impunity for 
acts of torture or ill-treatment. Complaints mechanisms remain in need of further development, 
and preventive monitoring – where it exists – is insufficiently independent and too restricted. 
Increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society and the media also limit its ability to serve as a 
check on torture practices. This creates unprotected spheres that can be abused due to a lack of 
procedural guarantees or judicial oversight. 
Carver and Handley spoke of technical measures of torture prevention being fruitless if the 
conditions in a given country were not right. These can be seen as the pre-conditions to the 
effectiveness of torture prevention measures. Without these in place as the foundation: technical 
torture prevention measures are less likely to operate effectively. Too many current institutional, 
structural, political and socio-cultural obstacles, legal loopholes and ‘grey’ unregulated spheres 
exist in China. While this remains the case, China cannot effectively fulfil its CAT obligations 
and truly progress in its torture prevention activities. 
Indeed, China does not have a full picture of the true frequency of torture and its real nature: there 
are simply not the mechanisms currently in place to oversee, co-ordinate and share information to 
cover all places of deprivation of liberty across China. No one body gathers, analyses the 
information to be able to gain a true picture of the problem of torture and ill-treatment, let alone 
drives a coherent programme to address protection gaps. The body that is primarily relied upon 
for such information is the procuratorate; yet it has ‘siloed’ and discrete areas of competence only, 
and does not have the mandate to undertake such a role; nor is it independent. 
Collectively, this assessment also points to a current governance model that does not adhere in 






officially adhere to the Rule of Law, China is a One-Party system where the CCP sits alongside or 
above the law. The obstacles examined above that are currently negating the full effectiveness of 
torture prevention in China are evidence of a non-rule of law system. These institutional, political 
and cultural obstacles illustrate a core challenge in modern-day China: the balance between the 
need to protect One-Party (CCP) rule and its priorities of social order and economic development, 
with its commitment to protect the rule of law and human rights.1121 These commitments may be 
reconcilable in most spheres, but the two conflict when it comes to torture prevention. Where this 
happens, it is clear that under Xi Jinping’s China, the priority of social order trumps the 
commitment to human rights protection. 
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PART III: IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS  
 
Conclusions: What needs to change for China to be able to fully protect all 








PART III: CONCLUSIONS: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?  
China has taken its first steps in developing prevention measures in certain detention spheres and 
significant developments are underway. These, however, stand on insecure foundations and 
currently suffer from some fundamental deficiencies. There are regulatory deficiencies, gaps in 
protection or ‘grey’ under-regulated detention spheres, which have not been addressed properly 
by legal reforms. Harder to address are the structural, institutional and political obstacles to 
safeguards being able to operate properly and as intended. Overall, the preventive measures put in 
place through recent reforms currently fail to fully protect all detainees and prevent against 
torture and ill-treatment. Wholesale change is needed to address these deficiencies. 
A. Analysis 
This chapter draws upon the evidence from previous chapters and argues that, for China’s torture 
prevention measures to have their full effect, a broad approach to torture prevention is necessary. 
Despite the wide and relatively ambiguous nature of the UNCAT 2(1) torture prevention 
obligation,1122 at minimum, all safeguards identified by the IHRL bodies, need to be in place and 
be fully implemented in China, as a UNCAT State Party. 
There have been significant steps taken towards legal reform in China today. Particularly 
noteworthy are the reforms of the criminal law and introduction of various measures aimed at 
increasing protection for detainees and curbing torture and ill-treatment in KSS police detention 
centres. Yet, even these are insufficient to give full protection to detainees in the criminal justice 
sphere. Prevention work also needs to extend to all types of deprivation of liberty (i.e., to all of 
China’s detainees); currently it does not. The justice processes that lie outside the criminal law 
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lag far behind in terms of regulatory protections and safeguards for detainees. This gap alone 
seriously undermines the foundation of current torture prevention work. 
It is the combination of three factors: the lack of effective regulated safeguards; the legal and 
political environment where impunity can exist; and obstacles in the institutional, structural and 
political governance and justice model, which enable circumvention of protections, where they do 
exist. This is compounded by the lack of independent oversight of the due process and 
transparency safeguards. These cumulatively create a challenging environment for effective 
torture prevention. 
Where one area appears to have become more regulated to afford strengthened protections for 
detainees, loopholes appear to permit circumvention. ‘Protection arbitrage’ allows for some 
spheres to be overtly rendered more robust in terms of protective safeguards (the criminal law 
justice process), and others to be kept more opaque (the administrative and Party justice 
processes), with porous boundaries between them. Indeed, even when an area is subject to more 
regulation, this has not necessarily resulted in better protective safeguards for its detainees (for 
example, CDR).1123  
A broad approach to torture prevention is necessary in such a context to adequately tackle the 
persistent nature of torture; without which, simply strengthening protections available in the 
criminal law and better legal regulation of ‘grey-er’ (i.e., less regulated and more opaque) 
administrative and Party discipline processes, will not afford sufficient protection against torture 
to all of China’s detained persons. 
Carver and Handley1124  stress that technical measures of torture prevention can be rendered 
fruitless if the conditions in a given country are not right; in essence, there are pre-conditions to 
the effectiveness of torture prevention measures. Without these in place as the foundation, 
technical torture prevention measures are less likely to operate effectively. Currently, China faces 
too many institutional, structural, political and socio-cultural obstacles, legal loopholes and ‘grey’ 
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unregulated spheres. Until these are addressed, China cannot adequately meet its UNCAT 
obligation for the establishment of effective torture prevention measures that can properly protect 
all detainees from, and prevent, torture and other ill-treatment. 
B. Recommendations 
A holistic approach to torture prevention in China may address many of the issues identified. 
There are two main areas that would benefit from significant reform. First, in line with the 
requirements for legal safeguards against torture is the need for better regulation of safeguards: 
the closing of loopholes in the law, the establishment of safeguards where they are missing and 
the abolition of extra-legal zones that sit parallel to the law.1125 Second, is the need for reform of 
the various structural and institutional obstacles currently hindering full and effective torture 
prevention measures.1126  
Key reforms could include, inter alia,  
(i) Strengthen protections in criminal law 
The (further) strengthening of protections in the criminal law is needed to address the protection 
gaps identified, 1127  and in particular, narrowing the scope of permissible exceptions and 
exclusions. 
Many of these deficiently regulated safeguards or regulatory protection gaps still exist. One 
example is court exclusion of evidence obtained through torture. The 2012 reform of the CPL and 
CL strengthened protections for criminal suspects by establishing court exclusion of evidence 
obtained through torture. 1128  However, this safeguard does not operate effectively in reality: 
practice is developing ways to circumvent it, negating its effectiveness and rendering obsolete its 
original intent as a safeguard.1129 Various measures should be taken to contribute to enforcing the 
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new exclusionary provisions. For example, regulations and guidelines should be adopted to 
ensure that where there is an allegation that a statement was made under duress, the burden of 
proof should remain with the procuratorate and courts, provisions should ensure an obligatory 
systematic forensic medical examination in all cases of suspected abuse, and clear guidelines 
drafted to ensure that the allegations are promptly and thoroughly investigated. Separate cases of 
torture prosecution should systematically follow cases on exclusionary proceedings; currently this 
is not the case in China. Such regulations should also ensure that doctors are empowered to be 
independent and competent enough to proactively and systematically pass relevant information on 
to the competent prosecuting authorities. Regulations should also specify that such information 
should immediately and systematically be acted upon by procurators. Equally, messages to the 
judiciary and procuratorate through oversight or professional conduct bodies are needed to 
remind them of their duty to take effective and prompt action where there is any suspicion that 
torture has been committed. 
There are various other examples of regulatory protection gaps in practice, especially regarding 
the ‘trinity’ of core preventive procedural safeguards (for access to a lawyer and doctor for 
criminal suspects as well as for notification of third party) in China.1130 While it is notable that 
such safeguards are established in the CPL for criminal suspects – they do not cover all criminal 
suspects in all circumstances. Even in circumstances where they do, their scope is limited. An 
illustration of this is the safeguard of ‘prompt access to a lawyer’ for all persons deprived of their 
liberty. As regards access to a lawyer, the CPL is not in conformity with the IHRL requirements 
for this safeguard, in that it does not guarantee the right of the detained person (run-of the 
mill/ordinary criminal suspect) to meet a lawyer from the very outset of the detention (only within 
48 hours). Another example of the dilution to this safeguard of prompt access to a lawyer is the 
exception permitted by law in certain cases, such as those suspected of “endangering State 
security”, terrorism or corruption. In these cases, the lawyer must obtain prior permission from 
public security investigators to meet the suspect, which may legally be withheld for an indefinite 
                                                     






period of time, on the grounds that it could hinder the investigation or could result in the 
disclosure of State secrets. The same potential for indefinite delay is also applicable to third party 
notification. Not only is delay possible in the law, it has been seen in practice. Thus, some 
detainees do not have the right to a lawyer at precisely the time when the risk of torture is at its 
greatest. 
In these aspects, there is a great deal more China could do to eliminate the gaps in protection in 
its criminal and criminal procedure laws, including strengthening legislation to afford access to a 
lawyer and third party notification – for all criminal suspects from the outset of deprivation of 
liberty. Should there be reasonable doubts as to the potential for the lawyer to hinder the 
investigation, the appropriate professional body could be contacted to ensure that another 
independent lawyer is found quickly. An indefinite or blanket delay to any detainee in accessing a 
lawyer or to third party notification is contrary to IHRL norms. In this respect, the CPL should be 
amended to reflect IHRL requirements. Without this, detention could be considered akin to de 
facto incommunicado detention; a prohibition that is universally applicable as part of general 
international law.1131 Indeed, a considerable body of international law jurisprudence clearly shows 
the right of access to a lawyer should be applicable from the outset of the deprivation of 
liberty, 1132  cannot be unduly restricted or delayed, 1133  third party notification should happen 
within 24 hours and any unlawful restriction on these rights should be able to be challenged 
before a court. All exceptions or dilution of the protection for third party notification for certain 
categories of crime such as ‘endangering state security’ or ‘bribery’ should be abrogated. 
Likewise, regular oversight and monitoring of implementation and compliance with the 
safeguards by public officials is needed and those found not to comply to be adequately 
disciplined within a system that adequately prosecutes, sentences with a sanction commensurate 
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to the crime and such a sentence is duly enforced.1134 This could help to provide meaningful 
deterrence to potential abuse perpetrators and bolster trust in the justice system. 
Another protection gap in the CPL is the audio-visual recording of interrogations. While this 
protective obligation is afforded in the CPL for criminal suspects, it is only applicable to ‘major’ 
or serious criminal cases and not for all criminal suspects. 1135  Moreover, there is dubious 
independence of the auditing of the recordings and police have been seen to selectively only 
record a certain part of the interrogation or use areas outside of the camera’s coverage to commit 
acts of alleged torture or ill-treatment. In this respect, China could also address this protection gap 
by refining the legislative protections available in the CPL. For example, given the systemic 
nature of torture during the period of police and other investigatory bodies’ (procurator and CCP 
discipline investigators) interrogation, China should legislate, in the CPL, for audio-visual 
surveillance to be obligatory for all criminal suspects, regardless of their crime. It should require 
that such footage be kept for a sufficient period of time for it to be used as evidence, copies of the 
footage be given to procurators, and made available to the court and defence lawyers; legislation 
should also establish effective and independent oversight mechanisms to check on the recording 
system and ensuring that no person is able to tamper with evidence. Indeed, there are positive 
signs that regulatory change is underway in this area. MoI Instructions have been issued recently 
to interpret this provision of the CPL to encourage the full recording of all interrogations of all 
suspects. Yet, these Instructions act as guidance only; the CPL has still not been amended. 
Not all the protection gaps identified in the thesis concern only regulation deficiencies, many 
areas suffer from both a primary regulatory gap and either a lack of general understanding or 
awareness to properly implement the law in practice, or deliberate misuse of the law (c.f. 
Introduction). One illustration can be seen in the torture definitional discrepancies in China; 
China still lacks a comprehensive definition of torture and ill-treatment in its national law (c.f. 
Chapter 2(4)(I)(i)): this is a clear regulatory protection gap that needs to be addressed. Moreover, 
it can impact how investigators, procurators and the judiciary view abuse and what can or can’t 
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qualify as torture (Chapter 2.4(I)(i)). If they consider that an act is not serious enough to qualify 
as torture, then many potential cases will not be investigated or prosecuted. It is likely to be one 
(of many) reason(s) for such low rates of prosecution of torture cases in China. It also links with 
the issue of impunity: where discrepancies in the torture definition risk creating loopholes for 
impunity to be able to flourish. Equally, this also links with how progress on reduction of torture 
and its prevention is perceived by the Chinese authorities and national scholars. The lack of a 
comprehensive definition and general understanding of what exactly qualifies as torture and ill-
treatment goes some way to explaining how national scholars and the authorities can consider that 
torture (but not ill-treatment) has significantly reduced, if not been effectively curbed (in KSS 
only) (c.f. Chapter 4.4), while IHRL bodies, national lawyers and civil society still receive 
hundreds of allegations of torture and ill-treatment emanating from Chinese places of detention 
every year (c.f. Chapter 3).  
Through the lens of prevention, the above findings are indicative of discrepancies in regulation, in 
implementation and in approach and are concerning. Progress in preventing torture needs, at the 
very least, the respective states’ national laws to be fully compliant with UN CAT definition (c.f. 
Chapter 1) and the above other regulatory gaps to be addressed, in addition to tackling the 
implementation gaps. Training and awareness-raising of what constitutes torture and ill-treatment, 
and of the consequences of such abuse, are necessary at all levels, for all persons involved in 












(ii) Reform the parallel, less-regulated, justice processes external to the 
criminal law and remove the possibility of ‘protection arbitrage’ 
(a) Abolish or, at minimum, strengthen regulation of the punitive administrative 
(PAD) justice process  
Ideally, the parallel PAD justice process would be abolished. While it remains, at minimum, there 
is a clear need to strengthen its safeguards to be in line with the regulation in the criminal law. 
This is needed given the true nature of punitive misdemeanours, which are virtually identical to 
their criminal offence counterparts. 
The PAD process confers significantly less protective safeguards for detainees than the CPL does 
for criminal suspects. As they currently stand, the few safeguards that do exist are not robust 
enough to be effective. The PSAPL does not afford access to a lawyer sufficiently promptly to 
detainees, but instead affords this right at some stage of a detainee’s detention period. 1136 
Formulated in such a way, it is unsurprising that reports indicate that, in practice, detainees 
generally do not get quick access to a lawyer despite the fact that given the nature of the criminal-
like PAD offences, detainees undergoing investigation and administrative trial need a lawyer as 
much as criminal suspects, especially at the outset of their deprivation of liberty.1137 In line with 
international jurisprudence and the “autonomous meaning” concept: if the essential nature of an 
act and its consequence is essential criminal-like in nature it should be treated as such – no matter 
what its official name in domestic law. Administrative detention must not amount to an evasion 
of the limits on the criminal justice system by providing the equivalent of criminal punishment 
without the applicable protections.1138 Thus, PAD detainees detained pursuant to administrative 
grounds that are similar, if not identical, to their criminal-law counterparts, should be protected by 
the same protective safeguards as should be conferred to criminal suspects. 
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 Equally, a right of access to a lawyer at some stage of a detainee’s detention period negates one 
of the original intents of this preventive safeguard, namely, for the lawyer to swiftly receive any 
complaint of torture after immediate apprehension of the detainee, to witness to any signs of 
injury, initiate proceedings, if necessary, and act as an avenue of communication with the outside 
world. The situation in the context of PAD is exacerbated by the fact that due to its administrative 
nature, there is no requirement for a PAD detainee to be brought before a judicial authority to 
have his or her detention approved. This safeguard can act as a conduit for a judge to be able to 
identify, and initiate proceedings to counter, torture and other ill-treatment. The deficiencies 
evident with this safeguard in law and practice need to be addressed given that PAD infractions 
are virtually identical in nature to crimes, and PAD detainees should be afforded all due process 
safeguards as the criminal law, not fewer. 
Likewise, better regulation of the PSAPL is needed regarding the right for detainees to be 
protected from incommunicado detention. As it stands, there are currently no maximum 
proscribed timeframes requiring the police to notify third parties that a detainee has been taken 
into custody and placed in administrative detention by the PSB pursuant to the PSAPL. It is up to 
the individual police officer to decide when to notify.1139 In addition, other safeguards, such the 
establishment of complaints’ mechanisms and preventive monitoring, while nascent in KSS 
police detention settings, are still in need of significant strengthening in many respects.1140  
In combination, these contribute to making a process that is more insular and opaque than its 
criminal-law counterpart, creating a circumvention possibility to the comparatively more 
regulated criminal-law track, and with it the risk associated with ‘protection arbitrage’. Removing 
the concept and rationale for a parallel justice process for infractions that so closely resemble 
their criminal counterparts would take away the administrative (police) discretion to choose one 
justice track over the other – and along with it the risks of a choice of a lesser regulated route 
(‘protection arbitrage’). Expanding the CPL to include all the PSAPL infractions instead would 
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ensure that these ‘lesser infractions’ would be better regulated in line with the stronger 
protections afforded in the CPL and more in line with IHRL requirements. 
(b) Better regulation and oversight of the CDR drug rehabilitation process 
In this respect, various crucial elements in the CDR placement and treatment procedure and 
safeguards in the law are currently missing and should be addressed.1141 These include the need 
for, inter alia, more transparent external oversight procedures and mechanisms, well-defined 
safeguards involving the initial placement decision, increasing the involvement – and clarifying 
the role – of doctors in the decision-making, safeguards around informed consent for placement 
and treatment, avenues to review the placement decision and to challenge the lawfulness of 
involuntary placement, appeals rights established, complaints’ mechanisms to be developed and 
external monitoring to be introduced and regulated for in CDR facilities.  
While regulated to a limited extent, there are many remaining regulatory protection gaps. For 
example, the family of the relevant person detained under CDR grounds should be notified within 
24 hours of the ‘letter’ notifying deprivation of liberty under CDR being given to the detainee. 
However, in practice, this process can take many days, weeks, if not months. Notification is not 
required under Chinese law from the immediate outset of the deprivation of liberty, contrary to 
the international law requirement for prompt notification to counter the risks associated with 
incommunicado detention.1142  
Additionally, there are many areas of the CDR process where there are complete protection gaps, 
rendering this area virtually unregulated by the relevant preventive safeguards. For example, in 
CDR legislation there is no explicit right to access a lawyer for a person detained by the 
police/PSB for CDR reasons, whether from the outset of their deprivation of liberty or at a later 
stage. Nor are there any safeguards in the relevant laws governing of the use of restraints (the 
CDR regulations specify that detainees can be restrained, but there are no accompanying 
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safeguards on the use of restraints, such as the maximum duration of restraint, upon whose orders 
this is allowed, among others). 
The length of time persons can be compulsorily detained needs to be fundamentally reviewed and 
kept strictly in line with individual-needs basis, and should not, ultimately, be a police decision. 
The environment needs to be made patient-centric and therapeutic, with a full range of therapies 
and rehabilitative activities available. To achieve this more resources – financial and human – 
need to be invested in the centres. Likewise, better regulation is needed of the jurisdiction and 
responsibility for CDR from the current split PSB-Justice responsibility to far greater emphasis on 
(and involvement of) the Ministry of Health.  
(c) Abolish the CCP investigation and discipline procedure (‘shuanggui’) and align 
it with the criminal law 
Reform of the Party investigation and discipline process is needed to ensure that it does not sit 
alongside or above the criminal law, but instead recognises CCP discipline offences as criminal 
offences to be regulated by a revised criminal law. This would enable regulated investigation by 
law enforcement agencies that afford due process and preventive safeguards in law. As it 
currently stands, the Party justice process is virtually unregulated, and the risk of torture therein is 
exceptionally great. Shuanggui should be abolished as an extra-legal ‘tertiary’ justice process, 
and its protections aligned to those of the criminal sphere. 
(iii) Empower and strengthen the judiciary, as well as increase 
protection for defence lawyers 
The strengthening of the judiciary and the protection of all defence lawyers is needed to provide 
them with the confidence required to fulfil their professional commitments without fear of 
reprisals. Equally, more measures need to be established to tackle aspects of judicial corruption, 
governmental intimidation of, or influence over, the judiciary (especially in political sensitive 
proceedings) and reported non-implementation of judgments. This is to enable the judiciary to 






appropriately with sentences commensurate with the crimes of torture and ill-treatment, thus 
addressing current perceptions of impunity. Some measures have already been taken to strengthen 
the judiciary, yet judicial corruption, influence from central and local authorities, judicial 
partiality and hindrances to defence lawyers’ practices remain. Institutional and structural 
separation of the justice processes from any CCP political influence is needed. This should 
include the establishment of a system of third party oversight for the judiciary, to ensure both its 
proper functioning, identify and stem intimidation possibilities from governmental and/or Party 
sources, address judicial corruption, and seek to ensure that the judiciary is properly trained and 
resourced. 
(iv) Counter impunity for abuse perpetrators, improve effectiveness of 
investigations and adequate prosecution of abuse allegations  
All allegations of torture and other ill-treatment need to be investigated promptly, impartially, 
transparently and thoroughly and adequately prosecuted. These elements are integral in the 
creation of the right environment in which other legal reforms can operate properly in practice. 
China could draw inspiration in this regard from the body of jurisprudence stemming from the 
ECtHR, a source of international law, which considers ECHR Article 3 prohibition of torture 
alongside positive procedural obligations to achieve effective prevention. This increasingly goes 
beyond the mere requirement of criminalisation of torture in national legislation, but also requires 
investigations to be effective (impartial, independent, adequate, thorough, prompt and 
transparent), a duty on the State to prosecute, a duty to impose serious penalties for acts of torture 
and a duty to enforce these sanctions.1143 A wider framework that ensures improved investigatory 
methodology to break the deeply systemic reliance on confession-based evidence, fosters judicial 
independence and improves the effectiveness of the trial process as a whole in China is crucial to 
ensure that torture prevention safeguards can operate properly. This will require targeted and 
thorough training of investigation officers (police, procuratorate and Party), as well as awareness-
                                                     






raising within the judiciary, along with sufficiently mandated and resourced external oversight 
mechanisms to check on the quality of investigations. 
(v) Ensure greater separation of powers, remove multiple roles within a 
single authority and involve the judiciary in authorising criminal 
and quasi-criminal detention  
The clear separation of powers between the investigative and detention branches of the police, the 
procuratorate, CCP investigation and discipline organs and the Courts is needed. Each authority 
should be able to act as a check on each other at every stage of the detainee’s passage through the 
justice and deprivation of liberty process, with the Courts standing as a completely independent 
authority. This would mean addressing the current internal conflicting roles within the police and 
the procuratorate.  
In the criminal–law sphere, greater direct (face-to-face) and prompt involvement of the judiciary 
in the approval of detention is needed, rather than the current remote approval by the 
procuratorate along with long permissible exceptions to investigation time-limits. A positive by-
product would be that the right of habeas corpus would be more likely afforded, allowing the 
detainee an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention before a judicial 
authority. More prompt direct access to a judicial authority would also reduce the risk of 
prolonged incommunicado detention. As regards the administrative justice processes, while there 
is no explicit requirement for a PAD detainee to be brought before a judicial authority to have his 
or her detention approved, PAD infractions are virtually identical in nature to their criminal 
offence counterparts, and along the ‘autonomous meaning’ reasoning, should be afforded the 
same due process safeguards as the criminal law. Equally, as regards CDR, greater involvement 
of the courts is needed to verify safeguards around informed consent for CDR placement and 
treatment, provide an avenue to review the placement decision and to challenge the lawfulness of 
involuntary placement, regularly review the lengths of CDR, and act as a conduit for the appeal of 






The clear separation and delineation of powers between investigation and custody/detention 
would require, inter alia, better oversight and implementation of the geographic and physical 
separation of the detainees from investigators and the delineation of the responsibility of 
detainees’ well-being in a custody setting from the investigation process. 
Reform should also include regulation, and oversight of implementation, of the use of only 
authorised designated places of detention. This would require the abolition of unofficial ‘black’ 
detention sites in China. These include hotels, hostels, offices and other undesignated locations. 
This is to remove the possibility of use of opaque locations where investigation and custody can 
happen simultaneously for an indefinite period without structural safeguards in place to protect 
detainees. 
(vi) Strengthen internal and external oversight bodies 
All the justice processes need to be rendered more transparent through the strengthening of the 
role of oversight bodies, both internally and externally. Internally, legal supervision (i.e., 
supervision of the implementation of the law) has traditionally fallen within the remit of the 
Procuratorate. Its mandate and powers, however, are too limited for it to undertake an overall role 
of leading supervision of torture prevention measures. Equally, there is in an inherent conflict 
within its multiple roles of investigator, approver of detention, prosecutor and supervisor. There is 
a need for substantive reform of the powers and role of the procuratorate and the establishment of 
a separate oversight body that is external to the investigation process. Likewise, externally, there 
is a need for an independent oversight body, with appropriate powers, to ensure those torture 
prevention measures that are in place, are operating, and to recommend the establishment of 
measures where they are missing. 
Monitoring and pilot complaints’ mechanisms in KSSs are a start, yet many places of deprivation 
of liberty remain in the dark. The frequency of torture and its real nature appears not to be 
properly understood even domestically. Nor can it be, as there simply are not the mechanisms 
currently in place to record, oversee, co-ordinate and share information pertinent to torture 






approximately 2,800 remand police centres (KSS), more than 1,000 prisons and many thousands 
of smaller police stations that can hold persons for initial periods of custody. Equally, there are 
thousands of persons in the military forces, where military custody facilities and military justice 
may deprive military staff of their liberty pursuant to suspected and actual military offences. 
There also are hundreds of psychiatric facilities, juvenile institutions and social welfare 
establishments, which also have powers to deprive persons of their liberty, in a given context. A 
country with more than 1.3 billion inhabitants unsurprisingly faces complex challenges in terms 
of co-ordination across different Ministries and Departments and discrete areas of responsibility, 
as well as retaining a general oversight of the current actual situation pertaining to all places of 
deprivation of liberty. A co-ordinated approach to enable strategic oversight, in this context, is 
essential.  
In China, no one body gathers, or analyses, the information to be able to gain a true picture of the 
problem of torture and ill-treatment, let alone drives a coherent programme nationwide and pan-
institution, Departments and Ministries to address all protection gaps. There is no one body 
responsible for synthesis of information from oversight work of all places of deprivation of 
liberty. Information generally about detention places is in piecemeal form, mostly not publicly 
available, and only available from the different Ministries/Departments involved. There is no 
independent body with the mandate to enable a comprehensive overview of all types of torture 
and other ill-treatment emanating from all types of places of detention across China. There is no 
body to assess the true picture of the operation of legal safeguards and where their deficiencies lie, 
with the authority to propose reform, to question and analyse why so few complaints on torture 
and other ill-treatment are received, to examine what is not working in practice and how to 
improve the system. 
Further, there is no external body to assess the selection of the monitors, and their effectiveness, 
other than the procuratorate and higher organs of the PSB.1144 Monitors currently can only operate 
in KSS (police remand detention) and some prisons, but not other place of deprivation of liberty. 
                                                     






There is no obligation of public reporting of monitors’ findings. Indeed, pursuant to monitoring 
regulations,1145 special monitoring supervisors can be fired if they either make their findings 
public or have views or recommendations that are not purely factual in nature. Monitors 
(procurators and special supervisors) have no independent oversight of whether recommendations 
are actually implemented, and in time, or whether recommendations have impact or are 
repeatedly ignored. Neither are monitors entirely independent from the institutions that they 
monitor. ‘Specially-invited supervisors’ bring different qualifications and expertise to the 
preventive monitoring function, but they are chosen by a combination of KSS and PSB decision-
making. Inherently, they will be known to, and have contacts with, the KSS and PSB. An 
interview conducted for this research with one of the very few active Chinese monitors and 
member of a Complaints Handling Committee shed light on an evidential finding: namely, that 
the monitor considered that torture and other ill-treatment “never happened” in police detention in 
China. This monitor argues that while China could improve some procedural safeguards in some 
areas (for example, the procedural safeguards around death penalty cases), the monitor considers 
that torture and ill-treatment per se is not an issue.1146 While it is indeed positive that China has 
established an obligation for some places of deprivation of liberty to be monitored, it is clear, 
however, that there is still a long way to go before China can guarantee that truly independent 
monitoring is reaching all places of deprivation of liberty. 
Finally, there is no body to assess what and how broader prevention measures are, or how they 
should be, working. There is no body to recommend or initiate changes pan-Department and 
Ministries responsible to all different types of deprivation of liberty (including for example 
psychiatric facilities and social welfare institutions), in a similar vein to the type of reforms 
evident in the KSSs. Even in the discrete area of the police-run KSSs (around 2800 nation-wide) 
where reforms, such as the establishment of complaints’ mechanisms are happening, it is almost 
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impossible to determine whether they are operating effectively, as no body has the mandate for 
assessing the quality of their operation.1147  
The Procuratorate is the main body that is currently relied upon to fulfil this role. Yet, this body 
suffers from limitations in its mandate to be able to undertake such a role, nor is it independent. In 
practice, it has ‘siloed’ and discrete areas of legal competence only and is not responsible for 
preventing torture in all places of deprivation of liberty. Nor is it responsible for gathering and 
analysing patterns of information and assessing, at a general level, whether torture prevention 
measures are working effectively or recommending reforms where they are not.1148 
(vii) Develop nascent complaints’ mechanisms and preventive 
monitoring, based on proper foundations  
Better legal regulation of the preventive measures of complaints’ avenues and regular preventive 
monitoring is needed, to ensure their independence and proper functioning, as well as the 
expansion of their legal remit to cover all types of deprivation of liberty (not just police detention 
centres (KSS)). 
Both types of mechanisms are in need of advice, support and training. Independent reporting lines 
(i.e., not only reporting to the local procuratorate, with whom the report can stay and remain 
confidential) and overall structural managerial and operational responsibility for all monitoring 
across China needs to be established, to fulfil the various criteria for independent and effective 
monitoring. The complaints’ mechanisms are equally in need of significant development. This is 
to ensure that all detainees, in all places of deprivation of liberty, have ready access to 
confidential mechanisms through which they can air complaints both internally and externally. 
Detainees should be aware that they will not suffer reprisals and know that their complaints are 
being addressed promptly with concrete outcomes. This is not the situation, in any place of 
detention in China, currently. Without these reforms, the risk is that the current models develop 
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on a shaky foundation and risk becoming non-credible in the eyes of detainees and the authorities 
alike, thus negating their effectiveness. 
(viii) Eradicate wider influencing factors that can increase likelihood of 
abuse 
These factors link the legal with the criminological and psychological, and throw the ‘protection 
net’ as wide as possible to stem wider influences that can facilitate torture.1149 Such measures 
could include: establishing better whistle-blower protections in legislation; institutional and 
wider-social awareness-raising to foster acceptance of the torture prohibition in all cases and 
eradication of taboos on reporting it; comprehensive law-enforcement training in appropriate 
investigatory practices to steer away from the confession-based evidence culture; training in the 
prohibition of torture; oversight of institutional work-culture and peer pressure; the reform of the 
cultural mind-set of obedience and lack of questioning of seniors in respect of abusive illegal 
actions; regular rotation of staff and robust oversight to ensure isolated work units do not become 
insular and opaque environments conducive to the facilitation of torture. In short, a multi-faceted 
approach is needed to change the culture within the police and Party-law enforcement that views 
torture and other ill-treatment of detainees as acceptable.  
This will require proper training of investigation and detention staff, but also requires a raft of 
legislation, that is adequately implemented, along with sufficiently mandated and resourced 
oversight mechanisms. These are needed to break current embedded institutional practices and 
socio-cultural influences that contribute to the resilient nature of torture in some detention spheres 
in China. The solution will require deep structural changes and the onus should not lie only with 
the procuratorate to fulfil this role. If successful, this could contribute in part to the 
implementation gaps that have developed between law and the practice in China. 
 
                                                     






(ix) Reform restrictive regulations on civil society and media to increase 
oversight and accountability 
This should empower national civil society and media to report on and act as essential watchdogs 
for torture prohibition and prevention, and to report cases of alleged torture and other ill-treatment, 
without fear of censorship or reprisals. This would provide another essential layer of protection 
against detainee abuse, and a safety net to catch cases that may have been missed by the other 
preventive mechanisms. 
The above is not an exhaustive list; rather these are illustrations only of reforms that might be 
able to individually address some of the structural and institutional issues stemming from the 
protection gaps identified that are currently hindering truly effective torture prevention in China. 
Each could contribute to improving torture prevention. 
C. ‘Rule of Party’ governance model: impact on the effectiveness of 
torture prevention 
(i) China’s Rule of Party: impact on the overall effectiveness of torture 
prevention  
The more concerning issue is whether these above reforms could in practice create sustainable 
and effective change given China’s governance model. Some of the institutional obstacles 
identified are inherent to China’s current political and governance system. They are reflective of 
China’s One-Party State, which follows, in practice, a “Rule of Party” governance model. 
Ultimately, the Chinese legal landscape mirrors its governance model and suffers from the same 
structural and institutional challenge, namely, that the Party can influence or override judicial 
work. China law professor, Margaret Lewis, highlights this concern about the sustainability of 
China’s human-rights approach. Lewis acknowledges the ‘sizeable basket of reforms’ undertaken 
in China and transitional challenges associated with reforming the criminal justice system, 






prosecutors, and judges.”1150 Lewis argues that “these transitional challenges are fundamentally 
different, however, from the government’s decision to selectively ignore legal protections 
embodied both in Chinese law and international legal norms.”1151  Lewis points out that the 
“character of China’s criminal justice system has to be measured not just by the handling of the 
relatively easy run-of-the-mill criminal cases like petty thefts and assaults, but also by the 
blatantly politically motivated prosecutions, even if such cases represent a relatively small 
percentage of all criminal cases. The Chinese government’s failure to live up to the legal 
standards that it sets for itself in these hard cases undermines the legitimacy of the entire 
system.”1152 
The main obstacle is that many of the torture prevention measures need the right governance 
environment to effectively counter and reduce the risk of recurrent torture, as identified in 
Chapter 1.1153 The UN SPT supports this view; it stresses that “the prevalence of torture and ill-
treatment is influenced by a broad range of factors, including the general level of enjoyment of 
human rights and the rule of law, levels of poverty, social exclusion, corruption, discrimination, 
etc. Whilst a generally high level of respect for human rights and the rule of law within a society 
or community does not provide a guarantee against torture and ill-treatment occurring, it offers 
the best prospects for effective prevention.”1154  
The need to look at torture prevention through the lens of the wider general situation and 
governance model in a given country is supported by various scholars. Bingham, Rejali, 
Hathaway, Carver and Handley, Financi,1155 among others, have examined, in differing contexts, 
the intersection of torture prohibition (and prevention) and broader political governance models. 
Carver and Handley, in their work on assessing the effectiveness of torture prevention, speak of 
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the right conditions needed for torture prevention to be effective. Indeed, without a proper 
foundation, technical legal measures of torture prevention can only operate to a certain extent. 
Scholars speak of the need for a proper foundation in order for torture to be fully curtailed1156 and 
point to fundamental elements in a society governed by the rule of law (such as separation of 
powers and an independent judiciary). While facets of the rule of law go hand in hand with the 
model of democratic structures and institutions, they point out that it is too simplistic to attribute a 
reduction in torture to democracy alone in a given state (Chapter 1). While not all democracies 
respect the principles of torture prevention,1157 scholars and torture prevention treaties bodies, 
such as the UN SPT, underline the correlation between democracy, the rule of law and effective 
torture prevention. The UN SPT, for instance, views democracy and the rule of law as crucial 
elements to torture prevention1158: “where democracy and the rule of law are absent, the incidence 
of torture, ill-treatment and corruption is generally greater since such acts go undetected or 
unpunished.” 
More specifically relevant for the case of China, is the link between a state governance model 
with structures that adequately reflect the rule of law requirements and the effectiveness of torture 
prevention. Studies suggest that that states truly governed by the precepts and structures 
associated of the rule of law, such as an independent, fully functional and impartial criminal 
justice system, are more likely to afford the right conditions for torture prevention technical 
safeguards to operate to their full or best potential.1159  
In China, Party influence remains woven into the very fabric of all branches of China’s 
governance model – including its legal system. The structure, and operation, of China’s legal 
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system remains subservient to the Party. Despite its purported increasing adherence to the rule of 
law, China does not see the rule of law as requiring the separation of powers and all bodies to be 
equally accountable to the law. Rather, it considers the rule of law to be that all bodies in China 
rule in accordance with its laws and the bodies’ own regulations. Further, Party law trumps all 
others, hence its status as a de facto and de jure ‘Rule of Party’, or One-Party, State. This is not to 
say that torture prevention cannot work in all States with de facto ‘Rule of Party’, or even ‘Rule 
of Man’ governance models.1160 However, many IHRL mechanisms and scholars consider that the 
establishment of institutions and legal structures associated with the wider concepts of rule of law 
and the separation of powers are essential elements for torture prevention to work effectively.1161  
In China’s case the situation is nuanced. The governance model in China is premised on a tri-
partite system ensuring power rests with the People. The three key pillars of China’s governance 
model are the Party, the government (the Executive branch), and the People (the National 
People’s Congress (the Legislative branch)). 1162  Their hierarchy is strict and is manifested 
regularly in every line-up of top officials at official events in China, and in the ranking of the 
seven most senior officials in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Each, in theory, creates a 
check and balance on the other. At first glance, power looks to be squarely in the hands of the 
People. It is the NCP who selects the President and members are voted upon in a complex, 
hierarchical and strict voting structure that progresses from village level up to national level. All 
sources of power, namely, the Head of Party and State, the Head of the Government, State 
Council, as well as the Army and the judiciary ultimately report into the NCP. 
Yet, the Party influence cuts across all branches of governance. In reality, to progress up the 
career ladder within the government, the judiciary and in Congress one has to be a Party member 
and the Party can permeate and influence every aspect of governance. It has designated 
representatives in every branch of decision-making (as well as senior members being Party 
members themselves). Hierarchy is part of the fabric of the governance structure both at the top 
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levels (National and Ministerial/Departmental) and at the next levels down, the provincial, 
township and village levels. While at every level People’s representatives, the government and 
others have a say, ultimately their purported equal Party representative, in practice, has more 
weight.1163 The Party holds the trump card. Ultimately, the General Secretary of the CCP (Xi 
Jinping) wields overall power over the State, government and Party, despite theoretical reporting 
lines. Indeed, this power has been shifting since Xi’s inauguration in 2012 and it has been 
growing. Reforms of the Standing Committee, creation of new Commissions, among other 
measures, have resulted in even greater concentration of top-level CCP political power.1164  
The legal landscape mirrors the political and governance model and suffers from the same 
structural and institutional challenge, namely, that the Party can influence or override judicial 
work. The PRC Constitution states that “the People’s courts shall […] exercise judicial power 
independently and not be subject to interference.” Yet, it also specifies that China is ruled “under 
the leadership of the Communist Party.”1165 Significant reforms have been undertaken to address 
local government influences on the judiciary. However, the courts are still accountable to the 
NCP, government and Party leadership. The Central Politics and Law Commission (CPLC) of the 
Party is used by the Party to exercise leadership and influence within the legal system. The CPLC 
is led by a member of the Politburo and includes the heads of the Ministry of Justice, Police, 
Judiciary, and Procuratorate. The CPLC has general responsibility for the judiciary and law-
enforcement agencies as well as the co-ordination and oversight of a plethora of local politics and 
law committees.1166 While the judiciary is notionally independent from the Party and government, 
in practice there are staffing overlaps between police, procurators and judges in progressive roles 
and secondments, while relationships (guanxi) continue to influence judicial decision-making.1167 
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In reality, the judges often face pressure from local officials to rule according to their interests.1168 
While top-level CCP and central government are currently legislating to strengthen the power and 
role of the courts to challenge local government and other interests, there is reportedly limited 
success. In practice, judges’ decision-making authority is regularly influenced and thus 
compromised by political adjudication committees. 1169  This reflects the underlining and 
foundational premise conferred by the PRC Constitution, that the leadership of the CCP is 
paramount. The fabric of the One-Party system means that in the context of the legal sphere, the 
Party ultimately holds the trump card, and the centralised power of the Party is growing.  
Where the Party sits alongside or above the law, the rule of law criteria cannot be adequately 
fulfilled, as the Party can circumvent or influence all decision-making, as it sees fit. This does not 
provide the right framework in which torture prevention can operate meaningfully; to be 
ultimately effective, torture prevention needs rule of law structures, separation of powers and an 
independent judiciary, along with laws that apply to all bodies.  
The environment in China is currently one where human rights (civil and political) and torture 
prevention are not the first priority, unlike rights applicable to social and economic 
development. 1170  When legal reform to increase detainees’ protections and the government 
priorities of economic development and harmonious social order exist side-by-side both can 
progress (as seen in the reform of the criminal law sphere for ordinary, ‘run-of-the-mill’ crimes). 
However, when they conflict, then the promotion of civil and political rights, such as the 
requirement for torture prevention, is likely to be overridden by economic and security 
priorities.1171 This is best illustrated in the measures undertaken to enforce the national policy 
against corruption (including the increasing use of the virtually non-regulated parallel Party 
justice process of shuanggui).1172 It can also be seen in the diluted protections for a minority of 
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‘sensitive’ non-‘run-of-the-mill’ crimes, such as ‘endangering state security’, commercial or 
public office corruption and disruption to public order.  
 
(ii) How should prevention progress given the challenges in the context of 
China? 
Prevention in China’s context 
There are clear challenges inherent within a One-Party State to the successful operation of torture 
prevention measures – and China is illustrative of this. While it is beyond scope of this research 
to establish the most effective approach to torture prevention for all One-Party States, the findings 
of this research do point to an approach for China specifically. Many of the obstacles to the 
effective functioning of the selected prevention measures identified in Chapter 4 boil down to the 
inherent lack of independent functioning of all aspects of governance – including in the legal 
sphere. This lack of autonomy from potential central-level / top-down interference and the lack of 
independent oversight can impede every prevention measure in one way or another. For example, 
in the cases of monitoring and complaints mechanisms, both fundamentally lack the criteria of 
independent personnel and budget. Both, although external to the PSB, can still not be considered 
as fully independent mechanisms, as required under IHRL norms (Chapter 1). The lack of 
independence jeopardises their quality and the trust and faith that detainees need to have in these 
systems for these systems to operate successfully (i.e. to be able to access and channel torture 
allegations to the competent authorities for investigation). Another aspect of the lack of 
independence in all strata of governance can be seen in the regulatory exceptions in the criminal 
laws for sensitive cases, especially those involving corruption (as well as within the CCP 
discipline system), which can override the protections afforded under the criminal law to ordinary 
suspects. Equally, permissible executive interference, structural co-ordination and influence over 
the judiciary can negate the quality of judicial findings and contribute to impunity; it shakes the 
very foundational premise of the rule of law. In short, where loopholes, exceptions and the 






measures can be overridden and their impact negated. The thesis findings indicate that this is a 
pervasive risk across all of the prevention measures examined. 
Nevertheless, despite these political, institutional and structural challenges impeding progress in 
torture prevention in China, some of the recommendations outlined in Section B can still be 
applied and developed – and may still yield some initial progress. For these to work, however, 
such initial measures need to be very specific and tailored to China’s context. 
Limitations of a standard prevention approach for China 
Choosing the most effective approach for China, given the limitations that it faces, involves a 
critical examination both of how torture prevention works theoretically (outlined in Chapter 1) 
and practically from the perspective of the torture prevention ‘practitioner’. Some of the most 
active prevention practitioners are those involved in monitoring the treatment of detainees and the 
safeguards designed to prevent ill-treatment and assessing their compliance with IHRL norms. 
Many of the assessments of a given state’s compliance with their prevention obligations look at 
prevention from the viewpoint of detainee treatment, safeguards and conditions, one that lies at 
the heart of preventive monitoring (c.f. Chapters 1 and 4.5).  While generally considered an 
effective measure, there are however inherent limitations with a purely ‘monitoring’ perspective 
to prevention, not least given that prevention requires a plurality of measures in a given context 
(c.f. Chapter 1.3.4). Moreover, these practitioners and monitoring bodies are often limited by their 
treaty mandates to only look at certain aspects; for example, the CPT can only look at ECHR 
article 3 prohibitions and conduct, and only within a deprivation of liberty setting.1173 Also, the 
heart of the CPT’s mandate focuses primarily on treatment, safeguards and conditions of 
detention. There is therefore a relatively formulaic approach to ensuring that ECHR article 3 is 
complied with across the CoE region. This approach has been explicitly undertaken as a necessity 
to ensure a common yardstick by which to analyse all CoE member states. While not a formal 
“checklist”, there is a prevention formula or algorithm applied to each country: first the 
assessment of detainee treatment; second, the existence and functioning of safeguards; and then 
                                                     






other issues, such as an examination of the health-care situation in detention, use of restraints, 
issues involving resources and staff, etc.1174 This is applied universally (i.e. to all ECPT ratified 
states).1175 The SPT and NPMs have slightly different mandates (OPCAT), but similar algorithms 
are applied to approaching and assessing prevention.1176  
All of these bodies are understandably limited by what they can do within their treaty mandate. 
When it comes to addressing wider issues of prevention – such as links between arbitrariness or 
legitimacy of detention,1177 the status of civil society or the power and independence of the 
judiciary in a given country, these can risk being considered peripheral considerations, and are 
often treated as non-core issues.1178 This is not because they are considered unimportant, but are 
often considered not to go to the heart of the mandate’s priorities. Moreover, in many of the 
ECPT (and OPCAT) ratified states, these are not problematic issues and thus do not warrant 
detailed focus. Consequently, there are inherent limitations in a monitoring-led perspective on 
prevention. One of these is the non-addressing of wider issues that are not generally considered 
core to the prevention of torture mandate. 
The UN CAT offers a broader (if not overly broad) obligation when it comes to prevention 
measures under article 2(1) (c.f. Chapter 1). However, when one examines the CAT Committee’s 
assessment of China,1179 the reference to wider preventive factors such as a strong functioning 
judiciary and the need for an unrestricted civil society to help in the oversight role are not the 
focus points and are either only addressed briefly or treated with similar weight to the other 
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issues.1180 A prioritised order of implementation of the recommendations is not put forward by the 
Committee (unsurprisingly, given the ‘plurality of measures’ approach to prevention followed (c.f. 
Introduction and Chapter 1)).  Further, there exists very limited scholarly work that ranks 
effectiveness of prevention measures. 1181  The scholarly work that has been undertaken (e.g. 
Carver and Handley) places emphasis on correct detention practice and the establishment of 
safeguards as top priorities for preventing torture,1182 and other measures such as complaints 
mechanisms come last in their ranking (Chapter 1.3). 
 In a One-Party state such as China, where broader structural and institutional issues (Chapter 4) 
can impede the establishment and proper operation of successful prevention measures, there is a 
clear need for the prevention approach to go beyond the application of a more typical monitoring 
of safeguards formula. There is a need for an initial prioritised and specific approach to 
prevention.  Addressing the wider issues first should be considered the basic foundational starting 
point, before the technical measures of prevention (e.g. safeguards) can be monitored successfully. 
In the case of China, a prevention approach that is likely to operate successfully should 
incorporate two key elements: first, an approach to prevention in China should start with some 
initial measures that are tailored to China bearing in mind the challenges that it faces. Merely 
applying a standard formula of legal and technical prevention measures cannot be the starting 
premise. Second, an effective approach to prevention needs a proper foundation for initial 
prevention measures to have a chance to embed successfully.  
Overview: a tailored approach to prevention for China in light of its context: some examples  
All the recommendations in Section B are China specific, formulated to help China progress in its 
prevention efforts. Nevertheless, the order in which these recommendations should be applied can 
contribute to their overall effectiveness. Realistically, deep-seated institutional and political 
change is unlikely to come to China soon.1183 While all recommendations listed in Section B are 
needed, some of the recommendations inherently need fundamental institutional change (e.g. 
                                                     
1180  CAT Committee Concluding Observations, 5th periodic report on China, December 2015. 
1181  See Thesis Introduction and Chapter 1.2. 
1182  See Thesis Chapters 2 and 3. 
1183  19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017 (this is alluded to only briefly, as it falls after the time 






recommendations (iii)(iv)(v)(viii)). Others can be applied progressively, despite China’s political 
context; although not entirely without consequence on their overall impact (e.g. recommendations 
(i)(ii)(vi)(vii)(ix))(see below). 
 A China specific approach to prevention should start with addressing some of the key 
foundational problems to allow torture prevention measures to embed and operate more 
successfully than currently. These can be grouped together into two key foundational issues that 
are needed, and can be addressed, for China to take some first steps to better protecting its 
detainees and achieving a more effective prevention approach than currently. First, is the need to 
address how torture is understood in China and how its progress is viewed, which is currently 
different from IHRL standards and international critique. Linked to this is the need to address 
regulatory and implementation gaps, notwithstanding the wider political and wider structural 
challenges that it faces (recommendations (i)(ii)). Second, is the need to reform the reporting 
avenues to identify or ‘catch’ all the torture and ill-treatment allegations early on and 
systematically pass these on to competent investigating and prosecuting authorities. This is to 
enable allegations to proceed to the courts and where relevant, sentences to be conferred 
impartially and commensurate with the gravity of the crime of torture. In China, ensuring 
thorough investigation, prosecution and sentencing is key to curbing impunity – a core 
impediment to effective prevention. A good place to start would be to focus first on improving the 
reporting avenues, including initial access to a lawyer, procuratorial onsite reporting measures, 
complaints mechanisms’ functioning and the external oversight bodies’ functioning 
(Recommendations (vi)(vii)(ix)).    These, however, are likely to need some political, structural 
and institutional change. These are a pre-requisite nonetheless to overall sustainable effectiveness 
of torture prevention (see below).  
(a) address regulatory and implementation gaps, including definitional discrepancies 
First, how torture is understood in China and progress on its prevention is currently different from 
IHRL standards (c.f. Introduction, Chapter 2.4(I)(i), Chapter 4.4.1 to 4.4.4). Basic definitional 






addressed to ‘plug’ a key regulatory and implementation gap and consequent abuse that has 
developed in China. This has impacted the authorities’ and national scholars’ perspective of their 
own progress on reducing - to the point of virtual eradication - of torture in certain detention 
spheres such as the police-run KSS and initial police custody, while allegations of torture in the 
above detention places still circulate to the point of being considered ‘pervasive’ by IHRL bodies 
and the West (c.f. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.4). Progress on prevention will be hard to measure 
when the starting point is viewed differently. Equally, as a UN CAT signatory, China is under an 
obligation to ensure that its definition of torture lies within the parameters of the UN CAT and 
that sufficient training of all relevant bodies is undertaken to ensure they are aware of this 
definition. Indications from this analysis suggest that this is currently not the case in China. The 
regulatory gaps in criminal and other relevant legislation (for all types of deprivation of liberty) 
should be addressed to ensure that national law clearly prohibits all elements of the UN CAT 
articles 1 and 16 definition of torture and ill-treatment as a starting premise. Moreover, at the 
implementation level, regular training and awareness-raising concerning the amended legal 
definitions of torture and ill-treatment is needed for all those persons involved in investigation 
and custody of detainees (including any person deprived of their liberty, not only criminal law 
suspects but also those held in other types of detention, such as CCP detention and CDR). The 
range of relevant bodies and persons involved in awareness-raising activities should be a broad as 
possible and not only apply to those involved in actual investigation and custody of detainees, but 
to all those connected with detainees and involved in meeting, representing, investigating, 
prosecuting, treating or ‘rehabilitating’ detainees (a premise of China’s criminal and 
administrative detention system (c.f. Chapter 2.3)), including defence lawyers, members of the 
judiciary, doctors, monitors and those involved in the complaints mechanisms. Involving 
independent members of civil society in this awareness-raising would also be beneficial, but 







As outlined in the analysis (Chapters 2 and 3) and in Section B recommendation (i), definitional 
discrepancies are not the only regulatory gaps, many others exist (concerning, for example, the 
lack of prompt access to a lawyer and third party notification rights for all detainees, and audio-
visual recording of all interrogations, in all cases – without exception). This all can and should be 
addressed through amendments to the relevant national legislation, accompanied by awareness-
raising and external oversight of implementation. Equally, there are many others aspects where 
protections are entirely missing that are in need of wholesale reform or in need of protections to 
be established in the first instance, and are not just ‘gaps’ in current legislative protections 
(Recommendation (ii)). These include the need to reconsider the whole PAD system and ideally 
incorporate it into, or at least align this justice process with, the (more robust) criminal law to 
address the protection vacuums identified (c.f. Chapters 2 and 3). At minimum, there is a 
fundamental need to establish basic safeguards regulating the treatment and procedure for persons 
undergoing PAD and CDR detention, including establishing core rights that are currently virtually 
entirely missing (such as the right of access to a lawyer, doctor and third party notification) as 
from the outset of a detainee’s deprivation of liberty.  
These all can be undertaken within China’s current political context. They should be addressed 
through amendments to the relevant national legislation accompanied by awareness-raising and 
external oversight of its implementation.   
(b) Improving the oversight and reporting avenues 
Another Section B recommendation that could be good place to start to improve China’s torture 
prevention approach, is the reform of the oversight and reporting avenues. This includes the 
strengthening of internal and external oversight bodies to identify and address torture allegations 
systemically, including initial access to a lawyer and procuratorial onsite reporting measures 
(recommendation (vi)). It also involves improving the nascent complaints mechanisms’ 
functioning and external bodies’ oversight role (recommendation (vii)).  
A crucial first step to improving prevention would be the strengthening of procuratorial reporting 






reporting mechanisms mainly lie within the mandate of the procuratorate (Chapter 4.4). This 
includes increasing awareness-raising of the definition of torture and ill-treatment among 
procurators (see above), the proper implementation of the onsite role and the strengthening of 
their ability and willingness to be able to identify, from an early stage, any allegations (c.f. 
Chapter 4.4 and recommendation (vi)). While only ‘semi-external’ (i.e. separate departments 
within the procuratorate dealing with investigation and prosecution), the onsite procuratorate 
currently has a key position to identify cases of torture and ill-treatment early on. The systematic 
reporting and passing on to the relevant bodies for investigation and prosecution is key 
foundational element to ensuring that torture allegations get identified and addressed. While the 
current set-up with the procuratorate is far from ideal (especially its non-independence and issues 
of conflict within its multi-role functions (Chapter 4)), improving this first stage of reporting 
could be a first step in strengthening this prevention measure within the current environment in 
China.  
Second, is the need for properly functioning complaints mechanisms and some form of 
functioning external oversight of all places of deprivation of liberty in China (c.f. 
Recommendation (vii) and Chapters 4.4.1 and 4.5), especially starting with a focus on certain 
categories of detainees (see below). Both current mechanisms are in need of significant 
development, support and training. The composition of the mechanisms and their reporting 
procedures could be significantly re-configured to ensure that they are selected by, and report 
directly into, the National People’s Congresses rather than the current combination of the 
detention institution, the local procuratorate and the PSB. Linked with this is the need for these 
mechanisms to have access to the full range of places that deprive of liberty, rather than the 
current thematic limitation of KSSs and a few prisons. This will require access rights and 
reporting structures to be developed along relevant Ministry/Department lines to start with.  
External oversight bodies also need to be tailored to address some of China’s specific problems 
first. They should be set up to check first specifically on those categories of detainees where the 






officials, public order and security ‘sensitive’ cases, where there is a suspicion that persons are 
being put through the PAD system deliberately to circumvent the criminal law protections and 
those in ‘shuanggui’ detention). These are the persons who currently face some of the greatest 
risks of torture and ill-treatment in China, and should be prioritised by any external oversight 
body. Equally, complaints mechanisms in China need to be developed further to ensure that they 
have as varied and as external composition of membership as possible, regular and ready access 
to detainees - and their trust, and systematically pass on allegations for criminal investigation 
where relevant (Chapter 4.4.1 & recommendation (iv)).  
These could be achieved in China, despite the current context, only with some legislative and 
minimum institutional change. They would not be fully OPCAT and IHRL-norm compliant 
(Chapters 4.4 and 4.5);1184 however, they are a start and with some reform they could make some 
progress in identifying and reporting more torture and ill-treatment allegations from an early stage.  
Ready access to lawyers for all detainees is also a prerequisite and foundational issue that should 
first be established for other aspects of prevention to operate successfully (recommendation (iii)). 
Access to a lawyer who is not fearful of reprisals for both the detainee and him/herself (c.f. 
Chapter 4.3.2) is a key element in prevention. The access per se to a lawyer can act as a deterrent 
for potential abuse and as a channel to witness any injuries early on and to initiate an 
investigation into an allegation. Currently, many lawyers fear taking on cases involving potential 
torture allegations (c.f. Chapters 3 and 4.3). Some strengthened legislative protections for lawyers 
have been established, but many of these have been open to abuse by the PSB, Procuratorate and 
even the judiciary/judges (Chapter 4.3.2). More legislative protections should be established to 
protect lawyers and ensure that they can take on cases without such fears and have ready, 
unimpeded access to all places of detention; relevant oversight should established to ensure that 
these protections are implemented in practice (recommendation (iii)). Training and awareness-
raising for lawyers about these protections – and also of reminders of the definitional parameters 
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of torture and ill-treatment (see above) – would be crucial first steps to empowering lawyers to 
follow-through all allegations received.  
Both (a) and (b) above are needed as crucial first steps towards better protection of detainees and 
could be mostly achieved in China’s current political and institutional environment.  These do not 
fall naturally within the prioritised order of a more typical approach to prevention (i.e. primarily 
focussing on compliance with technical measures such as safeguards and detention practice) (see 
above)); but they are a necessary starting premise in the case of China. They are, however, only 
(insufficient) first steps. China ultimately needs bodies to perform oversight of prevention 
measures that are fully independent from the government to have a chance at being sustainably 
effective.  
Prospect of the long-term sustainability of prevention efforts in China: what is required 
This research suggests that for torture prevention to be truly and sustainably effective all 
prevention measures will need ultimate oversight from bodies that are independent and 
autonomous, able to function away from political co-ordination or interference. Moreover, to 
create a solid foundation for prevention measures to embed successfully, China needs a properly 
functioning and robust judiciary capable of ruling on and enforcing all torture and ill-treatment 
cases without bias or interference (Recommendation (iii)). The judiciary needs to be one that can 
weigh cases without co-ordination or interference from the central-level CCP; one that is 
properly resourced, remunerated and empowered; one with an independent selection procedure 
for judges; one with judges who can push back on local or central interference, if required, and 
do not suffer consequences for this; one where lawyers and prosecuting procurators can fulfil 
their respective professional commitments without fear of professional or personal reprisals, 
intimidation or consequences; one where lawyers are not hindered from fully representing clients 
and potential victims in court, either by procedural rules or in practice; one where judicial 
requests for further evidence or material, and their sentences, are abided by and enforced; and 
one that can confer sentences that are commensurate with the crime of torture, no matter what 






loopholes and exceptions to justice currently seen in China start to be closed; and deterrence to 
abuse begin, through the observation of proper due process and the existence of severe 
consequences for torture. The need for a truly free and independent judiciary is a preventive 
measure that goes to the heart of the prevention obligation under UN CAT 2(1).1185 It both 
remains an obligation for China as a UNCAT ratified state and is intrinsically linked to the 
foundational precept of the rule of law.1186 It is also a preventive measure that falls short in China 
currently. It is a measure that should be addressed first, as a matter of priority for China, to 
enable any tailored approach to prevention to work and to enable all nascent prevention measures 
to have a chance to operate successfully in the long-term.  
Nevertheless, China would need to reform the very fabric of the One-Party system in China to 
ensure that the fundamental tenets of the rule of law are fully reflected in its structures, and 
especially in its judiciary. It is possible. China has a long history of adaptation to ensure that the 
Party continues to be relevant for the Chinese people. This is best illustrated in its own brand of 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Not only has it succeeded in ensuring that the Party 
remains relevant, but has also consolidated the Party’s power. It is also possible to reform and to 
ensure that all bodies, including the Party, are ultimately accountable to the law – and that the 
legal system itself functions independently and properly. This is a prerequisite for truly 
sustainable and effective prevention; it is not purely a facet of a ‘Western democracy’ (as 
perceived by China (Chapter 2.2)), albeit linked in many respects (Chapters 1.3.3 and 4). China 
could, and arguably should, undertake wholesale reform of all relevant institutions to ensure that 
all bodies - including the Party - are ultimately accountable to the law. Indeed, this would sit 
within China’s own expressed prioritised governance objective of ‘rule according to the law’ 
(Chapter 2.2).   
In many of the recommendations outlined above, the first step of the measure can be achieved, 
often through legislative change, and can constitute some good initial steps towards establishing 
and improving China’s approach to prevention, accompanied by awareness raising and some 
                                                     
1185  See Thesis Chapter 1. 






form of external oversight. In China’s case, the establishment of even a few prevention measures 
would be a significant step forward and the start of better protection for many of China’s 
detainees. Nevertheless, completely independent oversight bodies (fully transparent, accountable, 
autonomous and independent bodies – free from government co-ordination or interference) and a 
strong, impartial and robust judiciary are foundational elements for effective on-going torture 
prevention, and are of crucial importance to ensuring the proper and sustainable implementation 
of prevention measures. Deep-seated institutional reform and change at the political and Party 
level will be needed to achieve this. In the current political climate, this remains unlikely. Such 
holistic change is, however, a pre-requisite for China to protect all of its detainees from torture or 
other ill-treatment effectively and sustainably, pursuant to its international obligations. Without 
this, China’s torture prevention efforts will remain on shaky foundations. On current trajectory, 









D. Broader implications 
This study on China offers scope for some wider lessons that could be relevant to the efforts in 
torture prevention of other states. One salient lesson is the need for as broad an approach as 
possible to torture prevention in countries facing systemic and resilient practices of torture. This 
is to enable the right environment for torture prevention measures to be able to operate and embed 
successfully. Linked with this is a requirement for a governance model that enables, rather than 
hinders, the different elements of rule of law to function properly and independently, creating the 
essential checks and balances on each other, without loopholes or exceptions. This is an essential 
pre-condition for torture prevention to be effective and sustainable. This also implies that parallel 
justice systems (such as the punitive administrative and Party justice processes in China) should 
be addressed so that they do not sit alongside or, in the case of the CCP, above the law, providing 
an alternative less regulated, less protected sphere. 
This analysis on China also shows a clear need for a wider and more tailored approach for 
countries with embedded systemic torture practices and for those that repeatedly ignore or reject 
recommendations for change, in addition to the standard application of more traditional technical 
measures of torture prevention (i.e., ensuring the prohibition of torture and that technical legal 
safeguards are robust and operational in law and practice). Deep-seated structural and institutional 
reform can have a tangible and positive effect in countries that suffer from resilient torture 
practices and impunity issues. One example, examined in Chapter 1, is the former Soviet republic 
of Georgia, which has a similar legacy of a Soviet-inspired justice system to that of China 
(including the punitive administrative justice process (PAD)). Georgia underwent far-reaching 
institutional reform after it acknowledged that it had embedded practices of police torture, 
corruption and impunity problems. Thereafter, IHRL mechanisms and scholars started to see the 
positive effects of these reforms in the reduction of incidences of torture and a decrease in the 






reforms to strengthen the overall criminal justice system, improve investigation methodologies, 
curb cultures of impunity from developing, promote detention practice and target institutional 
sub-cultures can help to create the right environment for the torture prohibition and legal 
preventive safeguards to be able to operate meaningfully. 
The cumulative effect of all the elements examined in the case of China can contribute to more 
effective and sustainable torture prevention efforts in other countries where torture or other ill-
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